It's Long Past the Time to Move Beyond Carriers for Sea Control

We may finally be getting a seapower debate about how to best control the seas rather than the stale and fruitless debate we've had for decades about how super carriers can achieve that mission. 

Oh. My. God:

Since World War II, the Navy’s principal means of seizing command of the seas has been the carrier group. However, the service’s warfighting concept of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is fundamentally predicated on a different set of capabilities and force packages. The Tri-Service Maritime strategy – Advantage at Sea – defines DMO as “an operations concept that leverages the principles of distribution, integration, and maneuver to mass overwhelming combat power and effects at the time and place of our choosing.”2 To effectively win a war against a peer competitor, the Navy should transition to the decentralization and distribution inherent in DMO by empowering the surface fleet to take the lead in prosecuting sea control.

Kudos, Commander LaVopa. This is preaching to the TDR choir! 

A quarter century ago the United States Naval Institute purchased an essay of mine urging the Navy to transition away from super carriers to DMO. We were embarking on the new Ford-class super carrier program and it seemed a good time to change course. 

Carriers were platform-centric weapons while DMO was then called network-centric warfare. But the USNI never published my essay. I was so new to writing that I didn't know I should have been bugging them politely inquiring about the status. Anyway, I requested the rights back and they agreed. So I posted it here:

The end of the Cold War presents the United States with the opportunity and obligation to re-evaluate both strategy and forces. The debate over what the post-Cold War world means for American security and foreign policy has been vigorous. So too has the debate over the potential of the developing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Adopting and implementing the naval application of the RMA, network-centric warfare (NCW), is a "fundamental shift from what we call platform-centric warfare[.]" Both the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Defense Panel (NDP) final report of 1997 endorsed NCW as the proper path for the Navy. Victory in warfare dominated by networks will in large measure depend on making strategic choices that fit with the new and changing system. After over forty years of optimizing our naval forces to fight the Soviets in a global war, taking a fresh look at the Navy is a daunting task.

The question of whether large aircraft carriers deserve to be the center of our future naval strategy is a fundamental question that has not been adequately explored. Network-centric warfare signals the beginning of the end for the United States Navy's large aircraft carriers. They will lose their value as an instrument of forward presence and become valuable targets that, if struck, will encourage an enemy at the outset of war by apparently demonstrating that American technological prowess can be nullified and beaten. In the long run, large aircraft carriers will add little to most offensive missions and will absorb scarce resources and assets simply evading attack rather than striking the enemy and contributing to victory.

As I've droned on about for years in returning to my argument again and again, we've never had a good seapower debate over the role of the carrier. As I wrote in the post introduction to the essay, each side seems to argue about different roles:

Suffice it to say that the problem of arguing the merits of power projection apples versus sea control oranges is continued to the detriment of a real seapower debate.

I think we're arguing the wrong question if this is what we are learning from the Red Sea Regatta flexing its muscles and grunting at the Houthi while failing to wage a campaign to crush their anti-ship capabilities:

Ike’s latest extended cruise and its replacement once again raises questions about the finite carrier fleet’s ability to respond to a seemingly relentless series of global events that require the uniquely American naval presence of a flattop.

The issue shouldn't be about adding carriers to meet the need for naval power in response to global events. The question should be how do we meet the need with seapower. The RAND analyst, while not dunking on the carrier, correctly says:

Martin said the service could reevaluate its force structure and identify ways to meet requirements that carriers provide through alternative means.

And so here we are with an argument about embracing the logic of network-centric operations--which is a term of art numerous iterations out of style, but the same concept. Which may help us meet requirements through alternative means that carriers are currently intended to achieve.

Huzzah. 

Here's a CRS report on DMO, which is amazingly still the latest term of art.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

TDR Turns 22!

That's right, I've been a solo blogger now for twenty-two years. What was I thinking?

What can I say? It seemed like a good idea back in 2022. James Lileks inspired me. The media sucked and clearly didn't understand military matters. I could help, I thought! I'd say nothing changed, but the media got worse. I like to think I got better.

I miss the Golden Age of blogging that social media killed. Those were the days of Instalanches and cites in traditional media. Hell, The New York Times--of all places--would note TDR posts that linked one of their articles. And double Hell, I once got an email from a Marine officer in Anbar province who appreciated that I got the Marine role in the "surge" offensive right. In triple Hell territory, in the first two years of the Obama administration, someone in the Office of the White House--I'm sure in some sub-basement office across town--read me regularly. Didn't do any apparent good. But at least it wasn't for the purpose of compiling a permanent record!

Although that might explain the series of unpleasant border encounters I had with our people on the US-Canada border.

But I digress.

Anyway, it remains fun for me. Or at least satisfying to some degree. And useful as research for writing purposes. It keeps me off the streets, at least. Thanks for reading!

But I will try that Substack thing with The Dignified Rant: Evolved. We'll see how it goes.

Oh, I suppose I should highlight a post from the last year of blogging. Try "Proportionality in the Use of Force in War."

I'll keep writing here, of course. It would be a shame to break the streak at this point.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

If Somebody Denies the "Pivot" One More Time I'm Turning This Blog Around and Going Home

America is absolutely pivoting its military to Asia. But that doesn't mean Europe and the Middle East aren't in need of our military might, too.

This is just plain wrong:

Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine demonstrate in their insightful new book, Lost Decade, [that] the United States has repeatedly failed to achieve its promised shift [to Asia and the Pacific]. The efforts of successive administrations to complete the pivot, they write, have “foundered on the shoals of execution.” The United States has continued to allocate more military resources and pay more attention to the Middle East and Europe.  

Insightful? Hardly. They're foundering on the shoals of reality.

Since the Cold War ended, American military strength in Europe has been slashed. Even additional forces sent since Russia invaded Ukraine have barely dented that dramatic decline.

And American force levels in the Middle East are a fraction of what they were during the height of the war on Islamist terrorists. Hell, I'm suffering from whiplash after pondering the claim that we've abandoned the Middle East.

Even deployments to help Israel fend off the Iran-led war on Israel have not dented that decline. Hell, we pivoted away from the Middle East so thoroughly that we screwed the pooch in Afghanistan and needlessly lost that front in the war on terror.

Don't get me started on Africa, where sending Austin significantly increased our footprint. 

The problem is that people claiming that we have not pivoted to Asia do not account for several factors. 

First, our military has been slashed deeply for a "peace dividend." Remember the Ten Year Medium Term Rule that justified cutting military power? That also gutted our defense industrial base, as the Russian invasion of Ukraine has dramatically exposed.

So the pivot-blind don't count that America has basically kept its force levels in Asia and the Pacific intact even as overall military forces were cut since the end of the Cold War.

Nor do such critics account for the fact that America has allocated its best quality assets to Asia and the Pacific. Like this:

Fleets of new and updated fighter jets will be placed at U.S. military bases in Japan, a notable defense development and financial investment in the Pacific as tensions continue to rise with China.

Nor do they see that our allies and friends in Asia are increasing their military capabilities to oppose China, Russia, and/or North Korea. 

And in some cases, the call for a pivot is simply a tactic to hide an urge to never confront the enemies we have now with a facade of resolve to face the nebulous more important enemy of tomorrow.

First I had to grind my teeth that people ignored our gradual shift to the Pacific since after the Cold War to praise Obama's pivot announcement as the greatest strategic utterance since Clausewitz. When it was minor except rhetorically and really about covering his retreat from the Middle East.

But I digress. Sort of.

FFS. Enemies are waging war on the West in Europe and the Middle East right now. But we're supposed to pretend this isn't a threat and reduce our forces and actions even more than we have in those regions?

FFS 2.0, just where do we put all the forces we're supposed to cram into the western Pacific without tempting a Chinese first strike to exploit that target-rich environment?

A decade hasn't been lost failing to pivot. People have just lost their friggin' minds. Again.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

Iran is Our Enemy

Iran under mullah rule has been our enemy since their "students" stormed our embassy in Tehran and held Americans hostage for months on end. Too many want to pretend this isn't so.

Iran is our enemy and we pretend their jihadi rulers are just a friend we haven't made:

Today the Revolutionary Regime virtually controls Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza, through its proxies. A reemergence of the Persian Empire.

All of this was aided by a U.S. policy of denial, if not accommodation, which has precipitated the success of political Islam, particularly of the Iranian form. Iran’s destructive agenda has emboldened and enabled other strains of Islamism to flourish. In 2024, the United States has not changed much—whether myopic calls for pivoting to the Indo-Pacific, non-enforcement of sanctions against the Iranian regime, or a refusal to enable Israel—the first in the fight, and always in the fight—to finish the job with Hamas. This, even as Hamas holds Americans hostage and Hezbollah synchronizing its efforts in the north.

Coupled with other current policy failures and gaps, the lights are once again blinking red. Indeed, it is no wonder that several ISIS-linked individuals were apprehended trying to enter the United States illegally through the southern border; the only surprise is why it took this long.

Yeah, I'm worried about the Sunni jihadis.

And yeah, we need to end our bizarre policy that sees Iran as a source of stability and instead cut that Gordian Knot that perpetuates so many of our problems. 

And stop trying to prevent Israel from defeating our common enemy.

Maybe then the war on terror will decline to a time of global troubles. 

Have a super sparkly day.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NATO is Not a Threat to Russia

NATO is not a threat to Russia. Don't believe Putin's propaganda.

Don't believe Russian propaganda:

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s central argument has always been that NATO enlargement poses a grave security threat to the Russian Federation. However, his own actions convincingly demonstrate that he doesn’t actually believe this himself. ...

While NATO represents no plausible threat to Russian national security, it does create substantial obstacles for Russian imperialism.

In other words, NATO prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors.

... [Putin] has repeatedly claimed to be returning “historically Russian lands” and has compared his invasion to the eighteenth-century imperial conquests of Czar Peter the Great.

It’s no surprise to learn, then, that on the first day of the invasion, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reportedly quipped that Putin has only three advisors, “Ivan the Terrible. Peter the Great. And Catherine the Great.”

Russia invaded Ukraine because it feared it was running out of time to easily conquer Ukraine. Either Ukraine would become more Western state with too much economic strength or it would join NATO and Russia would risk general war to re-conquer Ukraine.

NATO is a defensive alliance that relies on member states voluntarily choosing to fight. This is in contrast to the Warsaw Pact "alliance" that was nothing more than a propaganda veneer over what were vassal ground forces integrated into the Soviet army. NATO never posed a threat to invade Russia's eastern European vassal states.

After NATO won the Cold War, NATO "expansion" consisted of former vassals eagerly applying for membership to protect themselves from renewed Russian imperialism. And even as NATO expanded back into contact with the Russian imperial border, NATO member states slashed their military strength. America slashed its forces in Europe, even withdrawing all of its tanks at one point. 

NATO lacked the plans or logistics capability for--or interest in--invading Russia.

And even now, after Sweden and Finland joined NATO, pushed by Russia's open invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has moved troops from the Finnish border to commit to Ukraine.

So why does Russia screech about NATO so much? In my view, it is because Russia needed to conceal its appeasement of China by loudly proclaiming a threat from a weak NATO that frankly--and insultingly from Russia's point of view--didn't even think much about Russia, let alone plan to invade it.

Perhaps over time Russians began to believe their own BS. Although I think Russia knew, and expected a short and glorious war to burnish Russian military credibility enough for Russia to pivot to face China before the non-aggression pact expired and allow Russia to deter China from erasing the stain of Russia's conquest of Chinese territory in the "century of humiliation."

But Russia has provoked NATO into rearming and making plans for fighting Russia. And Russia has only given China reason to see opportunity at Russia's expense because Putin wrecked rather than burnished the reputation of the Russian military.

#WhyRussiaCan'tHaveNiceThings

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

The Winter War of 2022 Seeks a Main Effort

If Ukraine is to survive, it must reverse the Russian ability to take terrain and rebuild to take more terrain. Russia went big in 2014 and 2015; and then again in 2022 to now. If Russia is allowed to keep all or most of what is has taken since 2022, Russia will rearm, perhaps learn from their errors, and come back in a matter of years. Where can Ukraine attack on a large scale with hope of success?

Russia continues to grind forward, with alternating blows better coordinated than in the past, as I noted in last week's post on the war.

I continue to view the Kherson front as potentially the most promising location for a successful Ukrainian offensive. Yes, the Dnipro River is a major obstacle. But Russian logistics are not as robust that far west. At least until Russia completes a railroad through occupied Ukrainian territory north of the Sea o Azov.

And like the Ardennes in 1940 and 1944, I don't believe the Dnipro is impassable. It is impassable if adequately defended. Terrain is an obstacle--not a thinking enemy.

As I've written, Ukraine needs to do a lot to overcome that obstacle.

But this is a good sign:

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struggle to conduct effective counterbattery fire in the Kherson direction because the east bank’s elevation is lower than that of the west (right) bank and Ukrainian artillery has longer ranges than Russian artillery, making it difficult for Russian forces to spot and hit Ukrainian artillery systems. The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces in the Kherson direction lack sufficient artillery shells for counterbattery fire.

If continued, Russian forces might be pushed back from the river, giving Ukraine opportunities to cross in force with small vessels, ferries, and helicopters. 

Combined with attacks on Crimean air defenses and logistics, Ukraine may be able to put an air defense--Ukraine is getting more air defense systems--and artillery shield across the river; and then bridge the gap.

If Ukraine can put heavy forces across the river, they might be able to take some serious ground.

And with Russia's Black Sea fleet pushed to the east, Ukraine may be able to land companies and battalions on the Black Sea coast to unhinge river-based defense lines. 

Ukraine may also be able to send small forces across the shrunken Kakhovka Reservoir to threaten the northern flank of the Kherson front.

Ukrainian partisans and special forces might increase their actions behind the front.

And Ukrainian forces on the southern Zaporizhzhia front may be able to pin the Russians to keep them from shifting west; and even exploit any weakness or panic that might develop if the Ukrainian Kherson front looks like it could roll up Russia's Surovikin Line defensive belt. 

A lot of conditional statements in this outline for victory, I know. But where else can Ukraine attack? 

The Kharkiv front goes into Russia and lets Russia use conscripts to defend Russia while portraying Holy Mother Russia as being invaded.

The Donbas front attacks into Russian logistic strength and fortifications.

The Zaporizhzhia front is formidable as the failed Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive showed.

And opening up a new front by attacking Belarus which isn't an active combatant would be insane. 

When nothing else makes sense, the Kherson front is the only one left. That's what the Germans concluded in 1940 and 1944, and they were able to take advance despite the terrain.

Worse for Ukraine, if Ukraine doesn't attack you can see what Putin wants to do by declining all negotiating pleas from the West:

Russian President Vladimir Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a "final" end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.

By appearing confident, he hopes the West will offer concessions to Russia and compel Ukraine to submit to them. At worst for Russia, Putin gets a ceasefire to reload for the next war. At best it demoralizes Ukraine to the point of causing it to collapse and let Russia occupy Ukraine during this war.

Ukraine needs to win on the Kherson front. Unless Ukraine's hope for victory rests on events off the battlefield inside Russia. But a lot more conditional statements might be necessary for that near-miraculous hope to work out well for Ukraine.

UPDATE: But don't, apparently expect anything in 2024:

Western and US officials reportedly assess that Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defensive for the next six months and will not be able to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive operation until 2025.

Sigh. We arm Ukraine too slowly. I hope our senior leaders have a damn clue about what they are orchestrating.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

Weekend Data Dump

Buh bye: "The pier built by the U.S. military to bring aid to Gaza has been removed due to weather to protect it, and the U.S. is considering not reinstalling it unless the aid begins flowing out into the population again, U.S. officials said Friday."

Maybe Russia needs a buffer zone inside Ukraine to protect Russians from their own air force: "The powerful glide-bombs that Russia has used to such great effect to pound Ukrainian cities into rubble have also been falling on its own territory, an internal Russian document has revealed."

Crap: "A U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter and a KC-46 Pegasus tanker were involved in an aerial refueling incident off the coast of the Netherlands on June 27, service officials told Air & Space Forces Magazine." But it's hard to do and that's why we practice.

Good: "Initial construction is beginning on a new fleet of warships for the Royal Canadian Navy, with the vessels expected to be operational by 2035, service and government officials said." The last ships will arrive in 2050. Fingers crossed.

Are Russia's nuclear red lines serious? "As the famed military and nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie explained, countries usually do not usually bluff when they make threats." But nuclear bluster for conventional threats are orders of magnitude greater. The Russians have a history of empty nuclear bluffs. 

Huh: "Multiple U.S. military bases in Europe are under a heightened state of alert for a terrorist attack against U.S. military personnel or facilities, multiple media outlets reported Sunday." Odd. Terrorists usually like to slaughter civilians. Just who is the terrorist threat?

I'm against using our SSBNs to visibly send messages. Their message should be "We have lots of nuclear warheads and you don't know where we are." 

Unless has nukes, this is not that credible: "Iran has threatened an 'obliterating war' if Israel launches a full-scale attack in Lebanon[.]" Iran doesn't already have nukes, right?

Is there much to celebrate on NATO's 75th anniversary? Seriously? When NATO formed, the Red Army sat on the Elbe River in the middle of Germany. Western Europe was exhausted. Now, Russia is bleeding out in the Donbas and NATO is rearming with new members committed to stopping Russia. Celebrate!

Does Ecuador need a Western (non-military) "intervention" to help it--by strengthening intelligence institutions, reforming the judicial system, addressing money laundering, and enhancing prison infrastructure--restore institutions to battle organized crime?

Cuban commies gotta commie: "Images captured from space show the growth of Cuba’s electronic eavesdropping stations that are believed to be linked to China, including new construction at a previously unreported site about 70 miles from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, according to a new report."

Hell no, Putin won't go: "Donald Trump has said repeatedly he could settle the war between Russia and Ukraine in one day if he’s elected president again. Russia’s United Nations ambassador says he can’t." The key is Trump says he'll end the war--not lose it. If Russia won't end it, Ukraine has to win it.

But not the murderers and rapists Russia sent to kill: "Ukraine is expanding the draft to cope with acute battlefield shortages more than two years into fighting against Russia’s full-scale invasion. And its recruiting efforts have turned, for the first time, to the country’s prison population."

White hull line in the sea: "The Coast Guard is slated to continue solidifying its Pacific footprint with new funds from Congress as the service plays an increasingly prominent role in Washington’s regional strategy."

Still playing defense: "U.S. Central Command reported U.S. forces in the Red Sea in a “self-defense engagement” destroyed three Houthi unmanned surface vehicles Sunday." America's Red Sea production of Resolve Theater will end in tragedy for the Navy if only the Houthi are trying to win.

Kick out the jams: "In Ukraine, Russia took the lead in developing electronic jamming technology and Ukraine, the United States and its NATO allies are hustling to catch up." 

I sure hope Nigerians aren't Islamophobic: "In northeast Borno States female Boko Haram suicide bombers, set off their explosives at a wedding and then a funeral, leaving 32 dead and 42 wounded." This is more rare now. Sadly tribal violence is making up for the decline in Islamist violence.

Macron is free to destroy his own career, but: "Is France heading to a civil war? Yes — if one is to believe the far-left activists, who keep saying that 'they will not allow the far right to rule,' even if they win the coming general election democratically." Their Left will destroy notre liberté to save it. Via Instapundit.

Who blinked? "China and the Philippines held a crucial meeting Tuesday to try to ease escalating tensions following their worst confrontation in the disputed South China Sea that sparked fears of a wider conflict that could involve Manila’s ally the United States."

Oh? "A new report from the Center for New American Security calls for push for a low-cost drones that would provide an autonomous, lethal shield against an amphibious invasion of Taiwan[.]" Stop looking for cheap silver bullets. Never trust the Center for No American Security. But sure, they coined a scary name.

One could do some damage. But ultimately the Kilo sub would lead a short but exciting life: "Russian submarines twice conducted unprecedented missions in the Irish Sea after Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, it has emerged." 

Is this instead of terrestrial war or in addition to that? "A new RAND report emphasizes China’s rising risk tolerance and growing strategic maneuvers in space, an aggressive push forged to challenge US dominance in the domain." That's the difference between avoiding war and winning war. Via Instapundit.

Interesting: "China’s leaders view the US as a dominant but declining power"; and America sees China as peaking and beginning a decline. I guess the risk of war due to a Thucydides Trap power transition is now zero. I've doubted the relevance of that trap for America and China.

Is Canada stepping up to defend the Arctic and Europe?

Escalation: "Taiwan said the Chinese coast guard boarded a Taiwanese fishing boat Tuesday before steering it to a port in mainland China, and demanded that Beijing release the vessel." Taiwan blinked.

NATO established a quick reaction force, the Allied Response Force, in Italy: "'The ARF can deliver forces, fires and effects within 10 days to either strengthen deterrence or provide strategic dilemma to adversaries,' SHAPE said." Let's hope its bite is worse than its bark.

Good: "Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria have activated a naval task force dedicated to countering mine warfare in the Black Sea."

Reflections on the battle at Wanat by soldiers involved: "On Monday, two paratroopers who fought in the July 13, 2008, battle shared their recollections as part of discussions designed to keep the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s history fresh for current 'sky soldiers.'"

Outlasting Russia: " NATO allies have agreed to fund military aid for Ukraine with 40 billion euros ($43.05 billion) next year, a Western European diplomat told Reuters on Wednesday, one week before the alliance's leaders are set to meet in Washington."

Hmmm: "Ukrainian officials said Monday that they thwarted an attempted coup, arresting individuals who had conspired to allegedly stage a riot in Kyiv." If Russia backed this, Russian confidence in their ability to sacrifice unlimited Russian troops to achieve victory might not be as solid as they portray.

Keeping Ukraine in the fight: "the U.S. will soon announce an additional $2.3 billion in security assistance for Ukraine, to include anti-tank weapons, interceptors and munitions for Patriot and other air defense systems."

And now for something completely different:
Nobody has done this, so please grant me clemency for what I hope is more clever than political.

Sigh: "All told, June was a hectic month for the sea service, which has not seen this much sustained combat since World War II." It seems like only the Houthi and their Iranian sponsors are trying to win.

Putin is NATO's best recruiter: "NATO continues to support Ukraine because that was what NATO was established in 1949 to do. The threat then was the aggressive Soviet Union, which never attacked. [Now Russia is] led by men who wanted to rebuild the Soviet empire and decided in 2021 to start with Ukraine."

The counter-battery duel in Ukraine. 

All your sea are belong to us: "China sailed its aircraft carrier CNS Shandong (17) into the South China Sea, as close as 230 miles from the Philippine main island of Luzon. Meanwhile, PLAN ships have been operating around Japan over the past few days, according to Japan Joint Staff Office releases."

Across the Atlantic, and through Norway and Sweden: "You’re going to have 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, a storied brigade, a storied division, fighting underneath the NATO banner underneath a Finnish land component." That was in the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercise.

Rim of the Pacific exercises wrap up with a SINKEX: "This year it will be an unusually substantial target: the former USS Tarawa, a full-size amphibious assault vessel." Huh. Are we worried our big ships are vulnerable (they are) or are we thinking about how to sink big PLAN ships?

Via Instapundit, the Marianas Islands: "There is a largely unknown U.S. territory that Chinese citizens can enter legally without a visa. China expert Cleo Paskal argues it’s an 'open backdoor into the United States' that the Chinese communist regime can exploit." My belief that we can't be that stupid is tested.

Did not expect that: "The frontline of the Russo-Ukrainian war now extends into Africa and the Middle East, where Ukrainian special forces have been hunting Russian forces to erode Moscow’s economic resources and influence." Should have.

Raping and slaughtering over a thousand Israelis will do that to Israeli opinion: "When it comes to the Palestinians, the survey found, almost everyone is a right-winger now." Well, not everyone. 

Turkey is a mediator? "Turkey has now intervened diplomatically - bringing Ethiopian and Somali delegates together for talks in its capital, Ankara." You'll recall the Ethiopia-Puntland port agreement. You may also recall Turkey's imperial ambitions in the region. Turkey's impartiality is suspect.

No! Way! "China is [replacing Russian influence by] building car plants and power stations in Ukbekistan and Kazakhstan, brokering surveillance software deals, and expanding its direct railway line into Kazakhstan, to further strengthen trade links." Is Putin having fun yet with his "partner" with no limits?

An additional American military aid package for Ukraine to provide additional air defense systems plus various ammunition and other equipment. So far no additional armored fighting vehicles are being provided. Is this because Ukrainian offensive operations aren't anticipated until 2025?

Sure, the claims are right: "With a single decision, Macron exposed himself as everything his political opponents have claimed he is—arrogant, aloof, and grossly naïve about what ordinary French want." But maybe Macron wants to fail upward to his dream job by showing he will fight the "right," no matter what.

European citizens may actually want their own countries to endure--reflecting their own countries' values. Shocking, no?

I think we're still at the first of the chance, coincidence, enemy action count: "An explosion at a defense weapons plant in Arkansas injured at least two people Wednesday and left another missing, the facility’s operators said." Tip to Instapundit.

Trying--and failing--to build a first-rate army.

It's China's best weapon: "Indians are mystified at the inability of India, the most populous nation in the world with over a billion people, as well as a current GDP of $3.7 trillion, to have adequate weapons for its military."

An admiral defends carriers. I think he does not distinguish enough between power projection and sea control. The idea that mobility makes carriers defensible is laughable. Carriers were found and sunk in World War II with Mark I eyeball surveillance. Carriers aren't the apex predator.

En garde: "Philippine forces will defend themselves with 'the same level of force' if they come under assault again from China’s coast guard in the disputed South China Sea, where Chinese personnel armed with machetes and spears injured Filipino navy personnel and damaged two of their boats [in June.]

Yeah: "Ukraine is addressing its manpower challenges and is forming several new brigades, but delayed and insufficient Western weapons deliveries will likely prevent Ukraine from equipping all these new brigades." And Ukraine needs more ammo, too.

There should be consequences: "Russia and China are working together to produce a version of Iran’s Shahed drone that could be used on the battlefields of Ukraine, European intelligence sources have said." Free fire zone in Russia, sanctions on China's economy, and treat mullah-run Iran like the enemy it is.

The Marine Commandant, discussing operating inside China's A2/AD envelope, counts on joint forces: "'You don’t want to fight alone' as the Marine had to do at Guadalcanal, Smith said." I respectfully contest that description. The Navy skedaddled sometimes, as I recounted in this LWP, but it was a joint fight.

Switching to European gauge railways would be self defense, too: "If its European aspirations hinge on [Ukraine's] ability to connect itself with its neighbors to the west, then the railway gauge difference will be a significant obstacle to this future." Are you paying attention Baltic States, with your Russian gauge?

Oh, hogwash. "American diversity is a national security asset[.]" Diversity is not inherently something that strengthens or weakens us. If it tribalizes us, it weakens America. If it provides perspective within an American melting pot, it strengthens us.

Huh: "A union that represents Michigan corrections officers asked Gov. Gretchen Whitmer Wednesday to deploy the National Guard to help understaffed prisons."

The Deep Mosque arranges for a new figurehead.

Good: "The CIA continues to aid Ukraine and HUR, the Ukrainian military intelligence agency by providing them with information the CIA has obtained on Russian operations as well as real-time video of Russian military operations in Ukraine." And what I assumed.

The Tories were crushed in Britain's snap election. As much as they deserved a thrashing, I wouldn't want to inflict Labour on my worst enemy. Lord, it's just the fever talking about reversing Brexit, right?

Is Russia developing an IFV based on the T-72? The idea makes sense to me.

A Europeanized NATO? "It is time for Europeans to approach defence much more strategically, invest in defence in the long term, and actively prepare to accept more responsibilities for the defence of Europe." All part of the EU plan. With less America it isn't NATO. That's bad for Europe, too. Why promote this?

We have a border open to jihadis, anti-Semites running amok, and citizen dissent suppressed. Screw DHS: "[Divisive rhetoric] leads to extreme political views, some of which gain footing among military and veteran communities, and increases the chance [of domestic violent extremism by such people]." 

Good: "Germany has delivered a third Patriot air-defence system to Ukraine, authorities said on Friday." 

Japan and South Korea sanction North Korea for supplying Russia's war machine. 

Against alert defenders, Ukraine's now-not-suicide USVs would still be suicide missions.

They will hold a net wall beneath them: "Russia plans to build a network of barrage balloons inspired by the First and Second World Wars to thwart Ukraine’s daring drone attacks[.]" I assume Ukraine will escort strike drones with incendiary suicide drones designed to ram a balloon to clear a corridor.

In isolation, this is BS: "Hamas is more than just a military, it is an ideology – and you cannot defeat a hateful ideology on the military front alone." We destroyed Nazism by crushing their military and prosecuting leaders. Only ineffective use of force recruits jihadis. That said, I have a next-day plan.

Adapting to counter-measures that disable precision munitions. I suppose self-maneuvering rockets and shells with cameras that go after programmed targets wouldn't need more than precision-ish aiming based on ISR that finds what is in a particular area. It's a measure-countermeasure race.

Welp, we're getting out of another country before an anniversary of 9/11: "The U.S. will remove all its forces and equipment from a small base in Niger this weekend and fewer than 500 remaining troops will leave a critical drone base in the West African country in August[.]"

If we help Israel crush Hamas they'd cower: "The State Department’s top intelligence official [warned the Gaza war] is bolstering recruitment among terrorist organizations and providing 'inspiration for lone actors' furious over the United States’ staunch support for Israel." Getting away with 10/7 inspires jihadis. 

Iraqi unemployment is high because of immigrant labor. Yet the economy expands. And Iran is losing influence in Iraq: "Few Iraqis want to emulate Iran and this now includes Iraqi members of pro-Iran militias." Iran's troubles grow at home both economically and politically.

Red alert: "NATO is depending more on locally developed weapons and munitions rather than obtaining them from the United States. The war in Ukraine has encouraged this trend because European nations now realize that they have a very real threat next door with Russia." Germany builds cruiser-size "frigates."

Putin's regime continues to "shield" Russians from what it considers "misinformation" and "disinformation": "Russian federal censor Rozkomnadzor announced on July 4 that it recently blocked Russians from accessing 25 mobile virtual private network (VPN) services." 

I will repeat that Gazans would stop dying and suffering if Hamas stopped using the people as human shields and simply surrendered. I refuse to care more about Gazans than Hamas does.

Tip to Instapundit: "Starting from 2022, Russia has been moving everything west, stripping the Far East naked. So, the Russian-Chinese border is getting effectively demilitarised, for the first time in >50 years[.]" When his war against Ukraine ends, will China let Putin remilitarize Russia's side of the border?

Big foot: "The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) said on Saturday that China's largest coastguard vessel has anchored in Manila's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, and is meant to intimidate its smaller Asian neighbour."

I'm kind of a big deal, you know: "The message to NATO from President Vladimir Putin was simple and stark: Don't go too far in providing military support for Ukraine, or you'll risk a conflict with Russia that could quickly turn nuclear." Will any of Russia's nukes explode?

How Strategery Gets Made

We have enough problems with our politicians. Could we please stop having political flag officers, too?

Keeping some American troops in Afghanistan would have kept NATO and allied troops there, too. And that help could have gotten the Afghan security forces through the danger zone of losing our more intense level of support. 

But no, we abandoned our allies and just left--losing the war and giving our enemies a win, with blowback ongoing in Ukraine as Putin assumed we'd retreat there, too; and blowback yet to be felt. How was it possible to choose defeat?

So, this is how we chose to lose the Afghanistan War?

Retired General Frank McKenzie writes in a new book, The Melting Point, that he briefed President Biden in February 2021 on four military options on Afghanistan: one that would keep about 2,500 U.S. forces in the country and maintain eight bases; one that would reduce U.S. force numbers to 1,800 and drawdown to three bases; one that took out all U.S. forces and kept the embassy in place, and one that pulled out all American forces and the U.S. embassy.

Biden picked the third option, which attempted to keep the embassy, American citizens and at-risk Afghans in the country.

“I felt that was the worst of all possible worlds to actually pick that particular approach,” McKenzie told VOA in an interview on Monday.

Ah, our civilian leadership chose that sweet spot of no American troops and plentiful American hostages waiting to be plucked. Bravo. Helluva Venn diagram, eh? I was very worried about our belated commitment of troops to a nearly indefensible airport perimeter as everything collapsed around our brilliantly executed skedaddle.

Why didn't McKenzie--the CENTCOM commander--go public with his conclusion that it was the worst possible option and accept the consequences? 

Why did he just go along like it was just one of our options to draw down without losing the war?

Why didn't he publicly resign and tell the American public that this was the worst of all possible worlds?

Instead, he wrote a book about how bad the decision was. Years later. Nice that he has his priorities. Documenting failure is more important than preventing failure.

This is what I've been talking about when I've written that our Afghanistan skedaddle debacle broke my confidence in our generals and admirals. Oh, not all--probably not even most--have many substitutes for victory. But as a group, the ones who rise to the top show we are clearly doing something wrong in educating our senior military leaders. 

Our political leaders are our fault--we vote for them. So there's no way CSI Kabul: This Time For Sure, will blame our senior political or military leadership for following the advice of the Fuck-Up Fairy.

But something needs to be done about our senior military leaders. We'll need political leadership willing to purge our military of our cocktail party-proficient flag officers whose junta-level of medals stretched across their chests reflect the approval of other cocktail-proficient flag officers through their climb up the officer ranks into the buttocks of approving civilian leadership.

If I sound bitter, it's only because I am. And worried. We seem to have neutered our senior officers in the post-Cold War holiday from history. And now that it's over we find we still have holiday generals still sluggish from the buffets and open bar.

But hey, good luck with that book tour.

UPDATE: Via Instapundit, an appropriate aside on business jargon infections at the Pentagon:

Was it really the system that produced our process - and not the system that selected our people - that needed to be looked at? Was it both problems, but we decided to attack the more comfortable of the two? [emphasis added]

We're doing something wrong.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

China Pounces

China may be making the best of Russia's struggling war against Ukraine backed by the West. Russia now has a two-front war. Russia should pray it doesn't get a third front. And Putin should pray Russians don't notice.

It begins: 

Following over two decades of negotiations, the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan ratified a trilateral agreement with China and Uzbekistan on the joint construction of the CKU railway, Russian language media outlet BigAsia.Ru reported on Wednesday. The deal was signed between the countries on June 6, and construction is expected to start in October. ...

The railway is expected to cut the route from China to Europe by 560 miles, shortening transit times for freight by an estimated eight days, and significantly, avoiding Russia and its Trans-Siberian Railway, the International Railway Journal (ICJ) reported.

What begins, you may ask:

Is Russia's military faceplant in Ukraine practically giving its former territory in Central Asia to China?

So if Russia-Chinese relations get tense, Russia can't threaten to cut China off from Europe overland.

What the heck, eh? China seemingly expected Putin to get a short and glorious war back in February 2022. Which would have made Putin insufferable and perhaps confident enough to cease appeasing China to safeguard its Far East conquests ripped from China in the 19th century.

But now Russia is just a sad compliant vassal desperate for China to help Russia sustain its war of aggression and desperate for China not to pounce on the wheezing Russia. For now, China will pounce on the corpse of the USSR.

What comes next? And what will China reap from that?

As Russians look at the wreckage of Putin's drive for glory, will Putin be strung up by his heels from a lamp post in Moscow before or after that sad end to Russia as an Asian power?

UPDATE: One day this may be about the Moon. But right now it is about Central Asia:

Kazakhstan has signed a memorandum on cooperation on the China-led ILRS and will also explore commercial use of each other’s spaceports. ...

A memorandum on cooperation as part of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) was one of the 30 signed documents, according to the Interfax news agency. 

Tip to Instapundit.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

Happy Birthday America

My Patriotism and love of my country do not depend on whether I like the government temporarily granted the honor and duty of leading America. I would hope that's everyone's view.

Anyway, enemies should not under-estimate us.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

Put Our Enemies at Risk

We need to put the fear of God and the United States military in the hearts of our enemies.

FFS: 

Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned Sunday that an Israeli invasion of Lebanon against Hezbollah could spark opposition from Iran, potentially putting U.S. troops in the region at risk.

I miss the days when our leaders caused concern in enemies rather than adopt a victim attitude. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

America's Ten-Year Rule Turns Fifteen

Have we decided we're in a potential pre-war period in time to overcome our long no-war theory of history?

Were the seeds of losing a naval arms race with China sown in the 1990s? 

Beijing has been indulging in an unprecedented "peacetime" naval buildup for 20 years, right out in the open. In his latest substack, milblogger CDR Salamander detailed the massive investments China has made since 2005 in its warship-building capacity.

Is the blame from the 1990s "when this country stopped being a serious nation"?

Sort of. In 1996 the Chinese found they couldn't even find our carriers sailing east of Taiwan, as I noted in this 2005 post about Chinese efforts to build the naval power needed to conquer Taiwan just 100 miles off their coast:

In 1996, the Chinese could not invade. Nor could they hold off the US Navy long enough even if they could have invaded. Indeed, the Chinese were horrified that they could not even locate our two carriers let alone target them during the 1996 missile crisis. (And we were horrified that we couldn't easily communicate with the Taiwanese, making it possible we were visibly backing the Taiwanese when they might have been preparing to strike without our knowledge. Hence our current hotline). And at some point in the future, the Chinese will have the ability to invade without a doubt given their trend lines. Some say a decade. Some say two. (I say sooner)

The Chinese reacted to that weakness. And how. But we were so far ahead that I place the blame in 2009 when America declared a Ten-Year Medium Term Rule for reduced defense capabilities that assumed no significant threat:

We've just instituted the Medium Term Rule on our defense spending. The problems that will flow from this plan won't show themselves in the near term. We can coast on our past progress in building the best military in the world. But have no doubt that our military strength will erode, and this means we are accepting risks in case we have to fight a conventional war in the medium term despite our assumption that we can still win such a war.

We won't cancel the Medium Term Rule until it's too late to do any good.

We keep hinting that we will end the Medium Term Rule. And we have spasms of defense activity for specific threats and capabilities. But the Navy sits on a pier and spins, going nowhere as it revolves around super carriers. That soaks up a lot of our shipbuilding capacity, no?

I'm seriously worried about the Navy's leadership that lacks a sense of urgency more than I'm worried about fleet size, as horrified as I am about our shipbuilding and shipyard repair capacity.

And don't get me started on reloading our ships' magazines to keep them in the fight and compensate for fewer numbers.

Still, the Navy doesn't fight alone any more than the PLAN does. We have naval power allies and China does not. I also hope our land-based air and missile power are well integrated into our sea control plan. Maybe that buys us time to build a bigger Navy.

I am an optimist, aren't I?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

The Winter War of 2022 Tests the Limits of Attrition

Russia is expanding its ground forces despite heavy losses that reduce quality. And is still getting equipment--albeit older stuff--to those troops. But even if on paper Russia can "afford" to lose this amount as long as it takes to wear out Ukraine and its Western suppliers, humans are not cogs in a Putin war machine.

Russia is banking on its ability to endure losses to break Ukraine or at least to break the West's willingness to support Ukraine:

Putin has articulated a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. The Russian military command is currently prioritizing consistent offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains over conducting a large-scale discrete offensive operation that aims to make operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver.

I heard an analyst I respect say that Russia is doing fine on manpower--leadership and equipment are different matters--because it invaded Ukraine with fewer than 200,000 troops and now has 500,000 committed to the war. So Putin can allegedly continue feeding men into meat grinder offensives indefinitely.

Russia had 910,000 ground forces in their military and paramilitary branches before the war (per my The Military Balance 2018). On paper. Isn't a lot of the increase of troops committed to Ukraine due to stripping other areas of troops? 

That's a lot of lost troops to make up for: 

Russian mortality statistics show that the number of Russian troops killed since the all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 likely exceed 71,000, according to a new report.

Apparently that doesn't include 2024 losses. But it is also based on statistics rather than counting actual verified dead soldiers. Add in wounded who won't return to combat. And deserters and prisoners. And consider the losses in that big number that took out trained unit leaders. Yet Russia has lost "a lot."

During the Iraq War, critics of the war looked at America losing a thousand troops KIA per year as something that was "breaking" the U.S. Army. Yet people look at Russia losses each week that approach America's level as something the much smaller Russia can of course endure for as long as it takes to defeat Ukraine.

Is that really true?

As I noted early on, we can't have a mechanical rule that says because Russia has X times the number of people that Ukraine has that it can lose X times as many troops in combat without suffering worse effects than Ukraine:

[Does] Russia's 3:1 advantage in population and vastly greater GDP mean Russia has the endurance?

On people, you'd think so. But the Iran-Iraq War suggests otherwise. Iran had three times the population while Iraq had the money to build material superiority. Iran had far higher willingness to fight and die. But after years of relentless Iranian offensives, during which Iran lost twice as many troops as Iraq, Iran's morale broke. It was not so simple to say Iran could suffer 3 times the casualties. Indeed, one would have thought superior Iranian fanaticism would make the casualty endurance higher than 3:1. But that did not happen.

Can that experience apply to this war? 

Like Iran, Russia has a 3:1 advantage in population. But Russian morale as a conqueror, that is clearly not liberating people from Nazis, is not superior. This could break Russia before Ukraine.

Iranians lost about twice as many troops as Iraq during their long war. Iran ultimately broke in that war as its troops lost the will to endure frontal assaults that only clawed away at Iraqi-held territory.

Can Russians really match the willingness to die for years on end that Iranians hopped up on revolution and religion couldn't muster? Ukrainians could break, too. But that's now how I'd bet right now.

War is a matter of humans fighting other humans--not equations that coldly calculate loss tolerance as if dead sons and husbands are just inputs. 

UPDATE (Monday): Big, if true:

Russians are finally losing their appetite for a quick death in Ukraine.

But I want it to be true so I'll hold off on accepting this as fact. 

UPDATE (Tuesday) Oof: 

Video emerged on social media showing a missile attack on the Ukraine’s Mirgorod Air Base in Poltava Oblast on Monday. The base, home to Ukraine’s 831st Tactical Aviation Brigade, is located in central Ukraine, about 100 miles southwest of the border. The attack and loss of aircraft has been confirmed by the Ukrainian Air Force.

Russia really wants to be able to destroy F-16s when Ukraine gets them. 

UPDATE (Tuesday): Exactly:

If Ukraine and its Western supporters lose resolve, Europe may face a scenario where Russia subjugates the rest of Ukraine, installs a puppet regime, and gradually integrates most or all of the country into a new Russian empire.

Russia will bleed Ukraine dry to make up for its losses taking Ukraine. 

But don't look for a silver lining:

In the long term, it would be a Pyrrhic victory for Moscow. The repressive empire would struggle to digest its occupied lands, subdue a restive population, and bear the burden of very high military expenditures in a new era of confrontation. 

Yeah, the long term could be a long time away, during which Russia can do more damage to the West trying to get a cheaper victory to add resources to prevent or delay that long term problem.

And while I do think Putin is putting Russia on the road to further splintering as China picks up Far East pieces, that gives me little comfort.

Just defeat Russia now. 

I went from being hammered by the Left as a so-called war monger for wanting to defeat the Soviet Union; and now by the Right for wanting to defeat Russia. This isn't about me, obviously. But it is frustrating. 

UPDATE (Wednesday): Russia is getting better at unified action across many fronts:

The interplay between ongoing Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka directions indicates that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to create operational opportunities for advances in either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka areas. Russian preparations that can support multiple future branch plans suggest a more developed level of operational planning and foresight than the Russian command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war since early 2022. The ability of this operational planning to come to fruition, however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level capabilities of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas.

But tactical implementation remains costly.

UPDATE (Thursday): Russia is determined to advance through the key Chasiv Yar:

Ukraine’s army has retreated from a neighborhood in the outskirts of Chasiv Yar, a strategically important town in the eastern Donetsk region that has been reduced to rubble under a monthslong Russian assault, a military spokesperson said Thursday.

I will ask what I've asked before. Why doesn't Ukraine mine a position that Russia is grinding through in order to set up a really big explosion under their advancing troops? 

UPDATE (Friday): Is this really a sign of Putin's confidence in ultimate victory?

Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement, instead demanding Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a precondition for any ceasefire agreement. Putin is thus demanding that Ukraine effectively surrender in advance of any ceasefire.

Or is it a sign that heavy casualties, equipment losses, and economic harm are forcing Putin to raise his objectives to reflect the losses already suffered? It might be hard for Putin to survive even a ceasefire after wrecking his ground forces and the Black Sea Fleet for a mere land bridge to Crimea.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.