Plugging Drones into NATO Fleets

Drones are one more weapon to plug into fleet intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities rather than a replacement for the more expensive and capable weapons that rely on the ISR.

Absolutely exploit the quality of cheapness that many air and sea drones provide fleets:

NATO is working to integrate emerging technologies like uncrewed surface vehicles and fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles into crisis planning through its latest major exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas.  

My issue has always been that the expensive ISR capabilities that NATO provides make Ukraine's air, surface, and undersea drones effective in the Black Sea. And the drones seen so dreamy because Ukraine has to rely on such cheap weapons rather than expensive Western weapons to fight the Russian navy there.

Cheap drones have mass going for them. But they can't replace the capabilities of the expensive weapons. Now what about using drones for point defense?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article.

A Larger Military Uses Up Inadequate Ammunition Faster

Right now, expanding America's defense industrial base is a critical need. 

It is prudent to pay attention to this issue:

Congress has expressed interest in the status of the U.S. military’s inventories of munitions (e.g., ammunition, bombs, missiles, torpedoes, anti-aircraft weapons, missile interceptors). Since the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran on February 28, 2026, some Members of Congress have sought information on the stockpiles and availability of U.S. weapons from the Department of Defense (DOD, which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025). Some Members have raised concerns about potential shortfalls in munitions, while other Members have said munitions are not an immediate concern. President Donald J. Trump has said U.S. munitions are “virtually unlimited.” DOD officials have said sufficient munitions are available, while maintaining that the status of U.S. stocks is considered “an operational security matter.” In these comments, officials have not differentiated between stocks of air-to-ground and air-to-air munitions versus missiles and missile interceptors. 

If we had the ability to supply multiple wars at once, we would not only have sufficient to wage a war with a margin of error, but we'd still be adding to our war reserve stockpiles while also helping allies.

Don't you dare warn me about the military-industrial complex. We would in fact again be the Arsenal of Democracy. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

The Brown Skies of the Air Littoral

I have often raised a skeptical hand when drone purists throw panties at cheap, plentiful First Person View (FPV) drones for recon and strike. Yet I'm no denier, having raised the alarm back in 2018 about the small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) threat to forward American combat units at the tip of the spear. I'm just asking for a little restraint on, ah ... enthusiasm ... for the new weapons.

In Army magazine I called for fighter drones to cover the forward Army ground units in contact with the enemy in a new zone of vulnerability outside of traditional weapons systems. I recognized that Air Force air supremacy would have no effect on that drone threat. I suggested an adaptation of the Navy categorization of the blue, green, and brown waters (at sea, closer to shores, and so close that dirt colors it at the shore and in rivers):

The Army should adapt the Navy continuum to the air domain to better improve air defense for Army ground troops in light of the problems the Air Force has in moving away from the blue skies where air supremacy has been fought for traditionally. The Air Force could lose the black skies of space to a potential independent U.S. Space Force. The brown skies low over the battlefield where dust, smoke and fog dominate the air domain are a challenge to the Air Force's ability to fully protect the Army from aerial threats. If the brown skies above Army units are effectively an extension of the ground domain, how does the Army control that air space for delivering firepower via small UASs and for preventing enemy forces from using rapidly deployed UASs flying low to bypass the Air Force command of the blue skies?

So when I urge caution in over-estimating cheap aerial drones, it isn't that I reject them. I just want them considered one more part of a combined arms fight. Especially as drone counter-measures proliferate--including interceptor drones.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

The Winter War of 2022 Shapes the Battlefield

For years I've considered a Ukrainian offensive to Crimea to be the most logical front to seriously harm Russia. Ukrainian military actions could be shaping the battlefield for such an effort.

Ukraine is continuing to attack south, next to what's left of the Kakhovka Reservoir remaining after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam.

Ukraine's drone attacks behind Russian lines seems to focus a lot on the stretch from Crimea to Rostov, according to maps I've seen on videos but can't find in static form anywhere. But ISW notes the effort:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. ...

Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to impact Russian energy assets and logistics in occupied Crimea. ... [strikes] destroyed Russian capacity to store petroleum products, fuels, and lubricants at one of the three main logistics hubs in occupied Crimea along with Sevastopol and the Kerch Bridge.

The overland route is under attack as well:

Ukrainian Crimea-based partisan group Atesh reported on April 12 that Atesh agents conducted a sabotage operation on an unspecified date that destroyed a Russian locomotive near the Likhovskaya railway station in Rostov Oblast, which [...] Russian forces use to deliver supplies to Zaporizhia Oblast. 

I also heard that Ukraine hit the last fuel ferry that moves train car tankers across the Kerch Strait. If the Ukrainians can drop the Kerch Strait Bridge that it previously just damaged, Russia could have severe problems sustaining their forces in Crimea and on the Kherson front.

Ukraine is even striking the overland route from Russia to Crimea and the Zaporishia front all the way to the Sea of Azov:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Mariupol. 

The Russians do seem to be having problems on the ground on the Zaporizhia front:

Russian forces are reportedly overextended across the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite receiving reinforcements from Russia’s strategic reserve.

And the problem seems more general:

Russian offensive operations have stalled in the past few months while Ukrainian forces advance, often unopposed because there are no Russian troops available to stop them. Ukrainian drone production from local factories have Russian troops fleeing or committing suicide rather than face obliteration by these drone swarms.

Not that Russia's war effort has collapsed. But I did write four weeks ago that the ground war seems different now. As in shifting against Russia. 

The drone swarms do seem to be striking deep behind Russian lines:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strikes against Russian military objects in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. 

And:

Ukrainian forces continue their frontline strikes against Russian military assets in the Kherson direction. 

And:

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea.

This fits with reports I've read that say Ukraine has begun to win the low-level drone war over the battlefield, as this success on one section of the front after knocking out Russian air defenses shows. 

This may be the source of that battlefield success:

Ukraine's Defence Ministry said on Wednesday it was introducing a ‌new model of operations integrating drone warfare with infantry activity and pointed to successes announced by its top commander in retaking territory from Russian forces in the south of the country. 

If Russia's supply problem and Zaporizhia frontline problems increase, we may finally find out if Ukraine has a strategic reserve available to throw into a counteroffensive. It could be a continuation of the drive south near the reservoir that would be supported by river crossings along the Dnipro River should the Ukrainian drive really start gaining ground.

Note that this would reverse the main effort that I speculated about in the river crossing post.  

Mind you, this is sheer speculation based on bits of information interpreted in ways that support some past notions. It also assumes Ukrainian capabilities I can't confirm. Bit it has been almost three years since the failed 2023 counteroffensive. Surely, Ukraine has made progress in training to create such a force by now, no? And the speculation is based on decades of playing board war games. That's dangerous ground to be on. I have no way to really test my notions by looking deeper into the intelligence to see if it supports or refutes my notion. I'm but a civilian in my figurative basement. So I put it out there. 

But at the heart of my thinking is the belief that Ukraine's commanders and NATO advisors can't possibly be content with--bordering on being inconceivable--sitting on the strategic defensive forever until the Russians give up. Professionals must be thinking about offensive action to actively break part of the Russian ground forces after the defensive war of attrition does its job on the Russian troops. Right? 

Right?! 

UPDATE: A couple timely bits of news add dots to the potential picture I have formed in my mind. First up:

Russia's "Crimea" operational-tactical group continues to actively mine the coastlines and beaches as Russia fears Ukrainian marines might land there again.

Not that D-Day is being planned. But a supporting effort for an overland attack approaching Crimea? Tip to OPFOR Journal. 

And:

Ukraine’s Security Service said its Alpha special operations unit conducted a drone strike on the Crimean peninsula, damaging military assets including three Russian naval ships.

Interesting. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: ISW map marked up in imgflip.com.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack:  Decapitation on Taiwan

In case you missed it on Substack:  21st Century Spheres of Influence

In case you missed it on Substack:  Small UAVs Should Be Maneuver Element Tools

In case you missed it on Substack: Quantifying Quality 

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Sure, Blame America for European Defense Deficiencies

Europeans slashed their heavy ground force weapons because they believed Europe was a zone of peace after the Cold War and not because they were prioritizing expeditionary warfare. Also, the Europeans' checks were in the mail and the sun was in their eyes.

I'm calling BS on this: 

NATO allies over two decades reshaped their ground forces in the image of a U.S. Army focused on operations in the Middle East, a decision that explains the loss of combat power in Europe, according to new research. 

Europe’s insufficient arsenal of tanks and heavy artillery is often blamed on tight defense budgets, but a new U.S. Army War College paper argues that the bigger culprit was spending choices centered on lighter expeditionary forces built for Afghanistan.

It sounds like a convenient excuse for Europeans to blame America for Europe's own priorities, as if those countries lack agency. 

It is insane to believe Europeans couldn't send the small contingents they did deploy without getting rid of too many of their tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery back in Europe. Reshaping their ground forces in the Army's image would have allowed that. American troops didn't bring tanks to Afghanistan but retained them in our force structure, just in case.

Europe's lack of tanks--and lack of troops who fight with or without tanks--is on the Europeans.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Chinese Interests in Vladivostok

Will China rename its pact of steel with Russia as the pact of steal?

Fun fact during the Russian civil war sparked by World War I:

At the request of Chinese merchants, 2,300 Chinese troops were sent to Vladivostok to protect Chinese interests there. The Chinese army fought against both Bolsheviks and Cossacks.

Remember when China changed its maps to label Vladivostok as Haishenwai?  

I wonder if China will "get a request" to protect its merchants there again? Could Russia refuse? Russia does owe China quite a bit for its dual-use and economic assistance.

That might leverage the goal of Chinese access to the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River, no? 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of Chinese troops marching near Vladivostok in 1918.

Artificial Intelligence as a Coalition Force Multiplier

Can artificial intelligence (AI) reduce the need for common weapons standards, doctrines, and processes?

Interesting:

Coalition warfare has always been messy. Different procedures, systems, standards, doctrines, and operational caveats complicate and slow coordination at every level of conflict. AI may finally cut through that dynamic to become the connective tissue that makes multinational forces more cohesive and coherent.

This makes sense. I've noted that AI could help make even obsolete weapons more effective within a campaign by maximizing their capabilities for specific missions.

Yet having standardized physical weapons, doctrines, and processes still seems vital. I'd want AI to cope with the differences that creep in despite the common standards rather than let coalition members go wild on their own private Idahos.

And I'd want AI to manage updates to adapt to a changing wartime battlefield without breaking standardization--which the article addresses with its call to make software rather than hardware the realm for updates.

And AI really seems valuable in filtering information flows so that company commanders aren't overwhelmed with irrelevant data that makes them incapable of operating as higher echelons intend.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from Britannica.

Tank Enough Until 2040

The M1-E3 is designed as a bridge to keep the Abrams tank effective in the face of anticipated 2040 threats without continuously adding weight until the Army can design a new 5th generation tank.

The new M1-E3 will incorporate a number of improvements:

A weight reduction of approximately 10 tons from the current SEPv3.

A hybrid-electric diesel engine that will produce some 50 per cent improved fuel efficiency.

An unmanned turret similar to those in contemporary MBT designs is seen in both Europe and Russia. This could reduce crew size from 4 to 3 by incorporating an autoloader. The three crewmen will be seated in the hull.

An advanced set of armor protection developments designed to defeat drone-deployed munitions.

A command and control system that permits Integration with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

An AI-powered threat detection and fire control system.

Some thoughts on designing a new tank. And some more radical thoughts on armament.

I really need to work on updating and improving a much longer article that hit a brick wall at Military Review a couple times.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from article. 

Hearts, Minds, and Dangling Balls in Urban Warfare

While many urban warfare tactics are universal, you need to fight differently when trying to take an enemy city than you would when trying to rescue/separate a city's population from enemy insurgents. 

American urban warfare experience from the Iraq War counter-insurgency campaign is not fully relevant when dealing with an enemy-held urban area, such as ISIL-controlled Mosul. Gaza went beyond even that:

Gaza differed from this experience in several fundamental respects, as Israel did not fight alongside a host nation, but rather against it. In Mosul, there was a legitimate Iraqi government, which at least part of the population supported, and the Islamic State ruled the territory for only two years. Hamas, by contrast, functioned not as an insurgent movement but as the sole authority of the Gaza Strip for almost two decades. Through its control of political institutions, welfare systems, education, and ideological indoctrination, it transformed both society and terrain into a prepared urban battlespace. Polling data from Gaza and the West Bank, including PCPSR surveys from December 2023, show overwhelming public support for Hamas’ October 7 attack and its earlier attacks on Israeli civilians, even when support for Hamas as a governing movement fluctuated.

Under these conditions, Israel could not plausibly expect to win over the local population. Organized anti-Hamas militias and protests against Hamas’ rule emerged only after its military capabilities had been severely degraded late in the war, and even then remained limited. For most of the conflict, the key structural conditions that underpin the Iraq and Afghanistan paradigms — friendly local government and a persuadable population — simply did not exist.

I touched on this difference over a decade ago:

Winning hearts and minds isn't some wimpy alternative to fighting insurgents. It is how you fight an insurgency when the objective is the people themselves. You want their hearts. You can settle for their minds. And when you are pacifying an enemy population, you need to grab the insurgents by the balls so the people's hearts and minds will follow.

And capturing an enemy city defended by that enemy's regular forces is even more dangerous. Doctrine for one situation is not a template for all situations. 

And yeah, don't get me started on the misinterpretation of "proportionality" of the use of force around civilians that just happens to only hamstring Western armies. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of American artillery in Aachen during World War II.

The Winter War of 2022 Becomes a Side Show

The Russian invasion of Ukraine keeps getting knocked out of the headlines by fighting in the Middle East. These are sad days indeed for Putin's goal of making Russia the Big Bad that demands the world's attention and makes targets quake in their boots. And it is getting worse for Russia every day the invasion drags on. How worse could it get?

Oh my:

The war appears to be continuing into 2026 despite Russia’s shortage of cash and soldiers. Russia has hired thousands of North Korean soldiers as a stopgap, but this is a limited resource. North Korea is demanding help with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. This angered China, the last major ally Russia has. Not only is China reducing economic cooperation with Russia but is also raising the issue of extensive portions of Russia’s Far Eastern Pacific coastal provinces that are claimed by China. Over the last few centuries Russia did take many of these territories from China and now China sees an opportunity to get them back, or simply take them back. If this happens, Russia could lose up to twenty percent of its territory. 

Russia's bulldozer is shaking, smoking, and shedding bolts.

Will Putin do something dramatic to try to restore his momentum? Would he really use nukes against targets in Ukraine--even if he avoids striking people or units? How would his military and people react? How would China react? Would that break Ukraine or bolster their resolve? 

Yet how valid is that threat? Can Russia risk revealing the true state of its foundation of its defense?

Or will Putin decide to escape the war through a Trump life line that lets Putin pretend he didn't lose?

Russia has found that its first major step west has not gone anywhere near what Putin planned. Even as China looms over Russia's Far East and gains influence in Central Asia, which Russia has tried to maintain as its backyard for eventual reincorporation into the empire. If Russia believes it can cut a real deal over Ukraine to end the hostility with NATO that has gotten way out of hand from its initial purpose of concealing Russian appeasement of China, Russia could pivot to Asia with its remaining strength and prepare to deter or defeat China's drive for influence or control of large chunks of Russian or former Soviet territory. 

Putin will do that if he has any brains, rather than dangle the Far East in front of China and continue to provoke European rearmament. 

And perhaps much worse.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Photo from here.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: The Objectives for the War Against Iran

In case you missed it on Substack: A Curtain of Drones for Air Defense

In case you missed it on Substack: The World War II Prototype for Interceptor Drones

In case you missed it on Substack: Reviewing the New European Security Environment

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Patrolling the Earth-Moon System

The Pentagon is looking at the space from Earth to the Moon. Patrol spaceships and ground troops will secure the region. Failure could mean China expand their nine-dash line of claimed control in the South China Sea.

Yes, talk about the Earth-Moon system: 

As the U.S. prepares to return astronauts to the Moon, the Pentagon is turning its focus to the vast region between traditional Earth orbits and its natural satellite as an emerging front for military operations.

But it won't be a Space Navy yet:

When we have space ships the size of even the Navy's smallest Cyclone patrol ships, then I'll agree that the Navy should control a space force. 

We’ll totally get SMOD.  

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Distance is the Carrier's Friend

Carriers can last half a century, or more. So I do like to keep them useful for all missions given we will have them for a long time even if other weapons are better for sea control missions.

Can we include enough MQ-25A Stingray drone aerial tankers in a carrier air wing to increase the range of fighter squadrons? 

The MQ-25A Stingray is a carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed primarily as an aerial refueling tanker for carrier air wings. 

It represents the first operational carrier-compatible unmanned aircraft in US naval aviation history and is intended to dramatically extend the reach of fighter aircraft by providing organic refueling capability at sea.

Secondary missions include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support.

This is useful for their already potent power projection role. I wonder if aerial combat drones could extend the range of carrier air wings enough to make them sea control apex predators rather than expensive prey.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

Proximity is Opportunity

American forces hammered Iranian warships in their ports and in waters near Iran at the start of Epic Fury. This seems like a test for coping with China's large and growing fleet.

America smashed up a number of Iranian warships at the start of the America-Israel attack on Iran:

Destruction of the Iranian Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy is a priority of the ongoing Operation Epic Fury, Pentagon officials have said since the start of the operation.

CENTCOM shows that the campaign has damaged or destroyed over 155 Iranian vessels. We're clearly getting down to the small stuff. Except for two (?) Iranian navy ships sitting out the war in India.

Naval targets includes Iranian anti-ship missiles kept in safe bunkers that American bunker busters destroyed. 

Of course, Iran has lots of smaller coastal assets that can do damage in the narrow Strait of Hormuz. But the damage inflicted is still a big deal. 

Well, hello target-rich environment:

China’s coast is well within range of American bases in the western Pacific. Add in American land-based missiles and aircraft placed on the Philippines and even Taiwan, and China’s ports and shipyards are well within range of American strike assets.

Truly, the Iran War of 2026 is a good test of this capability. And we may get a second production line for the B-21 that could strike in the western Pacific and the mainland from distant less vulnerable bases. 

All is not lost in INDOPACOM.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article.

Be Careful What You Wish For: Allied Rearmament Edition

Europeans strangely want to buy European weapons as long as they are going to spend more money on national defense.

America wants Europeans to defend themselves but isn’t happy Europeans want to buy European weapons systems:

U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has threatened to retaliate against European countries if the EU favors domestic weapons-makers in a drive to rearm the continent.

The U.S. Department of Defense objected to any EU effort to limit American arms-manufacturers' access to the European market and warned that would trigger a reciprocal response.

When we insist our European allies do more to defend themselves, they might just do more to defend themselves. Expecting them to simply buy more American weapons was assuming too much. I mean, nice work if you can get it, of course. But our European allies see things differently. As I've mentioned in other contexts.

The old strategy of doing more than allies made perfect sense when a war begun by an ally might escalate into strategic nuclear war between America and the Soviet Union, eh? We assume that problem no longer exists. Fingers crossed.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

The Folly of the Imminent Standard

The size of the Iran War is daunting to many who watch it. It is also the consequence of relying on an "imminent threat" standard to justify military action. 

Long ago I warned against the "imminent" threshold for justifying military action as "the last resort" (quoting a 2003 post):

When you believe that any path, no matter how unlikely to bear fruit, keeps you from that "last" resort, then military force is practically speaking never an option.

In regard to Iran I wrote:

And while many here continue to insist that military action must be the last resort, the more the knowledge of nuclear weaponry becomes deeply embedded within Iran. More people acquire the knowledge of how to proceed and unless we kill them all, destroying buildings is the least effective way to slow them down. Iran can rebuild structures if they have the scientists and technicians who take decades to train ready to pick up the pieces. Indeed, Iran could rebuild in other countries and subcontract various stages of the work in locations that may be immune to future attacks. 

Sure, time may provide a solution other than military action. But it can also lead to stupid paper deals to achieve seriously farcical "solutions" resting on fantasy:

President Barack Obama has spoken of his ambition to bring Iran in from the cold, saying the long-time US foe could be “a very successful regional power” if it agrees to a deal over its nuclear programme.

I long worried that a president confronted with finally being the one standing when the music turned off in the game of musical Oval Office chairs in the nearly fifty years of mullah rule in Iran would take the easiest option by unleashing the four-step plan.

Yet here we are with time short but not out, working the much larger Iran problem rather than shrugging our shoulders and hoping the mullahs are not as mad as their rhetoric and violence would indicate.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

The Winter War of 2022 Negates Russia's Size Advantage

Early in the war I assessed the balance between Russia and Ukraine via the example of the Iran-Iraq War and judged Ukraine had the GDP edge and that Russia's population edge didn't give it the advantage you would expect. The GDP edge and casualty edge is now clearly in Ukraine's favor.

Well hello arsenal of democracy:

A prominent Russian ultranationalist military and political commentator claimed that Western economic potential is “orders of magnitude” larger than Russia’s and is becoming militarily evident as “Western-backed” Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia have increasingly involved hundreds of drones.[1] The commentator claimed that the size of such strikes will only increase, and that Russia cannot produce enough interceptor missiles to compete with Western economic potential[.] 

So Ukraine has the edge in the production war, notwithstanding Europe's slow pace of restoring their defense industrial base. Not that ours is blazing fast except by comparison.

And to add insult to injury:

The European Union (EU) will transfer €1.4 billion in proceeds from frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine. 

As for casualties, Ukraine seems to be inflicting KIAs at more than twice the numbers overall, with 200,000 Ukrainian troops killed and 460,000 Russian troops killed (using maximum estimates for both).

Over the last year Ukraine has leaned into a thin line that trades space for time to kill Russian soldiers. That seems to indicate Ukraine has a much higher kill ratio than the overall ratio.

The cumulative effect of that attrition combined with Russia's communications problems have translated to changes on the battlefield (back to the ISW report):

Russian pro-war information space voices are beginning to acknowledge Ukraine’s frontline successes, mid-range BAI campaign, and drone adaptations. A prominent Russian ultranationalist milblogger complained on March 26 that Russian forces will be unable to reverse an unfavorable battlefield situation in the coming months and that “rather successful” Ukrainian counterattacks have disrupted Russia’s ability to pursue offensive efforts in 2026. 

Back in July 2022, based on a comparison to Iran and Iraq in their 1980s war, I wrote that Russia didn't necessarily have an advantage in people and economic strength that would enable Russia to bulldoze through Ukraine in the short run:

Like Iran, Russia has a 3:1 advantage in population. But Russian morale as a conqueror, that is clearly not liberating people from Nazis, is not superior. This could break Russia before Ukraine. Just how do we define the transition from the short run to the long run?

What about GDP and defense spending? You'd think Russia clearly has the edge with a 9:1 GDP advantage. 

But Russia is under Western sanctions that will harm Russia's ability to go to war production levels. Russian Soviet-era stockpiles will run low in time--or reach the material and ammo almost more dangerous to Russian users than Ukrainian targets.

And Ukraine is being supplied by the West, which has an immensely greater GDP advantage than Russia's advantage over Ukraine. So you can't just count the value of the arms and services provided to Ukraine when comparing the economic advantage. You'd have to count the research and development and logistics value on Ukraine's side of the ledger that provides the weapons, supplies, and services.

And the effects after four years of relentless Russian ground offensives seem to be tilting against Russia a bit:

Russia’s position on the battlefield has changed over the past six months (October 2025 through March 2026) as Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strikes, the block on Russia’s use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine, and Kremlin efforts to throttle Telegram have exacerbated existing issues within the Russian military.

Maybe this is just a blip in Ukraine's favor. It is tempting--and safer--to say things tomorrow will be the same as yesterday. And after the same old thing for years now, with only the obvious blip of Ukraine's 2024 offensive into Russia's Kursk region to break the trend, it would be easy to call this another blip that doesn't change the trajectory of the war. 

But it seems significant. Is the war on the knife's edge finally tilting in Ukraine's favor? 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Territorial change chart from ISW. 

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: The Forty-Five Year Oil War

In case you missed it on Substack: A Dangerous Lesson From the Winter War of 2022

In case you missed it on Substack: Four Lessons From the Iran War of 2026 for Taiwan?

In case you missed it on Substack: Protracted War?

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Is America's Military Build Up a Long-Term Shiny Mirage?

Don't build a hollow military. Fielding a military that looks capable is more dangerous to American security than having a military obviously ill-prepared for war.

This is worrisome:

By pouring billions into procurement for new ships, planes, and sensors, without a corresponding transformation in how we budget for their operations and sustainment across their lifecycle, we are jeopardizing future readiness for acquisition speed today.

This doesn't mean we won't budget for operations and sustainment--and the realistic training to use the weapons and systems--in future appropriations acts. But readiness isn't something we can assume just happens. I want a reverse emphasis:

Readiness in materiel and leadership/training is hard to maintain but easy to squander.

If we repair our defense industrial base, readiness, and leadership first, expansion of our military forces to global war standards could be done when threats become more active and imminent. We could expand to the limits of our revived industrial capacity. If we reverse that we risk having an impressive-looking but hollow military. Which is a problem.

Granted, my focus was on the problem of expanding the force structure at the expense of sustaining our military in a war. But focusing on modernization at the expense of readiness gets us to a similar bad place of not being able to sustain what we send to war.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Welp, grabbed the image from someplace and forgot the source. Or it was a DOD source.

Iran's Eroded Proxy Force in Iraq

I've long been frustrated at the apparent inability of the Iraqis to dismantle the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Force militias established during the ISIL 2014 offensive. Perhaps I have been wrong to worry.

I recognized both the threat of the PMF militias. Yet recognized forcefully disbanding them could be too much of a short-term threat:

I've written about the need to bring the militias under control or ultimately disband them. The weak Iraqi government has to be careful but the job must be started before the militias are as entrenched in Iraq as Hezbollah is in Lebanon.

The militias have largely been unwilling to rise up to support Iran. Seemingly, Iraq has slowly been working the problem:

They painted a picture of a proxy network hollowed out by years of targeted assassinations of hard-to-replace leaders; the loss of secure bases for training and weapons transit; and the transformation of Iraqi commanders into wealthy politicians and businessmen with more to lose than gain from confronting the West.

One commander said he believed only two or three of dozens of the militias would fully obey Iranian orders to strike.

It seems like the Iraqis took a smart, slow path to de-fang the militias. Crushing the mullah regime in Iran might finish them off whether or not the mullah regime survives. 

UPDATE: That's timely news:

Iranian-backed militias have been increasing their attacks in Iraq in part because Tehran has lost its control over these groups since the launch of Epic Fury, a retired tier one special operator who just left Baghdad told The War Zone.

Perhaps I'm mistaken about the pro-Iran militias not being as effective as I'd expect. The update article speaks of "chaos"; but I don't see news reports about that. Surely, much of the media would eagerly report that, no? 

Something to watch. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from here.

Combined Arms Changes

New weapons should change Army combined arms operations.

This is fair:

Drones are profoundly changing the Army’s approach to aviation and combined arms training, Maj. Gen. Clair A. Gill, commanding general of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, told Military Times in an interview.

I wonder about attack helicopters over the modern battlefield. 

As for drones, of course they change combined arms. And widely fielded counter-drone systems could eventually do the same. So this is relevant, too:

However, fighting methods from Ukraine should not be broadly applied to American forces, he noted, due to differences in U.S. tactics and capabilities. 

Endorsed! And let's not forget difference in the drone defense issue.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

Changing the Terms of NATO: Spanish Edition

I read complaints that America has changed the terms of Article V by insisting allies earn American help by doing more to defend NATO. Spain is one of the countries that changed the terms of Article V long before America did.

Spain doesn't spend much on defense and never has in NATO. And the current justification is that Spain is far from Russia:

Madrid had little incentive to ramp up defence spending. It languished further after Spain reeled from the 2008 financial crash, standing at just 0.9 percent when Russia annexed Crimea. And since the likes of Germany were slow to raise their tiny military budgets after what should have been a turning point, faraway Spain could be forgiven for stepping up inadequately. Especially seeing as Ukraine is on the other side of the continent. 

Just going to note--notwithstanding my longstanding support for arming Ukraine and my even longer support for preventing Russia from being a threat--that America is even farther from Ukraine and Russia, from the perspective of looking across the Atlantic.

While America may be revising the terms of Article V--never an automatic trigger--Europeans had already revised the terms of Article V by disarming far more ... enthusiastically ... than America did after the Cold War. Those European states counted on America defending them regardless of their contribution.

Much of NATO has or is correcting that mutual defense deficiency. Spain has not. Although it did decide to help defend Cyprus. And if the initial author is correct, internal politics will prevent Spain from spending more. Spain's failure to let America use its air bases for the war against Iran is not a promising sign. And it got worse. 

Perhaps another NATO ally would like to host the ballistic missile defense destroyers we base in Spain now.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of the Spanish destroyer ordered to Cyprus from the last article.