Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack:  Decapitation on Taiwan

In case you missed it on Substack:  21st Century Spheres of Influence

In case you missed it on Substack:  Small UAVs Should Be Maneuver Element Tools

In case you missed it on Substack: Quantifying Quality 

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Sure, Blame America for European Defense Deficiencies

Europeans slashed their heavy ground force weapons because they believed Europe was a zone of peace after the Cold War and not because they were prioritizing expeditionary warfare. Also, the Europeans' checks were in the mail and the sun was in their eyes.

I'm calling BS on this: 

NATO allies over two decades reshaped their ground forces in the image of a U.S. Army focused on operations in the Middle East, a decision that explains the loss of combat power in Europe, according to new research. 

Europe’s insufficient arsenal of tanks and heavy artillery is often blamed on tight defense budgets, but a new U.S. Army War College paper argues that the bigger culprit was spending choices centered on lighter expeditionary forces built for Afghanistan.

It sounds like a convenient excuse for Europeans to blame America for Europe's own priorities, as if those countries lack agency. 

It is insane to believe Europeans couldn't send the small contingents they did deploy without getting rid of too many of their tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery back in Europe. Reshaping their ground forces in the Army's image would have allowed that. American troops didn't bring tanks to Afghanistan but retained them in our force structure, just in case.

Europe's lack of tanks--and lack of troops who fight with or without tanks--is on the Europeans.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Chinese Interests in Vladivostok

Will China rename its pact of steel with Russia as the pact of steal?

Fun fact during the Russian civil war sparked by World War I:

At the request of Chinese merchants, 2,300 Chinese troops were sent to Vladivostok to protect Chinese interests there. The Chinese army fought against both Bolsheviks and Cossacks.

Remember when China changed its maps to label Vladivostok as Haishenwai?  

I wonder if China will "get a request" to protect its merchants there again? Could Russia refuse? Russia does owe China quite a bit for its dual-use and economic assistance.

That might leverage the goal of Chinese access to the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River, no? 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of Chinese troops marching near Vladivostok in 1918.

Artificial Intelligence as a Coalition Force Multiplier

Can artificial intelligence (AI) reduce the need for common weapons standards, doctrines, and processes?

Interesting:

Coalition warfare has always been messy. Different procedures, systems, standards, doctrines, and operational caveats complicate and slow coordination at every level of conflict. AI may finally cut through that dynamic to become the connective tissue that makes multinational forces more cohesive and coherent.

This makes sense. I've noted that AI could help make even obsolete weapons more effective within a campaign by maximizing their capabilities for specific missions.

Yet having standardized physical weapons, doctrines, and processes still seems vital. I'd want AI to cope with the differences that creep in despite the common standards rather than let coalition members go wild on their own private Idahos.

And I'd want AI to manage updates to adapt to a changing wartime battlefield without breaking standardization--which the article addresses with its call to make software rather than hardware the realm for updates.

And AI really seems valuable in filtering information flows so that company commanders aren't overwhelmed with irrelevant data that makes them incapable of operating as higher echelons intend.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from Britannica.

Tank Enough Until 2040

The M1-E3 is designed as a bridge to keep the Abrams tank effective in the face of anticipated 2040 threats without continuously adding weight until the Army can design a new 5th generation tank.

The new M1-E3 will incorporate a number of improvements:

A weight reduction of approximately 10 tons from the current SEPv3.

A hybrid-electric diesel engine that will produce some 50 per cent improved fuel efficiency.

An unmanned turret similar to those in contemporary MBT designs is seen in both Europe and Russia. This could reduce crew size from 4 to 3 by incorporating an autoloader. The three crewmen will be seated in the hull.

An advanced set of armor protection developments designed to defeat drone-deployed munitions.

A command and control system that permits Integration with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

An AI-powered threat detection and fire control system.

Some thoughts on designing a new tank. And some more radical thoughts on armament.

I really need to work on updating and improving a much longer article that hit a brick wall at Military Review a couple times.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from article. 

Hearts, Minds, and Dangling Balls in Urban Warfare

While many urban warfare tactics are universal, you need to fight differently when trying to take an enemy city than you would when trying to rescue/separate a city's population from enemy insurgents. 

American urban warfare experience from the Iraq War counter-insurgency campaign is not fully relevant when dealing with an enemy-held urban area, such as ISIL-controlled Mosul. Gaza went beyond even that:

Gaza differed from this experience in several fundamental respects, as Israel did not fight alongside a host nation, but rather against it. In Mosul, there was a legitimate Iraqi government, which at least part of the population supported, and the Islamic State ruled the territory for only two years. Hamas, by contrast, functioned not as an insurgent movement but as the sole authority of the Gaza Strip for almost two decades. Through its control of political institutions, welfare systems, education, and ideological indoctrination, it transformed both society and terrain into a prepared urban battlespace. Polling data from Gaza and the West Bank, including PCPSR surveys from December 2023, show overwhelming public support for Hamas’ October 7 attack and its earlier attacks on Israeli civilians, even when support for Hamas as a governing movement fluctuated.

Under these conditions, Israel could not plausibly expect to win over the local population. Organized anti-Hamas militias and protests against Hamas’ rule emerged only after its military capabilities had been severely degraded late in the war, and even then remained limited. For most of the conflict, the key structural conditions that underpin the Iraq and Afghanistan paradigms — friendly local government and a persuadable population — simply did not exist.

I touched on this difference over a decade ago:

Winning hearts and minds isn't some wimpy alternative to fighting insurgents. It is how you fight an insurgency when the objective is the people themselves. You want their hearts. You can settle for their minds. And when you are pacifying an enemy population, you need to grab the insurgents by the balls so the people's hearts and minds will follow.

And capturing an enemy city defended by that enemy's regular forces is even more dangerous. Doctrine for one situation is not a template for all situations. 

And yeah, don't get me started on the misinterpretation of "proportionality" of the use of force around civilians that just happens to only hamstring Western armies. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of American artillery in Aachen during World War II.

The Winter War of 2022 Becomes a Side Show

The Russian invasion of Ukraine keeps getting knocked out of the headlines by fighting in the Middle East. These are sad days indeed for Putin's goal of making Russia the Big Bad that demands the world's attention and makes targets quake in their boots. And it is getting worse for Russia every day the invasion drags on. How worse could it get?

Oh my:

The war appears to be continuing into 2026 despite Russia’s shortage of cash and soldiers. Russia has hired thousands of North Korean soldiers as a stopgap, but this is a limited resource. North Korea is demanding help with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. This angered China, the last major ally Russia has. Not only is China reducing economic cooperation with Russia but is also raising the issue of extensive portions of Russia’s Far Eastern Pacific coastal provinces that are claimed by China. Over the last few centuries Russia did take many of these territories from China and now China sees an opportunity to get them back, or simply take them back. If this happens, Russia could lose up to twenty percent of its territory. 

Russia's bulldozer is shaking, smoking, and shedding bolts.

Will Putin do something dramatic to try to restore his momentum? Would he really use nukes against targets in Ukraine--even if he avoids striking people or units? How would his military and people react? How would China react? Would that break Ukraine or bolster their resolve? 

Yet how valid is that threat? Can Russia risk revealing the true state of its foundation of its defense?

Or will Putin decide to escape the war through a Trump life line that lets Putin pretend he didn't lose?

Russia has found that its first major step west has not gone anywhere near what Putin planned. Even as China looms over Russia's Far East and gains influence in Central Asia, which Russia has tried to maintain as its backyard for eventual reincorporation into the empire. If Russia believes it can cut a real deal over Ukraine to end the hostility with NATO that has gotten way out of hand from its initial purpose of concealing Russian appeasement of China, Russia could pivot to Asia with its remaining strength and prepare to deter or defeat China's drive for influence or control of large chunks of Russian or former Soviet territory. 

Putin will do that if he has any brains, rather than dangle the Far East in front of China and continue to provoke European rearmament. 

And perhaps much worse.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Photo from here.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: The Objectives for the War Against Iran

In case you missed it on Substack: A Curtain of Drones for Air Defense

In case you missed it on Substack: The World War II Prototype for Interceptor Drones

In case you missed it on Substack: Reviewing the New European Security Environment

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.