Protect the Cargo Ships With Navy in a Box

Russia is leaning forward to attack shipping in the Black Sea in NATO state exclusive economic zones, and more ominously in their territorial waters. NATO should loan defensive systems to cargo and tanker ships that NATO forces ashore control while the ships are in the Black Sea.

NATO seems like it will respond to Russia's attempt to intimidate NATO over support for Ukraine:

Russian drones are suspected of sinking a cargo ship and leaving chemical tankers ablaze near the Black Sea coasts of Bulgaria and Romania, respectively. The latest attacks mean that at least seven ships have been attacked in the exclusive economic zones of NATO member countries—and even within Romania’s territorial waters if Russian involvement is confirmed in the case of the chemical tankers.

Such attacks have spurred requests for NATO to redeploy counter-drone systems to provide more protection. In a social media post on October 15, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that NATO had increased “counter-drone capabilities” along the alliance’s eastern flank after meeting with the leaders of Bulgaria and Romania.

I suggest Navy in a Box that would put NATO-controlled systems on the decks of civilian ships while in the Black Sea. Perhaps NATO A-Whacks patrolling would be a good idea, too.

Still, don't panic. In a shooting war the Russian Black Sea fleet would lead a short but exciting life. 

And of course, improve Ukraine's combat capabilities given that Russia strikes to deter that kind of NATO help.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

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NOTE: Image from the article (Credit: Hristo Rusev/Getty Images)

Here Be Dragons

Seafarers once saw sea monsters in the mists, which made sailing beyond sight of the coast a scary prospect. The sea monsters are coming back.

The sea is massive but the infrastructure of commerce over the seas is relatively small and quite vulnerable:

Pipelines and undersea communication cables are vulnerable to relatively simple types of disruptive and destructive sabotage. Unfortunately, most seaports face similar threats.

Add in the choke points for sea commerce and you have the battlefield defined for a global fight for the seas with sea drones battling each other to protect or degrade pipelines, cables, and sea traffic through choke points.

How do navies adapt to that? How do economies?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the second link.

The Winter War of 2022 Prepares to Turn Against China

 

I’m connecting dots to see a picture I’ve long wanted to see and which I think makes sense for America and Russia, not to mention Ukraine and the rest of Europe as well as America’s allies near China, which will have to devote more military resources inland. My wish to see such a picture could be the fatal weakness in dot-connecting skills. Yet while my picture rejects the common view that Trump is betraying Ukraine, that common view may actually help complete this picture by enabling Putin to claim Trump has Russia’s back if Putin ends his war on Ukraine. Then Putin could quietly pivot east to confront China and its claims on large and important portions of Russia’s Far East on the Sea of Japan.

Head on over to Substack for the essay. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: The Risk of Forward Defense

In case you missed it on Substack: Sea Control

In case you missed it on Substack: AI, the Cause of and Solution to Our Future Battlefield Problems

In case you missed it on Substack: Protecting Obstacle Reduction

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Four American Corps to Test Drone Warfare Concepts

Drone defense can't be based solely on vehicles or other targets. To restore operational movement, a corps must be able to orchestrate drones and counter-drones systems and other assets to gain an information advantage over the enemy to get the brigades moving and through the enemy kill zone. Patton achieved that in the hedgerow slog in Normandy.

Four U.S. Army corps withe tailored "autonomy formations" will test various aspects of drone warfare:

Several new Army formations will focus on autonomous warfare as the service continues its push to adopt battlefield drones.

Each corps will test equipment, evaluate tactics and recommend ways to carry out autonomous missions across long-range fires, protection, tanks, logistics and obstacle breaching, the service said. The new autonomy formations include a fires battery and watercraft company in I Corps, an armored reconnaissance company in III Corps, a breaching company in V Corps, and aerial reconnaissance and lift companies in XVIII Airborne Corps. 

I am sure that testing will show that many types of drones are useful for reducing the risk to soldiers near the front line (which extends quite a bit behind the forward line of troops). But I also suspect that testing will show that LINK small UGVs are not useful as general purpose direct-fire combat vehicles.

Hopefully the Army can restore operational maneuver from positional warfare:

Patton derived his success in large-scale combat operations on the continent from his dynamic approach to warfare and his special units, purpose-built to aid Third Army in managing information. Specifically, Patton strove to generate what twenty-first-century U.S. concepts define as information advantage, “a condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of relevant actor behavior, situational understanding, and decision making.”

How will drones affect that? And how can counter-measures negate enemy drones?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Map from second link.

The PLAN Plans For a SINKEX

China dangled its oldest carrier northeast and east of Taiwan. Which is useful training for its wartime role of distracting the United States Navy.

The PLAN headed to sea: 

The People’s Liberation Army Navy Liaoning Carrier Strike Group was operating in the Philippine Sea as of Wednesday, according to a Japan Joint Staff Office. 

Led by aircraft carrier CNS Liaoning (16), the strike group was spotted 155 miles south of Japan’s Ishigaki Island launching and recovering aircraft. The strike group includes Liaoning, cruisers CNS Anshan (103) and CNS Wuxi (104) and destroyer CNS Huainen (123). 

The location is interesting, as this map by Japan's Joint Staff Office tracked:

My view is that the old Soviet carrier that the Chinese used to begin their carrier development is best suited to distract the United States Navy which may take the time to smash the task force while China uses that time to get ashore in strength on Taiwan.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Images from the article.

Making Lemonade from LCS Lemons

The Navy is looking at how the Marines can use the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) for attack helicopter operations. Let's explore expanding that line of inquiry.

Huh:

The U.S. Navy is demonstrating how a ship originally built for littoral surface warfare could assume a broader role as a mobile aviation node for Marine Corps attack helicopters. In imagery dated October 5, 2026, and released October 12, Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group 7 documented sailors aboard the Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Canberra (LCS 30) preparing a Marine Corps AH-1Z Viper of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367 for departure at White Beach Naval Facility, Okinawa. The activity is part of wider Navy-Marine Corps integration that could expand the number of locations from which armed rotary-wing aircraft can operate across the Indo-Pacific.

One, if helicopters can carry out strike missions, why did the Marines rip apart the Corps with Force Design 2030?

Second, as long as the Navy and Marines are looking at the LCS, consider using them to move and sustain Marine outposts in expeditionary advanced base operations.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photograph from the article.

Are Russian Counter-Drone Operator Missions Effective?

Ukraine says that the Russians are more effective in hitting their small UAV operators behind the lines. Interesting.

Is this true?

Ukrainian military sources have reported on the increasing effectiveness of Russian glide bomb and artillery strikes against Ukrainian drone operators, as the Russian military command looks for ways to overcome Ukraine’s natural defensive advantage and its advantage in unmanned systems.

On the one hand, it has long made sense for combatants to use their persistent battlefield surveillance to find and strike the drone operators in their bunkers behind the lines. So this seems logical. Russia is going after Ukraine's drone operators and is having some success.

Yet it also makes sense for Ukraine to "admit" it is hurt if Russia's efforts aren't very successful. It makes sense for Ukraine to "publicize" Russia's so-called success to encourage Russia to keep doing what they are doing--which could be largely ineffective in reality.

From where I sit, the battlefield isn't transparent at all. And it isn't just from my perspective far from battlefields, eh? 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: U.S. Army photo.