The Winter War of 2022 Lies Back and Thinks of Positional Warfare

The Russians and Ukrainians aren't yet able to teach us lessons about a modern battlefield because they simply accept the positional warfare and seek to cope with that as best as they can. Unless we accept positional warfare is the new normal, can we really learn more than what we get from weapons performance data from the Winter War of 2022?

The war goes on. Talks to end the war go on, made difficult by Russia's insistence that "peace" means "victory"--over Ukraine and NATO. Russia resumed its effort to break Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

This isn't new, but it confirms what I've been observing for a while:

The Russian military command’s focus on light vehicle production and provision further demonstrates ISW’s ongoing assessment that Russian forces have optimized themselves for positional warfare in Ukraine and that Russian advances will likely remain constrained to a foot pace in the near to medium-term.

The Russians aren't innovating to restore maneuver to the stalemated battlefield. The Russians are just trying to cope with the stalemated battlefield to make the best of positional warfare.

This is what I described in an Army article about the Western Front of World War I. The Allies introduced a lot of novel weapons and equipment during the stalemate. But all they really did was cope with a stalemated, defense-dominated front. It took years before Allied tactics dramatically expanded in complexity to include all the new stuff and exploit them--and the traditional weapons--to begin to restore maneuver to the battlefield.

The German army cracked before the Allies could really mature their innovations in equipment and tactics. And so Allied innovations stalled. The Germans picked up the ball and from 1939-1941 demonstrated that they had developed expanded tactics to open up the battlefield far better than the Allies had since 1918.

Mind you, I don't assume that in the short run we would have done better in similar circumstances in Ukraine. We could have entered an era of figurative phalanxes that batter each other into submission as we see Ukraine and Russia trying to do. But if we do face that, innovations will--as the Germans did--break that paradigm of force and operations design. 

Can either side in the Winter War of 2022 make the leap from coping with drone-driven stalemate to incorporating their new weapons, equipment, and procedures in new tactics to make operationally decisive advances? 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

Weekend Data Dump

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In case you missed it on Substack: Be Careful About Diluting Army Attention in Operations Other Than War

In case you missed it on Substack: Could 50mm Cannons Equip American Tanks?

In case you missed it on Substack: So We Have a Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser Gap Now

In case you missed it on Substack: America's Interest in Europe

Oh? “War on Iran Could Provoke a ‘Shiite Jihad’[.]” Somebody, somewhere will always urge inaction in the face of threats by urging America to “let the Wookie win.”

STRAC is back! “The Air Force plans to conduct no-notice inspections of units to test their combat readiness, a senior Air Force official announced last week.”

U.S. forces in South Korea: “A Stryker brigade from Washington state has begun arriving in South Korea to assume the U.S. Army’s latest rotational mission on the peninsula[.]”

Good: “Israeli Iron Fist active protection system’s ability to down incoming drones [was demonstrated.]” It made no sense to me for this not to be possible.

Mowing the jihadi grass is still an American job: “This past week the United States and Kenya broke ground on a major expansion of a key air base in the country used by the U.S. military for counterterrorism operations.”

I’m not sure if Bosnia is safer keeping a separatist-leaning ethnic Serbian component; and Bosnia’s existence rests on separatism. But can the European union sort it out and keep a lid on violence? Let’s recall the 1990s era of American military intervention there.

Is Nigeria stepping up to fight jihadis?

The first Columbia-class SSBN is on track for delivery to the Navy in 2030.

Makes sense that the Navy needs specialized 5.56mm ammo to reduce shipboard damage. But is being boarded a big threat these days?

The State Department is calling together key countries to work together on critical minerals.

The frenemy of my enemy is my friend.

What’s the reason for Xi’s purge of top military officers and what is next for the PLA? I want to know if it is to prepare for war (when near, appear far), protect the CCP monopoly on political power (the core mission of the PLA), or protect Xi himself.

Interesting article on the foundations of actions against Venezuela in the Tripolitan War. In my view non-lawyer view, Congress has options to approve war by action or inaction. But I am on the lookout for more such articles.

This view from Australia sounds right: “US partners must aim for military resilience, strive harder to work with each other, and expect to handle second-order crises without much—or maybe even any—help from Washington.” And for Australia.

Macron is a lame duck. He may hope to fail up—as the EU seemingly encourages.

The scramble for the Arctic. POLARCOM, anyone?

America will focus its Africa strategy to focus on key African countries in key areas for the purpose of pushing back China’s influence in order to secure critical raw materials.

Don’t listen to Iran’s threat. Iran has been waging a regional war for close to five decades. An American attack would just be another of our intermittent participation.

Are cracks really emerging in Iran’s regime?

Breathe, people: “The U.S. and Canada cannot divorce and go their own way.”

Ugh: “Last year the Islamic terrorist Taliban rulers of Afghanistan shut down the Afghan internet. The Taliban took this drastic action to deal with Afghans gaining access to immoral material. Internet shutdowns for political reasons have become more common in nations like India, Iran, Iraq, Senegal, and Syria.”

American SOUTHCOM operations are stretching Russian military resources: “A heavy Russian cargo plane that previously brought air defense systems to Venezuela arrived at a military airfield near Havana, Cuba’s capital[.]”

I was 25 when I enlisted: “New Army recruits are entering the service later in life than previous years, with the average enlistment age at 22.7, according to Army data.”

WTAF!!! If true, serious retaliation against the mullahs is long overdue. Which may be why the allegation has been raised now, of course. But inflicting pain is no less valid—if true.

The new Navy frigate proposal will be a true low-cost frigate rather than the cancelled Constellation which is what I’ve described as a Burke Lite.

Trump’s gunboat diplomacy has overstretched the American military? Fewer than two dozen warships and a small fraction of our planes and Army units are deployed in the Caribbean and CENTCOM. If that overstretches us, it is damning of the size and readiness of the military.

This is more of a sales pitch for a Ukrainian company than a real assessment of the value of cheap drones in modern warfare.

America and India signed a trade deal.

Renaming the South China Sea won’t mean China will think of it as their territory any more than the Gulf of America means we own that. Far more effective at stopping China would be renaming INDOPACOM to PAINCOM.

Defining insurrection: “When a state moves from declining assistance to actively blocking federal officers, detaining them, threatening them, or using state force to prevent the execution of federal processes, it crosses the line from spirited federalism into open defiance.” Tip to Instapundit.

Perhaps: “In short, a total war against Iran would represent a disastrous scenario for the region.” But total war isn’t in the cards. And the very existence of the mullah regime has been a disastrous scenario for the region for many decades.

Anything but more panzers, infantry, and artillery.

American forces no longer dig in to hold South Korea. They can project power to resist China.

Does Vietnam plan for an American invasion? Or is this just a ploy to make it seem like Vietnam isn’t almost totally worried about China? I’m calling BS on this report.

America wisely shot down an Iranian drone that was approaching the American aircraft carrier in the region.

The Arctic has so many ways to kill you are get you killed. POLARCOM, perhaps?

The European defense industry expands.

Foreigners take home lessons learned fighting for Ukraine: “Many of the volunteers for the International Legion were from South America and found their drone knowledge a lucrative career for legal and illegal organizations.”

The Pentagon is looking at small companies for mass production of small suicide UAVs.

AFRICOM sent a team of officers to Nigeria to help kill jihadis.

The Coast Guard and Navy are watching Haiti during its latest crisis, known as Tuesday.

I don’t get why it is news that an Army supply unit would use aircraft to move supplies. Yet ground transport is needed for volume.

If Ukraine’s plan to kill or seriously wound 50,000 Russian troops per month relies on Russians attacking, Russia can adjust how many troops it loses.

Britain’s top naval commander says Russia still prioritizes their Northern Fleet, especially submarines, despite the war. This is something from the “Well, Duh” files. And also, the “Uh Oh” files.

Arguing drones are an evolution and not a revolution.

A Golden Dome won't make the America's defense infrastructure at home secure.

Calm down about a PLA “space carrier”. China has actual weapons to use. FFS, the unbridled enthusiasm for space fantasy is amazing.

Is Cuba close to collapsing?

Securing the Panama Canal by ejecting Chinese influence.

Who is funding a proto-insurgency in American cities?

The Sudanese probably wish the Sainted International Community® cared about them a tenth as much as it cares about Hamas.

A post-ceasefire “steel porcupine” to make Ukraine “indigestable” to a future Russian invasion must not be passive. It must include the ability to counter-attack and restore the line of control.

I can’t imagine Iran agreeing to any nuclear missile program terms that would satisfy America—let alone Israel. I assume Iran is buying time. And so is America before its assets are in place.

I can see how the Arctic is over-valued for sea trade routes and for natural resource extraction. But I part company over minimizing defense needs.

The growing campaign against Russia’s shadow tankers.

Ukraine’s growing campaign against Russia’s defense logistics foundation.

The Pentagon has made deals to ramp up SM-6 and Tomahawk missile production.

The U.S. hit ISIL targets in Syria again.

Marine helicopters will get the ability to conduct long-range strikes at maritime targets. Explain to me again why the Marines gutted their infantry regiments?

America and India have “deepening security ties”.

OPFOR Journal reports: “Russia, Belarus, Iran, Myanmar and North Korea issue a joint statement pledging the creation of a new security regime for Eurasia: ‘Towards a Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century’[.]” Interesting.

Taiwan will deploy ATACMS missiles to islands near China. Embarking the PLA to invade Taiwan now requires a little more Chinese preparation.

Are new night vision technologies too much for our monkey brains in crisis situations?

China will use ICBMs with conventional warheads. That’s an expensive way to bombard something. And is their CEP good enough to destroy targets without nuclear warheads? Still …

I still hold that the loudest voices of division are a minority of the minority active on social media who are unfortunately amplified by reporters too lazy to look beyond their phones and by politicians frightened that the real world resembles the online super-active insane minority.

Targets in Iran are assets (including nuclear related) that can strike American bases and ships; help Iran’s mullahs stay in power; and export oil. The first prioritizes land-based aircraft and subs, so ship-based systems can defend. The choice between the latter two tells us if we think the mullahs will fall.

Iran’s plan to win? Or to bluff and deter America? Iran has been battered the last 2+ years. And waging a regional war against America since the Islamic revolution.

The world is the tough place and this is sadly correct. Syria’s Kurds were in the end game once Assad fell.

Iran claims it seized to ships carrying smuggled fuel.

Why is China building so many coal power plants? To rub the West’s face in our suicidal green stupidity, of course.

The U.S. will export liquified natural gas to Ukraine.

I feel like my pucker factor should be red lining over CCP-linked biolabs in America. Tip to Instapundit.

How can Russia race for more nukes when they are so broke? And all America is trying to do is replace the aging systems we have.

Zelensky says 55,000 Ukrainian troops have died in the war; the BBC says it has confirmed the death of 160,000 by name who have fought for Russia.

I’m worried about Europe. It will get ugly. Will Russia pounce or watch?

Russia’s Arctic ambitions are stymied by sanctions.

American strikes on drug smuggling boats continue.

Putting carriers on offense. Are we spending too much to defend carriers?

The Navy wants NEREUS for “mature and proven below-the-surface capabilities to enable DMO, with a focus on seabed and subsurface warfare mission needs.”

What I find interesting about North Korean troops flying drones and other tasks is that the North Koreans don’t want to be cannon fodder any more.

I’ve long worried about the propaganda problem of a big explosion on a carrier: “Iran’s intense focus on U.S. aircraft carriers is not merely theatrical propaganda but a ‘deliberate strategic fixation’ designed to exploit the platform’s symbolic weight.

The search for the enemy center of gravity is of course valid. But sometimes it can seem like a search for the magical shortcut that bypasses the ugly nature of war.

Overcoming domestic shipbuilding woes in the Coast Guard. But ignore the FREMM part. That Constellation frigate was cancelled at the two under construction.

Don’t fear the end of New START, which only restrained America. Honesty, I assume only a small fraction of Russia’s arsenal works.

Takaichi won the snap election she called in Japan.

The new Marine ACV.

The Peter Principle at an Imperial Level

Is the European Union (EU) on a suicidal foreign policy path? Maybe. But the purpose is to gain domestic powers to erase the prefix of their proto-imperial project. Only the peasants will pay the price. And they'll damn well suffer in silence for holy ever closer union

That is an impressive record:

While the trajectory of EU diplomacy was a train wreck long before Kallas failed upward, few would argue that it hasn’t been a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad 14 months for the Union’s foreign affairs since she assumed her role. Incredibly, the EU now finds itself at loggerheads with essentially every major power in the world, drifting through the global game of geopolitics with no strategy, failing economies, deep resentment at home, and shaky access to crucial energy supplies from abroad.

I don't think this is a disaster from the EU's perspective:

Remember, the EU doesn't care about solving any particular problem. The EU just wants the authority to address the problem, as I noted before Russia invaded Ukraine (again). Lather. Rinse. Repeat. Empire[.]

That pictured EU troika dreams of a foreign policy success like the Soviet Russia achievement in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The power to negotiate is more important to the EU than the provisions of any deal. That's the strategy. Who in Brussels cares how it affects the peasantry?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!  

NOTE: Image from the essay. 

Desperately Seeking a Short War Over Taiwan

America counts on a short war if China invades Taiwan. So does China. We should be careful what we wish for. 

America and China, for their own reasons, want a short but victorious war over Taiwan*:

Considering these factors, planning for a short, sharp war provides a baseline that reflects current political considerations and what both parties would likely attempt to achieve. However, an exclusive focus on such a scenario risks overlooking how quickly a conflict can expand, protract, or shift. 

Yes, enemies vote and sh*t happens. Which makes getting a short war the hard part. 

China can throw an army across the Taiwan Strait. And I worry that China could exploit the mutual need for a short war to get a victory that America won't even recognize, as I warned about in Military Review.

*And wow! The article had a picture of old Army M60A2 tanks with 155mm ATGM-firing guns! Don't know why. But neat.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!  

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

Repairing the Foundation of Global Power

Allies and enemies are used to America manning the front lines in Eurasia in force, as it did throughout the Cold War and into the Russian Decline Era.* Pulling back to a reserve role is mistakenly viewed as retreat.

This is an accurate description of the 2025 national security strategy' emphasis on protecting America in the Western Hemisphere: 

In this framework, the American homeland is the center point. The first and most immediate line of security is the border. The second is the regional periphery-the Caribbean and Latin America. Only after these inner circles are secured, the logic goes, can the United States effectively project power more globally. 

Exactly:

The strategy seeks a firmer economic and military foundation of American power in the Western Hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere is the geographic foundation (defined more broadly) of operating abroad. While the strategy hopes to use non-military means as the main effort for national security, it does not disarm America in the belief that military power is unnecessary. Recall America’s Ten Year Rule as a warning about that approach.

I think the strategy is broad enough in scope to allow for a larger overseas military mission if all else fails. But this isn’t dogma. Circumstances can lead America to abandon this rule book and rewrite it on the fly.

America isn't retreating. America is reloading. Which includes making sure America has the bullets to finish the job.

*The Russian Decline Era. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Losing Iraq's Western Shield

Iraq is losing its western shield to prevent Sunni jihadi infiltration.

ISW writes that the Kurds of Syria are going down to defeat against the Islamist Syrian government, and there are repercussions for America:

The United States’ framework for sustaining success against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in northeastern Syria is collapsing. The risk that fighting in the northeast will significantly imperil the US mission to combat ISIS remains high unless negotiations or Kurdish operations can slow the pace of government advance towards Kurdish-majority areas.

There could be a Kurdish insurgency and the Kurds could face violence as they have so often in the region. Perhaps the Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian Kurds get back in the secession game. 

Iraq is concerned:

Iraqi government officials remain concerned that instability in Syria will cause the threat of ISIS to spill over into Iraq.

Iraq got its wish for all American forces to leave Iraq (except for the Kurdish region). It got that wish in 2011, too. What happens to Iraq's fragile democratic structure if it faces another Sunni Islamist invasion as it did during the Iraq War (Syria ratlines) and more overtly during the rise of ISIL (ISIS) in 2014?

The Kurdish-led SDF and America's small presence (along with some allies) in eastern Syria provided a shield to keep jihadis from again infiltrating Iraq to wreak havoc. And if Iran's mullahs don't go down, the mullahs will be in a better position to take over Shia-majority Iraq from the inside. 

And now leaving Syria is on the table again. Also, the U.S. had to race to begin transferring jihadis from SDF prisons to Iraqi prisons. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!  

NOTE: Map with my crude edits from Brookings.

Shield and Sword

All the smart kids want Taiwan to wage an asymmetric battle with lots of cheap air and sea drones to defeat a Chinese invasion. What if China nullifies the drones long enough to get a bridgehead?

China--like a lot of other countries are, including America--is working on microwave weapons to knock out drones on a large scale:

China has revealed new details about a high power microwave weapon it says can disable drone swarms at distances beyond those claimed by comparable US systems.

The truck mounted system, known as the Hurricane 3000, is designed to destroy or shut down drones by frying onboard electronics with focused microwave energy.

That would take a lot of the panties out of the flinging, no? 

What if China mounted a lot of those on lots of modularized auxiliary cruisers --in addition to other versions shielding the invasion fleet--to disable all those magical drones during the invasion of Taiwan?

People note that adaptation in the drone war in the Winter War of 2022 takes place in weeks. But if China strikes while it has an edge, that might be enough time for China to entrench on Taiwan and persuade America to accept a ceasefire rather than risk war with a nuclear-armed China sitting on the defensive close to its shores; or risk our economy in a long war of blockade and loss of trade. 

That ceasefire would allow China to prepare the final conquest in a subsequent war, as I argued in Military Review. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!  

NOTE: Image from article. 

The Winter War of 2022 Nears Its 'Use By' Date?

Russia's economy is hurting. But Russia has muddled through with an ability to endure deteriorating economic conditions. Predictions of collapse have passed repeatedly. Is a bill in Congress a "this time for sure" moment?

The war goes on. Starlink seems to have closed the gap that allowed Russia to control its drones deeper into Ukrainian territory. And  CSIS has new estimates on the casualties that both sides have endured:

Russia suffered 1.2 million casualties, including up to 325,000 troop deaths, between the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and December 2025. ... 

It estimated that Ukraine, with its smaller army and population, had suffered between 500,000 to 600,000 casualties, including up to 140,000 deaths. 

I keep worrying that if Russia could form a reserve of a fully equipped and acceptably trained combined arms army that Russia could charge through Ukraine's thinly manned drone belt on a fifteen mile front. It would be costly but would push through the kill zone with enough to break through and roll up the flanks. In the long run it would be cheaper. So far Russia appears incapable of that kind of discipline, preferring constant pressure along multiple points of the front line. 

But is this a kill shot?

The most significant development of 2026 isn't a new missile system; it’s a tariff. The Graham-Trump Bill, greenlit by the White House on January 7, has fundamentally rewritten the rules of economic warfare. By threatening a mandatory 500% tariff on any country—including China and India—that continues to purchase Russian petroleum or uranium, the U.S. has finally weaponized the one thing Russia’s allies value more than cheap crude: access to the American consumer.

Will this work? Could Russia's war effort sputter to crawl? Will Putin finally take Trump's offer to end the war as a last chance to declare victory in the special military operation gone horribly awry?

Or maybe this is just another "best by" deadline that Russia will continue to muddle through.

UPDATE (Tuesday): The heavy price Russia has paid for its failed invasion ... so far. 

UPDATE (Tuesday): I've long noted that sanctions fail be a decisive "silver bullet" weapon absent other pressure factors. And RUSI is clearly not on the side of another form of economic pain being decisive on its own:

Wars are rarely abandoned because they become expensive. They are more often terminated when states are defeated militarily, when ruling coalitions fracture, or when regimes themselves collapse. Economic pressure, where it matters, tends to operate through these channels rather than through persuasion alone. 

On its own is the key part of the judgment. Other factors that can be a spark for defeat can be exacerbated by underlying economic pain. Which leaves open the possibility that there is a 'use by' date for Russia's invasion.

Ukraine has been forced to pay a heavy price, too, for the choice of not wanting to be conquered by the brutal Russians.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.