The Winter War of 2022 Asks Oligarchs What They Can Do For Putin

Sh*t got real in Russia. Putin is asking for "voluntary" contributions to the war effort from Russia's wealthy class. Once powerful centers of power, these rich people are now just cows to be milked. Is revenue a secondary objective to destroying the potential of oligarchs to fund rival centers of power to oppose Putin?

The war goes on. Ukraine's strategic air campaign seems to be working better than Russia's air campaign. And the battlefield seems to have shifted perceptibly in Ukraine's favor.

And the war must be funded. Ukraine gets money:

The European Council (EC) adopted on April 23 the final piece of legislation underpinning the EU’s 90 billion euro (roughly $105 billion) interest-free loan to Ukraine, which the EC initially approved in December 2025. 

And Ukraine only has to repay it if it gets reparations from Russia. 

Putin, on the other hand, is scrounging for kopecks in the couch cushion. Putin made an offer that Russia's wealthy can't refuse: 

Even as he promised to take all of Ukraine’s Donbas region, he invited the assembled gathering of wealthy businessmen to contribute voluntary aid to the war effort.

The notion of shaking down business in a problematic time for the country originated with the Rosneft director, who proposed the issuance of war bonds as the fundraising process. Since he was not a major shareholder in the company he runs, he will be spared the questionable honor of contributing his own money.

Others, though, responded immediately, offering $1.1 billion. Another sanctioned businessman agreed to contribute when asked.

These men had little choice. It is beyond belief that Russia’s major billionaires would refuse, and that’s closely linked to why these men should no longer be called oligarchs. Decades ago, they could impose their will on Russia, manipulate the legislature, and bend or subvert the law: they were oligarchs in the true sense of the word.

Ask not what Putin can do for the rich men formerly known as oligarchs--ask where the money is.

That’s certainly interesting. Just before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 I read that Putin got financing for military efforts from oligarchs and repaid them with contracts resulting from gains in the military action:

How ... feudal: "[Russia's small wars] are financed by members of Putin’s inner circle. They don’t come directly out of state budgets. ... The oligarchs who funded the annexation of Crimea, for example, received a multibillion-dollar contract to build a bridge connecting that peninsula over the Kerch Strait to Russia." This means of finance requires short and/or small victorious wars. Which the Russians hope their nuclear weapons can enforce after achieving gains.

It was all very feudal, no? And while Putin could have success in short and glorious special military operations, that method can't possibly scale up to sustain a war of attrition.

Yet the oligarchs lack the power to resist Putin's invitation to help. Will Putin squeeze these former supporters until they are impoverished? Will they seek new champions outside of Putin's orbit to survive this war?

Interesting times, indeed, for Russia. Could Putin be trying to destroy these men to prevent them from conspiring against him?

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Image obviously from JFK speech, with modifications.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Creating Good Jihadis

In case you missed it on Substack: The Taiwan Question

In case you missed it on Substack: Looking at Small Drone Dominance Through a Different Lens

In case you missed it on Substack: America Should Remain in NATO

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Lebanon is Trapped in Its Fragility

I'm skeptical that the Lebanese government has the interest or capability to suppress Hezbollah, no matter how much Western help it gets.

Could Lebanon ask for Western help to defeat Hezbollah?

If Lebanon makes such a request, the West must answer.

For the U.S., Europe, and key Arab states — above all for NATO — this would present a clear and consequential choice to help a sovereign government restore control over its own territory. It is precisely the kind of international engagement that would be both justified and effective.

The Lebanese government has had the support of UNIFIL for decades without leveraging that to weaken Hezbollah--which reflects the force's role to shield Hezbollah from Israel. Western states have armed and trained the Lebanese military for decades and it remains incapable of remaining intact if it must fight internal enemies.

Sadly, no level of outside support can help the Lebanese government disband Hezbollah because the government is a fragile coalition of frenemies that includes Hezbollah.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article.

UPDATE: Forgive the apostrophe in the title. Why that wasn't a screeching alarm until I looked at it later Sunday is beyond me. 

South Korea's Horizon Expands Beyond the DMZ

South Korea has emerged as an industrial and military power perched on the edge of northeast Asia.

Winning: 

For China, South Korea has become a crucial trading partner and dangerous regional naval power. 

As the TDR ouija board foretold:

As long as Chinese power projection didn't reach out much beyond about 50 miles from China's coast, this wasn't an issue. But South Korea is a major trading power with shipbuilding industries thriving on foreign orders. They just launched a large Aegis-equipped destroyer for their growing fleet. 

With a large GDP reliant on trade, South Korea now has the need to have open access to the sea. With a large GDP, South Korea has the means to protect those sea lines of communication. And with China heading out to sea, South Korea has the impetus to build a fleet capable of defending those sea lines of communication. 

China is surrounded by actual enemies or potentially hostile neighbors and I'd never trade places with them. As China builds up, others are reacting. Like any communists, they don't understand that there is no free lunch. Not ever.

Nineteen years later, China faces more opposition to its ambitions. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

Plugging Drones into NATO Fleets

Drones are one more weapon to plug into fleet intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities rather than a replacement for the more expensive and capable weapons that rely on the ISR.

Absolutely exploit the quality of cheapness that many air and sea drones provide fleets:

NATO is working to integrate emerging technologies like uncrewed surface vehicles and fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles into crisis planning through its latest major exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas.  

My issue has always been that the expensive ISR capabilities that NATO provides make Ukraine's air, surface, and undersea drones effective in the Black Sea. And the drones seen so dreamy because Ukraine has to rely on such cheap weapons rather than expensive Western weapons to fight the Russian navy there.

Cheap drones have mass going for them. But they can't replace the capabilities of the expensive weapons. Now what about using drones for point defense?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article.

A Larger Military Uses Up Inadequate Ammunition Faster

Right now, expanding America's defense industrial base is a critical need. 

It is prudent to pay attention to this issue:

Congress has expressed interest in the status of the U.S. military’s inventories of munitions (e.g., ammunition, bombs, missiles, torpedoes, anti-aircraft weapons, missile interceptors). Since the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran on February 28, 2026, some Members of Congress have sought information on the stockpiles and availability of U.S. weapons from the Department of Defense (DOD, which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025). Some Members have raised concerns about potential shortfalls in munitions, while other Members have said munitions are not an immediate concern. President Donald J. Trump has said U.S. munitions are “virtually unlimited.” DOD officials have said sufficient munitions are available, while maintaining that the status of U.S. stocks is considered “an operational security matter.” In these comments, officials have not differentiated between stocks of air-to-ground and air-to-air munitions versus missiles and missile interceptors. 

If we had the ability to supply multiple wars at once, we would not only have sufficient to wage a war with a margin of error, but we'd still be adding to our war reserve stockpiles while also helping allies.

Don't you dare warn me about the military-industrial complex. We would in fact again be the Arsenal of Democracy. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

The Brown Skies of the Air Littoral

I have often raised a skeptical hand when drone purists throw panties at cheap, plentiful First Person View (FPV) drones for recon and strike. Yet I'm no denier, having raised the alarm back in 2018 about the small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) threat to forward American combat units at the tip of the spear. I'm just asking for a little restraint on, ah ... enthusiasm ... for the new weapons.

In Army magazine I called for fighter drones to cover the forward Army ground units in contact with the enemy in a new zone of vulnerability outside of traditional weapons systems. I recognized that Air Force air supremacy would have no effect on that drone threat. I suggested an adaptation of the Navy categorization of the blue, green, and brown waters (at sea, closer to shores, and so close that dirt colors it at the shore and in rivers):

The Army should adapt the Navy continuum to the air domain to better improve air defense for Army ground troops in light of the problems the Air Force has in moving away from the blue skies where air supremacy has been fought for traditionally. The Air Force could lose the black skies of space to a potential independent U.S. Space Force. The brown skies low over the battlefield where dust, smoke and fog dominate the air domain are a challenge to the Air Force's ability to fully protect the Army from aerial threats. If the brown skies above Army units are effectively an extension of the ground domain, how does the Army control that air space for delivering firepower via small UASs and for preventing enemy forces from using rapidly deployed UASs flying low to bypass the Air Force command of the blue skies?

So when I urge caution in over-estimating cheap aerial drones, it isn't that I reject them. I just want them considered one more part of a combined arms fight. Especially as drone counter-measures proliferate--including interceptor drones.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

The Winter War of 2022 Shapes the Battlefield

For years I've considered a Ukrainian offensive to Crimea to be the most logical front to seriously harm Russia. Ukrainian military actions could be shaping the battlefield for such an effort.

Ukraine is continuing to attack south, next to what's left of the Kakhovka Reservoir remaining after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam.

Ukraine's drone attacks behind Russian lines seems to focus a lot on the stretch from Crimea to Rostov, according to maps I've seen on videos but can't find in static form anywhere. But ISW notes the effort:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. ...

Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to impact Russian energy assets and logistics in occupied Crimea. ... [strikes] destroyed Russian capacity to store petroleum products, fuels, and lubricants at one of the three main logistics hubs in occupied Crimea along with Sevastopol and the Kerch Bridge.

The overland route is under attack as well:

Ukrainian Crimea-based partisan group Atesh reported on April 12 that Atesh agents conducted a sabotage operation on an unspecified date that destroyed a Russian locomotive near the Likhovskaya railway station in Rostov Oblast, which [...] Russian forces use to deliver supplies to Zaporizhia Oblast. 

I also heard that Ukraine hit the last fuel ferry that moves train car tankers across the Kerch Strait. If the Ukrainians can drop the Kerch Strait Bridge that it previously just damaged, Russia could have severe problems sustaining their forces in Crimea and on the Kherson front.

Ukraine is even striking the overland route from Russia to Crimea and the Zaporishia front all the way to the Sea of Azov:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Mariupol. 

The Russians do seem to be having problems on the ground on the Zaporizhia front:

Russian forces are reportedly overextended across the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite receiving reinforcements from Russia’s strategic reserve.

And the problem seems more general:

Russian offensive operations have stalled in the past few months while Ukrainian forces advance, often unopposed because there are no Russian troops available to stop them. Ukrainian drone production from local factories have Russian troops fleeing or committing suicide rather than face obliteration by these drone swarms.

Not that Russia's war effort has collapsed. But I did write four weeks ago that the ground war seems different now. As in shifting against Russia. 

The drone swarms do seem to be striking deep behind Russian lines:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strikes against Russian military objects in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. 

And:

Ukrainian forces continue their frontline strikes against Russian military assets in the Kherson direction. 

And:

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea.

This fits with reports I've read that say Ukraine has begun to win the low-level drone war over the battlefield, as this success on one section of the front after knocking out Russian air defenses shows. 

This may be the source of that battlefield success:

Ukraine's Defence Ministry said on Wednesday it was introducing a ‌new model of operations integrating drone warfare with infantry activity and pointed to successes announced by its top commander in retaking territory from Russian forces in the south of the country. 

If Russia's supply problem and Zaporizhia frontline problems increase, we may finally find out if Ukraine has a strategic reserve available to throw into a counteroffensive. It could be a continuation of the drive south near the reservoir that would be supported by river crossings along the Dnipro River should the Ukrainian drive really start gaining ground.

Note that this would reverse the main effort that I speculated about in the river crossing post.  

Mind you, this is sheer speculation based on bits of information interpreted in ways that support some past notions. It also assumes Ukrainian capabilities I can't confirm. Bit it has been almost three years since the failed 2023 counteroffensive. Surely, Ukraine has made progress in training to create such a force by now, no? And the speculation is based on decades of playing board war games. That's dangerous ground to be on. I have no way to really test my notions by looking deeper into the intelligence to see if it supports or refutes my notion. I'm but a civilian in my figurative basement. So I put it out there. 

But at the heart of my thinking is the belief that Ukraine's commanders and NATO advisors can't possibly be content with--bordering on being inconceivable--sitting on the strategic defensive forever until the Russians give up. Professionals must be thinking about offensive action to actively break part of the Russian ground forces after the defensive war of attrition does its job on the Russian troops. Right? 

Right?! 

UPDATE: A couple timely bits of news add dots to the potential picture I have formed in my mind. First up:

Russia's "Crimea" operational-tactical group continues to actively mine the coastlines and beaches as Russia fears Ukrainian marines might land there again.

Not that D-Day is being planned. But a supporting effort for an overland attack approaching Crimea? Tip to OPFOR Journal. 

And:

Ukraine’s Security Service said its Alpha special operations unit conducted a drone strike on the Crimean peninsula, damaging military assets including three Russian naval ships.

Interesting. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: ISW map marked up in imgflip.com.