Three Lessons From the Iran War

Lessons from the Iran War of 2026 were drawn before the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) shifted the war to negotiating tables for now.

This is an interesting article: 

While the Iran war is currently on hold, the race to study and apply its lessons has only just begun.

Distilled into three main points, the war demonstrated that the U.S. military is a) now proficient, though not exceptional, at drone defense; b) able to conduct prolonged, highly effective air campaigns in challenging environments; and c) more adaptable and lethal when fully leveraging partners.

I quibble at the prologue. The Iran War was not on hold when the article was published before the MOU. The war was waged more quietly but potentially more lethally to the mullah regime. 

But the military lessons are correct. Contrary to the accusations, America did prepare for the Iranian drone threat. We had sent new counter-drone weapons to CENTCOM on land and afloat. We didn't send enough. But we were able to power through that mistake and continue the air assault.

Yes, our air campaign was quite impressive. But air campaigns aren't all powerful. They can kill people and break things in a safer form of a March through Georgia.

And yes, we are more effective with allies. Israel was important and validates our national security strategy of urging allies to be partners and not dependents. And don't forget the allied bases to operate from in the area and to get to the theater of war. 

I drew a few early lessons in this essay, on counter-UAV defenses, ground forces, and sea control.

Fighting wars with allies is frustrating. But ask Iran if fighting almost entirely alone is a freeing experience. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

The Winter War of 2022 Reaches the Bunker Stage

Has the Winter War of 2022 entered the stage where Putin moves flags on maps in his bunker to maintain the fiction of a might Red Army restoring Soviet-era glory?

 

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to just put the essay there from now on. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Expanding Combined Arms Down the Table of Organization

In case you missed it on Substack: Universal Drone Salvation Hits a Limit

In case you missed it on Substack: The Shiny PLA Navy Object

In case you missed it on Substack: America Won the Iran War of 2026

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section. 

The King of Battle is Not Amused

Artillery is shy for the moment because of the attention it receives. When it gets a little privacy, it will roar back.

Artillery is not dead, it is just hunted more effectively:

Drones currently account for 70 to 80 percent of losses on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield, supplanting artillery as the “King of Battle.” At first glance, this shift suggests that both Russia and Ukraine have transitioned away from traditional artillery in favor of cutting-edge drones as a means of delivering fires. The reality is that drones cannot replicate the firepower of artillery, which remains central to Russian and Ukrainian combat operations. This shift has occurred not because drones are superior to artillery, but because drones have made artillery far more difficult to employ. Both sides use drones extensively to locate and target enemy guns, forcing artillery units to adapt their tactics in order to survive and continue delivering limited firepower on an increasingly transparent battlefield.

I will add that the shell shortage pushed Ukraine to use what they could get--FPV suicide drones. The artillery problem of being targeted expanded from armored vehicle vulnerability on the front to the rear where artillery lives when the range and density of the drone recon and strike network expanded to the rear.

Just as tanks and other armored combat vehicles need expanded combined arms operations to fight in this environment, artillery must adapt equipment and tactics, too. 

And anything in the rear that exists within an expanded No-Man's Land now must, too, of course.

Anyway, the King of Battle is pleased at the offering of respect. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

An Armored Brigade in Poland?

Should America station an armored brigade in Poland as a follow-up to our rotational brigades sent in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine? Yes. And I have another suggestion: REFORPOL.

The question is asked:

A decision to base an American armored brigade combat team in Poland permanently would go far to cement the U.S.-Poland military alliance. 

Absolutely do that. Poland is the Army's new center of gravity. Friction with Germany over American troop strength there must consider the simple fact that the Fulda Gap is no longer the front line.

And I'll go back to my suggestion after Russia invaded Georgia in 2008:

American, British, and German equipment depots for additional heavy brigades in southern Poland. If we can fly in troops to man these forces, in a return of forces to Poland (REFORPOL) concept, we'd enhance deterrence without forward deploying powerful NATO offensive units[.]"

Elements of V Corps are already in Poland. Let's end Russia's fantasy of rebuilding the Russian empire in the west so they will focus on holding what they have in the east. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article. 

Bring On the Army Robot Butlers

I'm now skeptical about direct-fire unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). But logistics drones seem like they have real promise now.

I'm now skeptical about small direct-fire combat UGVs. This, on the other hand, sounds really promising: 

Earlier this year, deep in an expansive training area, soldiers loaded an autonomous ground vehicle, entered a grid, and watched it depart on its own. No one stood behind it with a controller. No one drove it like a toy. It simply took a basic task that normally consumes soldiers’ time and attention and executed it autonomously. That was the moment the capability became real. For leaders who had heard about ground autonomy in briefings or seen it discussed in abstract terms, this was different. It was not just an interesting machine or another promising technology. It was a practical tool accomplishing a practical task in the field. 

One stumbling block that may be a problem is conducting these missions on a dynamic, mobile battlefield for supporting combat units. But for supplying the many more combat support and sustainment units behind the lines (assuming air defenses can provide some protection in the wider No-Man's Land that drones created) they could be great. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the quoted article. 

Divisions Don't Fight For Islands?

Should the Army back off its restoration of the division as the building block of large-scale land combat operations? Brigades had the flexibility for counter-insurgency. I think the shift is fully justified to coordinate more joint assets to fight ground enemies.

Is the Army focus on division-level capabilities wrong? 

The Army needs to be optimized to meet the threats against which it would have the least amount of time to adapt, which means a Chinese joint island landing campaign. To meet that threat, the Army needs decentralized, flexible forces that can counter Chinese strategic surprise, deny Beijing a fait accompli, and regain the initiative.

I don’t think the Army is wrong. Even though I share the author's concern about it getting stuck in a "methodical battle" mindset.

I am fully aware I am not and never have been an officer with deep knowledge of combat requirements. But I feel better about my judgment because the author thinks island operations supporting the Navy is the primary Army mission. I strongly disagree.

About such island operations. An Army corps headquarters was eventually deployed to command Army and Marine divisions on that island.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Map from Graeme Kent's Guadalcanal: island ordeal (Ballantine Books, 1971).

Iran Reassures the World That All Is Well

I don't believe the Iranians have agreed to end their nuclear or regional ambitions. At best this is a short-term measure to buy time. Iran is still at war with us. Let's not become confused. But we had a difficult environment for negotiations. Assessments of the war have relied on a highly unbalanced Western media portrayal of Iran's resilience after the brief air campaign and the subsequent blockade that smashed up and squeezed Iran's military and economy, as well as its defense and nuclear industries. 

We have an understanding for an eventual deal. In memo form. Allegedly. It was difficult for America to hold firm for a better outcome because of the information environment.

Yes: 

What comes out of Iran is the chronic form of lying associated with 'Baghdad Bob" during the Second Gulf War. No one yet knows the full extent of the damage to the regime or the viability of the Iranian resistance. The result is that Iran is likely to be in far worse shape than it lets on.

I have trouble drawing more than the broadest conclusion about the war: that Iran has been severely hammered. What that means is unclear. This is a problem, as Kipling wrote:

Man cannot tell but Allah knows
How much the other side is hurt. 

In contrast to the veil over Iran's problems, we have yet another story about how Iran hit American bases in CENTCOM harder than we admitted. Yes, drone defense was a weakness we did not prepare sufficiently to overcome. We certainly anticipated the problem. Stuff happens. Yet the damage didn’t stop America and its allies from hitting more than 13,000 Iranian targets. Also, why would we conduct Iranian damage assessment in the media during the campaign by admitting the damage?

Yet we allegedly have peace for our time. We'll see what the text shows. It couldn't possibly be worse than the first one, right? Right? 

Iran will not meet our expectations. I suspect this memo of purported mutual understanding is only an effort to buy time until after the November elections and so America and its allies can build up the evidence to justify more action to finally defeat the mullah regime of Iran. That's the domestic political reality.

But what else could we do? Let Iran race to nuclear weapons? The Iranian people and regular armed forces did not take the opportunity to rise up when we and Israel struck hard. Perhaps it would have been doomed. But everybody knew we were going to hammer Iran and give the Iranians a chance to rise up. We did that. For now.

On the bright side, assessments of rebuilding needs that the proto-deal addresses may provide us with needed damage assessment for future bombing. 

UPDATE: Hard to argue with this:

Three nations are involved in this war: the United States, Iran and Israel. The negotiations during the ceasefire will be heavily influenced by internal politics, with each nation having internal divisions, all of different natures and pointing in different directions. 

Whose divisions are worse? And with the memorandum of understanding not yet revealed, all we can say for sure is that it opens up the Strait of Hormuz to all parties. 

Everybody is seemingly buying time to better prepare for the next round of war. Whether that is in two months, five months, or at some point farther in the future is unclear. But Hell, maybe the horse will sing. It didn't the last time I had that hope. But who knows? 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!