Priorities In An Ammo Shortage

Ukraine can't afford to bounce the rubble against aerial threats to marginally increase interception success.

This comment on how Ukraine has adapted to a Patriot missile shortage is interesting:

The Patriot unit commander, identified as Oleksandr in a video released over the weekend by the Ukrainian military's Air Command West, said that while standard air defense doctrine calls for firing between two and four interceptors at each incoming Russian cruise or ballistic missile, his forces are launching just one per threat amid strained stockpiles. 

Firing multiple Patriots increases the odds of hitting. If you have an 80% chance of hitting with one missile fired, you have a 96% chance of hitting the target with two. A third gets you over 99%. In a situation where you have a very valuable target to protect and plenty of missiles (perhaps because the fight is a single battle rather than a war), it makes sense to launch even three. The value of the saved target far outweighs the cost of the "wasted" defensive missiles.

But if you have insufficient missiles and lots of targets (but none absolutely critical) to defend, it is better to fire three missiles at three separate incoming missiles to have a chance of destroying three incoming missiles. That is superior to a near-guarantee of one hit while watching two other incoming missiles hit your assets.

When ammo runs low, you make do and set priorities. 

Mind you, if the incoming missile is targeting the Patriot system itself, light up the skies, eh?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article.  

The Winter War of 2022 Tells the People To Shut Up, Pay, and Die

Will the combatants continue to suffer and die in the war?

Russia bombards Ukraine daily. Although one Russian milblogger claimed the campaign is not making the most of resources and that "Russian forces are also frequently switching target sets without accomplishing their initial objectives.

And Ukraine's strategic warfare against Russian energy production and export capabilities begins to do real damage. Further, on the ground, where Russia's biggest advantage supposedly lies, "Russian forces in April 2026 suffered a net loss of territory controlled in the Ukrainian theater for the first time since Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast." It may be an anomaly. But things do seem to have tilted in Ukraine's favor on the ground so far this year. Perhaps the war's fifth summer will change that.

The special military operation goes on--and is starting to leave a mark in Russia:

There are increasing indications that hostility to Putin’s policies is spreading throughout the leaders, increasing the probability that they will merge into groups which might seek and perhaps even succeed in blocking Russian government policies and erode voter support.

None of this means Putin is about to be emasculated, let alone overthrown. But it could persuade Putin to take even more repressive and aggressive measures. Taken together, these developments suggest Putin is now less able to act as if opposition to his policies is irrelevant.

Russian anger over President Vladimir Putin’s moves against the internet is growing and spreading even to groups long thought to be his most loyal supporters. Russian commentators are pointing to other mistakes Putin has been making, and opinion surveys show that his approval rating is falling to the lowest level since before he launched the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. He now faces a buildup of disapproval that some have called an apocalypse.

If the Russian people are restive now, wait until they get a load of this:

A prominent, Kremlin-coopted Russian ultranationalist milblogger has begun socializing the idea that Russians should prepare for possible future limited, rolling reserve call-ups to bolster Russia’s force generation mechanisms.

It's "limited" in the sense that those mobilized won't be in uniform for that long. Dying in a meat wave assault pretty much ensures that. 

While I think the chance of upheaval is higher in Russia, I do not rule out the possibility that Ukraine could experience the unrest first:

Ukraine and Russia are exhausted. Neither side is close to defeat and yet discontent is growing on both sides. In Russia, open criticism of the regime is spreading. Social media influencers have, bizarrely, led the charge. In Ukraine, fury is directed at press gangs who hunt down young men and force them, often violently, into the army. Today, the chances of some kind of political crisis in either Kyiv or Moscow seem more likely than a great breakthrough on the battlefield. 

Ukraine's relatively free society at least allows its soldiers better options than learning to like dying:

Ukraine’s top general ordered on Thursday a mandatory two-month time limit for front-line troops serving in forward positions, a week after photos of emaciated soldiers on combat duty sparked a nationwide outcry. 

So Ukrainian troops have that going for them.

Yet while I suspect that Russia's ground forces are significantly more vulnerable to cracking under the pressure of war, Ukraine could break first--with worse consequences.

To avoid the risk of collapse--of the army or state--might Putin accept Trump's outstretched hand to conceal Russia's defeat with a realignment to face China together? Quietly, of course. 

If not, just how will this war twist to provide somebody with a victory?

UPDATE (Monday): Huh:

“The overall mood is that’s enough already; you’ve been fighting for long enough,” a Russian official told the Washington Post last week on condition of anonymity. “It seems to everyone that it’s been going on for longer than World War II, the Great Patriotic War — and at the same time we can’t even take one region.” 

Will Russia accept Trump's fig leaf to conceal Putin's defeat and allow Russia to pivot to face China?

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: The Iran War of 2026 Adjusts Its Terms of Service

In case you missed it on Substack: Peak China

In case you missed it on Substack: Designing Mobile, Protected Firepower. And related fighter drones.

In case you missed it on Substack: Is the Age of Carriers Over?

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

War Over?

America had two alternate objectives at the start of the war. Regime change or pounding down Iran to buy time. The means to achieve either were the same for a while. We've apparently decided the larger objective is no longer worth pursuing. For now.

It was apparent from the start that America had two potential objectives for the Iran War of 2026, per the president:

“When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations,” he said.

As I noted when the war started after hearing Trump's intent, America has a maximalist objective and a Plan B:

Trump strongly implies that the campaign is a drive-by attack that he hopes Iran’s opposition can exploit—but it is up to them to win the fight.

Plan A was the more expansive regime change plan that Israel was mostly working on. Plan B was settling for striking Iran enough to weaken their nuclear industry, their military, their defense industry, their leadership, and their economy. 

Then we shifted focus to a blockade instead of kinetic efforts to squeeze Iran into negotiating what amounts to a surrender deal that prevents Iran from getting nuclear weapons. And maybe regime change is made more likely.

Has America has decided to take the exit to collect an interim Plan B victory?

The Trump administration is arguing that the war in Iran has already ended because of the ceasefire that began in early April, an interpretation that would allow the White House to avoid the need to seek congressional approval.

The statement furthers an argument laid out by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during testimony in the Senate earlier Thursday, when he said the ceasefire effectively paused the war. Under that rationale, the administration has not yet met the requirement mandated by a 1973 law to seek formal approval from Congress for military action that extends beyond 60 days.

This interpretation poses a dilemma for war opponents. No president of either party has ever accepted the validity of the War Powers Resolution. Even when presidents have reported to Congress, the wording "consistent with" rather than "pursuant to" was used to reject the idea that the president must report. If the administration's interpretation is challenged, it risks a trip through the courts that ends in declaring the 1973 law unconstitutional. As it likely is.

And consider that by Friday when I read about that war power act interpretation, Trump had a briefing on military options going forward:

Top U.S. military leaders including Adm. Brad Cooper, the head of U.S. Central Command, will brief President Donald Trump later on Thursday on potential military action against Iran, a U.S. official told Reuters. 

Did the president decide no bombardment or landing option is worth the effort at this point? Did he decide we already got the most bang for the buck already? Both against Iran and in a political context?

Will the momentum of declaring the war over for purposes of dealing with Congress expand to define the ongoing war (47+ years and still going)? Domestic needs could thicken that linkage. Is the blockade going to be an aggressive form of sanctions enforcement that doesn't rise to the legal level of war?

Will CENTCOM then be on a hair trigger if Iran opens fire anywhere to launch large retaliatory attacks to "mow the grass" inside Iran? Such defensive actions would not trigger the war powers resolution.

If this is the decision and not a pause before resuming the kinetic campaign, this is a military victory. Iran's military, nuclear program, and regime have been hammered. 

But it is not a war-winning victory that replaces the mullah regime. Iran's rulers, after reviewing the results, still insist it endured but a flesh wound. And if we're nice and accept their demands they will admit the war was a draw:

Do not become confused. The 47-year war that Iran started continues. Do not forget that. Iran's mullahs will try to regenerate their missing limbs if we let them. Just as they did after Israel smashed Iran's proxies and after Midnight Hammer that complemented Israel's strike campaign.

So as we go forward in the long war against Iran's mullah regime, don't focus on your worry. Focus on causing worry in Tehran. 

UPDATE: The diplomatic stalemate continues:

U.S. President Donald Trump said on Friday he was not satisfied with the latest Iranian proposal for talks on the Iran war, while Iran's foreign minister said Tehran was ready for diplomacy if the United States changes its approach.

But who is weakening behind the firm stances? Or will the war resume? 

UPDATE: America seeks to open the Strait of Hormuz to take away Iran's hope of outlasting our will to blockade Iran:

The U.S. military said it fired on Iranian forces and sank six small boats targeting civilian ships as it moved to reopen the Strait of Hormuz on Monday. The United Arab Emirates, a key American ally, said it had come under attack from Iran for the first time since a fragile ceasefire took hold in early April.

We'll see how Iran votes. And whether we vote harder. 

UPDATE: Project Freedom:

[The] U.S. is not formally escorting individual ships. Instead, the military has built up a multi-layered buffer that includes aircraft, watercraft, airborne early warning systems and electronic warfare assets to help neutral vessels complete their transits. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Britain's Naval Strategy Gets Inverted

Russia's revived military antagonism has reversed the post-Soviet Royal Navy mission.

The problem Britain has defending waters in Europe from a revived Russian threat has left the defense of British interests and possessions around the globe short of naval assets. Britain can't afford to spare its more capable ships and subs for a global role. 

Britain must build new ships not fit for the line of battle in home waters but capable of flying the British flag around the globe:

Given limited resources, HM Government should therefore procure smaller, cheaper ships to provide greater global presence and better protection of British interests[.]

Before Russia went all "death or glory" to revive its empire in Europe by invading Ukraine, Britain was planning to use its high-end fleet globally:

As Britain moves to an off-shore military role around the globe, Britain stands up Vanguard Strike Companies. ...

It sounds like these units are the means of calling down the lightning bolts from Britain's carrier-centric fleet and possibly land-based air power to support a Thin Red Line ashore in support of allies.

But just as the rise of the Kaiser's navy forced Britain to concentrate naval power in home waters, the sociopath Russians have made British homeland defense something that can't be assumed. Yet global interests remain. And there is no global fleet to call home.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Painting of Scapa Flow from Pinterest.

Battle Management

Ukraine has a constantly evolving list of who is naughty and who is nice on the battlefield. But is it really useful for NATO? Or for Ukraine in a different type of war?

Ukraine has a system to identify units on the battlefield to strike them quickly:

Ukraine has developed the Delta digital battle management system. With Delta, Ukrainian soldiers can detect a target and pass that data to an attack drone operator, who then destroys the target. The Delta system software dramatically reduces the time between detection and attack. ...

Using an AI/Artificial Intelligence system the Ukrainians can track over 10,000 Russian weapons systems, troop positions and drone operators each week. The map of these contacts is continually updated as the Russians move or are destroyed. At the same time Ukrainian commanders can also see the positions and movements of their own troops. This has dramatically reduced the incidents of friendly fire when Ukrainian soldiers are hit by Ukrainian drones or artillery fire.

That sounds great. NATO forces should be able to operate with that kind of speed. But is it just using recon drone data? Or can it use manned aircraft, satellites, signals intelligence, and even troop reports from the front?

Is the system optimized for--or just reliant on--Ukraine's static war? Could it function in a moving battle? Especially the ability to track friendly forces to avoid friendly fire.

I'm asking because while I want to learn from the Winter War of 2022 I do not want to simply copy the Winter War of 2022's lessons for Ukraine and for Russia from the conditions they face in the war right now. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from here.

Undermining Deterrence

Our freedom undermines the success of our military in demonstrating reasons not to test us in battle. Nothing we can do about that--our freedom is what we defend, after all--but it is a real problem with trying to measure deterrence.

Via Instapundit we have this cold bucket of water on our demonstrated military capabilities against mullah-run Iran:

It’s almost impossible to win a war any more given the disgustingness of today’s information space between American grifters, social media incentives for disinformation-fueled clicks and nefarious foreign influences posing as America First.

Sadly, even when we win on the battlefield our enemies know that we are vulnerable at home to losing. Which is a truth known since the Athenians defeated the Persians at Marathon. Iran--and China--will exploit our weakness.

Again, I would never suggest that we suppress freedom of speech to prevent this problem. That would cause more problems. Even communist scum in America have freedom of speech. I just hope shame may eventually constrain the, ah ... enthusiastic .. expression of the right of dissent. A right that oddly is not met with mass arrests from our Orange Hitler regime.

Nor can I imagine the Iranian fanatics not drawing hope from the Saturday night assassination attempt against the president and whoever else would have gotten in the way (which included an officer who was hit but protected by his body armor) had he not been stopped outside the ballroom. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from AFP.

When All You Have is a Drone

Ukraine and Russia to a lesser extent rely on battlefield drones as their primary tactical hammers. And so see every problem as a nail that must be pounded into the ground no matter how many blows it takes. What if either used another tool?

This is interesting:

An up-armored Leopard 1A5 tank belonging to the Ukrainian army’s 5th Heavy Mechanized Brigade shrugged off 52 first-person-view drones in a daylong bombardment, according to a new report from Ukrainian publication Defense Industry.

Every time I read about one of these mass FPV suicide drone attacks I wonder why an anti-tank gun or anti-tank missile wasn't used. With a tank optimized to stop small drones, wouldn't a direct-fire anti-tank weapon drill through the drone protection? The basic Leopard I is a very thinly armored tank. Even well-armored tanks are weaker away from the frontal arc.

I understand that if the tank is being attacked well behind the front "line" that direct-fire weapons can't be used. But I just get the impression that Ukraine and Russia use the FPV drones because that's what they have and not because it is the best weapon in the combined arms kit for the particular mission. 

Without a static front line with a very wide No-Man's Land, how could armies rely on firing so many drones at a single armored vehicle? Shouldn't direct fire be more in the mix?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the essay.