How the Enemy Votes

Iran hit American bases hard at the beginning of the air campaign early this year. Enemies will do that.

I was fully aware that Iran hit our forces hard despite the lack of public battle damage assessment. This shows what Iran did:

Iran's strikes on more than two dozen U.S. bases in the Middle East focused on early-warning systems before hitting aircraft and buildings, causing billions of dollars in equipment damage, according to an Associated Press analysis. 

It isn't that the U.S. didn't anticipate the threat. I noted the dispatch of defensive weapons before the American-Israeli campaign began, including new anti-drone weapons. But the proximity of American bases to Iran made the Iranian threat far worse than we apparently anticipated.

Further, this exposed our general failure to build both passive defenses to endure what we cannot shoot down (or destroy before launch) and the capability to rapidly repair what is damaged. That is less Future Warfare than flashy high-tech--especially drone-based--weapons.

The investigation also notes we pulled forces back from the exposed bases. Which is a good adaptation to cope. And I noted at the time that the damage Iran inflicted did not halt our ability to continue the strike campaign.

If strikes resume, I hope we prepared magazine depth, passive defenses, repair capabilities, and created better ability to strike the Iranian launchers before they fire. 

In related areas, the value of Google at war.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: The satellite image is from the cited article "taken over Naval Support Activity Bahrain on July 23, 2026, displaying extensive damage to the satellite communications system and warehouses. (© Airbus DS 2026 via AP) (Airbus DS via AP)."

Beware of What You Wish For: European Edition

If Europeans rearm uncertain of America's intentions, they will increasingly buy their own weapons. And have their own foreign policies. Hilarity may not ensue.

Britain, France, Germany, and Poland could move away from American weapons purchases if America draws down too much or with too much uncertainty:

A rapid, uncoordinated U.S. military drawdown from Europe could push key NATO allies further away from American weapons over the long term, according to a new RAND study, a shift the authors say would hurt the U.S. defense industrial base.

Well, yes. America has been telling other NATO members they must do more to defend themselves for decades. And that naturally risks allies building their own weapons if they think they can't count on the U.S. for the spares and ammo to use them.

And if our allies have their own weapons? Well, that alliance feature we have mistaken for a bug could cause problems, eh? This isn't to say Europeans are more prone to war than any other people. But we may not like the war Europeans fight. No more than they like all that we fight.

And if European combatants are stronger, America may not have the strength to quickly intervene--and be forced to watch nervously from afar. 

Mind you, if we had maintained our defense industrial base sufficient to remain the Arsenal of Democracy, allied rearmament wouldn't have to mean allies rebuilding of their own defense industries in ways that undercut our own. 

Yet this is our wish.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Map from National Geographic.

NOTE: I used this for a slightly expanded version on Substack. 

21st Century Camp Followers

Ukrainian soldiers at the front receive valuable help from friends and family. But I worry about the long run even as I recognize the need to survive the short run.

Ukrainian soldiers don't wait for the military procurement system to deliver what they need:

Once in the military, new soldiers reach out to friends and family back home for needed equipment, especially drones. The development of drones in Ukraine was enhanced by all the friends and family members of Ukrainian soldiers who didn’t just send their soldiers what they said they needed, but searched around on the internet, social networks, and among friends for ideas and help in developing those ideas into something useful in a combat zone.

I noted this resource early in the war. And more than supplies are possible. But I do worry that the effort could be twisted in ways that harm the Ukrainian war effort. Still, more than four years after I issued a caution, the system still seems beneficial.

In related areas, the value of Google at war.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

The Winter War of 2022 Adjusts to America’s Elections

 

Russia has decided to try to break the Ukrainian people rather than break the Ukrainian ground forces. This change in strategy coincides with America’s mid-term elections that led to Democrats controlling Congress (starting early next year). This this could lead to greater open support for Ukraine. Or just more angry talk about Putin. We shall see if it wrecks a chance to “flip” Russia into a frenemy alliance against China, which poses a threat to both America and Russia. Or maybe Putin thinks he is now on deadline to either win the war or cut a deal with Trump while he can. The Russian winter aerial blitz on Ukraine’s civilians may be the campaign that decides which way Putin—or his sudden successor—goes.

Head on over to Substack for the essay. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Fighting Under an Enemy Microscope

In case you missed it on Substack: The Proto-EABO Battle of Wake Island

In case you missed it on Substack: Punching Through the Reconnaissance Strike Complex

In case you missed it on Substack: American Support for the Defense of Ukraine

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

The FPV Suicide Drone-Artillery Convergence

I have viewed FPV suicide drones as a form of artillery. The branches are converging.

The Army and the manufacturer conducted a significant live fire test for the HIMARS rocket:

A GMLRS rocket normally follows a programmed trajectory using satellite-assisted inertial guidance, making it effective against fixed positions but less suited to targets that relocate during flight. Introducing an external targeting update creates another engagement option without requiring the launcher to fire a replacement rocket.

In a statement published on October 28, 2026, Lockheed Martin confirmed that the demonstration involved launching a GMLRS rocket from an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), followed by an in-flight target update transmitted through the Strigo datalink and Remote Interceptor Guidance-360 (RIG-360) system. The rocket successfully changed its target assignment and destroyed the moving objective. 

I think FPV suicide drones are simply a form of artillery. 

As artillery converges with FPV suicide drone capabilities, will it make sense to emphasize FPV suicide drones?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article. Also, I have a small amount of Lockheed Martin stock. 

Apres le Mauvais Homme Orange, le Deluge

The budding romance between Canada and the European Union will not last the end of the Trump presidency. The two use each other to tweak the Bad Orange Man. But their visions of what they want overlap nowhere else. Face it, they are friends with temporary political benefits.

While Canada needs close defense and economic ties with America, Canada wants a little room to maneuver alongside other sovereign middle powers. And defying the Bad Orange Man is good politics for Prime Minister Carney. 

The European Union resents America--regardless of who is president--for being a speed bump on the EU path to stripping away the prefix of their proto-imperial entity. Tweaking Trump by romancing Canada is using Canada as cannon fodder to achieve an ever closer union in Europe. And the hot European chick might just be a bloc tease:

The EU has backed away from its offer to Canada to start talks on becoming an "associate member" after disagreements between member states just as an EU-Canada summit was set to begin in Montreal.

So don't expect too much from this new relationship:

Canada’s prime minister wants to help build a new world order that can counterbalance the power of the United States and China. But his vision depends on a new relationship with a Europe that doesn’t see itself as a middle power at all. 

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has a different vision: a Brussels-centered bloc that extends the EU’s economic and geopolitical influence, starting with Canada. 

Unless Canada decides it doesn't mind being the "51st state" of the EU. But until their ugly breakup, they'll always have a magical honeymoon in Montreal.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article. 

Holding the Line in the First Island Chain

There are strategic and military risks operating forward in the First Island Chain close to China's military power. But there are strategic risks of standing off.

This is correct about America's military strength in the First Island Chain of the western Pacific:

The United States will never be able to peer inside of Xi’s head, but he must know that gambling on conflict in the Pacific could earn his place in history as the unifier of China or risk defeat, his legacy, and the stability of the Chinese Communist Party regime. Will he be more likely to take that wager with the presence or absence of forward-postured US forces? History points to the answer. The United States demonstrating a strong hand in the first island chain will help Xi recognize that war is a bad bet.

Yet forward-deployed forces on the first island line are vulnerable. But allies left on their own at the first island chain may wobble.

So it is a delicate balance between deterring with presence; preserving forces with distance; considering whether China is tempted to attack or is deterred; and reassuring or frightening our allies along the first island chain line.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Map from Taipei Times.