The Winter War of 2022 Says "This Time For Sure"

Russia's 2026 primary offensive season kicked off with armored combat vehicles again part of Moscow's arsenal. This time for sure? Or is Russia's home front getting unstable? Will the fires spread?

Russia again intensified their ground attacks against Ukraine:

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces intensified ground attacks across the theater in the last week, which is — consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have launched their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.

Russia's tired troops who may no longer have any delusions about their chances of survival will go up against Ukrainians who once again have to endure the Russian hammer blows.

And Russia's economy seems to be reaching its limits:

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly requested that Russia’s top businessmen provide funding for the Russian government, indicating that the Kremlin may be growing desperate for economic relief and may be setting conditions to nationalize their assets to support the war effort.

Yet if Russia's troops, people, or financial pillars can't endure this pace of war, going on the strategic defensive may not only be domestically risky but give Ukraine its opening. 

Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to counter-attack successfully this year. But can Ukraine's ground forces expand that to a counteroffensive if the opportunity presents itself? The possibility still seems open notwithstanding the beginning of Putin's latest Big Push:

Ukrainian counterattacks continue to make gains in southern Ukraine, creating operational and strategic effects against Russian forces going into the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt.

And Ukraine's strategic bombing campaign is growing in scale and reach:

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure near the Baltic Sea on the night of March 26 to 27, marking the fourth strike in five days against Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast.

One aspect of Ukraine's war effort is focusing on destroying Russia's air defense assets. This can aid either the ground or strategic bombing efforts by opening the door for more bombardment or troops support. Even Ukraine's small air force could add their weight to those battles instead of being kept mostly on air defense missions. 

Will Putin's need to finally win this war before the stresses building up in the ground forces, economy, and population openly crack a foundation of the war effort? Will Ukraine recognize an opportunity even if they have the forces to attack on a larger scale?

UPDATE (Monday): Predictions of stresses breaking Russia's war effort have been repeated over the last four years:

Russia can no longer afford its war in Ukraine. Since 2022 Russia has spent nearly $700 billion and lost 1.3 million troops, with over a million Russian men fleeting the country to avoid the war. There is a labor shortage and a growing number of protests against the war and its human losses and growing poverty.  

Yet the stresses never broke Russia. But the stresses are real. One day the effects will happen. And perhaps Russia's rulers will ignore real signs because they endured past false predictions of doom.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Image from ISW.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Israel Returns to the Hezbollah Problem

In case you missed it on Substack: Securing Ground Lines of Communication

In case you missed it on Substack: Combined Arms and Joint Warfare

In case you missed it on Substack: Geography, Strategy and U.S. Force Design (and to my eternal shame I forgot my Oxford comma in the title)

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Let's Not Pretend European Freelancing is New

Europe may deal with Russia separately from America. Don't act as if this is new.

Oh?

If the United States pursues its own deal with Russia to end the Ukraine War, it cannot expect the Europeans to refrain from engaging with Russia on their own.

Ah, the old European "strategic autonomy" goal. Which means the European Union. Which means that the EU doesn't actually care about Russia policy. The EU cares about the authority to have a Russia policy. 

Europeans can pretend this is America's fault. But during the Cold War, Europeans reached out to the Soviet Union separately from unified NATO action. Remember Ostpolitik? Mind you, I concede they had reasons to worry. 

But don't pretend Europeans would be happy if America was aggressive in its leadership in Europe through NATO. Or in the Middle East, for that matter. It's a geopolitical Goldilocks problem. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of Ostpolitik in action from this site.

Geography, Strategy and U.S. Force Design

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Geography shapes America’s strategy, which shapes American military strategy, which shapes force structure in unique ways that our Eurasian allies and enemies do not reflect given their own geography. Since the 1898 Spanish-American War, America transitioned from holding our ground against stronger European military powers sailing here to intervening in Europe (and then Asia) to prevent threats from growing to a size to cross an ocean and threaten America directly. And the military capabilities of our allies and potential enemies influence our force structure and foreign policy, including a decision to use military force.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Thickening the Thin Blue Line in INDOPACOM

The Air Force is reinforcing the Navy for the job of sinking enemy ships.

The Iran War has demonstrated the ability of American air power to sink ships.

This is needed when scarce air bases close to China for tactical aircraft are well within China's aircraft and missile reach:

U.S. naval aviation equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles and a B-2 stealth bomber held an integrated maritime strike exercise off California, the Air Force announced Tuesday.

Fighters from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11 – the naval aviation component of the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group – trained alongside at least one Spirit strategic bomber from the 509th Bomb Wing, flying from Whiteman Air Base, Mo., at an unspecified date.

I worry about risking our carriers within China's A2/AD envelopes. But by working with appropriately equipped and trained land-based planes to create a temporary bubble of protection so carriers can dash in and strike before retiring, the carrier wartime role in the western Pacific may be feasible.

We don't have many B-2s. But we will have many B-21s able to do what we test today.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

Combined Arms and Joint Warfare

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

The Iran War of 2026 is impressive in the ability of air power to kill bad people and break their things. It provides positive and negative lessons about the importance of combined arms and joint operations. I look at three broad lessons already evident.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Air Defense Returns to European Cities

Europeans are remembering the value of homeland air defense. 

Belgium will defend the Antwerp region with NASAM air defense missiles to defeat a drone threat:

Belgium's Prime Minister Bart De Wever said the Port of Antwerp-Bruges will get its own anti-aircraft defenses by next year, as the Belgian government moves to fortify one of Europe's most critical trade gateways. 

The title says the defense will be with anti-aircraft guns. But the text says missiles. I say guns are the way to go for volume against lots of cheap suicide drones. But missiles will work against more expensive threats.

Still, Belgium is rightly restoring priority for air defense as a logical response to the new threats. We need to protect those land corridors from the ports to NATO's eastern front. If the Winter War of 2022 and the Iran War of 2026 aren't driving home the lesson, I don't know what will.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from this site.

Securing Ground Lines of Communication

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Drones in many ways are just new forms of a threat that ground forces once had to take into account to carry out operations. To be fair, the revived unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threat to lines of communication (LOC) in the Winter War of 2022 is easier to carry out than old means of insurgents, partisans, special forces, or newer air-or artillery-delivered mines. But that just means the old methods need to be restored and updated. ... [CONTINUE READING]

In For a Penny

The big news is that a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division has been ordered to CENTCOM. Other ground forces will be available, too. What could they do?

This is the big news:

The Pentagon is preparing to deploy about 3,000 troops from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East, adding to the thousands of Marines already headed to the region to assist with operations in Iran.

Separately I heard that the division's headquarters element is going, too, so it could command more troops and coordinate joint support for the units it commands.

One Marine Expeditionary Unit (a reinforced battalion) is in the area and another is heading there. 

Add in rumors of special forces flowing into Jordan that I read elsewhere. That might include a Ranger battalion.

And we have artillery and helicopters in the region taking part in the war. And air and naval power, of course.

Another Army infantry battalion is in Djibouti, but I assume it remains a regional reserve force. We used to rotate an Army brigade through Kuwait, but I see nothing recent about that. But throw in a set of equipment in Kuwait for an Army brigade that could be manned by troops flown in.

America isn't massing an invasion force, for sure. But it could do a number of things: Capture Iranian-controlled islands in the Strait of Hormuz; capture Iran's Kharg Island oil export hub; defeat an Iranian ground attack through southern Iraq and into Kuwait; deploy to Iraq's Kurdish region to shield Iranian Kurds fighting Iran by providing a sanctuary; attack pro-Iran Iraqi militias; secure Iranian enriched uranium to move it out of the country; other raids into Iran; or base/embassy security.

The Strait of Hormuz mission seems the most likely.

Kharg makes no sense to me. Capturing it would destroy it during the battle. Why not bomb it if that is the end result? And the Marines there would be a missile (and drone) magnet for Iranian forces on the mainland. We can more easily blockade the island or lay naval mines around the island. But who knows? Maybe there is an angle I'm not seeing.

With artillery and air power, defeating a desperate Iranian offensive should not be a problem with American and Kuwaiti forces. Hopefully Iraq would resist an invasion. But just being attacked that way would be a shock. 

Deploying to the Kurdish region of Iraq to establish a sanctuary for Iranian Kurds to rest and regroup could be a mission if the war gets to the revolt stage in Iran. We did drop the 173rd Airborne Brigade (stationed in Italy) in Iraq's Kurdish region to support them in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 

We and the Israelis already bombard pro-Iran militias inside Iraq. Hitting them with ground troops to add to the damage and capture or scatter them would be useful. This is Phase IX of the Iraq War, after all. 

The most ambitious would be Army and Marine combat units plus special forces landing inside Iran to secure Iran's enriched uranium. This seems more likely to be a post-conflict operation that Iran agrees to. But perhaps we know where the uranium is and we think we can reach it, secure it, use air power to keep the Iranians from massing troops to attack in forces, and move it out by loading it on ships or flying it out. But I really doubt it. 

Related, I suppose it could be for another type of raid on the mainland. Special forces going in with big units as reserves in case things get hairy. Think Blackhawk Down territory--but without the FUBAR part.

Finally, maybe it is just to reinforce base security in case Iran starts infiltrating their covert guys into the Arab states. We don't want a Khobar Towers or Beirut Barracks attack, eh? Or another embassy attack like Tehran or the Benghazi consulate one.

Those are the missions that I see right now as possible. As I've noted, Iran is too large even for the entire Army and Marine active and reserve forces to pacify. Too big. Too many people. Too mountainous. And too many religious nutballs willing to fight us.

Really, in some ways it seems like standard operating procedure for coping with mullah-run Iran. That deployment looks familiar, no?

UPDATE (26MAR26): Confirming story about the 82nd Airborne deployment:

Elements from the 82nd Airborne Division headquarters and a brigade combat team will deploy to the Middle East, the Pentagon confirmed in a statement Wednesday.

UPDATE (29MAR26): Next phase?

Thousands of US Marines would be sent to the Middle East to conduct raids that include Special Operations forces and conventional infantry troops, the Washington Post reported, citing sources.

Interesting. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Map adapted from WorldAtlas.com

Israel Returns to the Hezbollah Problem

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Israel is edging toward an invasion of Lebanon to make a serious attempt to destroy Hezbollah. The effects of the aerial pounding that decimated and suppressed Hezbollah have worn off. I’ve long held a deep multi-division ground raid into Lebanon is required.

That Israel has resumed ground combat operations in Lebanon calls into question their victory through air power theory about defeating Hezbollah. It also raises the issue of whether Israel believes the American-Israeli strike campaign against Iran can set the conditions for the overthrow or collapse of the mullah-run Iranian regime.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Fear is the Beginning of Wisdom

When an enemy issues a threat, too many here quake in their boots. And when one of our leaders makes a threat to the enemy, too many here quake in their boots. Stop that. 

General Grant put it well to his subordinates during the 1864 Wilderness Campaign after they pestered him with worries about what Lee could do when Grant's army marched:

Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.

Precautions are good. But force protection is not the objective when America goes to war (quoting my 1997 Iran-Iraq War paper):

Our soldiers' lives are indeed valuable, and our country's insistence that we minimize risks to them is laudable (as well as being necessary due to the small size of the Army). Undue concern, however, is false compassion and, as was the case for Iraq in 1980, could result in even greater casualties in a prolonged war should we refuse - because of the prospect of battle deaths - to seize an opportunity for early victory.

Obsessing on force protection measures should not paralyze our war effort. Our enemies should spend more time terrified about what America will do to them. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Portrait from here.

The Winter War of 2022 Peeks Behind the Facade

Did Ukraine's winter counter-attacks expose the Russian ground force juggernaut as a hollow facade? Is this just the most apparent problem? Things seem different enough from the continuity of the big picture over the last several years to make me wonder if Russia has serious problems.

The war goes on. But things seem ... different:

Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026.

ISW in early March assessed the Ukrainian counter-attacks exploiting Russia's loss of Starlink communications:

The cascading effects that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions have generated in other sectors of the front show how constrained the Russian force structure in Ukraine really is.

And as the counter-attacks have continued, ISW stated:

Ukrainian counterattacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are forcing Russia to redeploy forces and means from other areas of the frontline and likely from operational level reserves.

If Russia needs more than local reserves to cope with apparently smaller scale counter-attacks, what does this say about the supposed juggernaut of Russian troops that continues to grow? 

Over the last couple years I've repeatedly called into question the reality behind the image of a relentless steamroller that Russia tries to create with reports of always expanding troop numbers:

I have strong doubts that Russia is managing to increase the raw numbers of its troops fighting inside Ukraine to continue its grinding offensive as long as it takes. Does Putin have a Potemkin Invasion Force? Would he even know he only has that?

Russia has maintained the strategic initiative with continuous attacks somewhere along the long front. This helps to conceal any Russian weaknesses on the ground. Ukraine exposed the weakness in its August 2024 offensive into Russia's Kursk region. There are probably more such weak points. Ukraine's strategic defensive strategy of trading space for time to inflict much heavier casualties on the Russians than the Ukrainians suffer has supported Russia's strategy, in effect, by leaving those Russian weak points untested.

How much will Ukraine's counter-attacks cascade? Can Ukraine's new corps formations exploit this to create a counteroffensive? 

Russia is still living in another world:

The Kremlin is likely setting informational conditions to expand Russian demands of Ukraine and NATO by making it clear that its current demands are no longer sufficient.

Really? Putin and what army? 

Could this troop shortage I've suggested exists, if true, push Putin--if he is aware of it--to change course to end the war? 

Are Russia's threats to NATO at Narva, Estonia, and aid to Iran to target American and allied targets around the Persian Gulf desperate efforts away from the main war to change the apparently ... different ... situation in their invasion of Ukraine? 

And (okay, this is my last string of conditional events that lower the overall odds of it happening) would that plan explain Russia's new efforts to be able to shut down the Internet in Russia? Can't have angry or confused Russians using it to express opposition, eh? Tip to Instapundit.

I've often said I try not to let my hopes guide my analysis. It is difficult. But there is an opposite problem. When the situation has been mostly the same for years, it is easy to assume current trends will continue. 

Is this a blaring alarm about Russia's capacity to wage war?

Russia suffered its deadliest day of the year in Ukraine on Tuesday, losing more than 1,700 troops in 24 hours.

Ukraine’s general staff said it had killed or wounded 1,710 Russian troops on March 17 and destroyed 29 artillery systems as well as 230 vehicles and fuel tankers.

It could just be a bigger example of the same old thing as Russians batter themselves against Ukraine's defenses. Russia is now using armored vehicles again:

Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline, possibly as part of intensified preparation for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.

Perhaps Russia over the past year got the Ukrainians used to fighting infantry assaults and calculates that resuming mechanized assaults with accumulated armored vehicles will break those defenses optimized for slower attacks.

Maybe. But things seem ... different ... now. 

UPDATE (Monday): This certainly doesn't contradict my gut feeling (that is hopefully a distillation of lots of data points bouncing around in my head):

Even with all this money spent on recruiting, after four years of war in Ukraine and over 1.3 million soldiers killed, disabled or missing in combat, Russia is having problems recruiting soldiers. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Map of Ukrainian gains in this year's counter-attacks from ISW.