Reconstituting Combat Ineffective Units

In post-Cold War limited wars, either in size and time for conventional campaigns or in intensity for counter-insurgency missions, the U.S. Army hasn't had to worry about reconstitution in anything but post-war action or via scheduled troop rotations, respectively. Great Power Competition ground combat will chew up units in ways we haven't experienced in a long time.

This is excellent: 

Despite publishing new reconstitution doctrine in 2021, the US Army lacks a clear operational-level model for reconstituting formations during combat.¹ The core challenge is how theater armies generate, restore, and integrate combat power while sustaining momentum against a peer adversary. 

To address this gap, US Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) developed a theater-level reconstitution concept that serves as the foundation for this article. The concept emerged from recent operational planning and exercise analysis and represents the first detailed framework in decades focused on rebuilding combat power during large-scale combat operations. Designed for theater armies, it provides a practical model for regenerating divisions.

Whatever else we may say about the poor quality of Russia's ground forces invading Ukraine, Russia is reconstituting their units to keep fighting the war they are in. The author looks to Amereican World War II and Ukrainian Winter War of 2022 examples.

One lesson is that we don't have the volume of maneuver units to have the luxury of pulling depleted units back to safe sanctuaries to reconstitute them. Reconstitution may have to take place on or near the front. 

We need to prepare now to fight the kind of campaign we want to fight for as long as it takes to win. If not, we may reconstitute at the level Russia is achieving and be forced to fight a Russian-style campaign. Without the willingness to lose lots of troops. Which means we lose the war. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Figure from the article. 

The Winter War of 2022 Hopes Quagmire is the Path to Victory

 

Russia’s war is dragging on with heavy casualties and damage to Russia’s economy. Putin seems to be edging toward mobilization of civilian reserves to compensate for insufficient recruiting evident this year. Ukraine may be winning right now, but it is nowhere near a decisive edge. And Ukraine is suffering tremendously. Will Putin be able to add to the pressure with mobilization and finally break Ukraine on the ground? Or will mobilization break Russia’s home front in its core European region and make internal unrest far more dangerous for Putin than Ukraine is?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: The Mostly Peaceful Human Wave Assault on Spain

In case you missed it on Substack: The Transparent Battlefield Arrives!

In case you missed it on Substack: Looking For Mr. Good Cohesion

In case you missed it on Substack: Plan B in the Eastern Mediterranean Takes Shape

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section. 

Big Air Force Fighter Drones?

The first Fury pilot-less fighter jet for the Air Force was built. Is this an evolutionary dead end?

High-end Air Force drone fighter planes:

Fury, also designated the FQ-44, is Anduril’s semi-autonomous fighter aircraft being developed for the US Air Force. In June, the Air Force selected Anduril to move the aircraft into production, bringing the programme closer to operational deployment. 

Sometimes I wonder if this kind of loyal wingman that an expensive piloted plane controls to go where it is too risky for crew is an evolutionary dead end. Except for niche missions. For general purpose missions, should we just have cheap flying missile-trucks carrying expensive, very maneuverable air-to-air missiles for air superiority missions? Or carrying longer range air-to-ground missiles for ground strike missions?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

Our Fearsome Planes are Sitting Ducks in CONUS

Using the example of Ukraine's Spider Web attack on Russian airfields is a bit of a problem for justifying better air base defenses in the Continental United States (CONUS). Except for our strategic bomber bases that would justify extreme defenses, I want more basic things first for ordinary air bases.

NORAD: 

Air Force bases inside the U.S. are heavily guarded, but they could fall victim to the same type of spectacular drone attack that struck bomber bases deep inside Russia last year[.]

True. But the Ukraine attack was a special forces strike that took 18 months to execute. 

Start with the basics and expand that:

I am fully onboard the need for ground-based air defense and more basic air base protection measures.

And grant me that I recognized the base defense problem that small drones would pose. And that was before they were armed with explosives and got longer range. 

CONUS is no longer a sanctuary. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from this article.

Hammer of the Gods?

I hope the name doesn't mean we are counting on a silver bullet electronic warfare system to win battles. But if it is simply a useful hammer in the tool kit, I'm okay with that.

The Navy, Army, and Space Force are testing a new electronic warfare system:

Because Hammer of the Gods keeps a low electromagnetic signature, meaning it does not broadcast in a way that makes it easy for an enemy to detect and target, it can push forward into contested areas and deliver what the Army describes as multi-domain effects at the forward edge of operations, essentially projecting electronic warfare capability into the thick of a fight rather than staying safely in the rear.

If it is a defensive weapon, you'd just mount it on your ship or on a vehicle in a platoon, no? 

It sounds like the weapon is supposed to get close to the enemy to crack open their defenses by breaking down their cohesion based on accurate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems to make them vulnerable to our own combined arms attack:

It is an emitter, a piece of hardware that broadcasts electromagnetic signals, built to deliver an expanded suite of command-and-control capabilities alongside a wider set of electronic warfare functions from a highly deployable, low-signature platform. 

I get the Army and Navy. But how is Space Force going to use it? In space against space targets? Dropped from orbit to support Navy and Army forces in combat like the old Rods from God idea? (Even though back then I thought the idea was gold-plated nonsense when precision weapons launched closer to or on the Earth were much cheaper.)

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article.

Spreading Out the Attack Helicopters?

Is spreading out Army helicopters on ships and remote sites the means of sustaining air power in the face of lethal threats to airfields?

An Army Apache attack helicopter operated from the deck of a Navy amphibious warfare ship:

The demonstration shows how the U.S. military is increasing the mobility and survivability of its attack aviation by enabling Apaches to operate from ships, islands and expeditionary sites, complicating an adversary’s ability to target a limited number of fixed airfields across the Indo-Pacific.

If the Army wants more sea platforms for its Apaches, may I suggest The AFRICOM PACOM Queen, that I discussed in Military Review? 

As long as we have these helicopters in our arsenal, sure. Dispersing assets will help. Unless enemy cheap missiles and drones are numerous enough to find and strike any potentially suitable flat area or ship within helicopter range. 

In the long run, drones may be superior to attack helicopters. Even if the drones aren't cheap suicide drones because of the need to put expensive counter-measures on the drones to survive expanding defenses.  

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Picture from the initial article. 

Spanish Civil War in a Hard Drive

The Germans and Italians learned a lot of lessons from the Spanish Civil War before World War II by sending expeditions to fight and learn lessons about weapon design and tactics. Ukraine has made that kind of experience something they can sell without the buyer spending lives by sending an expedition.

That's interesting:

The mass of recorded data generated by the Ukraine conflict is strategically and tactically invaluable for the United States and its allies. ... 

Few militaries have fought a high-intensity drone war at this scale, giving Ukraine an unmatched volume of combat data for training military AI. Successful strikes show AI what works. Failed missions reveal how Russian electronic warfare, camouflage, weather, or air defenses defeated a drone, allowing future software to adapt faster.

That is powerful information that provides Ukraine leverage in defense industry collaboration and diplomacy.

Truly, that which does not kill you makes you stronger. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.