The Eastern Question Reverses Direction

I used to think we have an Erdogan problem. Wait him out and Turkey could return to reliable ally status. I fear he is the symptom of an Islamist problem. And even if that wasn't the case when he was elected, his duration has made this an Islamist problem. And a new Eastern Question.

I believe our government once believed Erdogan would be a great example for Islam by being a "tame" Islamist government still able to align with the West. That is not working out:

Turkey’s accelerating development of ballistic, cruise, and potentially hypersonic missiles should force Washington and Brussels to reconsider whether Ankara is evolving into a stabilizing NATO partner—or a revisionist power armed with increasingly sophisticated strike capabilities.

We thought Turkey could be a good example for Iran, which we also once bizarrely believed could be tamed rather than defeated. Perhaps there was hope that Pakistan, which remains an army barely in control of a country--because of the Islamist-infected population--could be cured, too.

Instead, I fear that either Pakistan and Iran will be potential models for Turkey when its Islamists no longer pretend to be tame as they pursue a return to Ottoman glories. Although they'd be smart to model Iran which always gave hope to Westerners that mythical "moderates" could gain power if only we granted Iran enough concessions.

The Eastern Question may be reversing. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Map from Britannica.

The Winter War of 2025 Sees Continuity During Change

Observers, including myself, see changes in the Winter War of 2022 that seem to indicate a change in fortunes. But few, including myself, are willing to say the tide has turned. Are we at a turning point like the one that took place in the Iran-Iraq War when Iran lost the ability to pound Iraq? Yet nobody could believe that was happening after that feature of the war had lasted so long?

 

The war goes on. We can see and track the frontline and map the targets of bombing raids. But can we see what is behind that image of clarity about a "transparent" battlefield. War itself is cloaked in fog. Hence "the fog of war." But I see faint outlines through the fog. Are they real or my imagination? 

As I wrote back in March about my impression about the war:

I've often said I try not to let my hopes guide my analysis. It is difficult. But there is an opposite problem. When the situation has been mostly the same for years, it is easy to assume current trends will continue.  ...

Maybe. But things seem ... different ... now.  

This year, Russia continues to attack but they aren't doing the Hulk smash! routine like it used to. Indeed, Ukraine has glimmers of success:

Ukrainian forces appear to be regaining the tactical initiative in different sectors of the frontline in Ukraine. 

But just tactical initiative. No big deal in the strategic picture, right? It isn't really that different.

I recall that the Iran-Iraq War settled into a pattern of Iraq sitting on the defensive and Iran sending masses of men (and boys) to their deaths to overwhelm the Iraqi defenders. Nobody could see a way out from that basic fact even as each side sought salvation by attacking the other side's oil revenue (the Tanker War) and civilians (various Wars of the Cities). And when things seemed ... different ... after Iran in January 1987 launched yet another "final offensive" called Karbala V that attempted to take Basra in southern Iraq, nobody explained what was happening as the end of the pattern:

Perhaps 20,000 Iranians died in the battle. Iraq's casualties were about half of Iran's. Iraq's performance is notable in that Iraq withstood and won the kind of brutal bloodletting that supposedly only Iran could endure. Observers at the time saw only that Iran had launched yet another in a seemingly endless series of big offensives. They speculated about how many more of these attacks Iraq could endure. Actually, Iran broke at Karbala Five. It would be many months before observers began to wonder what was wrong with Iran when no further attacks were begun, yet it was true that the "Islamic Revolution bled to death in Karbala V."

People kept waiting for Iran to use its anger at failing to revive yet more Islamist-fueled offensives. But Iran could not. It would not be fully revealed until Iraq launched a big offensive to push the Iranians out of their major accomplishment of taking the Fao Peninsula in 1986:

While Iran continued to insist that ultimately it would be infantry who would decide the war, Iran had already let the usual season pass without launching a major offensive. This failure began to raise questions about what Iran was doing. One answer came in April 1988 when, after fewer than two days of fighting, Iraq recaptured the Fao peninsula with Operation Ramadan. Iraqi regular troops and Republican Guard forces backed by 2,000 tanks and 600 heavy guns plowed south and struck from the Gulf with a supporting amphibious assault. The Iranians were overwhelmed and showed no spirit of resistance. While it is true that the Iraqis outnumbered the Iranians by 8 to 1 odds, the contrast is amazing between April 1988 and February 1986, when Iranians fought hammer and tong for every square inch of worthless swamp on that peninsula. The day that Iranian infantry could not exact a heavy price for the terrain on which they stood was the day that Iran lost the war. April 18, 1988 was that day.

Has Russia truly faltered? Are we refusing to believe the evidence of our lying eyes?

Consider that Russia and China signed "a joint declaration on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations." I have to ask, is this simply a rote repeat of an old theme? Or a sign that Russia has internally admitted it cannot restore Russia's greatness on the battlefield and so must partner with China? Is this a sign that Russia will end their invasion of Ukraine?

And I wonder if this round of flinging nuclear poo and beating their atomic chest is to project military strength before ending the invasion: 

Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine’s allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses.

Could Russia be trying to shape public perceptions to make it seem as if ending the invasion of Ukraine without conquering Ukraine is irrelevant to Russia's national security because of Russia's nuclear might?  

If these are big picture signs supporting the faltering Russian offensive capability theory, can Ukraine do what Iraq did to attack and expose the eclipse of Russia's offensive capability?

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s army settled in to a defensive struggle from fortified lines against Iran. Its army evolved to survive in that environment. Iraq found it needed a mobile army to go on offense. So it built that army.

Ukraine has in fact been attacking and slowly gaining ground at both ends of the southern front for the last several months. Analysts have noted that for the first time in a long time Ukraine has gained more ground than Russia has. And Russia is losing so many troops that it can't replace battlefield losses. Are we in a post-Karbala V period of this war?

Will we see an April 1988 event that finally exposes the Russian threat as hollowed out? 

For years I've considered a Ukrainian offensive to Crimea to be the most logical front to seriously harm Russia. Ukrainian military actions could be shaping the battlefield for such an effort.

Was this a test of capabilities away from the southern front?

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized counterattack in the Borova direction, possibly penetrating up to five kilometers into the Russian defenses. 

Or maybe this is still 1985 and Russia has a lot more offensive life left in them that Putin--overriding some recognition that all is not well--wants to use:

Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to resolve the war on his terms, including fully seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of 2026. 

Maybe I am hoping fluctuations in the pattern are a turning point when in fact they are mere fluctuations in a continuing pattern of Ukraine hanging on as Russia throws body blows on the ground.

How much longer does this "lull" in Russian offensive gains have to go on to suggest things really are different? 

How are Ukraine and Russia judging their offensive and defensive options? 

I can't know. All I can say is that I know things do change--sometimes radically--after we get used to predicting tomorrow will be the same as yesterday. I hope somebody on our side can see deeper into Russia's conditions to tell if things are really ... different. And I hope that Ukraine has been building forces to exploit that turning point if it is taking place.

Perhaps the Russians see the turning point more clearly than we can despite our assessment that the Kremlin is blind to battlefield realities. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Should Canada Join JEF?

In case you missed it on Substack: Controlling the Land ... From the Sea

In case you missed it on Substack: Pearl Harbor as Standard Operating Procedure

In case you missed it on Substack: Are Super Carriers Too Big To Fail

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

I Am the State: North Korea Edition

South Korea has planned precision strikes on North Korean leadership in the absence of its own nuclear deterrent to discourage North Korean nuclear weapons strikes. North Korea has established the death of its leadership as a doomsday trigger to unleash its own nuclear weapons. Hilarity ensues?

Huh:

North Korea has updated its constitution to require a retaliatory nuclear strike if leader Kim Jong Un is assassinated, according to a report. ... 

The revised policy outlines procedures for retaliatory action if North Korea’s leadership is incapacitated or killed.

"If the command-and-control system over the state’s nuclear forces is placed in danger by hostile forces’ attacks … a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately," the updated provision states.

Well, Kim can certainly modify the state's "constitution" as he sees fit. But I'm not sure if he is thinking this through. 

South Korea has planned to deter North Korea's nukes with precision conventional weapons able to go directly for North Korea's leadership--like Kim. 

And there are even indications that should the North Korean state collapse, special ground units would attempt to secure North Korea's nuclear weapons.

But if North Korea will unleash its nukes during the time between losing their leadership and state collapse, South Korea's non-nuclear plans have a serious flaw. 

So what is the under-and-over on how many years before South Korea has nuclear missiles?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo that I turned into a meme from the initial article.

Lethality is Not a Larger Kill Count

Lethality is not only the ability to kill and break things. It is the ability to use killing to break the enemy.

This cannot be said enough:

A lethal unit applies violence that shatters an enemy’s will to fight. It does so with skill, tempo, and aggression that discourages an adversary from standing before it. Lethality is a fusion of advanced technology, rigorous training, and, most critically, a hardened, aggressive, and offensive mindset embedded in organizational culture.

Killing soldiers and breaking their things for the sake of killing and breaking in greater volume is not the key to victory. That just leads to a high-tech, high-tempo clash of phalanxes.

Firepower is one part of an expanded combined arms battle to restore maneuver--and that's where tanks come in with their mobile, protected firepower--by breaking the enemy's will and capability to fight at the point of attack is what is important:

Tanks are not made obsolete by a more transparent battlefield. The impact of tanks is amplified by secure information that surpasses what the enemy has. But tanks are just one more wonder weapon to be slaughtered if not used in combined operations in the right circumstances and at the right time and place. 

Yet I strongly disagree about the "transparent" battlefield angle. Do we have more ways to see the battlefield? Yes. But there will be countermeasures, in time. Ultimately, surprise is created in the mind of the enemy commander. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article.

Blather, Wince, Repeat.

Belief in communism (which is just the magical end state of socialism, remember) is stronger than most religious faiths. No failure discourages the useful idiots.

Useful idiots are a determined bunch: 

While ruthless in their practice of massive violence against civilian populations, Mao and his henchmen succeeded in duping Western sympathizers into viewing them as liberal democrats and reformers, much as Stalin persuaded influential Americans in the 1930s that Communists were just "liberals in a hurry."

When the crash of expectations arrives and denying failure becomes too much even for them to maintain, the refrain of "It wasn't real socialism!" erupts. Thus begins the new search for the Great Red Hope that will be embraced. Until failure requires another cycle.

Blather, wince, repeat. 

Useful idiots never learn. And cause America repeated foreign policy problems to win the same argument again and again against a new generation of true believers with no sense of history.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing. Forgive my raging Ogrephobia to make a point.

Russia Teaches China How Russia's Army Fights. Wait. What?

China is learning from Russia's combat experience. And I'm supposed to believe Taiwan should be the most worried?

This conclusion from Russia's exercises with China about improved cooperation amuses me:

The existing set of military exercises provides the PLA with access to wartime lessons drawn from Russian campaigns in the North Caucasus, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, particularly in the deployment and manoeuvre of large-scale combat forces in expeditionary operations. These exercises also enhance interoperability with the Russian military in terms of operational processes, as well as familiarity with (mainly Soviet-origin) equipment that has demonstrated battlefield effectiveness.

It sounds like Russia is teaching China how Russia fights and how Russian equipment works.

But no cause for alarm! Russia and China are best buddies, with Russia supporting Chinese territorial claims against Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xianjang; while China takes no position on Russian claims in the west.

And that is proof of close relations ... how?

I mean, China doesn't recognize Russia's claims. And Russia limits itself to endorsing specific Chinese claims. No general rule implied! Guess what territory is part of what China doesn't recognize and what Russia doesn't endorse?

That would be Russia's Far East taken from China in the 19th century.

It's bad enough Russia exposed its military as less than great. There is no way Russia should be letting China see Russia's military up close, lest China see Russia as a better target than frenemy.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Oh Those Inscrutable Chinese!

Does the Chinese Communist Party just expect its military to loom menacingly in a long-term effort to convince the Taiwanese to surrender to China?

China's plan is to watch and collect its victory when it arrives?

China wants to unify with Taiwan at the lowest possible cost, and it currently believes that unification will become easier and less costly as time passes. As China develops the military and economic capabilities to deter U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan, it believes that it can compel the island into capitulation without necessarily needing a full-scale invasion. And in the meantime, Beijing is confident that it can prevent Taiwan from trying to become formally independent.

I'll just skip past the possibility that China wishes to appear far when near.

But while I can accept that the Chinese are being patient in the best light, they might also simply be losing their effort to be able to take China by force or by persuasion/threat.

And claiming the Chinese are "playing a long game on Taiwan" drifts dangerously into a view that the Chinese have unique long-range planning abilities. I think that view is bunk:

Chinese rulers unable to think about the long term and simply focused on the short run? Say it ain't so! The culture! The history! The vaguely worded fortune cookie pronouncements! Patience and perspective are in their effing genes, aren't they?

Apparently not.

The Chinese are people, like anyone else. What a radical idea.

All we know is that China hasn't absorbed Taiwan despite it being a long-held core interest. I have no idea if we are entering a danger zone (the Davidson Window) when China is finally prepared to invade Taiwan but before America and our allies have responded to block China. But I seriously doubt China is playing a clever long game. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article.