The Brown Skies of the Air Littoral

I have often raised a skeptical hand when drone purists throw panties at cheap, plentiful First Person View (FPV) drones for recon and strike. Yet I'm no denier, having raised the alarm back in 2018 about the small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) threat to forward American combat units at the tip of the spear. I'm just asking for a little restraint on, ah ... enthusiasm ... for the new weapons.

In Army magazine I called for fighter drones to cover the forward Army ground units in contact with the enemy in a new zone of vulnerability outside of traditional weapons systems. I recognized that Air Force air supremacy would have no effect on that drone threat. I suggested an adaptation of the Navy categorization of the blue, green, and brown waters (at sea, closer to shores, and so close that dirt colors it at the shore and in rivers):

The Army should adapt the Navy continuum to the air domain to better improve air defense for Army ground troops in light of the problems the Air Force has in moving away from the blue skies where air supremacy has been fought for traditionally. The Air Force could lose the black skies of space to a potential independent U.S. Space Force. The brown skies low over the battlefield where dust, smoke and fog dominate the air domain are a challenge to the Air Force's ability to fully protect the Army from aerial threats. If the brown skies above Army units are effectively an extension of the ground domain, how does the Army control that air space for delivering firepower via small UASs and for preventing enemy forces from using rapidly deployed UASs flying low to bypass the Air Force command of the blue skies?

So when I urge caution in over-estimating cheap aerial drones, it isn't that I reject them. I just want them considered one more part of a combined arms fight. Especially as drone counter-measures proliferate--including interceptor drones.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

The Winter War of 2022 Shapes the Battlefield

For years I've considered a Ukrainian offensive to Crimea to be the most logical front to seriously harm Russia. Ukrainian military actions could be shaping the battlefield for such an effort.

Ukraine is continuing to attack south, next to what's left of the Kakhovka Reservoir remaining after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam.

Ukraine's drone attacks behind Russian lines seems to focus a lot on the stretch from Crimea to Rostov, according to maps I've seen on videos but can't find in static form anywhere. But ISW notes the effort:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. ...

Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to impact Russian energy assets and logistics in occupied Crimea. ... [strikes] destroyed Russian capacity to store petroleum products, fuels, and lubricants at one of the three main logistics hubs in occupied Crimea along with Sevastopol and the Kerch Bridge.

The overland route is under attack as well:

Ukrainian Crimea-based partisan group Atesh reported on April 12 that Atesh agents conducted a sabotage operation on an unspecified date that destroyed a Russian locomotive near the Likhovskaya railway station in Rostov Oblast, which [...] Russian forces use to deliver supplies to Zaporizhia Oblast. 

I also heard that Ukraine hit the last fuel ferry that moves train car tankers across the Kerch Strait. If the Ukrainians can drop the Kerch Strait Bridge that it previously just damaged, Russia could have severe problems sustaining their forces in Crimea and on the Kherson front.

Ukraine is even striking the overland route from Russia to Crimea and the Zaporishia front all the way to the Sea of Azov:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Mariupol. 

The Russians do seem to be having problems on the ground on the Zaporizhia front:

Russian forces are reportedly overextended across the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite receiving reinforcements from Russia’s strategic reserve.

And the problem seems more general:

Russian offensive operations have stalled in the past few months while Ukrainian forces advance, often unopposed because there are no Russian troops available to stop them. Ukrainian drone production from local factories have Russian troops fleeing or committing suicide rather than face obliteration by these drone swarms.

Not that Russia's war effort has collapsed. But I did write four weeks ago that the ground war seems different now. As in shifting against Russia. 

The drone swarms do seem to be striking deep behind Russian lines:

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strikes against Russian military objects in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. 

And:

Ukrainian forces continue their frontline strikes against Russian military assets in the Kherson direction. 

And:

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea.

This fits with reports I've read that say Ukraine has begun to win the low-level drone war over the battlefield, as this success on one section of the front after knocking out Russian air defenses shows. 

This may be the source of that battlefield success:

Ukraine's Defence Ministry said on Wednesday it was introducing a ‌new model of operations integrating drone warfare with infantry activity and pointed to successes announced by its top commander in retaking territory from Russian forces in the south of the country. 

If Russia's supply problem and Zaporizhia frontline problems increase, we may finally find out if Ukraine has a strategic reserve available to throw into a counteroffensive. It could be a continuation of the drive south near the reservoir that would be supported by river crossings along the Dnipro River should the Ukrainian drive really start gaining ground.

Note that this would reverse the main effort that I speculated about in the river crossing post.  

Mind you, this is sheer speculation based on bits of information interpreted in ways that support some past notions. It also assumes Ukrainian capabilities I can't confirm. Bit it has been almost three years since the failed 2023 counteroffensive. Surely, Ukraine has made progress in training to create such a force by now, no? And the speculation is based on decades of playing board war games. That's dangerous ground to be on. I have no way to really test my notions by looking deeper into the intelligence to see if it supports or refutes my notion. I'm but a civilian in my figurative basement. So I put it out there. 

But at the heart of my thinking is the belief that Ukraine's commanders and NATO advisors can't possibly be content with--bordering on being inconceivable--sitting on the strategic defensive forever until the Russians give up. Professionals must be thinking about offensive action to actively break part of the Russian ground forces after the defensive war of attrition does its job on the Russian troops. Right? 

Right?! 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: ISW map marked up in imgflip.com.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack:  Decapitation on Taiwan

In case you missed it on Substack:  21st Century Spheres of Influence

In case you missed it on Substack:  Small UAVs Should Be Maneuver Element Tools

In case you missed it on Substack: Quantifying Quality 

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Sure, Blame America for European Defense Deficiencies

Europeans slashed their heavy ground force weapons because they believed Europe was a zone of peace after the Cold War and not because they were prioritizing expeditionary warfare. Also, the Europeans' checks were in the mail and the sun was in their eyes.

I'm calling BS on this: 

NATO allies over two decades reshaped their ground forces in the image of a U.S. Army focused on operations in the Middle East, a decision that explains the loss of combat power in Europe, according to new research. 

Europe’s insufficient arsenal of tanks and heavy artillery is often blamed on tight defense budgets, but a new U.S. Army War College paper argues that the bigger culprit was spending choices centered on lighter expeditionary forces built for Afghanistan.

It sounds like a convenient excuse for Europeans to blame America for Europe's own priorities, as if those countries lack agency. 

It is insane to believe Europeans couldn't send the small contingents they did deploy without getting rid of too many of their tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery back in Europe. Reshaping their ground forces in the Army's image would have allowed that. American troops didn't bring tanks to Afghanistan but retained them in our force structure, just in case.

Europe's lack of tanks--and lack of troops who fight with or without tanks--is on the Europeans.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Chinese Interests in Vladivostok

Will China rename its pact of steel with Russia as the pact of steal?

Fun fact during the Russian civil war sparked by World War I:

At the request of Chinese merchants, 2,300 Chinese troops were sent to Vladivostok to protect Chinese interests there. The Chinese army fought against both Bolsheviks and Cossacks.

Remember when China changed its maps to label Vladivostok as Haishenwai?  

I wonder if China will "get a request" to protect its merchants there again? Could Russia refuse? Russia does owe China quite a bit for its dual-use and economic assistance.

That might leverage the goal of Chinese access to the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River, no? 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of Chinese troops marching near Vladivostok in 1918.

Artificial Intelligence as a Coalition Force Multiplier

Can artificial intelligence (AI) reduce the need for common weapons standards, doctrines, and processes?

Interesting:

Coalition warfare has always been messy. Different procedures, systems, standards, doctrines, and operational caveats complicate and slow coordination at every level of conflict. AI may finally cut through that dynamic to become the connective tissue that makes multinational forces more cohesive and coherent.

This makes sense. I've noted that AI could help make even obsolete weapons more effective within a campaign by maximizing their capabilities for specific missions.

Yet having standardized physical weapons, doctrines, and processes still seems vital. I'd want AI to cope with the differences that creep in despite the common standards rather than let coalition members go wild on their own private Idahos.

And I'd want AI to manage updates to adapt to a changing wartime battlefield without breaking standardization--which the article addresses with its call to make software rather than hardware the realm for updates.

And AI really seems valuable in filtering information flows so that company commanders aren't overwhelmed with irrelevant data that makes them incapable of operating as higher echelons intend.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from Britannica.

Tank Enough Until 2040

The M1-E3 is designed as a bridge to keep the Abrams tank effective in the face of anticipated 2040 threats without continuously adding weight until the Army can design a new 5th generation tank.

The new M1-E3 will incorporate a number of improvements:

A weight reduction of approximately 10 tons from the current SEPv3.

A hybrid-electric diesel engine that will produce some 50 per cent improved fuel efficiency.

An unmanned turret similar to those in contemporary MBT designs is seen in both Europe and Russia. This could reduce crew size from 4 to 3 by incorporating an autoloader. The three crewmen will be seated in the hull.

An advanced set of armor protection developments designed to defeat drone-deployed munitions.

A command and control system that permits Integration with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

An AI-powered threat detection and fire control system.

Some thoughts on designing a new tank. And some more radical thoughts on armament.

I really need to work on updating and improving a much longer article that hit a brick wall at Military Review a couple times.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from article. 

Hearts, Minds, and Dangling Balls in Urban Warfare

While many urban warfare tactics are universal, you need to fight differently when trying to take an enemy city than you would when trying to rescue/separate a city's population from enemy insurgents. 

American urban warfare experience from the Iraq War counter-insurgency campaign is not fully relevant when dealing with an enemy-held urban area, such as ISIL-controlled Mosul. Gaza went beyond even that:

Gaza differed from this experience in several fundamental respects, as Israel did not fight alongside a host nation, but rather against it. In Mosul, there was a legitimate Iraqi government, which at least part of the population supported, and the Islamic State ruled the territory for only two years. Hamas, by contrast, functioned not as an insurgent movement but as the sole authority of the Gaza Strip for almost two decades. Through its control of political institutions, welfare systems, education, and ideological indoctrination, it transformed both society and terrain into a prepared urban battlespace. Polling data from Gaza and the West Bank, including PCPSR surveys from December 2023, show overwhelming public support for Hamas’ October 7 attack and its earlier attacks on Israeli civilians, even when support for Hamas as a governing movement fluctuated.

Under these conditions, Israel could not plausibly expect to win over the local population. Organized anti-Hamas militias and protests against Hamas’ rule emerged only after its military capabilities had been severely degraded late in the war, and even then remained limited. For most of the conflict, the key structural conditions that underpin the Iraq and Afghanistan paradigms — friendly local government and a persuadable population — simply did not exist.

I touched on this difference over a decade ago:

Winning hearts and minds isn't some wimpy alternative to fighting insurgents. It is how you fight an insurgency when the objective is the people themselves. You want their hearts. You can settle for their minds. And when you are pacifying an enemy population, you need to grab the insurgents by the balls so the people's hearts and minds will follow.

And capturing an enemy city defended by that enemy's regular forces is even more dangerous. Doctrine for one situation is not a template for all situations. 

And yeah, don't get me started on the misinterpretation of "proportionality" of the use of force around civilians that just happens to only hamstring Western armies. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of American artillery in Aachen during World War II.