An online journal of commentary, analysis, and dignified rants on national security issues. Other posts on home life, annoying things, and a vast 'other' are clearly marked.
I live and write in Ann Arbor, Michigan. University of Michigan AB and MA from Eastern Michigan University. One term in the Michigan Army National Guard. Former American history instructor and retired nonpartisan research analyst. I write on Blogger and Substack. Various military and private journals have published my occasional articles on military subjects. See "My Published Works" on the TDR web version or under the mobile version drop-down menu for citations and links.
I have finally salvaged my pre-Blogger TDR archives and added them into Blogger. They are almost totally in the form of one giant post for each month. And the formatting strayed from the originals. Sorry.
But historians everywhere can rejoice that this treasure trove of my thoughts is restored to the world.
And for your own safety, don't click on any old Geocities links or any of their similar variations in my posts. Those sites have been taken over by bad and/or dangerous sites. Hover over links first!
A SINKEX provides useful information on weapons performance. It is not a tactical exercise. Yet the drone fever continues to burn and can only be quenched with more cowbell!
A U.S. warship used aerial and maritime drones to
help sink a decommissioned frigate last fall, Fourth Fleet officials
have confirmed, adding that the experience is now shaping how the Navy
will go into future battles.
An old, stationary American frigate. That wasn't defending itself. Or maneuvering. Or even moving, it seems. Or conducting damage control.
Also, the air and sea drones were employed to "help" sink the ship. Again:
The robot formation executed three kinetic strikes against the Simpson as part of live-fire attacks ...
What else helped as part of the UNITAS 25 live-fire attacks? Oh:
Is Russia gearing up for a summer offensive? Or is what we see what they've got? I keep hearing that the Russian ground forces are now combat experienced. But I see an exhausted ground force.
Russian forces are performing poorly on the battlefield and failing to
make operationally significant advances in their ongoing spring-summer
2026 campaign, as Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack and comprehensively strike Russian mid–range targets and deep in the Russian rear.
Russian war supporters wonder why Russia hits symbolic targets in their air war:
Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the May 24 strikes as expensive
but not militarily useful and that the Oreshnik strike against Bila
Tserkva did not have a clear militarily significant target. Milbloggers further criticized the strikes as expensive and as not
contributing to the Russian war effort, while Russian forces are
under-resourced and unable to advance on the frontline.
The appearance of success with missile strikes may now rely on aerial attacks in the absence of a ground war that provides that. You can only pretend to have taken a town from the Ukrainians so many times before people start to notice.
Our Army is stressed. And we need to take actions to counter and
eventually relieve that stress. So far, we seem to be doing that
successfully. Don't confuse this, as Korb seems to do, with the other
problem of being unbalanced--so focused on counter-insurgency that we
are slighting conventional warfighting skills. But once Iraq deployments
slow after victory, the problems of both stress and balance will be
resolved. And we will retain the combat experienced troops for a
generation.
Yet Russia with deaths in over four years of combat (nearly 500,000 according to Britain's GCHQ director) a couple orders of magnitude greater than
America's 4,500 deaths in Iraq over about 6-1/2 years of combat missions
is combat-hardened with hard-won experience against Ukraine? What survivors will make Russian ground forces better in
the next war?
Call me skeptical about seeing bloodied and battered Russian ground force elements and thinking "none shall pass" that awesome array of experienced combat power!
Ukraine has a six-month window in which to seize the battlefield initiative from Russia
and strengthen its hand for peace talks, a senior commander told
Reuters, predicting a “turning point” was imminent after more than four
years of war.
Can Russian ground forces recover? Will a much-discussed Russian mobilization make or break the troops in the field?
The mood among Ukrainian commanders, however, has changed. Russian
attacks are putting less pressure on their units than they did in
previous years. Although drone strikes and shelling remain constant,
Russian combat performance is waning. In Kyiv, there is a growing
optimism that Ukraine can fight Russia to a cease-fire.
Ukraine’s
mood shift is not the result of a radical transformation of how the war
is being fought but rather stems from a subtle turn in several trends
that together point to a major change in the war’s trajectory.
NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
The
Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous
week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on
everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me.
So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest
go in the data dump. Enjoy!
Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.
The Air Force
now has 18 new light attack aircraft that are designed to support
special operations forces on the ground, and it expects to receive “a
handful more” by October, said Lt. Col. Robert Wilson, of Air Force
Special Operations Command, or AFSOC.
The single-engine turboprop OA-1K
Skyraider II is “essentially a Swiss Army Knife of airborne capability,”
that can fly armed reconnaissance, close air support, and precision
strike missions, said Wilson, AFSOC’s armed overwatch requirements
branch chief.
The theory is often talked about in power transition terms. A dominant power may strike a rising power before it can be ascendant. Or a rising power impatient for its anticipated dominance may strike first to accelerate the trend.
There are problems with the data set, too. An obvious one is the U.S.-Japan rivalry that led to war in 1941. Japan's GDP was about 1/8 America's. Where was the threat or promise of a power shift?
And while there is certainly validity to the general observation about competing powers, the data gives it more credibility as a virtual machine that spits out predictable results with the competition inputs. That is merely the color of scientific rigor.
Marine Rotational Force-Darwin 26 was recently certified as a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, marking the first MRF-D unit to earn the certification since the rotational force was established in 2011.
Air supremacy is no longer America's God-given right. Our Cold War--let alone our World War II--anti-aircraft capabilities have eroded just in time for missiles and cheap drones to take aim at our air bases. A sense of urgency is in order given our reliance on air power.
Most of the American aircraft lost from Iranian action were drones and weren’t knocked down while on the ground and so completely irrelevant to the author’s point, but yes:
The days of exposed aircraft sitting safely on runways to prosecute operations unimpeded are over. But not nearly enough U.S. military bases at home or abroad are hardened or sheltered to protect our most capable equipment.
I used to think we have an Erdogan problem. Wait him out and Turkey could return to reliable ally status. I fear he is the symptom of an Islamist problem. And even if that wasn't the case when he was elected, his duration has made this an Islamist problem. And a new Eastern Question.
Turkey’s accelerating development of ballistic, cruise, and potentially
hypersonic missiles should force Washington and Brussels to reconsider
whether Ankara is evolving into a stabilizing NATO partner—or a
revisionist power armed with increasingly sophisticated strike
capabilities.
Instead, I fear that either Pakistan and Iran will be potential models for Turkey when its Islamists no longer pretend to be tame as they pursue a return to Ottoman glories. Although they'd be smart to model Iran which always gave hope to Westerners that mythical "moderates" could gain power if only we granted Iran enough concessions.