Should America have a more explicit set of conditions for assisting Taiwan to prevent China from thinking we believe Taiwan is strong enough to fight without us? Maybe. But don't get carried away.
What happens after deterrence over Taiwan fails?
Much of the American debate over Taiwan concentrates on preventing China from using force in the first place. Strategic ambiguity is defended because uncertainty is supposed to complicate Chinese calculations while discouraging unilateral actions by Taipei. Strategic clarity is advocated because an explicit American commitment might convince Beijing that an attack cannot succeed without bringing the United States into the war. Chen approaches the problem from another direction: deterrence can also be weakened if Washington inadvertently signals that its willingness to act depends on Taiwan satisfying an escalating series of demands.
Um [scratching my head and answering with an uptalk], war?
Which is why I hate planning for deterrence rather than victory.
How we fight will depend on how far along we are on the crawl-walk-run continuum for ground force readiness and cooperation with Taiwan.
Still, ambiguity about American intentions also serves to rein in Taiwan so they don't drag us into a war with China by initiating combat in a crisis, sure we will jump in to bail them out.
Strategy is hard.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
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NOTE: I made the image with Bing.








