As Ukraine holds the line with its drones and artillery, starving the front of infantry, Ukraine also reorganizes some of its forces in new corps formations. What's that for? Outlasting the Russians? Or attacking?
Ukraine has been trading space for time since its failed summer 2023 counteroffensive, inflicting heavy casualties on the Russians. I just don't accept that Ukraine's strategy is to hold on until Russia falters first. At some point, Russia's grinding offensive may take enough to seriously hurt Ukraine:
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months.
While Russian exhaustion could be how the war ends, I can't believe Ukraine's commanders and their NATO friends aren't trying to figure out how Ukraine could seize the initiative somewhere and launch a counteroffensive that will achieve a decisive victory on one section of the front.
Or at least a significant counter-attack to achieve a significant victory over those offensives such as the Poktrovsk region and drive the Russians back from several months worth of advances.
Ukraine is now building corps formations for their army to coordinate their forces better. The shift is dramatic:
Currently, the Ukrainian forces comprise 131 maneuver brigades of various types, supported by 15 artillery brigades, four army aviation brigades, [and] 14 antiaircraft brigades or regiments[.]
The brigades are self contained brigade combat teams, really, not reliant on a division for many assets that a divisional organization would provide. Command above the brigade level is changing:
Command and control (C2) above the brigade level is ad hoc in the form of operational tactical groups, operational strategic groups, and operational groups. The 9th and 10th army corps were formed in 2023. Ukraine is currently expanding to 18 corps headquarters to provide command and control for its many brigades, including the 3rd, 11th, 12th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Army Corps, plus two in the Air Assault Forces, one in the Marine Corps and two in the National Guard. These appear to function similarly to Russian corps, providing C2 for several brigades, not divisions, as with NATO corps.Command and control above the corps will presumably remain ad hoc.
These are like the 2023 counteroffensive corps that were really large divisions by NATO practice. The current plan:
Ukraine had added a new army corps to its ground forces, each of which encompasses four or five mechanized brigades, plus other battalions and units.
A standard corps will be made up of five brigades, with one additional formation containing seven. Ukraine’s Ground Forces will contain 13 corps with two Air Assault corps, one Marine Corps, and two National Guard corps.
Not just mechanized brigades. Some will be armored and some infantry, plus air assault and marine corps. It seems like the corps mostly have four maneuver brigades, so perhaps that larger count includes some other type of support brigades. Or maybe that's maneuver brigades. I think the 2023 corps included six maneuver brigades, if memory serves me.
Ukraine deployed three corps in their summer 2023 counteroffensive. Those were apparently disbanded when that failed and Ukraine lost the initiative. Which makes me think that despite their value in coordinating defensive battles, the main benefit in the current flowing-lava stalemate situation is on offense. Which could be very important if Ukraine is to seize the initiative anywhere.
As for the place, I keep getting drawn back to the Kherson front:
I continue to view the Kherson front as potentially the most promising location for a successful Ukrainian offensive. Yes, the Dnipro River is a major obstacle. But Russian logistics are not as robust that far west. At least until Russia completes a railroad through occupied Ukrainian territory north of the Sea o Azov.
And like the Ardennes in 1940 and 1944, I don't believe the Dnipro is impassable. It is impassable if adequately defended. Terrain is an obstacle--not a thinking enemy.
As I've written, Ukraine needs to do a lot to overcome that obstacle.
And toss in the seemingly dormant front where the Kakhovka Reservoir used to be (snipped from an ISW map).
This is the satellite image:
After two years of rebuilding its army after the failed summer 2023 counteroffensive, could Ukraine be preparing for a river assault at the distant end of Russia's supply lines? With perhaps supporting operations across the now-dry Kakhovka Reservoir that may by now be able to handle the movement and supply of significant forces?
On that issue, what about all that land emerging and drying out in the former Kakhovka Reservoir after Russia destroyed the dam that formed it? A new forest has emerged rapidly:
The forest’s growth rate is phenomenal. It’s hard to imagine that just a year ago, this place was bare ground, and now, in May, there are trees almost five meters tall.Is the ground solid enough for vehicles? Could roads be pushed through there to open up a new avenue for Ukraine to launch a counter-offensive?
The Kherson front remains at the end of lengthy Russian supply lines. And far from the Kursk front and now Sumy front where Russia is stretching the active front.
And consider Ukraine's long efforts to interfere with supplies to Crimea. Then add in Ukraine's F-16s which if concentrated on the Kherson front might provide enough air defense to protect bridges and ferries across the river.
Has Ukraine had enough time to digest and apply the lessons of its Kursk Incursion from last August?
I'll start off with a few things at the top and then I'll get to some of your questions here at the end. But let's start off with Ukraine because I'm sure that a lot of you have a lot of questions about that.
The Department of Defense continues to provide the president with robust options regarding military aid to Ukraine, consistent with his goal of bringing this tragic war to an end. And at the same time, the department is rigorously examining and adapting its approach towards achieving this objective, while also preserving US military readiness and defense priorities that support the president's America First agenda.
Not so much questions as assumptions. The hiccup in some American military aid is widely interpreted in the media as helping Russia. But Trump has expressed his frustration with Putin's long delaying tactics of real talks:
US President Donald Trump acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on July 3 as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate a critical lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
Bringing the war to an end could now be seen as depending on Ukraine defeating Russia. We'll see.
I know I'm connecting dots to make a picture I want to see. But I don't believe that the planning efforts of NATO and Ukraine have settled on hoping the Russians exhaust themselves first and then flee from Ukrainian territory.
Surely Ukraine's new corps will have a role in an offensive that will take place somewhere. Where else could it be?
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
