If Ukraine is to survive, it must reverse the Russian ability to take terrain and rebuild to take more terrain. Russia went big in 2014 and 2015; and then again in 2022 to now. If Russia is allowed to keep all or most of what is has taken since 2022, Russia will rearm, perhaps learn from their errors, and come back in a matter of years. Where can Ukraine attack on a large scale with hope of success?
Russia continues to grind forward, with alternating blows better coordinated than in the past, as I noted in last week's post on the war.
I continue to view the Kherson front as potentially the most promising location for a successful Ukrainian offensive. Yes, the Dnipro River is a major obstacle. But Russian logistics are not as robust that far west. At least until Russia completes a railroad through occupied Ukrainian territory north of the Sea o Azov.
And like the Ardennes in 1940 and 1944, I don't believe the Dnipro is impassable. It is impassable if adequately defended. Terrain is an obstacle--not a thinking enemy.
As I've written, Ukraine needs to do a lot to overcome that obstacle.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struggle to conduct effective counterbattery fire in the Kherson direction because the east bank’s elevation is lower than that of the west (right) bank and Ukrainian artillery has longer ranges than Russian artillery, making it difficult for Russian forces to spot and hit Ukrainian artillery systems. The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces in the Kherson direction lack sufficient artillery shells for counterbattery fire.
If continued, Russian forces might be pushed back from the river, giving Ukraine opportunities to cross in force with small vessels, ferries, and helicopters.
Combined with attacks on Crimean air defenses and logistics, Ukraine may be able to put an air defense--Ukraine is getting more air defense systems--and artillery shield across the river; and then bridge the gap.
If Ukraine can put heavy forces across the river, they might be able to take some serious ground.
And with Russia's Black Sea fleet pushed to the east, Ukraine may be able to land companies and battalions on the Black Sea coast to unhinge river-based defense lines.
Ukraine may also be able to send small forces across the shrunken Kakhovka Reservoir to threaten the northern flank of the Kherson front.
Ukrainian partisans and special forces might increase their actions behind the front.
And Ukrainian forces on the southern Zaporizhzhia front may be able to pin the Russians to keep them from shifting west; and even exploit any weakness or panic that might develop if the Ukrainian Kherson front looks like it could roll up Russia's Surovikin Line defensive belt.
A lot of conditional statements in this outline for victory, I know. But where else can Ukraine attack?
The Kharkiv front goes into Russia and lets Russia use conscripts to defend Russia while portraying Holy Mother Russia as being invaded.
The Donbas front attacks into Russian logistic strength and fortifications.
The Zaporizhzhia front is formidable as the failed Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive showed.
And opening up a new front by attacking Belarus which isn't an active combatant would be insane.
When nothing else makes sense, the Kherson front is the only one left. That's what the Germans concluded in 1940 and 1944, and they were able to take advance despite the terrain.
Worse for Ukraine, if Ukraine doesn't attack you can see what Putin wants to do by declining all negotiating pleas from the West:
Russian President Vladimir Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a "final" end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.
By appearing confident, he hopes the West will offer concessions to Russia and compel Ukraine to submit to them. At worst for Russia, Putin gets a ceasefire to reload for the next war. At best it demoralizes Ukraine to the point of causing it to collapse and let Russia occupy Ukraine during this war.
Ukraine needs to win on the Kherson front. Unless Ukraine's hope for victory rests on events off the battlefield inside Russia. But a lot more conditional statements might be necessary for that near-miraculous hope to work out well for Ukraine.
UPDATE: But don't, apparently expect anything in 2024:
Western and US officials reportedly assess that Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defensive for the next six months and will not be able to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive operation until 2025.
Sigh. We arm Ukraine too slowly. I hope our senior leaders have a damn clue about what they are orchestrating.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
