Russia is expanding its ground forces despite heavy losses that reduce quality. And is still getting equipment--albeit older stuff--to those troops. But even if on paper Russia can "afford" to lose this amount as long as it takes to wear out Ukraine and its Western suppliers, humans are not cogs in a Putin war machine.
Putin has articulated a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. The Russian military command is currently prioritizing consistent offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains over conducting a large-scale discrete offensive operation that aims to make operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver.
I heard an analyst I respect say that Russia is doing fine on manpower--leadership and equipment are different matters--because it invaded Ukraine
with fewer than 200,000 troops and now has 500,000 committed to the war. So Putin can allegedly continue feeding men into meat grinder offensives indefinitely.
Russia had 910,000 ground forces in their military and paramilitary branches before the war (per my The Military Balance 2018). On paper. Isn't a lot of the increase of troops committed to Ukraine due to stripping other areas of troops?
That's a lot of lost troops to make up for:
Russian mortality statistics show that the number of Russian troops killed since the all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 likely exceed 71,000, according to a new report.
Apparently that doesn't include 2024 losses. But it is also based on statistics rather than counting actual verified dead soldiers. Add in wounded who won't return to combat. And deserters and prisoners. And consider the losses in that big number that took out trained unit leaders. Yet Russia has lost "a lot."
During the Iraq War, critics of the war looked at America losing a thousand troops KIA per year as something that was "breaking" the U.S. Army. Yet people look at Russia losses each week that approach America's level as something the much smaller Russia can of course endure for as long as it takes to defeat Ukraine.
Is that really true?
As I noted early on, we can't have a mechanical rule that says because Russia has X times the number of people that Ukraine has that it can lose X times as many troops in combat without suffering worse effects than Ukraine:
[Does] Russia's 3:1 advantage in population and vastly greater GDP mean Russia has the endurance?
On people, you'd think so. But the Iran-Iraq War suggests otherwise. Iran had three times the population while Iraq had the money to build material superiority. Iran had far higher willingness to fight and die. But after years of relentless Iranian offensives, during which Iran lost twice as many troops as Iraq, Iran's morale broke. It was not so simple to say Iran could suffer 3 times the casualties. Indeed, one would have thought superior Iranian fanaticism would make the casualty endurance higher than 3:1. But that did not happen.
Can that experience apply to this war?
Like Iran, Russia has a 3:1 advantage in population. But Russian morale as a conqueror, that is clearly not liberating people from Nazis, is not superior. This could break Russia before Ukraine.
Iranians lost about twice as many troops as Iraq during their long war. Iran ultimately broke in that war as its troops lost the will to endure frontal assaults that only clawed away at Iraqi-held territory.
Can Russians really match the willingness to die for years on end that Iranians hopped up on revolution and religion couldn't muster? Ukrainians could break, too. But that's now how I'd bet right now.
War is a matter of humans fighting other humans--not equations that coldly calculate loss tolerance as if dead sons and husbands are just inputs.
UPDATE (Monday): Big, if true:
Russians are finally losing their appetite for a quick death in Ukraine.
But I want it to be true so I'll hold off on accepting this as fact.
UPDATE (Tuesday) Oof:
Video emerged on social media showing a missile attack on the Ukraine’s Mirgorod Air Base in Poltava Oblast on Monday. The base, home to Ukraine’s 831st Tactical Aviation Brigade, is located in central Ukraine, about 100 miles southwest of the border. The attack and loss of aircraft has been confirmed by the Ukrainian Air Force.
Russia really wants to be able to destroy F-16s when Ukraine gets them.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Exactly:
If Ukraine and its Western supporters lose resolve, Europe may face a scenario where Russia subjugates the rest of Ukraine, installs a puppet regime, and gradually integrates most or all of the country into a new Russian empire.
Russia will bleed Ukraine dry to make up for its losses taking Ukraine.
But don't look for a silver lining:
In the long term, it would be a Pyrrhic victory for Moscow. The repressive empire would struggle to digest its occupied lands, subdue a restive population, and bear the burden of very high military expenditures in a new era of confrontation.
Yeah, the long term could be a long time away, during which Russia can do more damage to the West trying to get a cheaper victory to add resources to prevent or delay that long term problem.
And while I do think Putin is putting Russia on the road to further splintering as China picks up Far East pieces, that gives me little comfort.
Just defeat Russia now.
I went from being hammered by the Left as a so-called war monger for wanting to defeat the Soviet Union; and now by the Right for wanting to defeat Russia. This isn't about me, obviously. But it is frustrating.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Russia is getting better at unified action across many fronts:
The interplay between ongoing Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka directions indicates that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to create operational opportunities for advances in either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka areas. Russian preparations that can support multiple future branch plans suggest a more developed level of operational planning and foresight than the Russian command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war since early 2022. The ability of this operational planning to come to fruition, however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level capabilities of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas.
But tactical implementation remains costly.
UPDATE (Thursday): Russia is determined to advance through the key Chasiv Yar:
Ukraine’s army has retreated from a neighborhood in the outskirts of Chasiv Yar, a strategically important town in the eastern Donetsk region that has been reduced to rubble under a monthslong Russian assault, a military spokesperson said Thursday.
I will ask what I've asked before. Why doesn't Ukraine mine a position that Russia is grinding through in order to set up a really big explosion under their advancing troops?
UPDATE (Friday): Is this really a sign of Putin's confidence in ultimate victory?
Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement, instead demanding Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a precondition for any ceasefire agreement. Putin is thus demanding that Ukraine effectively surrender in advance of any ceasefire.
Or is it a sign that heavy casualties, equipment losses, and economic harm are forcing Putin to raise his objectives to reflect the losses already suffered? It might be hard for Putin to survive even a ceasefire after wrecking his ground forces and the Black Sea Fleet for a mere land bridge to Crimea.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
