Iran's Eroded Proxy Force in Iraq

I've long been frustrated at the apparent inability of the Iraqis to dismantle the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Force militias established during the ISIL 2014 offensive. Perhaps I have been wrong to worry.

I recognized both the threat of the PMF militias. Yet recognized forcefully disbanding them could be too much of a short-term threat:

I've written about the need to bring the militias under control or ultimately disband them. The weak Iraqi government has to be careful but the job must be started before the militias are as entrenched in Iraq as Hezbollah is in Lebanon.

The militias have largely been unwilling to rise up to support Iran. Seemingly, Iraq has slowly been working the problem:

They painted a picture of a proxy network hollowed out by years of targeted assassinations of hard-to-replace leaders; the loss of secure bases for training and weapons transit; and the transformation of Iraqi commanders into wealthy politicians and businessmen with more to lose than gain from confronting the West.

One commander said he believed only two or three of dozens of the militias would fully obey Iranian orders to strike.

It seems like the Iraqis took a smart, slow path to de-fang the militias. Crushing the mullah regime in Iran might finish them off whether or not the mullah regime survives. 

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