Yes, I Have Another Site

I experimented with linking my individual Substack posts here to increase their search engine visibility. But I think I was addressing a non-problem. So I'm not doing it any more notwithstanding my lovely illustration for the tag.

As long as you are here, head on over to my Substack, The Dignified Rant: Evolved, for more dignified rantiness on a new platform. 

I've been blogging since July 2022. I started on Geocities. Partially moved from the absorbed Yahoo!Geocities when my storage ran low to Blogger. Then fully relied on Blogger when Yahoo!Geocities died. 

And now I've moved partially to Substack. I would like escape the nightmare of again moving old site content to my latest site.

FUN FACT: When I started The Dignified Rant, I thought that one day I might move away from the more whimsical early Blogosphere vibe to the more buttoned down The Dunn Report--thus keeping the TDR shorthand intact. Screw that. Dignified and ranty will endure.

Geography, Strategy and U.S. Force Design

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Geography shapes America’s strategy, which shapes American military strategy, which shapes force structure in unique ways that our Eurasian allies and enemies do not reflect given their own geography. Since the 1898 Spanish-American War, America transitioned from holding our ground against stronger European military powers sailing here to intervening in Europe (and then Asia) to prevent threats from growing to a size to cross an ocean and threaten America directly. And the military capabilities of our allies and potential enemies influence our force structure and foreign policy, including a decision to use military force.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Combined Arms and Joint Warfare

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

The Iran War of 2026 is impressive in the ability of air power to kill bad people and break their things. It provides positive and negative lessons about the importance of combined arms and joint operations. I look at three broad lessons already evident.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Securing Ground Lines of Communication

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Drones in many ways are just new forms of a threat that ground forces once had to take into account to carry out operations. To be fair, the revived unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threat to lines of communication (LOC) in the Winter War of 2022 is easier to carry out than old means of insurgents, partisans, special forces, or newer air-or artillery-delivered mines. But that just means the old methods need to be restored and updated. ... [CONTINUE READING]

Israel Returns to the Hezbollah Problem

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Israel is edging toward an invasion of Lebanon to make a serious attempt to destroy Hezbollah. The effects of the aerial pounding that decimated and suppressed Hezbollah have worn off. I’ve long held a deep multi-division ground raid into Lebanon is required.

That Israel has resumed ground combat operations in Lebanon calls into question their victory through air power theory about defeating Hezbollah. It also raises the issue of whether Israel believes the American-Israeli strike campaign against Iran can set the conditions for the overthrow or collapse of the mullah-run Iranian regime.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

NATO's Achilles Heel

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

NATO is vulnerable at the city of Narva on Russia’s border. While its Russophile citizens may not actually be happy with experiencing the loving embrace in practice as Ukrainians have suffered under and rejected, Putin could pretend they do to justify invasion. Ultimately, Narva’s main defense is prying Belarus from Russia’s imperial grasp.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Distributed Artillery

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

Can the Army get rocket launchers that roam the battlefield for ground support and air defense? I’m skeptical of filling a complex battlefield with unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that we can command and control in large numbers. Artillery robots might be a proof of concept before trying to bring in direct-fire UGVs.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Chum, Despondency, and Whiplash

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

I’ve long been worried about the Royal Navy. Britain’s inability to rapidly deploy warships to protect British interests has been revealed by the Iran War. Britain is being forced to confront the shock that its once globe-spanning fleet cannot rule even portions of the seas. ... [CONTINUE READING]

Conventional Air Power as a Counter-UAV Asset

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

I observed regarding the Iran War of 2026 that we are ignoring the power of conventional air power to disable enemy drone attacks while we curse our failure to pay attention to Ukrainian air defense skills in the face of Russian drone and missile attacks.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

 

Russia is a Liability as China's Wartime Ally

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

All the talk of China and Russia being partners without limits is nonsense. China and Russia are called a future Axis despite China’s refusal to support Russia with explicit military aid. China only sells useful dual-use products to Russia. America—which is accused of siding with Russia in the Winter War of 2022—sells weapons for Ukraine, trains Ukrainian troops, provides diplomatic and economic support, and shares intelligence and targeting data. America is an ally of Ukraine that wants Europeans to carry more of the burden in their own neighborhood. Russia can only dream of getting similar support from China. But China does not provide it. Let me explore that a bit and what it may mean for the Russia-China alignment.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

The 2026 National Defense Strategy Report

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

The United States National Security Strategy establishes that America would prefer to trade with people—even enemies if they would let go of that framing—as an alternative to waging war against them. But if an enemy is determined to fight America and undermine our national security, the National Defense Strategy seeks the ability to reach out and inflict damage on a scale we choose to inflict. Consider it the 2x4 strategy that seeks to knock sense into the heads of foreign leaders who prefer war to trade.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Surprise On the Modern Battlefield

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

Surprise on the battlefield is not a thing of the past. When we figure out the latest leap in battlefield intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) partnered with new communications means, we will find that the tank was born to exploit information superiority. ...  [CONTINUE READING]

The Iran War of 2026 Seeks a Victory Condition

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

By waging war on the mullah regime of Iran, we will get either a weakened Iran less able to threaten us, its neighbors, or its people—for a while; or in a perfect world we get a friendly Iran. Getting the latter (call in Plan A) is something we are trying to enable. We are a force multiplier for that objective. But Iranians themselves must be the force that we multiply to actually pull down the mullah regime.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Setting Up Company Commanders For Failure

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

Are Army company commanders going to be overwhelmed with information processing and decision-making burdens that overwhelm them in high-intensity conventional combat?

Read the rest here. 

Intelligence and Putin's Preparations For War

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

Western allies and Ukraine refused to believe America and Britain who warned them that Russia was determined to invade Ukraine prior to the February 2022 attack. It was too inconvenient and in defiance of common sense and rationality as they defined them to believe our intelligence prediction.

Read the rest here. 

Drone Worship Got A Big Dose of Silver Bullet Fever

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

Small drone purists have a silver bullet fever. And they got the cow bell they crave.

Read the rest here. 

 

The Hollow NATO Expansion

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

Russia pretended that a weak NATO was a threat to Russia in order to conceal its post-Cold War appeasement of China while Russia rebuilt its decayed post-Cold War military. Appeasement was needed to delay a day of reckoning over Russia’s trophies in the Far East taken from China during weak China’s self-proclaimed Century of Humiliation. Russia’s threats to NATO convinced NATO to rearm. Yet Russia failed to break NATO when it was weakest. Worse, Putin failed to take even smaller Ukraine. And as time drags on with Putin self-immolating Russia’s ground forces, China sees opportunity in the Far East to erase the largest stain remaining from China’s period of weakness.

Read the rest here. 

Strengthening Both Pillars of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

The defense of Europe must reflect a very simple observation that America cannot care more about defending Europe than Europeans care. Defense spending and capability are the relevant measure of caring. Is Europe willing to adjust to an era when threats to Europe are small enough to reduce the need for American military power in Europe in contrast to the need from 1917 to 1991? The threat to Europe is real. But after two world hot wars and a world cold war, the military threat to Europe is small enough that America can watch from afar with only a framework of power in Europe as an insurance policy. This is not abandoning Europe. This is partnering with Europe.

Read the rest here. 

Blood, Mud, and New Technology

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

A British Army battalion is going all-in on using drones. Listen to the commander. You won’t hear panty-flinging enthusiasm for making the job of infantry obsolete.

Read the rest here. 

Europe is a Crucial Staging Area

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

American power abroad is a multiple of American power in the United States and the ability to project it great distance. If either part of that equation is weak, America does not have effective power abroad to support friends and defeat enemies. Europe is an under-appreciated power projection platform for getting relevant power closer to enemies. Presidents in a crisis may very well ask “Where are the carriers?” But what they really need to know is where are the land airbases?

Read the rest here.