Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: The NATO Force Model Shrinks

In case you missed it on Substack: Operation Epic Criticism

In case you missed it on Substack: Baby UGV Steps in North Africa

In case you missed it on Substack: To the Shores of Taiwan

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

The Air Force Taunts the Army

The Air Force deigned to provide special forces with dedicated ground support aircraft. The Army can continue to pound sand.

Well that’s nice for special forces: 

The Air Force now has 18 new light attack aircraft that are designed to support special operations forces on the ground, and it expects to receive “a handful more” by October, said Lt. Col. Robert Wilson, of Air Force Special Operations Command, or AFSOC.

The single-engine turboprop OA-1K Skyraider II is “essentially a Swiss Army Knife of airborne capability,” that can fly armed reconnaissance, close air support, and precision strike missions, said Wilson, AFSOC’s armed overwatch requirements branch chief.

But this plane is a flashy distraction from the refusal to have a dedicated close air support plane for the Army's maneuver forces.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

The Thucydides Trap Definitions Section

China's Xi raised the Thucydides Trap during the recent Peking summit as a cautionary tale that should instill American caution. How convenient.

Victor Hanson writes that the Thucydides Trap does not actually describe the situation between Athens and Sparta as a cause of the war. Yet the political scientist who popularized the model relied on other competing rivals to bolster the ancient scenario that he used to name the problem. 

The theory is often talked about in power transition terms. A dominant power may strike a rising power before it can be ascendant. Or a rising power impatient for its anticipated dominance may strike first to accelerate the trend. 

There are problems with the data set, too. An obvious one is the U.S.-Japan rivalry that led to war in 1941. Japan's GDP was about 1/8 America's. Where was the threat or promise of a power shift?

And while there is certainly validity to the general observation about competing powers, the data gives it more credibility as a virtual machine that spits out predictable results with the competition inputs. That is merely the color of scientific rigor.

I think the great distance between America and China prevents each from really going for the throat of each other's homeland. America can't successfully invade vast China and China can't even try to invade vast America. This distance reduces the tipping point urgency to act now.

I suspect Xi was trying to appear near when he knows it is far from overtaking America.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from https://www.hellenic-art.com/hellenipedia/greek-hoplite-phalanx/.

Marines in Australia

Has the Marine presence in northern Australia reached its endpoint? Or is it just the beginning?

Capabilities in Australia: 

Marine Rotational Force-Darwin 26 was recently certified as a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, marking the first MRF-D unit to earn the certification since the rotational force was established in 2011.

The Marine presence has come a long way.  

Will it go even farther?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article.

Air Base Defense 101 Must Be Reviewed

Air supremacy is no longer America's God-given right. Our Cold War--let alone our World War II--anti-aircraft capabilities have eroded just in time for missiles and cheap drones to take aim at our air bases. A sense of urgency is in order given our reliance on air power.

Most of the American aircraft lost from Iranian action were drones and weren’t knocked down while on the ground and so completely irrelevant to the author’s point, but yes:

The days of exposed aircraft sitting safely on runways to prosecute operations unimpeded are over. But not nearly enough U.S. military bases at home or abroad are hardened or sheltered to protect our most capable equipment.

I am fully onboard the need for ground-based air defense and more basic air base protection measures.

And grant me that I recognized the base defense problem that small drones would pose. And that was before they were armed with explosives and got longer range. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the last war when we failed to have a sense of urgency about air base defense.

The Eastern Question Reverses Direction

I used to think we have an Erdogan problem. Wait him out and Turkey could return to reliable ally status. I fear he is the symptom of an Islamist problem. And even if that wasn't the case when he was elected, his duration has made this an Islamist problem. And a new Eastern Question.

I believe our government once believed Erdogan would be a great example for Islam by being a "tame" Islamist government still able to align with the West. That is not working out:

Turkey’s accelerating development of ballistic, cruise, and potentially hypersonic missiles should force Washington and Brussels to reconsider whether Ankara is evolving into a stabilizing NATO partner—or a revisionist power armed with increasingly sophisticated strike capabilities.

We thought Turkey could be a good example for Iran, which we also once bizarrely believed could be tamed rather than defeated. Perhaps there was hope that Pakistan, which remains an army barely in control of a country--because of the Islamist-infected population--could be cured, too.

Instead, I fear that either Pakistan and Iran will be potential models for Turkey when its Islamists no longer pretend to be tame as they pursue a return to Ottoman glories. Although they'd be smart to model Iran which always gave hope to Westerners that mythical "moderates" could gain power if only we granted Iran enough concessions.

The Eastern Question may be reversing. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Map from Britannica.

The Winter War of 2025 Sees Continuity During Change

Observers, including myself, see changes in the Winter War of 2022 that seem to indicate a change in fortunes. But few, including myself, are willing to say the tide has turned. Are we at a turning point like the one that took place in the Iran-Iraq War when Iran lost the ability to pound Iraq? Yet nobody could believe that was happening after that feature of the war had lasted so long?

 

The war goes on. We can see and track the frontline and map the targets of bombing raids. But can we see what is behind that image of clarity about a "transparent" battlefield. War itself is cloaked in fog. Hence "the fog of war." But I see faint outlines through the fog. Are they real or my imagination? 

As I wrote back in March about my impression about the war:

I've often said I try not to let my hopes guide my analysis. It is difficult. But there is an opposite problem. When the situation has been mostly the same for years, it is easy to assume current trends will continue.  ...

Maybe. But things seem ... different ... now.  

This year, Russia continues to attack but they aren't doing the Hulk smash! routine like it used to. Indeed, Ukraine has glimmers of success:

Ukrainian forces appear to be regaining the tactical initiative in different sectors of the frontline in Ukraine. 

But just tactical initiative. No big deal in the strategic picture, right? It isn't really that different.

I recall that the Iran-Iraq War settled into a pattern of Iraq sitting on the defensive and Iran sending masses of men (and boys) to their deaths to overwhelm the Iraqi defenders. Nobody could see a way out from that basic fact even as each side sought salvation by attacking the other side's oil revenue (the Tanker War) and civilians (various Wars of the Cities). And when things seemed ... different ... after Iran in January 1987 launched yet another "final offensive" called Karbala V that attempted to take Basra in southern Iraq, nobody explained what was happening as the end of the pattern:

Perhaps 20,000 Iranians died in the battle. Iraq's casualties were about half of Iran's. Iraq's performance is notable in that Iraq withstood and won the kind of brutal bloodletting that supposedly only Iran could endure. Observers at the time saw only that Iran had launched yet another in a seemingly endless series of big offensives. They speculated about how many more of these attacks Iraq could endure. Actually, Iran broke at Karbala Five. It would be many months before observers began to wonder what was wrong with Iran when no further attacks were begun, yet it was true that the "Islamic Revolution bled to death in Karbala V."

People kept waiting for Iran to use its anger at failing to revive yet more Islamist-fueled offensives. But Iran could not. It would not be fully revealed until Iraq launched a big offensive to push the Iranians out of their major accomplishment of taking the Fao Peninsula in 1986:

While Iran continued to insist that ultimately it would be infantry who would decide the war, Iran had already let the usual season pass without launching a major offensive. This failure began to raise questions about what Iran was doing. One answer came in April 1988 when, after fewer than two days of fighting, Iraq recaptured the Fao peninsula with Operation Ramadan. Iraqi regular troops and Republican Guard forces backed by 2,000 tanks and 600 heavy guns plowed south and struck from the Gulf with a supporting amphibious assault. The Iranians were overwhelmed and showed no spirit of resistance. While it is true that the Iraqis outnumbered the Iranians by 8 to 1 odds, the contrast is amazing between April 1988 and February 1986, when Iranians fought hammer and tong for every square inch of worthless swamp on that peninsula. The day that Iranian infantry could not exact a heavy price for the terrain on which they stood was the day that Iran lost the war. April 18, 1988 was that day.

Has Russia truly faltered? Are we refusing to believe the evidence of our lying eyes?

Consider that Russia and China signed "a joint declaration on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations." I have to ask, is this simply a rote repeat of an old theme? Or a sign that Russia has internally admitted it cannot restore Russia's greatness on the battlefield and so must partner with China? Is this a sign that Russia will end their invasion of Ukraine?

And I wonder if this round of flinging nuclear poo and beating their atomic chest is to project military strength before ending the invasion: 

Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine’s allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses.

Could Russia be trying to shape public perceptions to make it seem as if ending the invasion of Ukraine without conquering Ukraine is irrelevant to Russia's national security because of Russia's nuclear might?  

If these are big picture signs supporting the faltering Russian offensive capability theory, can Ukraine do what Iraq did to attack and expose the eclipse of Russia's offensive capability?

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s army settled in to a defensive struggle from fortified lines against Iran. Its army evolved to survive in that environment. Iraq found it needed a mobile army to go on offense. So it built that army.

Ukraine has in fact been attacking and slowly gaining ground at both ends of the southern front for the last several months. Analysts have noted that for the first time in a long time Ukraine has gained more ground than Russia has. And Russia is losing so many troops that it can't replace battlefield losses. Are we in a post-Karbala V period of this war?

Will we see an April 1988 event that finally exposes the Russian threat as hollowed out? 

For years I've considered a Ukrainian offensive to Crimea to be the most logical front to seriously harm Russia. Ukrainian military actions could be shaping the battlefield for such an effort.

Was this a test of capabilities away from the southern front?

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized counterattack in the Borova direction, possibly penetrating up to five kilometers into the Russian defenses. 

Or maybe this is still 1985 and Russia has a lot more offensive life left in them that Putin--overriding some recognition that all is not well--wants to use:

Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to resolve the war on his terms, including fully seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of 2026. 

Maybe I am hoping fluctuations in the pattern are a turning point when in fact they are mere fluctuations in a continuing pattern of Ukraine hanging on as Russia throws body blows on the ground.

How much longer does this "lull" in Russian offensive gains have to go on to suggest things really are different? 

How are Ukraine and Russia judging their offensive and defensive options? 

I can't know. All I can say is that I know things do change--sometimes radically--after we get used to predicting tomorrow will be the same as yesterday. I hope somebody on our side can see deeper into Russia's conditions to tell if things are really ... different. And I hope that Ukraine has been building forces to exploit that turning point if it is taking place.

Perhaps the Russians see the turning point more clearly than we can despite our assessment that the Kremlin is blind to battlefield realities. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Should Canada Join JEF?

In case you missed it on Substack: Controlling the Land ... From the Sea

In case you missed it on Substack: Pearl Harbor as Standard Operating Procedure

In case you missed it on Substack: Are Super Carriers Too Big To Fail

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

I Am the State: North Korea Edition

South Korea has planned precision strikes on North Korean leadership in the absence of its own nuclear deterrent to discourage North Korean nuclear weapons strikes. North Korea has established the death of its leadership as a doomsday trigger to unleash its own nuclear weapons. Hilarity ensues?

Huh:

North Korea has updated its constitution to require a retaliatory nuclear strike if leader Kim Jong Un is assassinated, according to a report. ... 

The revised policy outlines procedures for retaliatory action if North Korea’s leadership is incapacitated or killed.

"If the command-and-control system over the state’s nuclear forces is placed in danger by hostile forces’ attacks … a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately," the updated provision states.

Well, Kim can certainly modify the state's "constitution" as he sees fit. But I'm not sure if he is thinking this through. 

South Korea has planned to deter North Korea's nukes with precision conventional weapons able to go directly for North Korea's leadership--like Kim. 

And there are even indications that should the North Korean state collapse, special ground units would attempt to secure North Korea's nuclear weapons.

But if North Korea will unleash its nukes during the time between losing their leadership and state collapse, South Korea's non-nuclear plans have a serious flaw. 

So what is the under-and-over on how many years before South Korea has nuclear missiles?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo that I turned into a meme from the initial article.

Lethality is Not a Larger Kill Count

Lethality is not only the ability to kill and break things. It is the ability to use killing to break the enemy.

This cannot be said enough:

A lethal unit applies violence that shatters an enemy’s will to fight. It does so with skill, tempo, and aggression that discourages an adversary from standing before it. Lethality is a fusion of advanced technology, rigorous training, and, most critically, a hardened, aggressive, and offensive mindset embedded in organizational culture.

Killing soldiers and breaking their things for the sake of killing and breaking in greater volume is not the key to victory. That just leads to a high-tech, high-tempo clash of phalanxes.

Firepower is one part of an expanded combined arms battle to restore maneuver--and that's where tanks come in with their mobile, protected firepower--by breaking the enemy's will and capability to fight at the point of attack is what is important:

Tanks are not made obsolete by a more transparent battlefield. The impact of tanks is amplified by secure information that surpasses what the enemy has. But tanks are just one more wonder weapon to be slaughtered if not used in combined operations in the right circumstances and at the right time and place. 

Yet I strongly disagree about the "transparent" battlefield angle. Do we have more ways to see the battlefield? Yes. But there will be countermeasures, in time. Ultimately, surprise is created in the mind of the enemy commander. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article.

Blather, Wince, Repeat.

Belief in communism (which is just the magical end state of socialism, remember) is stronger than most religious faiths. No failure discourages the useful idiots.

Useful idiots are a determined bunch: 

While ruthless in their practice of massive violence against civilian populations, Mao and his henchmen succeeded in duping Western sympathizers into viewing them as liberal democrats and reformers, much as Stalin persuaded influential Americans in the 1930s that Communists were just "liberals in a hurry."

When the crash of expectations arrives and denying failure becomes too much even for them to maintain, the refrain of "It wasn't real socialism!" erupts. Thus begins the new search for the Great Red Hope that will be embraced. Until failure requires another cycle.

Blather, wince, repeat. 

Useful idiots never learn. And cause America repeated foreign policy problems to win the same argument again and again against a new generation of true believers with no sense of history.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing. Forgive my raging Ogrephobia to make a point.

Russia Teaches China How Russia's Army Fights. Wait. What?

China is learning from Russia's combat experience. And I'm supposed to believe Taiwan should be the most worried?

This conclusion from Russia's exercises with China about improved cooperation amuses me:

The existing set of military exercises provides the PLA with access to wartime lessons drawn from Russian campaigns in the North Caucasus, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, particularly in the deployment and manoeuvre of large-scale combat forces in expeditionary operations. These exercises also enhance interoperability with the Russian military in terms of operational processes, as well as familiarity with (mainly Soviet-origin) equipment that has demonstrated battlefield effectiveness.

It sounds like Russia is teaching China how Russia fights and how Russian equipment works.

But no cause for alarm! Russia and China are best buddies, with Russia supporting Chinese territorial claims against Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xianjang; while China takes no position on Russian claims in the west.

And that is proof of close relations ... how?

I mean, China doesn't recognize Russia's claims. And Russia limits itself to endorsing specific Chinese claims. No general rule implied! Guess what territory is part of what China doesn't recognize and what Russia doesn't endorse?

That would be Russia's Far East taken from China in the 19th century.

It's bad enough Russia exposed its military as less than great. There is no way Russia should be letting China see Russia's military up close, lest China see Russia as a better target than frenemy.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Oh Those Inscrutable Chinese!

Does the Chinese Communist Party just expect its military to loom menacingly in a long-term effort to convince the Taiwanese to surrender to China?

China's plan is to watch and collect its victory when it arrives?

China wants to unify with Taiwan at the lowest possible cost, and it currently believes that unification will become easier and less costly as time passes. As China develops the military and economic capabilities to deter U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan, it believes that it can compel the island into capitulation without necessarily needing a full-scale invasion. And in the meantime, Beijing is confident that it can prevent Taiwan from trying to become formally independent.

I'll just skip past the possibility that China wishes to appear far when near.

But while I can accept that the Chinese are being patient in the best light, they might also simply be losing their effort to be able to take China by force or by persuasion/threat.

And claiming the Chinese are "playing a long game on Taiwan" drifts dangerously into a view that the Chinese have unique long-range planning abilities. I think that view is bunk:

Chinese rulers unable to think about the long term and simply focused on the short run? Say it ain't so! The culture! The history! The vaguely worded fortune cookie pronouncements! Patience and perspective are in their effing genes, aren't they?

Apparently not.

The Chinese are people, like anyone else. What a radical idea.

All we know is that China hasn't absorbed Taiwan despite it being a long-held core interest. I have no idea if we are entering a danger zone (the Davidson Window) when China is finally prepared to invade Taiwan but before America and our allies have responded to block China. But I seriously doubt China is playing a clever long game. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article.

The Winter War of 2022 Gives Its Failure a Wonderful New Set of Clothes

What is the Russian government preparing for during this fifth year of the three-week special military operation? Does the Russian government believe it is safer to turn the disinformation dial to 11 and risk a fight against its own people rather than continue to fight NATO-backed Ukraine?

I almost don't care if this is real:

A top-level Kremlin policy document discussing post-war political planning and how to neutralize potential ultranationalist discontent has been leaked to the Russian investigative site Dossier Center. Entitled “Images of Victory,” the paper gives a rare insight into the inner workings of Russia’s political machine. Crucially, it shows that while the Kremlin remains officially indifferent to peace talks, behind the scenes apparatchiks are working hard on selling an inevitable stalemate to the Russian people by dressing it up as a species of victory. The document was leaked before President Trump’s announcement today of a three-day ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.

While the source of the leaked document is unknown, its tone and content seem entirely plausible and its authenticity has not been challenged by the Kremlin even though Dossier is funded by exiled London-based oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Significantly, the paper warns that continuing the war carries serious dangers for Russia’s economy and society. But in practical terms the policy paper’s focus is how to construct a post-war narrative of why the war was worth it, as well as how to systematically dismantle all potential areas of dissent, first and foremost from a constituency it describes as “armchair patriots.”

The Sad parade to commemorate the victory over Nazi Germany in 1945 reminds Russians that Russia has been fighting small Ukraine for more time than it took to defeat actual Nazis. And with far less to show for it. 

Indeed, it may tarnish the Great Patriotic War by raising the possibility that the only reason the USSR won in 1945 was the extensive Allied support for Soviet industry and military power. With Western power helping Ukraine instead, Russia has floundered. Perhaps not a coincidence, eh?

Just publicly raising the issue of declaring victory and ending the war bolsters those inside Russia who can plainly see the tsar has no victory. That may cause dissent to rise to opposition. And the document could be real given the apparent shift in fortunes to Ukraine (which even before this shift has blunted and slowed Russia's invasion for over five years). It would explain Putin's possible fear of demobilizing his military after the war--whenever and however that happens. 

At the very least, the signs of Russia wobbling in its determination to win at all costs seem to be rising. But until the signs really accelerate, the war goes on. Ukraine seems to have gained edges in both the strategic air war and the ground war. Will that trend reverse, continue, or accelerate?

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: I found the picture on the web with no attribution. I carry forth that lack of information. 

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Why Yes, Tanks Are Nice To Have Around

In case you missed it on Substack: The Future is Clear

In case you missed it on Substack: Drone Dive Bombers!

In case you missed it on Substack: Sea Control Goes Berserker

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

The New Army Air Corps

Army companies will get autonomous drones to support them in combat with ISR, targeting, and logistics. Add air defense and we're good to go.

This autonomous drone is good:

The U.S. Army has selected a new small unmanned aircraft system to push aerial capability down to the company level. Army Contracting Command awarded the contract to Mistral Inc. for the THOR Group 2 UAS, a backpack-portable multi-rotor drone designed for frontline units.

This type of drone adds to the company's ability to close with and destroy the enemy rather than distract the company and tempt it to become a mini-air force. 

Add fighter drones that shoot down enemy drones, as I asked for in this Army article, and we're good to go. An autonomous combat air patrol fighter drone over the company would be great.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from article. 

More F-15EX to Fly

The F-15EX fleet will expand. Not every mission needs a stealth fighter.

The Air Force is diversifying its fighter fleet. And foreign countries like the F-15EX, too:

The Pentagon’s latest budget request for the air force would more than double the planned procurement of F-15EX strike fighters to 268 examples — moving Boeing to full-rate production of the revamped Cold War jet in the next year. ...

Each F-15EX included in the FY2027 budget request is to include the BAE Systems Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System or EPAWSS — an advanced electronic countermeasures package designed to improve the non-stealth fighter’s defence against modern air defences. 

A 2025 evaluation by the Pentagon found that EPAWSS-equipped Eagle IIs are effective in both offensive and defensive counter-air missions, even against advanced fifth-generation platforms like Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57 or China’s Chengdu J-20.

It is easy to forget that even stealth planes benefit from electronic countermeasures.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

The Yin and Yang of China Blockading Taiwan

Is one lesson of the Iran War of 2026 the realization that any Chinese military action in the South China Sea, no matter how successful, would cut China off from world trade?

China is learning from the America-Israeli campaign against Iran. One lesson is the effect on oil traffic in the face of only nominal Iranian military capacity. Fear has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz:

China’s maritime insurance ecosystem does not yet have enough depth or international credibility to underwrite the scale of coverage that a Taiwan-related disruption would demand. A harder problem still is even if China can ensure its own flag vessels, it cannot compel foreign-flagged ships to continue sailing into a warzone.

And if China doesn't in effect inflict a blockade on itself to blockade Taiwan, America could impose it without getting close to China. How much energy can China stockpile to outlast a world cut off from China, too?

China is no longer a mass lump of autarkic proletarian fury that is immune to economic pressure--and which could have swallowed, digested, and expelled an invading army. China is now urbanized, more advanced (on and near the coasts, anyway), and plugged into the global trade system. I don't know if China or the world can last longer without the other. But I bet China doesn't, either.

India could cut off China's Middle East energy imports, too. This Chinese trade vulnerability bolsters my view that India has the edge in a major war with China. Speaking of which:

India is pressing ahead with a $9 billion infrastructure project to bolster its military footprint on the Great Nicobar Island which sits far from the Indian mainland near one of the world’s most critical shipping arteries. 

Unless Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles can pose enough of a threat to India's ports, too. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Not Abandoning NATO Every Day

America is not abandoning Europe. The Army is participating in exercises to test NATO war contingency plans.

This is walking toward the sound of the guns and not running away:

Sword 26 is the U.S. Army Europe and Africa’s premier annual exercise series, taking place from late April through May 2026 across eight countries in the High North and Baltic region. Formerly known as DEFENDER, Sword 26 validates NATO’s regional defense plans and operationalize the Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative (EFDI). 

This exercise series demonstrates the U.S. Army’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense and its ability to deter and decisively defeat adversaries while advancing global stability. Sword 26 highlights the strength of Allied unity, the integration of cutting-edge technologies, and the ability to project decisive power in defense of NATO territory.

Every day with the well-publicized noise of diplomatic wrangling obscuring their work, America's military and civilian officials quietly work with our NATO allies.

America has good reasons to remain active in leading NATO.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Infographic from the initial linked Army document.

Explain To Me Again Why Marines Had To Change So Much?

The Marines are forging ahead on novel means to sink ships instead of destroying enemy ground forces. I'll ask again, why?!

But why is this better than having the Navy or Air Force do the job? 

The Marines demonstrated the ability to launch attack drones from their self-built submerged drones, [which will] significantly increase sensing and firepower in defense of the fleet. 

Seriously, why is killing a Marine ground combat capability to create an entirely new anti-ship capability that the Navy can expand more efficiently a good idea? 

The Marine Corps feared being a second Army to avoid going on the budget chopping block as a redundant formation. It chose to be a second Navy. The Marine haven't even done enough to be a redundant second Navy.

Well, really a third navy. After the Coast Guard. Which actually makes the Marine changes worse. 

NECC could become grunts to make up for that, I suppose.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

The Winter War of 2022 Fears Peace

Perhaps Putin can survive a peace deal with Ukraine that doesn't represent a diplomatic form of conquest. But he cannot survive demobilization after the war. Then things get interesting in a heavy pucker factor sort of way.

The war goes on. Ukraine continues to counter-attack to claw back land; and Ukraine expands its aerial attack capabilities to match Russia's aerial bombardment scale. Well, hello:

Air traffic at 13 airports in southern Russia has been suspended after drones struck a building at a local air navigation center in Rostov-on-Don, the Russian transport ministry said. 

I can't help but think that America responded to Russian aid to Iran with increased targeting data for Ukraine. I have no proof. Just a suspicion that Trump is a FAFO kind of president, and Putin decided to FA. Russia seemingly ponders mobilization to provide bodies for his war. Perhaps Putin's invasion force isn't the juggernaut Russia portrays.

Putin fears demobilization:

Today, Russia faces what can be called a demobilization dilemma. The war in Ukraine is not about Ukrainian territory. The war is being waged as a response to Russia’s domestic fragility, declining legitimacy and a political system that depends on mobilization, fear and external confrontation to maintain control.

This is plausible. But technically, a ceasefire (I won't be so bold to call it "peace") with Ukraine doesn't have to mean demobilization if demobilization means a new Time of Troubles for Russia. Putin may be preparing to win a civil war, but that doesn't mean he wants a civil war.

And then there is this odd development (tip to Instapundit):

Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested the war in Ukraine was drawing to a close — just hours after he vowed to triumph at Moscow’s puniest Victory Day parade in years.

“I think that the matter is coming to an end,” Putin told reporters inside the Kremlin Saturday about the four-year-long war.

Putin said the United States — which he referred to as a “partner” and “friend” during his remarks, alongside the likes of China and India — was eager to help broker a deal.

Huh.

What happens if Putin agrees to a ceasefire without demobilizing? Maybe he decides that Stalin was a coward for not taking advantage of his massive army in central Europe in 1945 to immediately wage war on his Western allies to win the whole thing. Stalin didn't have nukes, Putin may think. I do. Regardless of the truth.

But the tattered mob Putin commands is not the 1945 victorious Red Army that marched across Europe to raze Berlin in less time than Russia has spent still trying to capture all of Donetsk province. As the initial article notes:

Unlike Western professional militaries, Russia’s forces are disproportionately composed of prisoners, ethnic minorities and contract soldiers recruited through exploitative arrangements. 

Perhaps that go big or go home course of action is still too risky for Putin.

Or maybe Putin ends the war without demobilizing and without deciding to wage another war as Iraq did in 1988 because hostile Iran remained across the border. But by 1990, Saddam decided to use his expensive army to solve his financial problems by taking over Kuwait in a lightning attack. Believing nobody would stop him, he found out that he was very wrong. Desert Shield and Desert Storm followed in 1990 and 1991 (but at least the Coalition reduced Saddam's military to a more affordable level--suicide by cop?). And after a pause, the predictable--but not to Saddam who expected a mere drive-by shooting--2003 war finished Saddam off.

Maybe that's not a good plan for Putin given that Russia is already financially struggling. 

Or perhaps Putin decides that a more muscular subtle attack should be his post-Winter War of 2022 military option while his mobilized army stands guard. Break NATO in the Baltic states, which Putin seems to be threatening (even if he has to AstroTurf supporters), with a Kargil-style invasion of heavily armed "little green men." Then dare NATO to go to war against his bridgehead. Putin could break NATO in several ways with such a strategy if NATO isn't prepared, as I discussed in this Army magazine article.

Sure there is risk. But the West may be unwilling to admit Russia has invaded. And at least it is deniable. If things go really bad, Putin can abandon the irregular troops and deny all responsibility. Will NATO then invade Russia while it has nukes? Not likely. And Putin may think something must be tried if history is to append the honorific "the Great" to his name.

So maybe. Unless a tall open window veto from other Russians is wielded. Or even if Putin just gets too nervous from Western disinformation to walk by windows.

Ukraine faces a similar problem with demobilization. Do it and Russia could pounce. Fail to do it and Ukraine will go broke eventually and not be able to afford a large active army. Will Europe really be as generous with financial support when the war is over? Even if Ukraine gets reparations in one form or another, will Ukraine spend it not on reconstruction but on keeping their army in the field ready for renewed invasion? If so, eventually Ukraine will run out of that source of cash. Going broke follows as does demobilization.

Ukraine and Russia--if Putin or whoever succeeds him does not choose another war as the post-war path--both could use a post-war deal that limits both NATO and Russian forces within striking distance of the ceasefire line.

And if that agreement cements in place a Russian "flip" against China so Russia can focus on holding its Far East from Chinese recapture, so much the better. Is that what Putin expects from the United States, his partner and friend?

But until then, the war goes on. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Photo from Getty via that "disinformation" link.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: How Can Enemies Possibly Find Warships At Sea?

In case you missed it on Substack: "Modifying" the Infantry Squad Vehicle

In case you missed it on Substack: The Future of Warfare

In case you missed it on Substack: Counter-measures Emerge For UAVs

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Big Overture, Little Show?

North Korea has always issued threats. Can North Korea carry them out?

I assume they continue to be quite serious about that threat:

In 1994 a North Korean official declared, during a meeting with his South Korean counterpart at the North Korean capital Panmunjom, that the South Korean capital is not far from here. In wartime Seoul will become a sea of fire. This is what passes for North Korean diplomacy, subtle but brutal.

About a quarter of South Korea's population is in the Seoul region that is quite close to the DMZ and so vulnerable to long-range artillery fire. 

But does the threat still work? Not just because repetition may dull the fear. Can North Korea actually strike Seoul at sea of fire levels? Their army may be too weak to push into or even close enough to Seoul to use basic artillery to bombard the city.

And the situation could be even worse from North Korea's perspective:

If a crisis erupts on the Korean peninsula and the North Koreans fire even a warning barrage at Seoul, I expect the South Korean army to march north of the DMZ and carve out a no-launch zone in an arc around Seoul to protect their capital and home to a quarter of the population from North Korean artillery. And if the attack is focused just on a no-launch zone, will Pyongyang unleash nukes that might be shot down and which would trigger an American nuclear retaliation?

I'm not sure how valuable the money and experience that North Korea has gotten from helping Russia invade Ukraine will be in the long run after a short-term bump.

UPDATE: Intersteing:

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspected the production ‌of new artillery with a range ‌exceeding 60 km (37 miles) that would be deployed at ​the South Korean border and bolster its ability to hit Seoul[.]

The correlation of forces has shifted. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

Ukraine Builds an A-Whacks

Ukraine has developed the A-Whacks plane to shoot down incoming suicide drones with cheap air defense weapons. See? Not all my notions are impractical.

Ukraine already mounted a 7.62 mini-gun on a An-28 transport to successfully shoot down drones. This improvement is outstanding:

As depicted in a new video montage, the same An-28 is now launching 3D-printed SkyFall P1-Sun interceptor drones from an underwing hardpoint.

And if I do say so myself, an idea I suggested two years ago based on using APKWS rockets on a radar plane able to detect the incoming drones, and dubbed it A-Whacks: 

The rocket can go nearly 7 miles when fired from aircraft. A lot could be packed into a commercial airliner converted to an air defense aircraft, right? There could also be a smaller number of longer-range sophisticated air-to-air missiles carried.

The concept is working. With suicide air-to-air drones rather than APKWS. But that's a mere detail.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from Trench Art. 

Establishing the Logistics Backbone in INDOPACOM

The Army has the primary role in getting supplies to the joint force in the figurative "last mile" after the Navy gets the supply ships into the port across the ocean.

This is interesting:

The U.S. Army is using a facility in Subic Bay to stage equipment for exercises and alliance contingencies, according to a recent think tank report and imagery released by the Pentagon.

Army trucks and helicopters rolled off a Military Sealift Command-contracted vessel at Subic Bay last month during Washington’s annual mass disembarkation in the Philippines for a series of consecutive military drills. 

This extends logistics for American and allied forces to operate close to China from the southern Philippines in Mindanao, as America planned in the 1930s to do to defend the Philippines:

The enduring need for secure logistics to the western Pacific hasn’t changed. But history is just rhyming. And so America looks to the Davao region rather than Dumanquilas Bay for a new logistics link should the current Pacific threat, China, move from the “pacing” standard to the active enemy.

For a long time, American logistics was pretty much restricted to northeast Asia to support South Korea and Japan. With the need to cope with rising Chinese power, INDOPACOM needs a wider and more robust logistics effort.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: The image is from the initial article. 

Kneel Britannia

Britain will crawl back to the empire they escaped?

This is sad:

Sir Keir Starmer is at it again. Not content to merely thwart the democratic will of the people over attempted delays to local council elections, his government is now seeking to rejoin the EU through the backdoor. As if 'dynamic alignment' on everything from food standards to carbon emissions wasn't bad enough, Labour wants to guarantee we keep playing by EU rules through something called 'secondary legislation'. This means ongoing legislation to tie us to EU laws gets authorised by ministers rather than by new updated legislation in the Commons. 

Nice knowing you, constitutional monarchy.

The EU punished Britain for Brexit. And Remainers in Britain eager to bend the knee to Brussels undermine an independent Britain. Naturally, British opinion once narrowly for Brexit eroded.

Mission accomplished. 

And so now, Britain will--after many centuries--finally be stronger in Europe.

I'd add that I am unhappy that America didn't forge trade deals with Britain to reinforce their independence. But I'm not sure it would have mattered with the forces in political Europe and in Britain itself working to overturn Brexit from the start. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

Priorities In An Ammo Shortage

Ukraine can't afford to bounce the rubble against aerial threats to marginally increase interception success.

This comment on how Ukraine has adapted to a Patriot missile shortage is interesting:

The Patriot unit commander, identified as Oleksandr in a video released over the weekend by the Ukrainian military's Air Command West, said that while standard air defense doctrine calls for firing between two and four interceptors at each incoming Russian cruise or ballistic missile, his forces are launching just one per threat amid strained stockpiles. 

Firing multiple Patriots increases the odds of hitting. If you have an 80% chance of hitting with one missile fired, you have a 96% chance of hitting the target with two. A third gets you over 99%. In a situation where you have a very valuable target to protect and plenty of missiles (perhaps because the fight is a single battle rather than a war), it makes sense to launch even three. The value of the saved target far outweighs the cost of the "wasted" defensive missiles.

But if you have insufficient missiles and lots of targets (but none absolutely critical) to defend, it is better to fire three missiles at three separate incoming missiles to have a chance of destroying three incoming missiles. That is superior to a near-guarantee of one hit while watching two other incoming missiles hit your assets.

When ammo runs low, you make do and set priorities. 

Mind you, if the incoming missile is targeting the Patriot system itself, light up the skies, eh?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article.  

The Winter War of 2022 Tells the People To Shut Up, Pay, and Die

Will the combatants continue to suffer and die in the war?

Russia bombards Ukraine daily. Although one Russian milblogger claimed the campaign is not making the most of resources and that "Russian forces are also frequently switching target sets without accomplishing their initial objectives.

And Ukraine's strategic warfare against Russian energy production and export capabilities begins to do real damage. Further, on the ground, where Russia's biggest advantage supposedly lies, "Russian forces in April 2026 suffered a net loss of territory controlled in the Ukrainian theater for the first time since Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast." It may be an anomaly. But things do seem to have tilted in Ukraine's favor on the ground so far this year. Perhaps the war's fifth summer will change that.

The special military operation goes on--and is starting to leave a mark in Russia:

There are increasing indications that hostility to Putin’s policies is spreading throughout the leaders, increasing the probability that they will merge into groups which might seek and perhaps even succeed in blocking Russian government policies and erode voter support.

None of this means Putin is about to be emasculated, let alone overthrown. But it could persuade Putin to take even more repressive and aggressive measures. Taken together, these developments suggest Putin is now less able to act as if opposition to his policies is irrelevant.

Russian anger over President Vladimir Putin’s moves against the internet is growing and spreading even to groups long thought to be his most loyal supporters. Russian commentators are pointing to other mistakes Putin has been making, and opinion surveys show that his approval rating is falling to the lowest level since before he launched the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. He now faces a buildup of disapproval that some have called an apocalypse.

If the Russian people are restive now, wait until they get a load of this:

A prominent, Kremlin-coopted Russian ultranationalist milblogger has begun socializing the idea that Russians should prepare for possible future limited, rolling reserve call-ups to bolster Russia’s force generation mechanisms.

It's "limited" in the sense that those mobilized won't be in uniform for that long. Dying in a meat wave assault pretty much ensures that. 

While I think the chance of upheaval is higher in Russia, I do not rule out the possibility that Ukraine could experience the unrest first:

Ukraine and Russia are exhausted. Neither side is close to defeat and yet discontent is growing on both sides. In Russia, open criticism of the regime is spreading. Social media influencers have, bizarrely, led the charge. In Ukraine, fury is directed at press gangs who hunt down young men and force them, often violently, into the army. Today, the chances of some kind of political crisis in either Kyiv or Moscow seem more likely than a great breakthrough on the battlefield. 

Ukraine's relatively free society at least allows its soldiers better options than learning to like dying:

Ukraine’s top general ordered on Thursday a mandatory two-month time limit for front-line troops serving in forward positions, a week after photos of emaciated soldiers on combat duty sparked a nationwide outcry. 

So Ukrainian troops have that going for them.

Yet while I suspect that Russia's ground forces are significantly more vulnerable to cracking under the pressure of war, Ukraine could break first--with worse consequences.

To avoid the risk of collapse--of the army or state--might Putin accept Trump's outstretched hand to conceal Russia's defeat with a realignment to face China together? Quietly, of course. 

If not, just how will this war twist to provide somebody with a victory?

UPDATE (Monday): Huh:

“The overall mood is that’s enough already; you’ve been fighting for long enough,” a Russian official told the Washington Post last week on condition of anonymity. “It seems to everyone that it’s been going on for longer than World War II, the Great Patriotic War — and at the same time we can’t even take one region.” 

Will Russia accept Trump's fig leaf to conceal Putin's defeat and allow Russia to pivot to face China?

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.