Did Ukraine's winter counter-attacks expose the Russian ground force juggernaut as a hollow facade? Is this just the most apparent problem? Things seem different enough from the continuity of the big picture over the last several years to make me wonder if Russia has serious problems.
The war goes on. But things seem ... different:
Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026.
The cascading effects that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions have generated in other sectors of the front show how constrained the Russian force structure in Ukraine really is.
And as the counter-attacks have continued, ISW stated:
Ukrainian counterattacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are forcing Russia to redeploy forces and means from other areas of the frontline and likely from operational level reserves.
If Russia needs more than local reserves to cope with apparently smaller scale counter-attacks, what does this say about the supposed juggernaut of Russian troops that continues to grow?
Over the last couple years I've repeatedly called into question the reality behind the image of a relentless steamroller that Russia tries to create with reports of always expanding troop numbers:
I have strong doubts that Russia is managing to increase the raw numbers of its troops fighting inside Ukraine to continue its grinding offensive as long as it takes. Does Putin have a Potemkin Invasion Force? Would he even know he only has that?
Russia has maintained the strategic initiative with continuous attacks somewhere along the long front. This helps to conceal any Russian weaknesses on the ground. Ukraine exposed the weakness in its August 2024 offensive into Russia's Kursk region. There are probably more such weak points. Ukraine's strategic defensive strategy of trading space for time to inflict much heavier casualties on the Russians than the Ukrainians suffer has supported Russia's strategy, in effect, by leaving those Russian weak points untested.
How much will Ukraine's counter-attacks cascade? Can Ukraine's new corps formations exploit this to create a counteroffensive?
Russia is still living in another world:
The Kremlin is likely setting informational conditions to expand Russian demands of Ukraine and NATO by making it clear that its current demands are no longer sufficient.
Really? Putin and what army?
Could this troop shortage I've suggested exists, if true, push Putin--if he is aware of it--to change course to end the war?
Are Russia's threats to NATO at Narva, Estonia, and aid to Iran to target American and allied targets around the Persian Gulf desperate efforts away from the main war to change the apparently ... different ... situation in their invasion of Ukraine?
And (okay, this is my last string of conditional events that lower the overall odds of it happening) would that plan explain Russia's new efforts to be able to shut down the Internet in Russia? Can't have angry or confused Russians using it to express opposition, eh? Tip to Instapundit.
I've often said I try not to let my hopes guide my analysis. It is difficult. But there is an opposite problem. When the situation has been mostly the same for years, it is easy to assume current trends will continue.
Is this a blaring alarm about Russia's capacity to wage war?
Russia suffered its deadliest day of the year in Ukraine on Tuesday, losing more than 1,700 troops in 24 hours.
Ukraine’s general staff said it had killed or wounded 1,710 Russian troops on March 17 and destroyed 29 artillery systems as well as 230 vehicles and fuel tankers.
It could just be a bigger example of the same old thing as Russians batter themselves against Ukraine's defenses. Russia is now using armored vehicles again:
Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline, possibly as part of intensified preparation for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
Perhaps Russia over the past year got the Ukrainians used to fighting infantry assaults and calculates that resuming mechanized assaults with accumulated armored vehicles will break those defenses optimized for slower attacks.
Maybe. But things seem ... different ... now.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: Map of Ukrainian gains in this year's counter-attacks from ISW.
