America, Israel, and associated powers are winning the military campaign against Iran. Western opinion is skewed by American domestic politics. Yet allied victory of some sort is likely. What form is acceptable in the short run remains unclear.
I've covered the Iran War of 2026* in two essays (here and here) plus numerous smaller posts in Weekend Data Dumps and in my Substack Notes.
We are clearly winning the military campaign so far. Talk of Iran really winning because they are enduring the ass-kicking is weird but common. Not that Iran hasn't hurt us or our allies with their (weakened) military. Enemies do that. War isn't target practice with a nice little bonus in your paycheck the next month.
And now, increased emphasis is on securing the Strait of Hormuz enough to allow oil exports to resume. Was this a failure in the initial plan? Or was it considered too much of a warning to Iran to see escort and counter-mine assets gathered? Perhaps the need to take out the leadership in a fleeting moment accelerated the start of the campaign. Perhaps we knew the world would survive a few weeks without the exports in order to gain surprise. I can't know what the thinking was.
As I noted in that first linked essay, Trump succinctly stated our objectives when he addressed remarks to the Iranian people:
When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.
Opposition to the U.S. president contorts much of the war analysis. And a fixation on having THE PLAN spelled out to the final victory as if that is wise in an ongoing war--or even relevant when no plan survives contact with the enemy--is not new. Plans are a framework that must be flexible in the face of reality. And the president described that flexibility if you'd accept that rather than insisting on seeing the operational orders.
Preventing Iran from getting nukes is the obvious military and political objective. Overthrowing the mullah regime is the ideal political outcome to do that. And destroying Iran's conventional military and weakening its internal security apparatus is currently the main effort by volume. This both reduces the mullah ability to harm and intimidate neighbors for years; and increases the ability of internal actors (many of the people and hopefully defecting security forces) to drive from power the mullah regime and their Revolutionary Guard base of power.
So far it doesn't seem as if the internal security forces are sufficiently weakened. Yet I assume Israel has the uprising portfolio in the campaign. I have no idea where they are in that effort. They aren't saying.
You can see the divisions between America and Israel from presidential statements and allied target focus. Israel is first up in Iran's nuclear crosshairs and so is obviously more committed to regime change than America. America as a global power has broader concerns and doesn't want a long war in this narrow theater. So America and Israel approach even the same war we are jointly fighting with very different perspectives.
So if Iranians can't rise up successfully now, America will finish its military campaign and pocket the relatively inexpensive narrow military win that knocks down Iran's conventional and nuclear capabilities. And Iranians will have lost their best shot at freedom "for generations." Then American and Israeli plans will need to be adjusted for the long run.
*And really, this is a campaign in the 47-year war since the Iran Revolution and their invasion of our Tehran Embassy and subsequent lengthy hostage crisis. But it is common to call any upsurge in organized violence a "war." So I usually do. But it isn't really that. Although the difference is indistinguishable to those fighting and paying the price for fighting.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!
NOTE: Image adjusted from WorldAtlas.com
