Perhaps Putin can survive a peace deal with Ukraine that doesn't represent a diplomatic form of conquest. But he cannot survive demobilization after the war. Then things get interesting in a heavy pucker factor sort of way.
The war goes on. Ukraine continues to counter-attack to claw back land; and Ukraine expands its aerial attack capabilities to match Russia's aerial bombardment scale. Well, hello:
Air traffic at 13 airports in southern Russia has been suspended after drones struck a building at a local air navigation center in Rostov-on-Don, the Russian transport ministry said.
I can't help but think that America responded to Russian aid to Iran with increased targeting data for Ukraine. I have no proof. Just a suspicion that Trump is a FAFO kind of president, and Putin decided to FA. Russia seemingly ponders mobilization to provide bodies for his war. Perhaps Putin's invasion force isn't the juggernaut Russia portrays.
Today, Russia faces what can be called a demobilization dilemma. The war in Ukraine is not about Ukrainian territory. The war is being waged as a response to Russia’s domestic fragility, declining legitimacy and a political system that depends on mobilization, fear and external confrontation to maintain control.
This is plausible. But technically, a ceasefire (I won't be so bold to call it "peace") with Ukraine doesn't have to mean demobilization if demobilization means a new Time of Troubles for Russia. Putin may be preparing to win a civil war, but that doesn't mean he wants a civil war.
And then there is this odd development (tip to Instapundit):
Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested the war in Ukraine was drawing to a close — just hours after he vowed to triumph at Moscow’s puniest Victory Day parade in years.
“I think that the matter is coming to an end,” Putin told reporters inside the Kremlin Saturday about the four-year-long war.
Putin said the United States — which he referred to as a “partner” and “friend” during his remarks, alongside the likes of China and India — was eager to help broker a deal.
Huh.
What happens if Putin agrees to a ceasefire without demobilizing? Maybe he decides that Stalin was a coward for not taking advantage of his massive army in central Europe in 1945 to immediately wage war on his Western allies to win the whole thing. Stalin didn't have nukes, Putin may think. I do. Regardless of the truth.
But the tattered mob Putin commands is not the 1945 victorious Red Army that marched across Europe to raze Berlin in less time than Russia has spent still trying to capture all of Donetsk province. As the initial article notes:
Unlike Western professional militaries, Russia’s forces are disproportionately composed of prisoners, ethnic minorities and contract soldiers recruited through exploitative arrangements.
Perhaps that go big or go home course of action is still too risky for Putin.
Or maybe Putin ends the war without demobilizing and without deciding to wage another war as Iraq did in 1988 because hostile Iran remained across the border. But by 1990, Saddam decided to use his expensive army to solve his financial problems by taking over Kuwait in a lightning attack. Believing nobody would stop him, he found out that he was very wrong. Desert Shield and Desert Storm followed in 1990 and 1991 (but at least the Coalition reduced Saddam's military to a more affordable level--suicide by cop?). And after a pause, the predictable--but not to Saddam who expected a mere drive-by shooting--2003 war finished Saddam off.
Maybe that's not a good plan for Putin given that Russia is already financially struggling.
Or perhaps Putin decides that a more muscular subtle attack should be his post-Winter War of 2022 military option while his mobilized army stands guard. Break NATO in the Baltic states, which Putin seems to be threatening (even if he has to AstroTurf supporters), with a Kargil-style invasion of heavily armed "little green men." Then dare NATO to go to war against his bridgehead. Putin could break NATO in several ways with such a strategy if NATO isn't prepared, as I discussed in this Army magazine article.
Sure there is risk. But the West may be unwilling to admit Russia has invaded. And at least it is deniable. If things go really bad, Putin can abandon the irregular troops and deny all responsibility. Will NATO then invade Russia while it has nukes? Not likely. And Putin may think something must be tried if history is to append the honorific "the Great" to his name.
So maybe. Unless a tall open window veto from other Russians is wielded. Or even if Putin just gets too nervous from Western disinformation to walk by windows.
Ukraine faces a similar problem with demobilization. Do it and Russia could pounce. Fail to do it and Ukraine will go broke eventually and not be able to afford a large active army. Will Europe really be as generous with financial support when the war is over? Even if Ukraine gets reparations in one form or another, will Ukraine spend it not on reconstruction but on keeping their army in the field ready for renewed invasion? If so, eventually Ukraine will run out of that source of cash. Going broke follows as does demobilization.
Ukraine and Russia--if Putin or whoever succeeds him does not choose another war as the post-war path--both could use a post-war deal that limits both NATO and Russian forces within striking distance of the ceasefire line.
And if that agreement cements in place a Russian "flip" against China so Russia can focus on holding its Far East from Chinese recapture, so much the better. Is that what Putin expects from the United States, his partner and friend?
But until then, the war goes on.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: Photo from Getty via that "disinformation" link.
