The war goes on. We can see and track the frontline and map the targets of bombing raids. But can we see what is behind that image of clarity about a "transparent" battlefield. War itself is cloaked in fog. Hence "the fog of war." But I see faint outlines through the fog. Are they real or my imagination?
As I wrote back in March about my impression about the war:
I've often said I try not to let my hopes guide my analysis. It is difficult. But there is an opposite problem. When the situation has been mostly the same for years, it is easy to assume current trends will continue. ...
Maybe. But things seem ... different ... now.
This year, Russia continues to attack but they aren't doing the Hulk smash! routine like it used to. Indeed, Ukraine has glimmers of success:
Ukrainian forces appear to be regaining the tactical initiative in different sectors of the frontline in Ukraine.
But just tactical initiative. No big deal in the strategic picture, right? It isn't really that different.
I recall that the Iran-Iraq War settled into a pattern of Iraq sitting on the defensive and Iran sending masses of men (and boys) to their deaths to overwhelm the Iraqi defenders. Nobody could see a way out from that basic fact even as each side sought salvation by attacking the other side's oil revenue (the Tanker War) and civilians (various Wars of the Cities). And when things seemed ... different ... after Iran in January 1987 launched yet another "final offensive" called Karbala V that attempted to take Basra in southern Iraq, nobody explained what was happening as the end of the pattern:
Perhaps 20,000 Iranians died in the battle. Iraq's casualties were about half of Iran's. Iraq's performance is notable in that Iraq withstood and won the kind of brutal bloodletting that supposedly only Iran could endure. Observers at the time saw only that Iran had launched yet another in a seemingly endless series of big offensives. They speculated about how many more of these attacks Iraq could endure. Actually, Iran broke at Karbala Five. It would be many months before observers began to wonder what was wrong with Iran when no further attacks were begun, yet it was true that the "Islamic Revolution bled to death in Karbala V."
People kept waiting for Iran to use its anger at failing to revive yet more Islamist-fueled offensives. But Iran could not. It would not be fully revealed until Iraq launched a big offensive to push the Iranians out of their major accomplishment of taking the Fao Peninsula in 1986:
While Iran continued to insist that ultimately it would be infantry who would decide the war, Iran had already let the usual season pass without launching a major offensive. This failure began to raise questions about what Iran was doing. One answer came in April 1988 when, after fewer than two days of fighting, Iraq recaptured the Fao peninsula with Operation Ramadan. Iraqi regular troops and Republican Guard forces backed by 2,000 tanks and 600 heavy guns plowed south and struck from the Gulf with a supporting amphibious assault. The Iranians were overwhelmed and showed no spirit of resistance. While it is true that the Iraqis outnumbered the Iranians by 8 to 1 odds, the contrast is amazing between April 1988 and February 1986, when Iranians fought hammer and tong for every square inch of worthless swamp on that peninsula. The day that Iranian infantry could not exact a heavy price for the terrain on which they stood was the day that Iran lost the war. April 18, 1988 was that day.
Has Russia truly faltered? Are we refusing to believe the evidence of our lying eyes?
Consider that Russia and China signed "a joint declaration on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations." I have to ask, is this simply a rote repeat of an old theme? Or a sign that Russia has internally admitted it cannot restore Russia's greatness on the battlefield and so must partner with China? Is this a sign that Russia will end their invasion of Ukraine?
Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine’s allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses.
Could Russia be trying to shape public perceptions to make it seem as if ending the invasion of Ukraine without conquering Ukraine is irrelevant to Russia's national security because of Russia's nuclear might?
If these are big picture signs supporting the faltering Russian offensive capability theory, can Ukraine do what Iraq did to attack and expose the eclipse of Russia's offensive capability?
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s army settled in to a defensive struggle from fortified lines against Iran. Its army evolved to survive in that environment. Iraq found it needed a mobile army to go on offense. So it built that army.
Ukraine has in fact been attacking and slowly gaining ground at both ends of the southern front for the last several months. Analysts have noted that for the first time in a long time Ukraine has gained more ground than Russia has. And Russia is losing so many troops that it can't replace battlefield losses. Are we in a post-Karbala V period of this war?
Will we see an April 1988 event that finally exposes the Russian threat as hollowed out?
For years I've considered a Ukrainian offensive to Crimea to be the most logical front to seriously harm Russia. Ukrainian military actions could be shaping the battlefield for such an effort.
Was this a test of capabilities away from the southern front?
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized counterattack in the Borova direction, possibly penetrating up to five kilometers into the Russian defenses.
Or maybe this is still 1985 and Russia has a lot more offensive life left in them that Putin--overriding some recognition that all is not well--wants to use:
Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to resolve the war on his terms, including fully seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of 2026.
Maybe I am hoping fluctuations in the pattern are a turning point when in fact they are mere fluctuations in a continuing pattern of Ukraine hanging on as Russia throws body blows on the ground.
How much longer does this "lull" in Russian offensive gains have to go on to suggest things really are different?
How are Ukraine and Russia judging their offensive and defensive options?
I can't know. All I can say is that I know things do change--sometimes radically--after we get used to predicting tomorrow will be the same as yesterday. I hope somebody on our side can see deeper into Russia's conditions to tell if things are really ... different. And I hope that Ukraine has been building forces to exploit that turning point if it is taking place.
Perhaps the Russians see the turning point more clearly than we can despite our assessment that the Kremlin is blind to battlefield realities.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
