Monday, June 20, 2022

The Winter War of 2022 On the Knife's Edge

Ukraine has survived and Russia's offensive seems to be grinding to a halt. Is this it? Or can either side do something that changes the apparent stalemate deeper inside Ukraine? Or will events away from the front lines be decisive?

Too often when one side wins a war it looks inevitable in retrospect. In reality, the outcome can sit on the knife's edge until the fighting tilts to one side and begins a growing advantage that leads to victory.

Russia's offensive on the narrow Severodonetsk salient has not culminated. But Ukrainian counter-attacks have not grown to a scale that can be called a counter-offensive. A forming consensus is that Ukraine can't win the war. And Russia is too big, it is said, to lose this war. 

The question of who is winning is complicated. Ukraine is losing territory. But Russia is losing far more of their army to capture that. As a general rule, I'd rather lose territory than troops. With troops you can regain lost territory. A hold-at-all-costs order to keep terrain will ultimately lose you both troops and territory.

So I don't see evidence that the war has tilted to Russia's side. Perhaps in the long run Russia could bring its weight to bear and overpower Ukraine. If Russia's economy, society, military, and powerful civilian elites can support such a big effort when they were promised a short and glorious special military operation.

But in the short run, Ukraine has a shot at exploiting shaky Russian morale and inability to replace losses in order to achieve a decisive battlefield victory--say retaking the territory in the south from Kherson to Melitopol--that shocks Russia into abandoning its occupation of Ukrainian territory taken this year. If Ukraine can get the weapons and supplies from NATO and can sustain the casualties to launch a counter-offensive.

The direction of the war is on the knife's edge. Don't get defeatist now about Ukraine's chances and create a self-fulfilling prophecy. And perhaps rather than solely focusing on a long war scenario, the West should look to see how it can help Ukraine tilt the advantage its way this summer and win this war. A short war is better than a long war. Food and energy are just two factors for that obvious assertion.

I can't rule out that widespread Western discussion of a long war is designed to obscure efforts to enable a Ukrainian counter-offensive to win a major battlefield victory before summer is over.

I'm going to try not following the news in real time to make updates every day, given the slow-motion nature of the current stage of fighting. You can check the ISW updates each evening here.

UPDATE: Severodonetsk is pretty much doomed. Russia has strengthened their air defenses in the Donbas. Ukraine made some serious strikes on Russian forces holding Snake Island.

This map shows the armies facing off. I can't believe it took me this long to find this information.

The Ukrainian brigades on the line or close to it seem to represent all the active duty army plus some reservists organized in brigades. No doubt many of the brigades are much smaller by now. I assume smaller reservist units have internal security and border duty, including the border with Belarus. But this appears to dash my hopes that Ukraine has a strategic reserve.

The map is from this CSIS publication, which has a key at the back.

I hope that Ukraine is holding the line with its pre-war army and mobilized reserve units while building a new army with regular cadres and mobilized reservists and new recruits using many Western weapons. Otherwise it will have to wait until it can pull brigades off the line to reconstitute them and prepare them for a counter-offensive. 

Russia's army holding the line is shaky but Ukraine's army is suffering the effects of fighting this long, too

Ukrainian troops are deserting battle while Russian troops are facing "troubled" morale as Russia's invasion of Ukraine could drag on for "years," officials said.

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq found that its units holding the line became worthless for maneuver warfare after adapting to holding trench lines against massive frontal assaults year after year. So Iraq built up its Republican Guard "palace guard" force into a mobile reserve (of 6 divisions, I believe). It carried out the offensives that finally broke the shaken Iranian ground forces that had battered themselves to pieces in repeated offensives.

I've long urged Ukraine to preserve their army even if it means giving up territory. Ukraine isn't doing that in Luhansk province. Why? Ukraine's tough defense in the Severodonetsk salient makes little sense unless a big counter-offensive is relatively imminent. But I can't rule out the tough defense is because politically Zelensky can't appear to be giving up territory. Even though it isn't the smart thing to do, it might be what he must do.

It's a pivotal time in the war. Who delivers the knock-out blow?