The Air Force has a long history of wanting to get rid of the A-10 and therefor shed the mission it carries out--direct close air support of troops. After decades of failure, will the Air Force win by repurposing the close air support plane to the mission of defeating China's navy in the Western Pacific?
Could the A-10 be what the Air Force needs for operating from dispersed, temporary, and low quality air strips around the western Pacific?
Imagine a rapidly-deployable force of non-nuclear fighters that can operate from the most austere locations with a minimal footprint while providing long range fires, decoys, electronic attack, and mission support.
The idea might actually have merit. Yet saving the A-10 at the price of abandoning the Air Force close air support mission for ground troops is a steep price to pay for keeping the aging plane.
If the Air Force brass agree to that use of the A-10 they will finally kill the close air support mission for the price of keeping a plane they long tried to kill (from the A-10 article):
There is a joke amongst the A-10 community that discussions of getting rid of the A-10 started 2.5 minutes after the last one rolled off the Fairchild-Republic assembly line in 1984.
And make no mistake, the Air Force has little interest in putting ordnance on target in direct support of Army troops. Oh, they'll get to it. And likely do a good job. But when the Air Force wants to do the job--not when the Army needs it.
The irony of saving the A-10 by losing the mission of close air support for ground troops which the plane was designed to do is not lost on me. There will be awards and promotions around the Air Force if this works out.
NOTE: War updates continue at this post.
