The Russian invasion of Ukraine actually has parallels with Germany's invasion of Russia--but on a faster pace. Are we at the 1943 stage?
Germany invaded on a broad front in 1941, expecting the Russians to collapse. Russia did not surrender and the German offensive stalled at the gates of Moscow before being pushed back.
In 1942 German military power was too weak to resume the broad offensive. So Germany attacked on a smaller front in the south that it thought would be decisive. Meanwhile, Russian industry relocated beyond the initial German invasion began to rebuild the Russian army. The German army was stopped and was defeated in its efforts, retreating from its high water mark.
In 1943 as the Russians gathered power to build on their late 1942 counter-offensives, Germany launched a spoiling offensive at the Kursk salient into the teeth of Russian defenses in order to prepare a better defensive line to hold the off Russian offensives. The Germans bled their army in this attack, exposed it to a Russian counter-offensive at Kursk, and weakened the German army so much that future major German offensive operations were impossible.
Over three months ago the Russians began with a broad offensive against Ukraine from Belarus to Crimea, expecting Ukraine to collapse. Ukraine fought. The offensive made advances in the south but was stopped at the gates of Kiev, where the Russians were pushed back.
Then the Russians focused on the Donbas and the south. The Russians took Mariupol but were stopped elsewhere and forced to retreat from Kharkiv. Meanwhile, military industry in the West beyond Russian reach began reinforcing Ukrainian ground forces.
Then Russia's depleted military scraped up everything for a battle for the Severodonetsk salient, attacking the Ukrainian lines and hoping to take all of Luhansk and hold what they took. The Russian army is grinding forward, enduring casualties, and pulling in power from the rest of the front to sustain its offensive.
The question is whether Russia can take the territory it wants and then hold it. Or has the offensive to take Severodonetsk gutted the Russian army, with a sanctioned economy hurting civilian morale and the reality of casualties finally becoming apparent.
And is Ukraine nearly as exhausted as Russia and holding on by its fingernails? Or does Ukraine have the power for a counter-offensive that seizes the initiative from Russia for good during the remainder of this war, driving Russia back from this year's conquests.
UPDATE: Ukraine used helicopters to resupply and even reinforce the Azovstal defenders at Mariupol. I did wonder about that, being iimpressed at how well Ukraine prepared for a siege in absence of knowledge about the resupply efforts. Although I remember reporting on rumors of non-specified resupply efforts.
Attrition can rapidly yield to maneuver if critical geographical points fall that enable maneuver (or force the enemy into headlong retreat), or if the damage inflicted on an enemy force undermines its coherence and ability to resist.
Either side could be on the winning side of attrition and restore maneuver. As I've said:
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Fighting continues in Severodonetsk and the salient in general. Russians remain on the defensive around Kharkiv. The Kherson front is static. The Russians continue to try to integrate the southern conquests into Russia's economic orbit.
UPDATE (Tuesday): The BBC live blog is back now the way it was before.
UPDATE: Ukrainian insurgent activity appears to be growing. And yeah, I assume much at this point is by Ukrainian special forces.
UPDATE: I'm suspending judgment on whether this happened or reflects more than a local problem. But did we really forget to supply Ukrainians with batteries for the Javelin missiles we sent?
UPDATE: Pyrrhic Putin victory.
If Russia even wins, of course. I never ruled out that Putin could plow
his way to some kind of costly victory. But Ukraine could actually win
this on the battlefield.
I figured Ukraine could hold the line at some point and wage guerrilla, partisan, and irregular warfare in Russian-occupied territory. But didn't foresee the ability to stage a successful counter-offensive. That may yet happen. But then again, I also didn't expect NATO (and others in the West) to provide so much support to Ukraine.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Russia has most of Severodonetsk but is stuck in general in the battle for the salient. Russia may be diverting forces from the center of the southern front west to the Kherson front to reinforce that region anticipating Ukrainians attacks. Russia launched some local counter-attacks on the Kherson front but don't seem to have achieved much. Casualties seem to be having an effect on Russian home front morale.
UPDATE: I've noted that the Russian firepower-intensive offensive is on a very narrow front. So it did not overly impress me. This ISW opinion piece is interesting in that light:
The fight for Severodonetsk is a Russian information operation in the form of a battle. One of its main purposes for Moscow is to create the impression that Russia has regained its strength and will now overwhelm Ukraine. That impression is false. The Russian military in Ukraine is increasingly a spent force that cannot achieve a decisive victory if Ukrainians hold on.
Could be. If Russia could attack on a broader front it would. And I don't think Russia will break Ukrainian morale with this battle. Hold on, Ukraine. Preserving your forces at the price of some territory is a good trade. Russia's "Kursk" offensive isn't going to break Ukraine's army. Hold on and Russia will be the broken party.
UPDATE (Wednesday): This doesn't fill me with confidence in our well-funded intelligence apparatus nor our departments of defense and state:
American intelligence agencies have less information than they would like about Ukraine’s operations and possess a far better picture of Russia’s military, its planned operations and its successes and failures, according to current and former officials.
What exactly do they do?
UPDATE: Help: "Norway donated 22 self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine, including spare parts, ammunition and other gear, the Norwegian defence ministry said on Wednesday."
UPDATE: This really shouldn't harm Ukrainian morale:
Ukrainian forces battling Russian troops in a key eastern city appeared on the cusp of retreat Wednesday, though the regional governor insisted they are still fighting “for every centimeter” of the city.
Ukraine has bled the Russians over Severodonetsk. But preserving Ukraine's forces is a higher priority than continuing to fight for the last portions of it. Ukraine's troops must live to fight another day in order to defeat Russia. Ukraine's troops should hold their heads high and not feel like they've been beaten.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Fighting continues at the Severodonetsk salient. The Kharkiv front is static. Fighting continues on the Kherson front where Russia is acting to counter Ukrainian attacks.
Is Russia running out of steam and does Ukraine need more time to build up capabilities to exploit that?
UPDATE (Thursday): Ukraine is putting pressure on Russia's conquests in the south but has not yet launched a major counter-offensive:
Maj. Roman Kovalyov, a deputy commander of a Ukrainian military unit located northeast of Kherson, said in an interview last week that Ukraine was engaged more in disrupting actions than a full-fledged counteroffensive. “There are some settlements that we have liberated through our actions, but these were the fights of a tactical level,” he said.
At the same time, a clandestine battle has emerged inside the occupied regions, involving Kremlin loyalists, occupying Russian forces, Ukrainian partisans and the Ukrainian military.
I assume the counter-offensive is coming. But I don't know if Russia will be better able to resist when Ukraine is ready to attack.
UPDATE: After giving Ukraine 18 locally produced self-propelled 155mm artillery pieces, Poland will sell more to Ukraine. For Putin, it is ironic that his invasion is pushing Ukraine into NATO's arms just from Ukraine running out of Soviet-era weapons and needing secure sources of new weapons and ammunition. Oopsy.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. The front remains static and Russia is having problems replacing troop losses and equipment losses. Ukraine seems to be counter-attacking on the Kherson front.
UPDATE (Friday): Ukraine claims to have launched air strikes on the Kherson front.
UPDATE: They should be worried: " As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine grinds into its fourth month, officials in Kyiv have expressed fears that the specter of 'war fatigue' could erode the West's resolve to help the country push back Moscow's aggression." I worry, too. Ukraine needs Western support to fight Russia. Sadly, despite Ukraine's greater will to fight, Ukraine is a smaller version of corrupt Russia. Overcoming that is a long struggle.
UPDATE: Thoughts on the war.
UPDATE: Ukraine's defense "directorate said Russia's economic resources would enable it to continue the war at its current pace for one year." The current pace is a very narrow--if heavy firepower-intensive--offensive.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russia continues to have problems recruiting soldiers. But Ukraine is increasingly vocal about needing Western artillery to replace their dwindling Soviet-made artillery and ammunition. Ukraine still clings to parts of Severodonetsk as the war centers on this salient. On the Kherson front Russia continues to prepare defenses even as it launches ground and artillery attacks. No sign of any Ukrainian offensive.
UPDATE (Saturday): This isn't true: "US President Joe Biden has said that his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky 'didn't want to hear' American warnings ahead of Russia's invasion of his country." It seemed that way at the time. But since then we learned that Ukraine quietly prepared for the invasion because they believed the warnings--but didn't want Russia to know.
UPDATE: I've mentioned the battles around Snake Island. I didn't realize it was this deadly: "Russia has had about ten amphibious and assault ships destroyed or damaged trying to resupply Snake Island, as well as evacuating wounded and bringing in troop replacements. Hundreds of Russian troops have been killed or wounded on or near Snake Island. Russia could just abandon Snake Island but that is seen as another defeat at a time where there were too many of those on land."
NATO is preparing an alternate plan, that would establish a safe corridor from Odessa via coastal waters of NATO members Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey to the Turkish straits. For this to work, Ukraine must have the weapons to keep Russian ships out of that corridor until it reaches Romanian waters. That means Snake Island must be retaken. If Russia tries to attack the grain ships off the coasts of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, NATO can fight back.
How much of Russia's Black Sea fleet will Putin risk to break the Ukrainian leg of the journey? I'm assuming he wouldn't attack NATO territorial waters.
UPDATE: I don't understand Ukraine's complaints that its artillery is outnumbered 10-15 to 1. My most recent The Military Balance shows Russia with a 3:1 edge. While Ukraine surely doesn't have all of its pieces in working order, the same must be true of Russia. Is it just a problem in the Severodonetsk salient where Ukraine possibly can't risk deploying too many guns and rocket launchers because of Russian air power? Has Ukraine lost a lot of pieces? Is it simply a matter of lack of force structure to use all of the guns it has? If so, Western guns will improve Ukrainian artillery rather than expand it. Or is it a matter of ammunition running out? What's the real story?
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Fighting continues at the Severodonetsk salient. Ukrainian forces may hold a third of that city. Ukraine may have resumed attacking on the Kherson front. The Kharkiv front remains static. Russia may have pulled back troops on the Zaporizhia front in the south to free up troops for the salient offensive.
Ukraine believes Russia has extended war plans to October and thinks Russia has gathered 40 battalion tactical groups in reserve. ISW thinks the latter unlikely. I tend to think whatever Russia scraped together can't possibly be that large--or even very good. But could even a small, low quality--but fresh--reserve backed by heavy firepower break the tired Ukrainian troops holding the salient line up until now?
Whatever the reason for Ukraine's deficiency in artillery, it desperately needs more. Standing up a supply line for Western artillery ammunition will be necessary. I wonder if NATO could help Ukraine produce 155mm ammunition.
UPDATE (Sunday): An ISW analyst notes what my impression has been:
I would say that we've not seen a Ukrainian capability to actually retake territory that the Russians are serious about defending. The territory that the Ukrainians recaptured in and around Kyiv and Kharkiv in the north is largely because the Russians withdrew.
Not that Ukraine hasn't conducted local counter-attacks. But Ukraine hasn't attacked to defeat the Russian army and take territory in big chunks. The Kherson front is the closest to that so far. But so far it isn't.
But the analyst feels that the Russians are close to culminating. I hope so. Then we'll see if Ukraine can generate a large-scale offensive. But if Russia has created a reserve, perhaps the Russian offensive can grind forward a little more. And you never can tell what might be the straw that breaks the camel's back. Who strikes first and achieves that?
It would be funny if Russia did that and the
locals resisted because they believe they are truly independent
entities. Ukraine changed a lot between 2014 and 2022. Even Crimea has shown signs of ... friction. What of Russian-occupied Donbas? Especially after the drafting of locals to die in Putin's war to "protect" them.
Russia might want the other bits of empire, too. Would Belarus go along with being formally annexed? Would Central Asian countries turn to China for support to avoid the same fate in the future?
Back in December, when speculating about what Putin wanted out of his massing of troops on Ukraine's borders, I wondered:
Could this drama be for shielding the annexation of the Ukrainian Donbas territory that Russia's proxies hold? And while he's at it, would Putin annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Russia pried away from Georgia?
How much better off would Putin be now if he had started out doing that rather than falling back on that after demonstrating that Russia is no great power?
UPDATE: More on the fighting in the Severodonetsk salient. Russia is still grinding forward on different parts of the front.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Reports that Russia is mobilizing additional battalion tactical groups from brigades that have already organized two should not be overstated. The BTGs are pulled together from odds and sods and filled out with new recruits and recalled reservists (who got no refresher training when in the reserves, I assume). They will be weak units. And I assume pretty brittle.
Russian forces are trying to push back Ukrainian units on the Kharkiv front. Russia has clawed forward on the Severodonetsk salient front. The southern front was static.
NOTE: War coverage continues at this post.
