Monday, June 13, 2022

The Winter War of 2022: When You Start to Defeat Russia, Defeat Russia

Don't let the Russian military claim it was "stabbed in the back" by failing to help Ukraine defeat Russia's invasion clearly and drive it back. And if you are worried about "humiliating" Russia by helping Ukraine defeat Russia's invasion, that's all on Putin. He can end that worry by withdrawing from his gains made this year while he still has an army willing to fight and die for him.

The war goes on. Russia is still focused on the Severodonetsk salient that includes the last of Luhansk province still held by Ukraine. But Russia's shrinking offensive backed by massive firepower continues to erode Ukrainian troops, territory, and troop morale. Yet Russia is paying a large price to do this.

Russia does seem to be scraping up new units:

[The UK's defence ministry said that] Russia continues to seek to generate combat units to deploy to Ukraine. In recent weeks, Russia probably started preparing to deploy the third battalion from some combat formations, the ministry says, while most brigades normally only committed a maximum of two of their three battalions to operations at any one time.

Third battalions within brigades are often not fully staffed, the MOD notes, and Russia will probably have to rely on new recruits or mobilised reservists to deploy these units to Ukraine.

That's bottom of the barrel stuff. But something beats nothing.

Who can gather a sizable and effective reserve force first to break this stalemated attrition war? Russia is using its own resources to build something--even if it is poorly trained and equipped with old tanks and weapons. But Ukraine apparently relies on NATO to build such a force.

I hope to God that America isn't trying to calibrate aid to Ukraine to finesse a fine diplomatic achievement that prevents Ukraine from winning. Perhaps Ukraine can't win this war. But America should not stop Ukraine from winning.

And don't think that kind of hubris is impossible. In the Syria multi-war, the Obama administration tried to help rebels just enough to push Assad to negotiate (quoting an article):

I’ve written in this space before that the Western efforts to consolidate, arm, and train Syrian rebels have had the greatest impact in the south of the country. There is now mounting new evidence to suggest that these efforts have modestly increased in the last few weeks, though not with the goal of defeating or even debilitating the Assad regime militarily (we can’t have that now, can we?). Rather, the idea is to apply “pressure” on Damascus during the second round of Geneva II negotiations, which began this week, and which the apparently non-pressured Syrian reconciliation minister has already classified as a “failure” waiting to happen.

That pressure failed. Letting your enemy know you won't try to defeat them eases the burden on an enemy tremendously. But the people who tried it are still around and still think highly of their truly stunning intellects. This time, for sure!

But Russia won't feel any gratitude for the West easing the scope of Russia's defeat. The West will get the worst of both worlds: Russia not fully expelled from Ukraine and Russia angry at the West for allegedly denying Russia victory. Indeed, it may not be possible for Putin to make peace:

The geopolitical point is that Russia has failed to take Ukraine or split NATO. The political fact is that Putin has failed. He cannot achieve his strategic goals. He has welded NATO into a solid force it hasn’t been for a long time. More important, he has governed as the final authority on all things. The last is the bog he is caught in. He may blame others, but his country will blame him. That means that unlike the harshest divorce, he cannot concede without destroying himself. He will continue to fight. He has no one to answer to unless the regime evolves. There can be peace only if it is understood by Putin that in due course he will enter history.

As long as Ukraine wants to liberate its territory taken this year, the West must help Ukraine defeat Russia. Russia must be defeated to discourage it from advancing in the west. And then our diplomacy can help Russia pivot to its east to defend Russia's Far East and it's influence Central Asia from Chinese encroachment. We keep asking about what China might do to help Russia as it bleeds in Ukraine for what may a Pyrrhic victory. But what if China sees Russia's stumble as an opportunity to erase a huge example of China's "century of humiliation," as China sees it? 

Bolstering Russia's ability to resist China--if Russia stops its pointless hostility toward NATO--should be the "off ramp" that gets Russia out of Ukrainian territory.

UPDATE: The battle for Snake Island continues: "Satellite imagery adds additioanl evidence to reports that Russia has reinforced its seized outpost on Snake Island with additional surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems." Plus Russia seems to have stationed a landing craft with a SAM vehicle in firing condition south of the island.

HIMARS rockets will be able to hit the island when Ukraine puts them in action. In related news, Ukraine has deployed new Harpoon missiles on the Black Sea Coast.

The battle for Snake Island may determine if Ukraine can export grain by sea.

UPDATE: Any weapon operated by poorly trained troops and commanded by poor quality leaders will look "obsolete." This, however, is interesting:

“The Russian military appears to have dramatically cut the infantry from its units, often with just two to three soldiers available for dismount in infantry fighting vehicles. These are structural issues,” said Kofman, the research program director in the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses.

Normally you'd have at least 7 infantry in an IFV. Russia is clearly pounding buildings with artillery and direct fire until they are rubble and then occupying the abandoned rubble. Holding what is captured would be harder against serious counter-attacks.

UPDATE: Interesting

All three bridges to the embattled city of Severodonetsk have been destroyed, says regional governor Serhiy Haidai.

Is destroying the bridges a sign of Russian weakness? That they are more worried about taking the city from tough Ukrainian resistance than crossing the river after taking the city?

Or does Russia plan something other than a contested river crossing with bridging equipment? Could Russia outflank the river line west of the city? Will Russia try helicopter assaults again?

UPDATE: This attitude from the New York Times baffles me:

After the Russian butchery in Bucha, near Kyiv and in Mariupol, the chances of successful diplomacy appear more remote than ever. It is even unclear what the very term "victory" would mean for either side."

I won't address Putin's ever-shifting justifications for invading Ukraine. But for Ukraine, victory would mean not being occupied by or dominated by Russia, which is willing to commit whatever horrors it is capable of to subjugate Ukrainians. "Unclear," indeed. What morons. 

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russia is pushing hastily trained personnel and pulling out old tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to replace losses. The Russians attacked around the Severodonetsk salient; captured some more of Severdonetsk itself; and likely had some success attacking around Kharkiv. There is ground fighting on the Kherson front, but it is unclear if Ukrainian forces advanced.

You hear more that the Russians are going to gain the edge now. Maybe. Before the war I expected Russia could plow their way to the Dnepr River at a high cost. But Russia lost too many troops trying to stage a victory parade. Their losses forced them to focus on plowing their way forward in the Donbas. That failed and now it is mostly the Severodonetsk salient. 

Perhaps if Russia had started the war taking Ukrainian defenders seriously, my assumption would be closer to accurate. But Russia didn't do that and lost a lot of troops and equipment. Unless NATO abandons its effort to supply Ukraine, there is no reason for me to think Ukraine can't inflict a serious defeat over Russia's depleted and unenthusiastic army and get some kind of victory.

I just don't see the evidence of Russia being on the verge of overwhelming the Ukrainians now. But I haven't seen the Ukrainians ready for the big counter-offensive. I don't have enough information to know which way this war will go at this point. But being at this point of uncertainty over the outcome more than three months into the war is pretty amazing for Ukraine. And even a Russian win at this point will seem fairly hollow.

UPDATE (Tuesday): I've mentioned the force-to-space ratio being pretty low overall. Strategypage writes: "The front lines are over a thousand kilometers long and many areas are lightly controlled and guarded. This often consists of checkpoints on main roads that cross the 'front line.'"

UPDATE: Regarding my comments yesterday that I don't see the growing Russian victory, Russia is resorting to disinformation:

This has become more difficult in the age of cellphones and commercial satellite images. Russia earlier developed an Internet based disinformation capability that can plant fake news all over the Internet where journalists outside Russia look for newsworthy (contrarian) items they use for an essentially pro-Russia article. Get enough of these online or in print and the authors can cite each other if sources are demanded. This disinformation effort is mainly about Ukrainians actually losing the war and suffering large but unverifiable, losses.

If Russian disinformation causes NATO to end or even just lower its aid to Ukraine, it will be a cause of Ukraine's defeat--not Russia's glorious army. 

UPDATE: This author believes Ukraine is doomed. If Russia was capable of waging war at the intensity of the Severodonetsk attacks along the entire front I'd agree with him. But Russia is focused on a small front because they have to from their own shortcomings.

UPDATE: I'm hoping that Ukraine's claims that the West is not sending heavy weapons quickly enough is Ukrainian disinformation to conceal preparations for a counter-offensive.

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment.  Belarus is acting like it might enter the war but is unlikely due to domestic opposition and because the military is rather poor quality. Russia seems eager to annex conquered territory. Russia is desperate for recruits to replace losses.

Russia continues to attack in the Severodonetsk salient. And Russia is attacking around Kharkiv.

Ukraine is also attacking around Kharkiv. Ukrainian attacks on the Kherson front have pushed forward and seemingly compelled Russians to focus more on defensive moves.

UPDATE (Wednesday): Russia is firing up to 60,000 rounds per day on the Donbas front

The Russians are using indiscriminate and overwhelming artillery strikes to grind Ukrainian defenders down, underscoring how the Russian military’s approach to firepower prizes volume over accuracy.

The article confirms my impression of Russian "rubble" tactics that I noted in an earlier update.

I'm sure Russia is focused on measuring inputs and so the results don't match the volume. Studies of World War I Western Front bombardments showed that there was a diminishing returns slope for heavy bombardment.

And how long can Russia keep up this firing pace? Surely, it isn't just Ukraine having supply problems. Right?

UPDATE: The latest American arms commitment to Ukraine. Some of this is new production and not drawn from American stocks.

UPDATE: Actual resistance to tyranny. And yes, distinguishing between partisan and special force efforts is difficult from afar. Although special forces would be trying to set up and help partisan efforts.

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russia continues to assault Ukrainian defenders in Severodonetsk and have interdicted lines of communication with fires. Russia continued attacks mostly on the southern part of the salient, with only a little success. Russia is also trying to push back Ukrainian troops northeast of Kharkiv. Ukraine seems to hold the initiative on the Kherson front--albeit with only shallow advances so far. Russia is reinforcing Snake Island. Ukrainian resistance is hampering Russian efforts to control southern territory occupied earlier in the invasion.

UPDATE (Thursday): Russia doesn't want to mobilize and admit the war isn't going well: "Russia is scrambling to recruit men to fight in Ukraine after major losses in the early months of the war left the army stretched thin and some soldiers disenchanted."

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. European leaders visiting Ukraine pledged that Ukraine would not be pressured to make concessions to Russia to end the war. 

Mostly static fighting at Kharkiv, the Severodonetsk salient, and the Kherson front continue. Ukraine is preparing a counter-attack near Izyum at the northern base of the salient.

UPDATE (Friday): While much of the headlines today focus on peripheral issues like EU membership or Eurovision, the war continues: "Heavy fighting continues in the Donbas, with Ukrainian forces holding out against massive bombardment in the key city of Syevyerodonetsk and the nearby region as Russian forces seek to complete the encirclement of the area and cut off defenders and civilians left inside the pocket."

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment:

The Russian military has concentrated the vast majority of its available combat power to capture Severodonetsk and Lysychansk at the expense of other axes of advance and is suffering heavy casualties to do so.

It's like Russia has tunnel vision on the Severodonetsk salient. I'm hoping they get blindsided by the Ukrainians taking advantage of that. Ukraine seems to be more aggressive in small-scale counter-attacks across the front. Does this telegraph more?

Ukraine also sank a tugboat resupplying Snake Island.

UPDATE (Saturday): Russia fights a near peer and not a victim. And: "A fundamental problem with Russia is that they are enthusiastically paranoid, seeing all neighbors as potential threats or territorial acquisition opportunities. As bad habits go, that has been a hard one to shed." Russia is getting a whack with the clue bat in Ukraine. Will it help?

UPDATE: An interesting interview. Of note regarding Ukraine:

They just don't have enough in reserve in terms of trained soldiers or equipment to make a big gain when they poke a hole in the Russian lines.

That's been my concern. Is Ukraine holding the Donbas front as thinly as they can risk in order to build up that kind of multi-brigade reserve? Or is Ukraine pushing everything they can generate into the line to barely hold on? 

UPDATE: Russian strategic warfare: "Three Russian missiles have reportedly hit an oil depot in the central region of Dnipropetrovsk, says the regional governor."

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment:

As ISW previously assessed, Russian forces will likely be able to seize Severodonetsk in the coming weeks, but at the cost of concentrating most of their available forces in this small area. Other Russian operations in eastern Ukraine—such as efforts to capture Slovyansk and advance east of Bakhmut—have made little progress in the past two weeks. Russian forces are continuing to fight to push Ukrainian troops away from occupied frontiers north of Kharkiv City and along the Southern Axis, but have not made significant gains in doing so, thus leaving them vulnerable to Ukrainian counteroffensive and partisan pressure.

Russian morale is still shaky. And some BTGs appear to be shadows of their original strength, nothing more than symbols on a Russian map.

UPDATE (Sunday): Russia says it has destroyed Western artillery and vehicles in the Kherson front region. Does this suggest that this is where most of the Western heavier equipment is going? Or am I connecting dots based on the picture I expect to see?

UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Fighting continues around Kharkiv.

The Russian offensive in the Severodonetck salient is pairing heavy artillery fire with "likely" weak infantry units. The front remained fairly static despite heavy fighting.

Ukraine has counter-attacked in the Zaporizhia section of the southern front, forcing Russia to divert troops there.

Local Ukrainian counter-attacks on the Kherson front continue. Eventually Kherson itself might be within reach.

ISW believes Russian artillery is firing on Donetsk city and pretending Ukraine is doing it to turn people in that Russian-occupied Donbas city toward Russia. In addition, Russia and their Donbas hand puppets will conduct unjustified war crimes trials for Ukrainian troops who surrendered at Mariupol. I imagine this will harden Ukrainian troops against surrendering in all but the most dire circumstances.