A new phase of the war is coming. I don't believe it will be stalemate given the often low force-to-space ratio along much of the front lines that look so solid when drawn on a map. The images of firepower-heavy slow-moving trench warfare around Severodonetsk obscure that reality. But I don't know what the new phase will be.
Late last week, Ukraine ordered its troops to evacuate Severodonetsk. Good. The troops did a Hell of a job buying time and inflicting casualties on the Russian invaders. They paid a price for it but should not feel defeated. That order was needed because Russian momentum in the salient is small but noticeable. The signs appeared that more terrain must be given up to save troops:
Russian forces have made substantial gains in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area over the last several days and Ukrainian troops continue to suffer high casualties, but Ukrainian forces have fundamentally accomplished their objective in the battle by slowing down and degrading Russian forces.
Russia even surrounded some Ukrainian troops in a small pocket on the southern front of the salient.
The Ukrainians are also setting the stage to pull back from Lysynchansk, just west of Severodonetsdk. Again, hold the city only to buy time and inflict casualties on the Russians. Don't risk another pocket that bags a lot of those defenders. Spend more effort helping isolated Ukrainian troops break out to fight another day.
I've written that there are parallels in this war with Germany's invasion of Russia in World War II:
Germany invaded on a broad front in 1941, expecting the Russians to collapse. Russia did not surrender and the German offensive stalled at the gates of Moscow before being pushed back.
In 1942 German military power was too weak to resume the broad offensive. So Germany attacked on a smaller front in the south that it thought would be decisive. Meanwhile, Russian industry relocated beyond the initial German invasion began to rebuild the Russian army. The German army was stopped and was defeated in its efforts, retreating from its high water mark.
In 1943 as the Russians gathered power to build on their late 1942 counter-offensives, Germany launched a spoiling offensive at the Kursk salient into the teeth of Russian defenses in order to prepare a better defensive line to hold the off Russian offensives. The Germans bled their army in this attack, exposed it to a Russian counter-offensive at Kursk, and weakened the German army so much that future major German offensive operations were impossible.
I compared Russia's shrinking offensive scale to this German experience.
If the battle for the Severodonetsk salient is analogous to the Kursk campaign in 1943, how do we assess the outcome of the salient battle and what it means for the next phase?
Will Russia continue to pound Ukrainian troops to take all of Donetsk province after getting Luhansk?
Ukrainians are running short of artillery ammunition so they use their mobile artillery only for counterbattery (firing on Russian artillery). The Russians are also using artillery ammo at an unsustainable level and, if the Ukrainians receive more artillery ammo from NATO, Russia’s artillery superiority will fade.
Russia wants people to think they can keep up the pace forever. I thought that was unlikely, but what do I know?
Or will Russia regroup for another offensive on a more thinly held part of Ukraine's lines outside of the Donbas after capturing the last part of Luhansk province at the tip of the Severodonetsk salient, seeking easier territorial gains that continue the illusion of winning? And which don't require the volume of artillery fire to win.
Will Russia deploy to defend their gains after taking Luhansk, declare victory, and go over to the defensive, building a reserve to repulse Ukraine counter-attacks and continuing to wage strategic bombing on Ukraine's economy to compel Ukraine to accept--whether formally or in practice--Russia's second round of conquests?
Will Ukraine build a reserve and use it on Russia's weakened army to defeat a portion of the Russian army in battle and drive back Russian forces a significant and perhaps decisive distance, perhaps breaking the Russian army or provoking political unrest within Russia?
The ISW assessment says that Russia's under-the-radar recruitment of troops to replace losses means there won't be a big drop in troop strength that Ukraine can wait for and exploit.
But Russian soldiers rushed to the front will be vulnerable to breaking if Ukraine pushes a counter-offensive forward. We shall see.
UPDATE: The word is that Lysychansk, the last major Luhansk city still in Ukrainian hands, could hold out for months. Maybe. But I wonder if Ukrainian troops are up to the same level of sacrifice as they displayed in Severodonetsk. They're only human. Unless something else happens to bolster Ukraine's war effort, I wouldn't count on that kind of endurance.
ISW updates continue here.
UPDATE (Thursday): Russia abandoned Snake Island in the northwestern Baltic Sea.
Ukraine is continuing to claw back territory on the Kherson front. Although there isn't enough mass to really score a breakthrough.
But Russian gains south of Lysychansk indicates to me that Ukraine won't hold its last city in Luhansk province very long. ISW thinks it is possible there will be a fighting withdrawal back to better defensive lines. Unless something dramatic happens to change that vector.
Russia seems to be dissipating its dwindling combat power by increasing attacks around Kharkiv.
UPDATE (Saturday): The latest ISW update. Ukraine evacuated Lysychansk and fell back to lines less likely to be cut off. I wonder if the talk of resistance "for months" was meant to be a deception. I sure didn't think that was likely, as I noted earlier. Or wise.
Otherwise mostly static. Ukraine may be able to attack Russian lines of supply east and southeast of Kharkiv with new American-made rocket systems. And Ukraine has the initiative on the southern front where Russian troops are digging in to resist counter-attacks and partisans.
