When Russia invaded Ukraine in February, much of the Western public's worry was about what it might become. A war between Russia and NATO? Cyber-war? The end of Russian energy exports to Europe? Chemical warfare? Nuclear warfare? But those things didn't happen. Ukraine is hanging on with Western support; and Russia is flailing with bluster failing to compensate for ineptitude. Apparently the West can live with that. Say? What are Harry and Meghan doing now?
And with the boring normality of a war seemingly in stalemate, dangerous delusions will regain strength in the West. Yes, it would be nice to get Russia on the West's side. But the obstacles
to that are all on Russia. The West should not be thinking about carving up
Ukraine as the price for seeking friendship with Russia. I fear that impulse will grow as time goes on. Already, American public support for aiding Ukraine has eroded.
Ukrainians seem determined to expel the Russians:
Ukrainians, from those in power to the man in the street, are adamant that the country will not cede any territory in order to make Russia end its invasion, and all the suffering and destruction that come with it.
From President Zelensky to opinion polls, the message has been clear. Many are furious that such idea is even being suggested. They are quick to remember that the war started not in February but in 2014, with Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in the east.
If you make a deal with them today, the general view goes, they will come for more later.
But it isn't all up to Ukraine. And even if it was, I don't know if Ukraine could expel Russia from all of the territory Russia has taken since 2014. Ukraine might not have the military power to do all that. And as a democracy, Ukraine may find its people are unwilling to sacrifice more to regain what they lost in 2014. I can easily see Ukrainians saying, "Those people chose Russia in 2014. Let them enjoy being Russian!"
Let's first see if Ukraine can finally stop the Russian drive in the Donbas, which is making slow progress on a narrow front the way I feared the Russians could behind a wall of massive firepower. And then see if Ukraine can drive the Russians back from what they took this year.
I agree with Kissinger that Russia needs an "off ramp" to end its invasion of Ukraine without losing too much prestige so things don't risk getting nuclear should Russia really get shaky from its embarrassing military performance:
"Negotiations need to begin in the next two months before it creates upheavals and tensions that will not be easily overcome. Ideally, the dividing line should be a return to the status quo ante. Pursuing the war beyond that point would not be about the freedom of Ukraine, but a new war against Russia itself," he said.
He told the World Economic Forum that Russia had been an essential part of Europe for 400 years and had been the guarantor of the European balance of power structure at critical times. European leaders should not lose sight of the longer term relationship, and nor should they risk pushing Russia into a permanent alliance with China.
But an off ramp cannot involve Russia gaining territory from this invasion. There should be no "ideally" about that outcome. The idea that the West is prolonging the crisis by helping Ukraine defend itself from Russia is nonsense and fully in line with Russian propaganda. Russia can end the war at any time by withdrawing from Ukraine. Beginning to lift sanctions after Russia retreats out of what it has taken this year is off ramp enough.
And on top of restoring Ukrainian control to the status quo ante bellum--assuming Ukraine can't win more on the battlefield--negotiations should then be started on the status of the portions of the Donbas that Russia took from Ukraine in 2014.
Still, I'd be open to letting Russia
buy--or perhaps rent on a long-term lease--Crimea from Ukraine to settle
that issue of importance to Russia and close the books on that dispute.
Perhaps Western seizures of Russian assets can be used for that,
disguising de facto Russian reparations for Ukraine as the purchase price. It would be some justice if Ukraine regained Crimea, but let's be realistic. Does Ukraine really want a Trojan Horse of pro-Russian Crimeans inside Ukraine's political system now?
I'd certainly like Russia to flip away from China, as Kissinger clearly wants. But not at the price of appeasing Russian demands. The West isn't blowing that opportunity. Russia has blown it with its post-Cold War policy of appeasing China and now its invasion of Ukraine. If Russia is determined to be a vassal state of China, the West can't prevent that by throwing Ukraine to the bear.
Although God help us, some Westerners will propose exactly that futile policy.
No matter what the West "gives" Russia, Russia's rulers will always
resent the West for not letting Russia take more.
And at some level, I feel we have our current problems with Russia because the West was too easy on the Russians after defeating the USSR in the Cold War. Perhaps Russian nukes means that constraint continues. I don't like that reality, but we can't do anything about that. Which means going easy on Russia--again--may just pave the way for the next problem if Russia doesn't pull its collective head from its butt and confront the real threat to Russia in the Far East.
The lesson for Ukraine is that it had best defeat Russia's army in the field in the next two months and drive Russia from its 2022 conquests. Otherwise, Ukraine may face a mobilized Russia and a West suddenly rediscovering the joys of nuanced surrenders.
UPDATE: Ukraine calls their southern move a "counter-offensive": "In Kherson, the Ukrainian military says it has launched a counter-offensive in a bid to reclaim land taken by Russia, perhaps heralding a new stage of the fighting." We'll see if it is that extensive. If successful, such attacks would first threaten the lines of supply of Russian forces north of the area under attack.
UPDATE: A (the?) Ukrainian defense advisor has walked back expansive territorial objectives: "We need military support in order to achieve our goals, to restore our territorial integrity at least to the level of before 24 February [when Russia invaded Ukraine]." More would be nice. And it is certainly what should happen. But less would be acceptable for the moment.
UPDATE: The Russians don't seem like they are willing to go over to the defensive once they secure all of Luhansk province: "Taking control of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine is an 'unconditional priority' for Russia, the country's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said in an interview." The Russians seem to be breaking into Severodonetsk. Does this telegraph Ukraine's decision to pull back and not risk being isolated in the city?
UPDATE: More on the Russian advance into Severodonetsk. Has Ukraine inflicted more significant losses on the Russians than they've endured holding this front?
UPDATE: This is Russia's offensive now:
Does an army break in this battle?
UPDATE (Monday): The latest ISW assessment. Russia is slugging its way into Severodonetsk, but has not surrounded the city. The rest of the front is static.
But Russian officer casualties should reduce the effectiveness of the Russian army. Which might open opportunities for a Ukrainian counter-offensive as Russia thins out the rest of the front to funnel troops into the Severodonetsk front. Which may imply that Ukraine is holding troops out of the front as a reserve that might conduct such a counter-offensive.
There appears to be Ukrainian partisan activity north of the Severodonetsk salient.
And Ukraine holds a bridgehead over the Inhulets River on the Kherson front. Which is significant and presents an option for Ukraine to advance east to try to break through Russia's weakened lines.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Unless Ukraine launches a counter-offensive somewhere else soon, Severodonetsk will fall: "Russian troops have gained partial control of the eastern Ukrainian city of Syevyerodonetsk, where intense street-by-street battles continue with thousands of civilians caught in the cross fire in the ruined city and in urgent need of aid."
UPDATE: Germany steps up and: "will allow modern German-made tanks to backfill Soviet-era tanks sent from Greece to Ukraine." Germany has done this with Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland.
UPDATE: What's going on? "Ukrainian officials are reporting a "shutdown of all communications" in the Russian-occupied southern region of Kherson, Reuters reports." Are Russians trying to prevent Ukrainian partisans from operating or communicating with Ukrainian forces that seem to be trying to counter-attack from the outside?
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. The key part:
Moscow’s concentration on seizing Severodonetsk and Donbas generally continues to create vulnerabilities for Russia in Ukraine’s vital Kherson Oblast, where Ukrainian counter-offensives continue. Kherson is critical terrain because it is the only area of Ukraine in which Russian forces hold ground on the west bank of the Dnipro River. If Russia is able to retain a strong lodgment in Kherson when fighting stops it will be in a very strong position from which to launch a future invasion. If Ukraine regains Kherson, on the other hand, Ukraine will be in a much stronger position to defend itself against future Russian attack. This strategic calculus should in principle lead Russia to allocate sufficient combat power to hold Kherson. But Russian President Vladimir Putin has chosen instead to concentrate all the forces and resources that can be scraped together in a desperate and bloody push to seize areas of eastern Ukraine that will give him largely symbolic gains. Continuing successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson indicate that Ukraine’s commanders recognize these realities and are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities that Putin’s decisions have created.
These two things, Russian offensive in Donbas and a Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson have long been my greatest worry and greatest hope. Well before Russia's retreat from Kiev.
My greatest worry has largely evaporated. Russia has failed to carry out such a grand encirclement even though it has taken almost all of Luhansk province. And while Russia my yet trap some Ukrainian troops in the Severodonetsk salient, it would be a small win. But it seems likely that Ukraine will pull its troops back before they are cut off.
Meanwhile, Russia is stripping the rest of the southern front for the firepower needed to plow forward in Luhansk. Ukraine, if it has the reserves, could rip Russia's army a new a-hole. Ukraine is attacking on the Kherson front. Let us hope that we don't have a replay of this tragic conversation in 1940:
Churchill asked General Gamelin, "Where is the strategic reserve?" which had saved Paris in the First World War. "There is none", Gamelin replied.
The Ukrainians have been smart this war. I cannot believe that Ukraine has not built a strategic reserve. Even at the price of asking outmanned and outgunned Ukrainian troops to desperately hold the line in the Donbas.
In other reports, Belarus is giving up stocks of equipment to replenish the Russian army. Which is amazing. How can Russia not have sufficient stocks? Unless Russia is worried Belarus will defect and wants to strip Belarus of equipment. In addition, Ukrainian partisans remain active.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Ukraine is clearly pulling back: "Russia is now in control of around 70% of the key eastern city of Severodonetsk, according to the governor of the Luhansk region."
UPDATE: Predictable: "Cracks are appearing in the Western front against Moscow, with America’s European allies increasingly split over whether to keep shipping more powerful weapons to Ukraine, which some of them fear could prolong the conflict and increase its economic fallout." Europeans who hope not to piss of Russia too much should recall some old advice after beginning to defeat Russia. When you start to take Vienna, take Vienna. Defeat Russia.
UPDATE: Backbones turn to jelly in NATO:
One sign of this is the increasing number of voices demanding that Ukraine make concessions to stop the war. Italy’s “peace plan” will not be the last such effort (“why not give Russia Lake Como,” says Odesa-based Hanna Shelest). Another is the scramble among some European countries (Italy again, also Austria, and notoriously Hungary) to secure Russian energy supplies. Don’t forget Germany’s solipsistic, sophomoric “can violence be fought with violence?” philosophizing.
These NATO voices will get no credit in Russia for inflicting a small harm on Russia and then stopping.
UPDATE: The latest American arms package for Ukraine. It includes HIMARS rocket systems.
UPDATE: Ukraine says it still holds 20% of Severodonetsk and may try to retain it. Is this defense perhaps holding both ends of the last bridge across the river to block the Russian advance at the river line? But still poised to bug out if necessary?
UPDATE: The United States has carried out offensive and defensive cyberwar in support of Ukraine. Russia is not specified as a target of offensive action, of course. Still, that would have been a good thing to discuss behind closed doors given that deniability is a major advantage of cyber.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment.
Russian troops claw forward at Severodonetsk. The Russians are trying to avoid having to assault river defenses west of Severodonetsk to continue the advance.
Ukrainian attacks on the Kherson front are close to disrupting Russian lines of supply further north despite Russian attacks on bridges supplying the Ukrainian counter-attacks. Supply problems could make those Russian forces to the north vulnerable to direct attacks.
Russia worries about the potential of Ukrainian partisans in Luhansk province.
Russia seems to have won the battle for Snake Island and is reinforcing it.
Russia is destroying Ukrainian assets that could have been economically useful to it if captured intact.
UPDATE (Thursday): Are there growing cracks in the Western consensus that Russia can exploit?
UPDATE: Interesting: "The Biden administration plans to sell Ukraine four MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones that can be armed with Hellfire missiles for battlefield use against Russia, three people familiar with the situation said." Will Ukraine refrain from trying to use them for deep strikes inside Russia?
UPDATE: Ukraine says it may hang on to its toe-hold in Severodonetsk: "Contradicting earlier statements from officials, General Gromov said that at this point, there was no need for Ukrainian troops to withdraw." At this point.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Russia is bleeding their army on the Severodonetsk front and may be too spent to turn to the Donetsk conquest. Russia has problems replacing losses and sustaining morale of what is there. Ukrainian resistance in occupied territory is hurting Russian efforts to exert control. Ukraine is continuing attacks on the Kherson front and promises a bigger attack.
UPDATE (Friday): Speculating on outcomes. I won't pretend to know how this ends. But Ukraine could win, which is a shock to many. Including me. Yet Russia, as I said they could, is using firepower to compensate for poor army quality. But Russia is thus far able to do this only on a narrow front at the Severodonetsk salient.
I fully predicted Russia's military wasn't nearly as good as people thought, and couldn't conquer Ukraine.
What I got wrong was how well Ukraine would fight and NATO's aggressive response once Ukraine didn't collapse.
Also, I did not imagine that Russia's initial war plan would be so divorced from reality, which provided the opening for Ukraine to do better than I imagined they could. And which bought time for NATO to send weapons.
Given that I consciously named this war after the Soviet-Finland Winter War of 1939-1940, I can't rule out that the casualties Ukraine is inflicting on Russia could deter future Russian invasions even if Russia ends this war with new territory, as happened in 1940. But I wouldn't count on Russia failing to eventually fix some of the problems this war exposed and trying again, even if it takes a decade.
UPDATE: This is interesting recent history of Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but speculating about Russia taking part of Ukraine in the south and east being good enough because "what is left of Ukraine would be little more than an indefensible and economically diminished statelet with no viable future. Furthermore, the Russians would not even need to conquer it all. After all, the costs of trying to take and occupy Western Ukraine ‒ an area whose population has long harbored Russophobe attitudes for generations ‒ would be superior to the benefits, since it would probably lead to a protracted military quagmire and a nasty bloodbath" makes no sense.
If we're supposed to "understand" Russia's need for a territorial buffer in the west, how are we to explain this defense that Russia doesn't actually want to pay the price to have that buffer? Don't accept a partial Russian conquest of Ukraine by pretending Russia has no more territorial ambitions.
UPDATE: This is true:
Over the past several weeks, Russian troops have slowly expanded their control of territory in the Donbas, pounding Ukrainian defense forces with artillery bombardments and reducing towns and villages to rubble.
I've said this would work. But note that Russia must do this on a very narrow front. Does Russia have the tube and rocket artillery (and ammunition) for a broad front war?
On the other hand, getting ammunition for Ukraine's Soviet-designed artillery is difficult. America is scouring the world for the rounds and is likely running out of sources willing to sell. And Ukraine's industry doesn't seem capable of producing the amount needed given Russian bombardment.
I wonder if Western manufacturers could switch to making 152mm and 122mm instead of 155mm and 105mm. Or is the solution going to be shifting Ukraine's artillery to the Western weapons. Which means many hundreds of Western guns and lots of ammunition produced at war consumption rates.
UPDATE: Is Putin's health faltering? I've dismissed this because I've seen no proof and because it seems too good to be true. But perhaps I'm wrong. Do we have proof? Still, even if Putin dies or is incapacitated I don't assume it ends the war. Maybe someone who wants peace takes over. Maybe someone who wants to escalate takes over. And maybe someone too weak to do anything other than maintaining the current path takes over. how lucky are we?
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. The Russian clusterfuck continues behind the hammer of massive firepower at the Severodonetsk salient. Russian big talk will be hard to back up in the short run. But Russian electronic warfare--which I thought was a strong suit--seems to be getting in gear. Russian counter-attacks against the Ukrainian counter-attacks on the Kherson front failed. So far there isn't a lot of weight behind the Ukrainian counter-attacks, so it doesn't rise to the level of a counter-offensive, it seems.
UPDATE (Saturday): Ukraine seems to be fighting hard for the small portion of Severodonetsk it still holds.
UPDATE: Russian combat power in Ukraine has plummeted:
Russian forces engaged in the Ukraine offensive are down to just over half the pre-war deployment strength as all sides gird for an extended war of attrition, western officials have said.
If you wonder why Russia's offensive went from a wide Kiev-to-Kherson front down to the narrow Severodonetsk salient.
Russia is large enough to replace its losses. But Putin is reluctant to mobilize the country to do that with any sense of urgency. Will the peacetime recruiting practice be enough?
I don't think Ukraine is nearly in as bad a shape but I can't really tell for sure from publicly available information. I suspect Ukraine is building a strategic reserve. But I don't know.
UPDATE: The hubris of Macron in thinking we can calibrate just enough defeat for Russia is amazing:
Macron has again warned today against humiliating Russia, after urging the West in May not to give in to "the temptation of humiliation, nor the spirit of revenge". Draghi has suggested Europe wants "some credible negotiations".
We need to focus on helping Ukraine defeat Russia. Trying to calibrate just enough Russian defeat--as if we know what that is--risks Ukraine losing. And even if we inflict a small harm on Russia, it risks Russia's military leadership developing a "stabbed in the back" theory for their non-humiliating retreat, and plotting revenge for another generation.
Russia's army needs to be crushed in battle. Russia's nukes will prevent any temptation to pursue it back through Russia. Let the spirit of revenge be tamped down by a promise of ending sanctions for real peace and respect for Ukrainian territorial integrity.
And once again we see why French leaders have a reputation for being cheese-eating surrender monkeys.
UPDATE: Interesting:
Ukraine said its forces had recaptured 20 percent of the territory they had lost in the city of Syevyerodonetsk, the focus of a Russian offensive to take the eastern Donbas region, and could hold it for up to two weeks as fighting continued on June 4.
Is Ukraine trying to hold there for two weeks to keep Russia's attention on Severodonetsk until Ukraine can launch a counter-offensive? Probably at Kherson but perhaps closer to the Donbas.
I mean, holding just to stall the Russian drive is useful all by itself. And withdrawing to the portion of Severodonetsk closest to the river probably means only maneuver units are on the east bank of the river while harder-to-move support units are on the west bank. So pulling out the frontline units if necessary would be easier even if there is no bridge.
UPDATE: Apparently to avoid Ukrainian air defenses, Russian attack helicopters are firing unguided rockets while angled up to give them a ballistic arc. That extends range but makes them like vehicle-mounted unguided and inaccurate rocket artillery. Which makes the helicopters expensive artillery. But cheaper than losing helicopters, I guess.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Ukraine is more aggressive around the Severodonetsk salient and appears more confident of holding the line for now, having absorbed a big push from the Russians who thinned the rest of the front to grind forward there. Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk may have hit Chechen units hard in a counter-attack. The Kherson front was static. Ukrainian partisan threats in the south appear to be putting more stress on the Russian occupiers.
UPDATE (Sunday): It seems like the BBC has ended its blog-style live updates of the war. I guess the war is normal background noise now. How's that Platinum Jubilee going? [UPDATE: I stand corrected. But it does seem downgraded.]
UPDATE: Don't doubt Russia has learned some things after their disastrous start to this war:
Since then, the Russian military has learned and adapted, Kostenko explained.
“They have started setting up defensive positions; they have begun to use their equipment better; they are incorporating artillery. They are learning and it has become a more difficult fight for us,” he added.
Russia’s military has increased its use of tactical air to support its creeping advance in the Donbas, Britain’s Defense Ministry said in its daily intelligence bulletin on June 4.
Weaknesses remain, of course. The question is whether the disastrous start has crippled the ability of a somewhat smarter Russian military to achieve a victory.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked at the Severodonetsk salient and on the Kherson front. Ukrainian counter-attacks in the salient recaptured some ground while Ukraine resumed attacks near Kharkiv. The fact that Ukraine could retake ground at the point of Russia's main effort seems to indicate how much the Russian army has been shredded in combat. Russia launched missiles at Kiev for the first time in a month. Another Russian general was killed.
NOTE: War coverage continues on this post.
