Monday, May 02, 2022

The Winter War of 2022 Victory Parade?

Russia has new Ukrainian territory from its two-month war. Their new and improved offensive (Now with competence!) is either fizzling or can't seem to get off the ground. Is the cost in Russian troop lives and economic damage so high that Russia must end the war by declaring victory?

Russia still hasn't really ramped up its offensive in the south despite the stated intention to make the south the main effort following the retreat from Kiev.

If you can't win your original objective but can't afford to admit defeat after suffering heavy casualties, the only option is to declare victory with what you did get and act like you won. Russia has a convenient date to try that coming up, May 9th, celebrating the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

The problem is that NATO won't go along with that fiction. Russia has lost much of its propaganda fear factor, which has encouraged Sweden and Finland to think about joining NATO. And China won't fear Russian military power, either.  

I didn't think Russia would do more than try to bite off a bit more Ukrainian territory given Russian military weakness. If Russia had treated Ukraine like a capable enemy rather than parade crowds, Russia could have focused on a campaign for the land bridge to Crimea. Russia would have what it has now, but with fewer casualties and way less humiliation. European resolve would not have formed and Russia could have ridden its energy exports to Europe to a ceasefire that ended European support for Ukraine.

Russia could have then pivoted east before their non-aggression pact with China expires, with a stronger position in the west (including the Anschluss with Belarus) that demonstrated NATO would not ride to Ukraine's rescue in time to prevent defeat. That might have demoralized Ukraine and encouraged corrupt Ukrainian officials to make deals with Russia that pulled Ukraine away from NATO and the EU.

But perhaps the short time before the non-aggression pact with China ends convinced Putin he had to go big to get his buffer and still have time to pivot to face China and block potentially renewed Chinese territorial demands in the Far East. And competition for influence in Central Asia. So Putin attacked big. Putin convinced himself the Ukraine campaign would be short and glorious.

But is has been neither short nor glorious. Even if Russia manages to bulldoze its way to a battlefield victory, Russia has crippled its army and destroyed its reputation. And Russia will be tied down fighting Ukrainians or at least manning a front line that leaves fewer troops to pivot east. A revitalized NATO is in no mood to "reset" with Russia to enable a full Russian pivot.

But Russia is still stuck in a war with NATO growing stronger and China perhaps thinking more about exploiting Russia's quagmire

Bravo, Russians. You let Putin take you on a viking funeral ride to national doom. Will Russians go along with whatever "victory" Putin demands? Or eventually proclaims? Or will Putin end up (figuratively if not literally) hanging by his heels from a lamp post?

UPDATE: Ukraine claims to have destroyed two Russian patrol boats in the Black Sea.

UPDATE: Ukraine claims it destroyed a command center in Izyum, inflicting large casualties on the Russians.

UPDATE: "France has sent several of its truck-mounted 155mm Caesar systems to Ukraine along with ammunition and some accessories. More are on the way."

UPDATE: Bigger weapons for the next phase of Ukraine's fight. A lot of emphasis on the Donbas front. But Russia's advantage in a shorter supply line there makes it harder for US and Western weapons to be supplied that far from NATO territory. I still think the Western artillery makes most sense for a Ukrainian counter-offensive on the Kherson front. The line of supply for Western ammunition and spare parts to NATO will be much shorter and secure.

UPDATE: Are Russian officers shooting reluctant soldiers? Probably. I'll find it newsworthy when reluctant Russian soldiers are shooting officers. Tip to Instapundit.

UPDATE: Russia may annex the Donbas this month.

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. All quiet on the Russian front:

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Ukraine on May 2. The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on the Russian command post in Izyum may be continuing to disrupt Russian efforts on the Izyum axis. Russian troops on the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline and Southern Axis continued to regroup, likely in preparation for renewed offensives or to resist or reverse Ukrainian counter-offensives.

Artillery did not take a break.

UPDATE (Tuesday): NATO is treating Ukraine like an alliance member. Well, NATO isn't sending troops into combat. So not quite. But it is true as I've said that NATO is treating Ukraine pretty darned well given Ukraine isn't in NATO.

UPDATE: Related to the report that Russia appears to have shot some reluctant soldiers that I mentioned yesterday, the USSR executed 19,000 troops in the Stalingrad campaign alone. So yeah, SOP. I'll pay attention when Russian soldiers return fire.

UPDATE: Russian ground forces appear to be assaulting the Mariupol steel plant.

UPDATE: Ukrainian source says the Russians are landing troops by boat at the steel plant.

UPDATE: The impact of American artillery in Ukrainian hands. I'm glad the West is sending artillery. But unless Ukraine is running out of ammo for their existing guns, I don't understand the hype. Ukraine has lots of artillery pieces. According to my 2018 The Military Balance, over 500 self-propelled and 500+ towed pieces, plus over 300 multiple rocket launchers and 300+ large mortars. Again, unless ammo is a problem. Although I hope we appreciate what American artillery can do in the Army's hands.

UPDATE: Interesting: "The Pentagon said on Monday that Ukrainian forces are mounting a successful counteroffensive against the Russian military, pushing them 40 kilometres outside the north-eastern city of Kharkiv."

UPDATE: Is Russia's Donbas offensive faltering or simply not succeeding yet?

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Ukraine's counterattacks around Kharkiv are taking ground; Russian attacks on the largely stalemated Donbas front seem composed of broken units (but does Russia have more intact units in reserve to throw into a main effort?); Ukraine's Mariupol defenders are still holding out against air and ground attacks; Russia may be preparing to attack in Kherson province; and Lord knows what the Russians are up to in Transnistria. 

UPDATE (Wednesday): Britain will supply cargo drones to Ukraine. Those will be useful for resupplying irregulars, partisans, and special forces behind Russian lines.

UPDATE: What is Belarus up to? "Ukraine is vowing Wednesday that it’s "ready" after its northern neighbor Belarus – which Russia used as a springboard for its invasion – announced military exercises to assess the combat readiness of their armed forces." Preparing to help Russia? Or eject Russia from Belarus?

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russian attacks continue to falter. Russian troops entered the Mariupol steel plant. And Russia has struck Ukrainian supply lines in an effort to hinder Western supply efforts. Those efforts have apparently failed.

UPDATE (Thursday): Ukrainian troops continue to hold out in the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol. The city will fall to Russia. But the loss will not demoralize Ukraine. This city--and this plant--are Ukraine's Alamo. I hoped it would be Rorke's Drift with a Ukrainian counter-offensive taking the pressure off of the defenders. But I clearly was wrong about Ukraine retaining a strategic reserve capable of doing that. May the example of the defenders inspire the Ukrainian counter-offensives when they come.

UPDATE: When near, appear far? "Ukraine is unlikely to launch a counter-offensive against Russia before mid-June, when it hopes to have received more weapons from its allies, an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has said."

UPDATE: I'd like some confirmation but I can't say Russia wouldn't do this: "Mariupol’s advisor to the mayor said Thursday that the filtration camps set up by Russian forces outside the southern port city have become "ghettos" where men face torture and forced labor."

UPDATE: Belarus President Lukashenko doesn't sound like a man eager to hitch his future to Putin's war on Ukraine: "'I am not immersed in this problem enough to say whether it goes according to plan, like the Russians say, or like I feel it. I want to stress one more time, I feel like this operation has dragged on,' Lukashenko said." 

UPDATE: Question. How many of Putin's Victory Day parades will be marred by Ukrainian missile or drone strikes, special forces, or intelligence agents?  

UPDATE: Could Ukraine defeat Russia? Maybe. I think a Ukrainian victory requires a successful counter-offensive on one section of the front that really hammers the Russian army and destroys a portion of it while driving deep into Russian-occupied territory. Then maybe the panic and defeatism spreads and makes serial Ukrainian local counteroffensives on the rest of the front possible and not too expensive to prevent multiple repeats. My candidate initial front is the Kherson front.

UPDATE: The latest ISW analysis:

The Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Kharkiv city may disrupt Russian forces northeast of Kharkiv and will likely force Russian forces to decide whether to reinforce positions near Kharkiv or risk losing most or all of their positions within artillery range of the city. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zalyzhnyi stated on May 5 that Ukrainian forces are transitioning to counteroffensive operations around Kharkiv and Izyum, the first direct Ukrainian military statement of a shift to offensive operations. Ukrainian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the last 24 hours but repelled Russian attempts to regain lost positions. Russian forces made few advances in continued attacks in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to build their ongoing counterattacks and successful repulse of Russian attacks along the Izyum axis into a wider counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in Kharkiv Oblast.

Interesting. I'm a little surprised that Ukrainian forces could be counter-attacking this effectively on the main Russian front. Although Kharkiv is on the fringe of that main front.

And in the south, "Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Zaporizhia City but did not conduct any attacks in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on May 5."

Russian forces continue to battle into the Mariupol steel plant.

Also, is Russia's puppet government in Transnistria going to make a suicide attack for the marginal distraction that would cause Ukraine? 

UPDATE (Friday): War crimes.

UPDATE: Good: "The United States provided Ukraine with intelligence that helped Kyiv attack and sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, the Moskva[.]" I'm still pissed at Russia for this.

UPDATE: RUMORINT? "Russia's massive Admiral Makarov warship has reportedly been hit by Ukrainian missiles causing it to burst into flames." But the frigate isn't massive. Tip to Instapundit. 

UPDATE: Russians continue to assault the Azovstal defenders in Mariupol.

UPDATE: Indeed: "Even the people taking part in this conflict do not have full information, and it is worth emphasising that one of the things that characterises this conflict and this section of the conflict is how hard it is to know exactly what is going on." Please note that the odd British aversion to the letter "z" pre-dates Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

UPDATE: The deep roots of Ukrainian will to resist Russian invaders.

UPDATE: Russia denies Admiral Makarov was hit. Tip to Instapundit.

UPDATE: The latest ISW update:

The Ukrainian counteroffensive north and east of Kharkiv city secured further gains in the last 24 hours and may successfully push Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv in the coming days. Ukrainian forces captured several settlements north and east of Kharkiv in the last 24 hours, reducing the ability of Russian forces to threaten Ukraine’s second-largest city. This Ukrainian operation is developing into a successful, broader counteroffensive—as opposed to the more localized counterattacks that Ukrainian forces have conducted throughout the war to secure key terrain and disrupt Russian offensive operations.

Russian attacks on the Donbas front have not made gains; Russia continues attacking the last defenders in Mariupol; and Russia was quiet on the Kherson front, although the Russians may be preparing an offensive.

The scale of the Ukrainian counter-offensive makes me wonder if it could develop into a threat to the rail lines supplying the Russian Izyum front. 

UPDATE (Saturday): Ukraine claims to have hit a Russian landing craft, apparently at Snake Island. The craft isn't that significant. But the capability to carry out such strikes makes Russian amphibious operations far less likely. 

UPDATE: I assume Russia does this to attack logistics rather than thinking about an amphibious operation: "Several missiles have hit Odesa on Saturday, a spokesman for the administration in the southern Ukrainian city says."

UPDATE: I expressed my surprise that Ukrainian counter-attacks around Kharkiv have expanded to the breadth of a counter-offensive. I've expected a counter-offensive on the western edge of the Kherson front to aim for the destruction of Russian army units and subsequent recapture of territory to the Crimea isthmus and then northeast. 

 

Is my map-based analysis ignoring internal Ukrainian politics? Must the Ukrainians demonstrate a roll-back of Russian forces in the east before going on offense elsewhere?

Or is my map analysis wrong? I think securing Odessa from a land threat, threatening Sevastopol, and exploiting Russia's longer lines of supply to the Kherson front (with a shorter Ukrainian line of supply to Western sources) argue for the Kherson front. Am I missing something or just wrong on timing?

UPDATE: Ukraine continues its counter-attacks around Kharkiv.

UPDATE: More American aid will go to Ukraine: "A U.S. official said the new aid includes funds for 25,000 155-mm artillery rounds, counterartillery radars, jamming equipment, field equipment, and spare parts." This gets to near the end of existing authorization. Congress will need to authorize more spending for assistance.

UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv are pushing the Russians back--who seem to be willingly retreating and blowing bridges as they withdraw:

Given the current rate of Ukrainian advances, Russian forces may be unable to prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border, even with additional reinforcements. Ukrainian forces are not directly threatening Russian lines of communication to Izyum (and ISW cannot verify claims of a separate Ukrainian counteroffensive toward Izyum at this time), but the Ukrainian counteroffensive demonstrates promising Ukrainian capabilities and may set conditions for further offensive operations into northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russia has had to reinforce the Kharkiv front in the face of Ukrainian advances. Otherwise, Russian forces remain largely stalemated in the Donbas and on the Kherson front. Ukrainian defenders still holding in their sliver of Mariupol but all they can do is delay defeat.

UPDATE (Sunday): Russia faces bad options that don't seem to involve victory. Of interest is the statement that 40% of Ukraine's army was on the Donbas front. That makes far more sense than earlier reports of 67% that I read, based on what I thought was Ukraine's number of active duty maneuver brigades.

UPDATE: I don't mean to drink the Ukraine koolaid, because I just don't have the view into their problems. I wasn't overly excited by Russia's withdrawal from the north because Ukraine followed rather than pursued the Russians out. And Ukraine hasn't hit on the Kherson front as I've long anticipated.

But Ukraine has expanded counter-attacks into a broader counter-offensive around Kharkiv. What will Ukraine be able to do when it incorporates Western-provided weapons into veteran hands?

Yet Russia might still get their act together. And Russia is much bigger. If Russia even partially mobilizes, it could build enough power to bulldoze some type of territorial win at a high cost in lives; while wrecking Ukraine for a generation.

Still, I don't rule out that Ukraine could launch the big effort on the Kherson front. My view was a smaller one from the west end. Maybe with Ukrainian mobilization an attack from west and north will take place, sealing off Crimea and eventually rolling up the Sea of Azov coast with an end point on the Donbas-Russian border.

I want Ukraine to win. I'm trying not to let that color my judgment. Often enough, the bigger battalions--even crappy Russian BTGs, if backed by enough firepower--win.

UPDATE: This Strategypage YouTube podcast says the Russians captured a bunch of Ukrainian marines who got cut off from the Azovstal plant. But the Azov unit and some marines still hold out in the plant. Also, Ukraine may have used helicopters for nighttime supply runs for a while. But that is uncomfirmed. Still, this might have been a Stalingrad For Russia if Ukraine had a line of communication to feed reinforcements and supplies in overland. As it is, it may be--as I've commented--Ukraine's Alamo, supplanting the Snake Island defenders who filled the role early.

UPDATE: In Russia, the blame game is on over bad intelligence and poor military performance. But so far nobody is taking the anti-war side to save their skins. Could that change?

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment is all quiet static on the Russian front the day before Victory Day:

Russian forces did not make any significant advances on any axis of advance on May 8. The Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv City has likely forced Russian troops to redeploy to Kharkiv instead of reinforcing stalled Russian offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine. 

The Donbas front remains stalled, Ukrainian defenders still hold out in the Azovstal plant in Mariupol, and the Kherson front.

The worrying part of my brain says surely the Russians have some forces in reserve to unleash a firepower Hell on Ukrainian troops. But there isn't evidence of it. Surely our reconnaissance would detect anything significant, right?

NOTE: War coverage continues at this post.