Monday, May 09, 2022

The Winter War of 2022: Death or Glory?

Is Putin going to bleed Russia dry to save himself? He didn't earn a new triumph for the Victory Day commemoration of the bloody victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. And now all the troops and equipment of his glorious legions paraded through Russian cities will need to keep on driving and be fed into the Russian front. Hopefully the troops don't expect more friendly, waving crowds.


The rumor for the last week is that Putin is going to order general mobilization of Russia's people and resources. Oh, not for that silly special military operation to save Ukraine from Nazis! That would have worked out swell but for those meddling NATO states that armed Ukraine. So now Russia is to be told it is in a Third World War against NATO? The NATO that defeated the more powerful USSR?

That should go over well. So maybe Putin will think better of scaring his own people too much.

But what choice does Putin have?

As Russian military expert Michael Kofman has examined in detail, mobilizing the country for open war against Ukraine would be necessary to free up or create new fighting formations to continue the war in Ukraine. Doing so incurs considerable political costs for Putin. But without mobilization, Russia might not capture the Donbas and definitely would not be able to carry the war further.

All that effort could eventually rebuild Russia's army to have another go at defeating Ukraine. Or it might lead to the downfall of Putin or even the shattering of Russia itself in a third round of breaking up the Soviet Russian empire after 1989 and 1992.

Maybe a partial mobilization to hide the costs of war against Ukraine--and indeed the very existence of a kinetic war--from his supporters will shore up Putin. For now. Because Putin's path sows the seeds of his own destruction: "As Vladimir Putin's position worsens, the role played in our public life by the search for enemies grows larger." At some point as that search goes on--and "succeeds" in finding "enemies"--potential named "enemies" may resist.

UPDATE: Putin's Victory Day speech shows he is clearly stuck in a 1945 bubble:

But despite the predictable linking of today’s war in Ukraine with the fight against Nazism in the Second World War, he gave no real clues to his future intentions.

No talk of mobilisation. No declarations of victory in Ukraine. A reference to casualties, but no change in terminology: this is still a “special military operation”, not a war.

Forgotten is the vital role American and British aid played in getting the Soviets to Berlin in 1945. Not so much the weapons sent, but the raw materials for production and the trucks for logistics. 

And naturally, Putin blames it all on the so-called military threats from NATO. Well of course he did.

UPDATE: Ukraine would really like Western tanks and combat aircraft.

UPDATE: Ukrainian aircraft struck Russian-occupied Snake Island.

UPDATE: The Russian invasion continues: "Battles are taking place around the town of Rubizhne (to the north of Severodonetsk) and Bilohorivka (to the west)." And elsewhere Russia bombards targets while also assaulting the last Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol.

UPDATE: Ukrainian forces retreated from the Donbas city of Popasna: "Luhansk Governor Serhiy Gaidai told Ukraine television that Ukrainian troops had retreated to take up more fortified positions, adding: 'Everything was destroyed there.'" The Russian grinding assault is slow enough to allow Ukrainian engineers to prepare the next line of resistance, apparently.

UPDATE: Is it just me, or did Xi Jinping order Putin to lose the Ukraine war? "The conflict must not be allowed to expand or intensify, Xi Jinping is quoted as saying by state media." Xi certainly told Putin not to use WMD or to attack NATO. Or will China supply Russia to keep the war going within China's parameters?

UPDATE: With Putin neither promising anything new and Xi demanding limits on Russia's war, is this the only path forward? "It seems that until Ukraine collapses, or the Russian army does, or there is some kind of — let us speak gently now — political change in Moscow, there war will drag on, bloody and inconclusive." Could be. And I don't rule out that political change in Moscow might be to put someone in charge who is unwilling to stay within China's parameters. Have a super sparkly day.

UPDATE: ISW speech review: Putin neither mobilized the nation nor declared victory prior to coming home in his Victory Day speech. He seems more interested in preventing Russia from defeating him than in defeating Ukraine. 

But trying to wage war without Russians noticing can only last so long. Eventually, the casualties will be too high to ignore.

UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Russia is failing to generate new combat power. Russian troops display reluctance and even refusal to fight. Russia continues to pull BTGs that are being bled in continued offensives back into Russia to regroup and resupply. It is meaningless to measure Russian power by counting BTGs given their depletion. 

Russian progress on the Donbas front is slow. Two Russian BTGs of uncertain strength have the job of finishing off the Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol.

The Russians have 19 BTGS (whatever their strength is) at Belgorad province, Russia. Will they go to hold the line around Kharkiv or to reinforce the Izyum drive? The Russians are building up in the south, aided by new rail connections back to the Crimean peninsula.

Still, I have little information to compare the Ukrainians to the Russians. Ukrainian units are still holding the line, but what is their status? The Russians seem on the verge of losing combat capacity in their army. What about the Ukrainians?

UPDATE (Tuesday): Collateral damage from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the problems Putin has continuing the war, even on the defensive.

UPDATE: Ukrainian "cossacks" in action. Or the British World War II North Africa campaign Long Range Desert Group, if you prefer. Such raiders can work with a low force-to-space ratio. 

UPDATE: This sounds about right:

New weapons take time to be integrated with the [Ukrainian] forces using them. Until then, if Russia wants to win, it will have to commence an offensive designed to prevent these weapons from becoming operational. The problem is that the Russians have shown little flexibility in abandoning their assumptions for new realities. The Ukrainians are getting stronger, not weaker, and the United States, while still not deploying forces, is providing a significant arsenal. The Ukrainians are not under pressure to concede defeat. The Russians are not winning, but assuming they have reserves we haven’t seen yet, they might be able to defeat the Ukrainians.

I'd add that Ukraine needs to undertake a counter-offensive before Russia can deploy reserve combat power to either resume the offensive or successfully hold what they took.

UPDATE: Is this true (via Instapundit)? “The Russians see this as an existential crisis. They will fight until they can’t.” Putin started the war believing it was a victory parade into Ukraine's major cities. His armies failed, except at Kherson that simply surrendered (did local leaders wrongly assume they were on the right side of history?). Yet Putin did not take Victory Day as an opportunity to mobilize Russia for total war. If "Russia" thinks this is an existential struggle, that level of commitment is a no-brainer. And the people would rally around the flag. Clearly, "Russia" doesn't see this as an existential crisis.

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment.  

Ukraine's counter-offensive around Kharkiv continues to gain ground. It is compelling Russia to divert forces to contain it. It has the potential to disrupt Russia's Izyum front.

Russia continues to bombard and attack Ukrainian lines in the Donbas, making small gains. Ukraine says 1,000 Ukrainian troops continue to hold out in the Azovstal plant in Mariupol, although hundreds are wounded.

There was fighting at the western edge of the Kherson front.

Belarus falsely claims NATO is preparing to attack it. Belarus deployments likely don't telegraph Belarus entering the war because Lukashenko can't afford to lose troops who keep him in power. But I suppose the noise adds to the illusion that Russia has allies and options, much like Transnistria drama seems.

UPDATE (Wednesday): Russia looks like it will annex portions of Ukraine's south. Will annexing all of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory be the "victory" that Putin will proclaim? Will he then order his troops to defend that territory? That is an easier order to give than telling them to continue attacking. But after all their losses, could they succeed?

UPDATE: Ukraine's Zelensky urged his people not to expect too much from Ukrainian counter-attacks around Kharkiv. The Russian army is not broken. It is damaged. But it still fights.

UPDATE: Actual information about Ukraine's war effort:

The Ukrainian command is trying to “patch holes” by redeploying troops between different sections of the Donbas front. For instance, units previously seen near Lyman have appeared near Velyka Novosilka, where local defenders found themselves in a vulnerable position about a week ago. Units that had previously fought north of Donetsk have been similarly redeployed in Lyman. No new brigades seem to be transferring to the Donbas front from the western and central regions. Still, there are resources for doing this in the future: sending new defense brigades to the Donbas from western Ukraine is currently under discussion.

Ukraine needs to laterally move forces along the line to deal with Russian attacks. Which itself is amazing given the overwhelming size of the Russian air force. The threat from Belarus must be low enough to ponder moving troops east; although mobilized reservists may replace any units moving out from the west. And what of the units that defended Kiev and points east? Some must remain in case the Russians return, of course. But are others being readied as a reserve force for a major counter-offensive in Kherson?

I'll repeat it again, but don't assume Russia's much larger population (3.5 times bigger, I think) allows Russia to take that many more casualties than Ukraine with similar effects. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had much better morale and three times the population. Yet Iran's troop morale broke despite "only" suffering twice the combat deaths.

An yeah, a lot depends on whether Russia can replace their losses in men and equipment.

UPDATE: This is true about pre-war misconceptions about Russian military power:

It is now apparent that there is no steamroller. The second phase of the war has been underway for a month now and the Russians have made few gains. The encircling movement to eliminate the substantial Ukrainian force in the Donbas has yet to take place. There have been a few gains but they have been minimal while Ukraine is starting to see some successful counter-offensives pushing up from Kharkiv and eating away at Russian positions in Kherson. 

I've consistently downgraded Russian power over the years. But I thought Russia could deploy a smaller steamroller in the Donbas even after failure in the north to take Kiev. And to be fair, if Russia had started with massive firepower on February 24th, the invasion could have worked well enough. Perhaps Russia's army is too damaged from early losses for a steamroller, absent a year of preparation. 

Or maybe there is no steamroller yet. Perhaps Russia is actually gathering the steamroller. Russia may not be able to produce many more advanced weapons without Western components. But Russia can surely make dumb bombs and shells.

UPDATE: CSI: Ukraine

The Russian military has stalled because the theory of victory that undergirded its campaign was based on an assessment of will, not means. This flaw is rooted in a common transposition of military mathematics. Devising a theory of victory that hinges on breaking the will of the enemy, as opposed to overwhelming the enemy’s capacity to resist, is tenuous at best, and catastrophic at worst. This oft-ignored but sobering reality is playing out before the eyes of the world in Ukraine.

Good point. But our models didn't do any better and I bet they were based on quantifiable data. Still, planning on destroying your enemy's capacity to fight is better than planning on breaking their will to fight. 

And the war isn't over yet.

UPDATE: There is a battle going on around Russian-occupied Snake Island off of Ukraine's western coast. But is it a battle to control the island, as Russia says? If Ukraine can keep the Russian navy away and prevent Russia from deploying air defense missiles, could Ukrainian forces assault the island--just 28 miles from the coast--by helicopter? We did give Ukraine some Russian-designed helicopters.

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment:

Russian forces did not make any significant advances anywhere in Ukraine on May 11, and Ukrainian forces took further ground northeast of Kharkiv. The Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Kharkiv City has forced Russian troops onto the defensive and necessitated reinforcement and replenishment efforts intended to prevent further Ukrainian advances towards the Russian border. Russian efforts along the Southern Axis and in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts remain similarly stalled, and Russian forces have not made any significant gains in the face of continued successful Ukrainian defenses.

The fighting is still intensive, however. Honestly, if Russia is going to change the trajectory of this war they sure aren't showing any capacity for that.

The Ukrainians still hold out in Mariupol's Azovstal plant.

UPDATE (Thursday): Looting destroyed Russian combat capabilitiesAnd: "Despite the censorship of casualty news, families all over Russia realized that contact had been lost with a very large number of Russian soldiers since February 24th, the day the 'Ukraine Operation' began."

UPDATE: Oh? 

Russia’s current operations are slowly strangling Ukrainian troops in the Donbas and that despite optimistic rhetoric out of Kyiv and Western capitals, the battle is trending towards a Russian tactical success, possibly within two months.

The author has a good point that Russia is grinding forward. They do hold substantial Ukrainian territory in an arc from Kherson to the Kharkiv region. But I can't judge what the odds of either side winning are. I've certainly worried about Russia surrounding Ukraine's army manning the Donbas front. 

But if Ukraine can hold the Russian offensive until it culminates (runs out of steam, essentially), build a reserve force, and then launch a counter-offensive on one section of the front (my preference is in Kherson province), Ukraine could unhinge the Russian defenses and roll them up, breaking the land bridge to Crimea along the Sea of Azov.

Otherwise, a peace deal--and how could it be better than a ceasefire-in-place?--that "saves" Ukraine from more war will just provide Russia with a launching pad to resume the war after it rebuilds its army and--God help Ukraine--learns from its mistakes in this war.

UPDATE: Ukraine says it struck a Russian supply ship near Snake Island in the Black Sea

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment.  Russia may be abandoning an effort for a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, notably the Izyum front. But the smaller effort may have no more success as Russian units continue to display poor morale. Ukraine's counter-offensive around Kharkiv has the potential to compel a Russian withdrawal. Russia is trying to fortify Snake Island. Russia did not assault the Azovstal plant in Mariupol where Ukrainian soldiers and marines continue to hold out.

UPDATE (Friday): Putin says Ukraine is blocking talks. Naturally Putin wants to talk. His forces have bulldozed their way to controlling a stretch of Ukrainian territory from Kherson to the Kharkiv region. Talking is all about keeping what he took. 

UPDATE: When a Russian BTG attempted a river crossing in the Donbas near Severodonetsk, Ukrainians let two companies cross the pontoon bridge, destroyed the bridge, and then smashed the two companies. That BTG is not likely to be combat capable any more. 

UPDATE: Russia struck an oil refinery in central Ukraine

UPDATE: Russia has lost almost all of its Raptor patrol boats in the Black Sea. It's better to risk such boats to enemy missile strikes than risk major warships.

UPDATE: Russia's frigate Makarov was not destroyed by Ukraine. I did say it was potential RUMORINT. Via Instapundit.

UPDATE: If Russia can keep this up, they'll get across:

A Ukrainian military analyst admits that constant attacks from Moscow mean the Ukrainians are on the back foot around the Siversky Donets river – even though they’ve managed to thwart Russian attempts to put down bridges near Severodonetsk. 

 “The advantage is now on the side of the Russian Federation,” Oleh Zhdanov tells the BBC. “We still can't bring down Russia's offensive pace.” 

Zhdanov says it’s “very important” that his side keeps control of this part of the Siversky Donets. 

German experience fighting the Russians was that counter-attacks against Russian bridgeheads should be immediate rather than giving the Russians time while gathering a larger counter-attack force. 

UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Russia appears to have abandoned efforts to defend positions around Kharkiv. And Russian efforts in Donbas are slow and halting. Ukrainian forces continue to hold out in Mariupol. And Ukraine is attempting to regain control of Snake Island. Which is interesting given Russian naval and air advantages. Will there be a Ukrainian ground assault by sea or air?

In related ISW news, does Putin really think he can annex Ukrainian territory and immediately place it under the Russian nuclear umbrella to deter Ukrainian counter-offensives? Putin is delusional if he thinks that will work. Which is dangerous. Dangerous to defy and dangerous to submit to. 

UPDATE (Saturday): The Russians have withdrawn from the Kharkiv region, apparently back to the Russian border. Also, Ukraine has reinforced the Zaporizhzhia region in the south.

UPDATE: Possible Ukrainian effort to capture Izyum

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russia pulls back from Kharkiv; Ukraine is poised to counter-attack the Izyum salient; Russian forces continue to work to isolate Severodonetsk in the eastern Donbas front; Mariupol defenders are still holding off Russian attacks; the Kherson front was static; and Russia is reinforcing Snake Island air defenses. 

And this is interesting:

The Ukrainian destruction of significant elements of a Russian motorized rifle brigade that tried to cross a pontoon bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River on May 11 has shocked prominent Russian milbloggers. Those bloggers have begun commenting on the incompetence of the Russian military to their hundreds of thousands of followers. 

The wall of confidence is broken inside Russia. What comes through?

UPDATE: Is Ukraine counter-attacking the Izyum salient already?

UPDATE (Sunday): Interesting:

Most Ukrainian artillery operates as individual vehicles or towed systems that can halt, fire one or two shells at a designated target and be moving again in a minute or so. Since 2014 the Ukrainians have developed a lot of new tech and tactics, especially for artillery, which proved itself once the Russians invaded and provided more targets.

Ukraine had requested 100 multiple rocket launchers and 300 artillery pieces--all self propelled--from Western countries. 

Also interesting is that Ukraine salvaged equipment from the Kharkiv Tractor Plant that was damaged by the Russians and moved them to Romania where they will be able to build a Ukrainian-designed truck-mounted artillery. Shades of Soviet moves during World War II as the Germans advanced in 1941.

UPDATE: Can Ukraine mount a counter-offensive in the Donbas? The analyst has questions about whether Ukraine is launching broad counter-attacks or simply following Russian retreats, essentially. In some cases it looks real, but Ukraine needs more of that. I'm still looking for that on the Kherson front.

UPDATE: With Russian withdrawals from the Kiev front and Kharkiv front, you can at least say Putin isn't making a Hitlerian mistake of ordering troops not to give up one inch of their conquests.

UPDATE: How long before we find out the true scale of Ukrainian civilian casualties at the hands of Russian firepower and war crimes? I haven't wanted to assume the worst, but it is harder and harder to give the Russians any benefit of the doubt.

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russia appears to have given up trying a major or even a minor encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. Instead Russia will try to gain control of all of the mostly captured Luhansk province. The immediate focus is on surrounding and capturing Severodonetsk. 

Ukrainian units keep pushing (following?) Russian units away from Kharkiv back to the Russian border.

Russian efforts to find replacements don't seem capable of replacing losses with bodies, let alone trained troops. Russia is even merging decimated airborne units with military contractor units. Naval brigades are reportedly getting ship crew as replacements for losses.

Russia appears to be building obstacles and defenses in Kherson province.

And Ukrainian defenders amazingly still hold out in Mariupol. Wow.

NOTE: War coverage continues at this post.