Just what does our military do if it can't properly assess how a war will play out? America spends a lot on military intelligence, but what has it provided?
Our military believed Russia would quickly win the war it launched. Which explains why America offered to get Ukrainian President Zelinsky out of Kiev in those first days. I was horrified:
What the Hell is wrong with our government? Are we trying to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russia? Why would we offer Zelensky a figurative helicopter ride from the roof of our Kiev embassy? "The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride," Zelenskyy responded, to his credit.
As it turns out, we weren't trying to do that. We simply wrongly calculated it would happen.
“The discipline, the leadership, the fighting spirit, whatever you want to call it, models don’t account for that. They can account for a weapon system, they can do [calculations]. They cannot explain why Ukraine is still hanging on. Why is that?” [Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David] Berger said.
“We have to understand there’s a human component to fighting — a brutality. All the technology in the world allows them [Russia] to win, but it doesn’t replace the human.”The article also notes the failings in Russian logistics that must sustain what the model says any given unit can do. I've long noted that Russian logistics are a point of weakness:
Despite Putin's attempt to make his military look awesome, his military really isn't prepared to fight more than a small war with any type of skill.
Oh, he could send large formations into battle. But they'd suffer heavier casualties against any decent opposition and would achieve their objectives only with brute force.
And when the basic load of fuel and ammo in his vehicles went black, the resupply effort might be less than impressive. Which is why I think Putin's window to easily seize eastern Ukraine is closing.
Despite the mobilization for war that went on for about half a year before Russia invaded, Russia did not prepare the logistics for the war Russia is in. Which surprises me. Especially because news reports claimed--wrongly--that Russia had indeed prepared the logistics for an invasion.
And then there is morale. I warned of this a quarter century ago in a Land Warfare Paper:
The critical advantages provided by highly trained soldiers with good morale are not easily quantifiable in peacetime. The lack of quality becomes quantifiable, indirectly, when one counts the burned-out armored vehicles of an army whose troops did not know how to use their equipment and who lacked the will to fight on in adversity.
We're seeing the Ukrainian advantages quantified by Russian losses and failure to advance as fast as models told us.
First our military's models thought the Afghan military could hang on for months or years. Then they thought Ukraine would collapse in days. Are we asking too much of models that may have use for battles but which can't be scaled up to a war?
I understand that trying to quantify the unquantifiable is risky. Maybe you model the notion popular prior to World War II that Japanese pilots obviously were inferior because of purported poor Japanese eyesight. How many wars were started because those in charge believed their superior troop elan would compensate for material inferiority?
I swear, I fear the model probably downgraded the Ukrainian because they don't recognize more than two pronouns for their troops.
But I digress.
The models that don't accurately incorporate morale and training are only useful to compare the military forces of mostly identical armies whose intangibles cancel each other out. As I cautioned in my paper quoted and linked earlier:
The importance of this invisible edge that the United States Army works hard to maintain cannot be overestimated. The disasters that can follow from incorrectly believing you have a trained army are appalling. Iraq's experience in 1980--having its presumed blitzkrieg lead to a grinding eight-year war of attrition, heavy casualties and debt, and the long-term mistake of trying to reverse the losses of the 1980s by invading Kuwait in 1990--should serve as a warning to us. And as demanding as it is to maintain well-trained, motivated and combat-ready troops, diverting soldiers from combat training to prepare for and execute peace operations poses additional tasks. Given the narrow margins on which the U.S. Army is forced to operate, any degradation in quality could be the difference between victory and defeat--or at best, the difference between decisive victory and costly marginal victory.
And God help us, but I'm sure our models are relied on to guide our strategy and weapons development for a potential war with China.
UPDATE: Is this an indirect swipe at the Pentagon models?
In [Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger's] early assessment three weeks into the fighting, he said the Russians also may have relied too heavily on computer modeling and a presumption that the Ukrainians would not mount a large resistance. “Computer models help in some regards,” but “models can’t factor in the human element.”
[NOTE: I continue war updates in this post.]
