The war that Putin began the night of February 23rd, eastern U.S. time, continues at a virtual battlefield stalemate after early war Russian advances. Around the world, Russia is facing loud opposition. Putin seems shocked that his invasion of Ukraine to restore the territorial, military, and international stature of the USSR has prompted a restoration of the USSR's diplomatic and economic isolation.
Russian manpower and supply shortages have slowed the offensive against tough Ukrainian resistance. And Ukrainian counterattacks and successful attacks on Russian supply lines have complicated Russia's advance. As have NATO and other Western nations' supply and intelligence efforts for Ukraine.
The [U.S.] defence official notes that both the Russians and Ukrainians have used about 90% of their combat power. More US-funded weapons are expected to arrive in Ukraine over the next 24 hours, he said.
Given that the Russian figure seemingly is restricted to the ground troops massed around Ukraine prior to the war, what does the Ukraine figure count? I swear I haven't seen much evidence of Ukrainian armored formations in combat. Ukraine has generally been pretty smart (defending cities against infantry-poor Russian units, going after supply columns, hit and run raids, local counter-attacks, maintaining a credible air defense long into the war). Would Ukraine really not have a strategic reserve of heavy mobile formations? It's possible. I question the Ukrainians holding the Donbas front so strongly and failing to hold the Crimean isthmus at the start of the war. So who knows?
Ukraine isn't in NATO and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum was not an alliance. Ukraine is getting as much help as it could reasonably expect. I'm pleasantly surprised at how NATO and other states have stepped up to stop Putin. Now it is up to Ukrainians to fight. Sucks to be a neighbor of Russia. This is the price for not being part of Russia.
Nonetheless, Russia has taken over much of Ukraine's Black Sea coast and is poised around Kiev, the capital.
And if China decides to supply Russia, the war between Russia and Ukraine suddenly becomes a proxy war between NATO and China. Which would be kind of funny given Russia's superpower pretensions if not for the danger of the war in Europe spreading.
But it could be worse for Russia. If Putin sees himself having the stature of a Hitler (although an anti-Hitler, in his mind) reviving a once-defeated state, it must be a shock to find he gets the Mussolini role. Is history rhyming? Will China get decisively distracted by rescuing its junior partner from a foolish assault?
The latest ISW update (and map below) from the end of the fighting day yesterday indicates that only in the south, from Kherson to the Donbas, are Russian forces making much progress. And those forces have naval infantry in reserve. Forces around Kiev haven't managed more than battalion-sized attacks. Indeed, Russia has not launched theater-wide attacks since March 4th. That pause for regrouping, replacing losses, and establishing supply lines is taking a long time. "Success" may next come at surrounded Mariupol, as ugly as that is.
UPDATE: The Russian navy bombarded Odessa and then pulled back. And then in the morning moved closer again. Which seems odd. Why not use aircraft from Crimea? But apparently it wasn't a risk to the ships from shore defenses. Seems like a feint while Russian ground forces are still distant.
UPDATE: Russian Iskander missiles are using previously unseen decoys to reach their targets. Which is a compliment to Ukrainian air defenses, I suppose.
UPDATE: To be fair to the vice president, apart from whether she thinks Ukraine is in NATO or not, defending Ukraine is a forward defense of NATO. Ask Poland, among other NATO states.
UPDATE: Thoughts on the war so far by George Friedman. Will foes react to the power of our weaponized dollar weapon to dull its effects after seeing how it hit Russia? Also, the war isn't over.
UPDATE: Austin Bay: Somebody in Russia didn't understand the correlation of forces; Russia shredded the pledge it made in the Budapest Memorandum to respect Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine giving up all its nuclear weapons; Russia's plan to quickly kill President Zelensky and move airborne and mechanized forces into major cities to collect the surrender of cowed Ukrainians failed; and meanwhile, in the Far East, China can't help but notice that Russia's military isn't performing as advertised. Ahem.
UPDATE: There is more speculation that somebody in Russia might depose Putin. Don't count on this magic bullet the way Russia counted on taking out Zelensky. A replacement might end the war. A replacement might also decide to wage the war more brutally. We don't get to predict who takes out Putin. Better to count on Ukrainian resistance defeating Russia and act accordingly.
UPDATE: Would Russia use a tactical nuke on Ukrainian troops or even "just" a detonation over the Black Sea? Would that compel Ukraine to surrender? Or compel NATO to end support for Ukraine? Or would it steel everyone--perhaps even inside Russia itself--to the threat from Putin?
UPDATE: Reviewing the war after three weeks: "Almost three full weeks since the invasion began, Russian forces are largely stalled in Ukraine while a crisis which the Red Cross called 'nothing short of a nightmare' continues to unfold for civilians." With all due respect, Russia has not yet begun to inflict a nightmare on Ukrainian civilians.
UPDATE: Navigating the hurdles and details of volunteering to go to Ukraine to fight the Russians. Ukraine needs to be cautious despite the need for men. UKrainians don't want someone fighting for them to commit an atrocity on the battlefield, eh?
UPDATE: From the Tiger's Lair:
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that the West would not succeed in what he called its attempt to achieve global dominance and dismember Russia.
If the West thinks that Russia will step back, it does not understand Russia, Putin said on the 21st day of the war against Ukraine.
Putin is the largest factor in Russia's potential shrinkage. And I think Putin in the one who does not understand Russia, which has no stomach for dying for Putin's glory.
UPDATE: I wonder if Russia will reinforce success by focusing its limited offensive power on Ukraine's Black Sea coast? That would include bombarding and starving Mariupol until it surrenders.
Russia could scale back the other fronts except for bombardments of Kiev and Kharkiv to put pressure on Ukraine to accept that loss in a peace deal. It may depend on what Putin can accept after his fantasy parade ground invasion failed. And it may depend on what Ukraine is holding back to counterattack.
I don't rule out a Russian battlefield win. Yet I don't rule out a Ukrainian battlefield victory on a scale that demoralizes Russia's army to an extent that promotes a post-Russo-Japanese War style of revolt by the Russian people who had no idea Russia might lose to an inferior power.
UPDATE: The sun has set in eastern Ukraine, so another day of war is mostly over as far as major ground and air operations.
UPDATE: Russia is scrambling to replace losses by pulling in replacements from across Russian units and domestic and foreign mercenaries. The speculation is that Russia will use foreign troops for occupation duty to free up Russians for the front. Although Chechen troops were used at the front. And this makes no sense if Putin wants to reduce Russian casualties. But if true, Ukrainian civilians may resist them more fiercely, I suspect.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update plus map at the link. The stalemate largely continues. Russia bombarded Odessa but it doesn't seem likely that a landing is intended while overland forces are far away. Russia is pulling in forces from scattered deployments abroad; committing Eastern Military District reserves; and forming new battalion tactical groups with remnants of depleted BTGs pulled from the line, with newly graduated officers added.
It is stunning that the Russians have been largely limited to small attacks here and there plus bombardment for so long. How hard is it for Russia to build up supplies? Yet I worry about Ukrainian forces on the Donbas front. And I wonder if Ukraine has the capacity for a multi-brigade counterattack against a portion of the Russian invasion forces that reaches its culminating point.
A drive that pushes past Kherson and reaches the isthmus to the Russian-annexed Crimean peninsula prior to heading northeast might shake the Russians a lot. But I have no idea if that is possible. Like I've noted, I've seen very little about Ukrainian heavy forces in action. But were I God of war, I'd move Heaven and earth to retain a strategic reserve. But it does require patience to commit it at the decisive point and moment. If it exists.
UPDATE (Thursday): So any diplomatic end to the war would have to include Ukraine staying out of NATO and the EU? Huh. Russia claims this war is about fear of NATO. Now it is the EU, too? Actually, the first time Russia ended up invading Ukraine in 2014 it had started with Russian opposition to Ukraine joining the EU.
UPDATE: Huh: "Russian government websites are facing unprecedented cyber attacks and efforts are being made to filter foreign web traffic, the TASS news agency cited the digital ministry as saying on Thursday." Governments or private groups and individuals?
UPDATE: Getting close:
UPDATE: Ukraine struck a Russian airbase in Kherson.
UPDATE: American intelligence estimates that Russia has lost 7,000 troops in the war so far. Putin had better hope Russian mothers don't find out.
UPDATE: Has Russia's offensive culminated for now? "Russian forces in Ukraine are blasting cities and killing civilians but no loner making progress on the ground, Western countries said on Thursday" Russia can build up power to resume the offensive given time. Is this the time for Ukraine to launch a counteroffensive or is taking advantage of this stall to build its own power the right move?
UPDATE: The Ukrainian defense of Voznesenks on the Kherson front: "Judging from the destroyed and abandoned armor, Ukrainian forces, which comprised local volunteers and the professional military, eliminated most of a Russian battalion tactical group on March 2 and 3." A small Russian mechanized naval infantry battalion was thrashed by Ukrainian regular army artillery (at least), special forces recon, territorial defense reservists, and civilian construction companies that channelized the Russian advance. A single small battalion. The Red Army, it ain't.
UPDATE: Consider that Russia's three-week death toll is about the same as America's losses in twenty years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
UPDATE: Putin (executive summary): Whoever survives my war and repression will be purer Russians and worthy of my glory. Tip to Treacher.
UPDATE: The deputy chief of Russia's National Guard--Putin's purportedly personal army--was arrested.
UPDATE: Will Russia push its former Central Asian states into China's arms out of fear they are next? "Uzbekistan Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov said Thursday that his country wants the war in Ukraine to end through diplomatic means and that it would not recognize rebel-held areas in Ukraine's east that are backed by Russia, according to Reuters."
UPDATE: The British MOD says (via Instapundit) "Russia is resorting to the use of older, less precise weapons that are less militarily effective and more likely to result in civilian casualties[.]" That's true even for America in a tough enough war.
UPDATE: BS: "Pentagon officials say a 10 percent casualty rate, including dead and wounded, for a single unit renders it unable to carry out combat-related tasks[.]" German World War II experience is that even greatly reduced units could fight as long as their artillery support is intact. Maybe our units can't fight. But others could. And does this mean our brigades or divisions? Although I admit that a ten percent casualty rate for one of our larger units would mean a high percentage of trigger pullers are casualties. And if true for Russia's units, recall from earlier updates that Russia is taking depleted BTGs and rebuilding new ones. They won't be German World War II battlegroups, but they can fight.
UPDATE: The West will learn a lot from Russia using their Iskander missiles in the war. My question is whether Russia is desperate enough to use weapons they'd probably rather keep secret; or whether Russia doesn't have alternatives for smart weapon missions?
UPDATE: I assumed we were doing things like this. I'd be more upset to find out we weren't.
UPDATE: We read a lot about Russian losses. Not so much about Ukrainian losses: "The officials pointed out that Ukraine is suffering losses too, and that it is not clear 'how long they can hold out'." Ukrainian losses in regular army are being made up by reservists and territorial forces. Ukraine has a lot more trigger pullers after mobilization. But how effective are they? Pray they don't have to fight outside cities. Still, is there a Ukrainian strategic reserve?
UPDATE: I have no problem with America engineering the delivery of S-300 air defense systems from NATO countries to Ukraine. Let's recall the tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft missiles--and yes, even fighter planes--that Russia supplied North Vietnam when America fought Hanoi.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment and map. Russia's offensive continues to spin its wheels, except for grinding away at Mariupol; while Ukraine has carried out successful local counterattacks.
UPDATE: Honestly, I'm sure Assad would be happy if a lot of the veterans of the long multi-war in Syria went to Ukraine to die. One less variable and risk factor for his survival.
UPDATE: I do worry that the Russians are doing more during this long stalemate than reinforce failure. Surely we'd know if satellites showed Russia massing reserve forces to conduct an actual offensive to isolate Ukraine's Donbas front army, wouldn't we?
UPDATE (Friday): Russian cruise missiles struck a dormant Ukrainian aircraft repair facility in Lviv.
UPDATE: More on Russia's preparations to invade. And this: "Russia expanded their available BTGs from 96 in 2014 to 125 by 2018 and 170 by 2021." I had assumed Russia could create more from their brigades, assuming the 125 massed were more than half. But I also assumed that most deployed were crappy, which this suggests was right: [Russia planned] "fifty or more simultaneous attacks using their BTGs (Battalion Task Groups), advancing into Ukraine from different locations along the northern border as well as from the larger garrison now stationed in Russian occupied Crimea[.]"
UPDATE: I still wonder if Russia is truly stalled or whether Russia is massing troops for an actual main effort instead of the dispersed offensives Russia started with. I'm having trouble believing the Russians are as bad as they appear. So yeah, I still worry about the Ukrainian army on the Donbas front.
UPDATE: There has been talk of Russian options to use nukes as their invasion has stalled. But I thought Russia's "escalate to de-escalate" notion of using a small nuke was a ploy to end a war after military success. That is, grab a chunk of territory against inferior resistance and scare an enemy from mobilizing superior resources to counterattack. How would the theory work to compel an enemy not beaten to give up? It makes no sense.
UPDATE: I still wonder if Russia is leaving the units inside Ukraine short on supplies in order to build a new army to launch a big effort: "Russia is still struggling to supply its forces in Ukraine with the most basic requirements three weeks after its troops invaded the neighboring country on Feb. 24, a senior U.S. defense official said Thursday." We'd see this, right? But if we did, would we say it aloud or only work with Ukraine quietly to prepare for it?
UPDATE: Yes, as I've tried to convey: "Though Russians remain stalled, the official said Ukraine is not a 'static environment — there's a lot of fighting going on.'"
UPDATE: Discussing the concept of a "culminating point" that I've referenced. I've only been looking for a narrow culminating point on a sector of Russia's invasion front that Ukraine can take advantage of.
UPDATE: Let me illustrate my hope and my worry:
I hope Russian forces in the south culminate and that Ukraine can launch a multi-brigade counteroffensive. I fear Russia is building up forces that could attack and isolate the best Ukrainian army units on the Donbas front. The base map from the BBC site.
UPDATE: Since the start of the war, 60 civilians have been killed in Kiev. With all due respect to the many stories about the horrors of war on civilians, Kiev hasn't seen anything yet. If the Russians seriously gear up the firepower on Kiev, adjectives many orders of magnitude higher will need to be used.
UPDATE: If China sends weapons to Russia, China could get some combat testing for them. Which will hurt Russian arms exports against Chinese versions of the same things. But China risks the reputation of its arms if Russia continues to flail--but with Chinese weapons. And will Russia disassemble some to look at closely? Will some fall into Ukrainian hands--and so make it to the West for examination?
UPDATE: The recent American arms package for Ukraine: 800 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; 6,000 AT-4 anti-tank rockets; 2,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles; 1,000 light anti-tank weapons; 100 Switchblade loitering "suicide" drones; 7,000 small arms; 20 million+ artillery, mortar, and arms rounds of ammunition; 25,000 helmets; and 25,000 body armor sets. Plus information on the last and next packages.
UPDATE: Ukraine's food distribution system is falling apart under the stress of war. Unless fixed, this alone could push Ukraine to accept a ceasefire.
UPDATE: Russian troops have reached the center of Mariupol. The city is being destroyed. Which is what happens when two sides fight for a city. Can the Ukrainians counterattack?
UPDATE: This answers one question of mine: "[A Western] official says Russian forces hold 'an enormous amount of artillery ammunition' which could allow them to mount a "bombardment" that lasts for weeks - or longer."
UPDATE: The latest ISW update and map. Russia advances into Mariupol and Ukraine apparently conducted a counter-attack over several days at Mykolaiv. Fighting rages but lines don't move much. I worry that the ISW assessment relies too much on Ukrainian sources. Although I can't rule out it has DOD sources but cites Ukrainian sources to disguise that.
UPDATE: A UN humanitarian convoy made it to Sumy in Ukraine's northeast. We'll see how Russia tolerates this. Aside from the humanitarian nature of this, it helps Ukraine sustain its defenses out there.
UPDATE (Saturday): Russia claimed it used a hypesonic missile to destroy a Ukrainian air force ammunition depot.
UPDATE: Discussing what went wrong. Russia would have performed better if it had prepared for a war and not a parade. Not great. But good enough. The other mistakes largely flowed from the mistake of assuming a parade invasion.
The strategy would likely involve attacking civilian areas, destroying cities and blocking off supplies, possibly leading to famine, according to the analysis. The organization later drew parallels to an artificial famine engineered by the Kremlin in the 1930s that killed millions of Ukrainians — a Soviet attempt to "subjugate the Ukrainian nation."
It makes a sick sort of sense if even Putin realizes Ukrainians don't want him to "rescue" them.
UPDATE: If Russia can get their act together after their initial mistake of assuming a parade through Ukrainian streets, Russia could still bulldoze their way to victory over the bodies of Ukrainians. Russia has lost a lot of equipment, but the majority were lost because of Russian mistakes and not to Ukrainian weapons: "Two out of three of those were captured or abandoned, signaling the failings of the Russian troops that let them go." Russia effed up and then regrouped in the Winter War of 1939-1940, World War II, and the Chechnya wars. But we'll see if the Russian people want to suffer the casualties to do that if it takes time.
UPDATE: A feature rather than a bug in Russia's plan: "The UN's World Food Programme (WFP) says it cannot reach the thousands of people trapped there because it is completely encircled by Russian forces."
UPDATE: If Ukraine can launch a counteroffensive on the Kherson front, it would be good to launch it while Russian troops are occupied trying to capture Mariupol--not after it has fallen and freed up Russian forces. My hopes and worries, as noted yesterday above, may hang in the balance.
UPDATE: As Russia's invasion campaign becomes a war, winning isn't just about the military forces. Will Russian financial and military casualty problems be more significant than Ukrainian civilian casualties and humanitarian problems?
UPDATE: If Ukraine could reinforce and resupply Mariupol, it might hold: "Russian forces pushed deeper into Ukraine's besieged and battered port city of Mariupol on Saturday[.]" But all depends on how many troops, ammunition, and supplies are there now. The city might hold for weeks. Or it might fall today.
UPDATE: It isn't looking good for Mariupol holding on much longer:
"There are tanks... and artillery shelling, and all kinds of weapons fired in the area," the mayor said. "Our forces are doing everything they can to hold their positions in the city but the forces of the enemy are larger than ours, unfortunately."
UPDATE: The latest ISW post. The Russians culminated in their initial effort at regime change. And I swear, this morning I was writing up something for Monday that reflects this:
The doctrinally sound Russian response to this situation would be to end this campaign, accept a possibly lengthy operational pause, develop the plan for a new campaign, build up resources for that new campaign, and launch it when the resources and other conditions are ready. The Russian military has not yet adopted this approach. It is instead continuing to feed small collections of reinforcements into an ongoing effort to keep the current campaign alive. We assess that that effort will fail.
But I said I couldn't imagine the Russians doing the latter! But they seem to be.
Also, I am wrong about a Russian victory at Mariupol freeing up Russian troops:
The block-by-block fighting in Mariupol itself is costing the Russian military time, initiative, and combat power. If and when Mariupol ultimately falls the Russian forces now besieging it may not be strong enough to change the course of the campaign dramatically by attacking to the west.
The result will be a stalemate:
Stalemate is not armistice or ceasefire. It is a condition in war in which each side conducts offensive operations that do not fundamentally alter the situation. Those operations can be very damaging and cause enormous casualties. The World War I battles of the Somme, Verdun, and Passchendaele were all fought in conditions of stalemate and did not break the stalemate.
Russia will then try to kill Ukrainian civilians and destroy infrastructure to inflict enough pain on Ukraine to agree to peace terms that Russia finds acceptable.
Nice plan. But will Russian casualties force its leaders to escalate demands beyond what is reasonable to expect Ukraine to agree to?
UPDATE: The ISW report doesn't reflect the sense of defeat in Mariupol that I got from reading media reports. Fingers crossed.
UPDATE (Sunday): This is amazing: "The Russian invasion of Ukraine is 'pretty demoralised, pretty stuck and pretty stalled,' the former UK head of Defence Intelligence says." I really thought Russia's long pause would be for the purpose of adapting and not doing more of the same. A Ukrainian multi-brigade counteroffensive would have a good shot at inflicting a serious defeat.
UPDATE: I mentioned Germany's rearmament decision started from a low state: "Germany has failed to deliver its historic pledge to provide arms to Ukraine, ministers have said, amid reports that weapons have been held up by red tape and are too old to be used." Only a fifth of the weapons promised have been delivered.
UPDATE: Russia used hypersonic missiles for a second time, it claims. Against petroleum storage targets. I can't believe Ukrainian missile defenses require use of these missiles. Is this for testing? Propaganda? Lack of cheaper missiles?
UPDATE: Starlink goes to war keeping Ukraine's drones connected.
UPDATE: Is the Russian ground offensive petering out as well as being stalemated?
UPDATE: If Russia has depleted their army by persisting with attacks on a long front as the above update notes, my constant worries about the Ukrainian army on the Donbas front being cut off and destroyed were wrong. Pulling out would have just given Russia free territory. Did the Ukrainians know their army was not in danger or did they get lucky? But could the Russian threat be created in the future?
UPDATE: Will the hand puppet act? "Ukrainian officials warned on Sunday that the Belarusian military was preparing to invade at the onset of the fifth week since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s forces first descended on Ukraine last month." Belarus army is small and its units won't be very good. I can't imagine their motivation to fight will be higher than Russian units. Putin may insist, however. But what will the troops do? And I assume Russia will need to provide the logistics. Would Belarus troops invading Ukraine be an asset or a burden?
UPDATE: The Russians called upon Mariupol defenders to surrender.
[NOTE: War coverage updates continue at this post.]
