Russia has dug itself into a hole in the west by invading Ukraine, both alienating NATO and getting bogged down fighting. Russia failed to get a quick win. Can Ukraine counterattack to get a quick win that persuades Russia to get out in whole or part? Or will we see a new low-level war of attrition like the Donbas was from 2014 until this year, but on a larger front?
The war goes on. Which worries me.
Ukraine has not lost. Russia has not won. Both need to do something to win.
Russia could regroup and bulldoze Ukraine, paying a high price for a battlefield victory. And I still worry about Russia "bagging" Ukraine's regular army on the Donbas front.
Ukraine could launch a counter-offensive and exploit Russia's demoralized and over-extended army and gain a local battlefield victory.
I've summed these up in map form already:
Either could lead to diplomacy that ends the war. Sadly, Russia will likely hold some new territory even if Ukraine is judged the winner. If some deal can't be made, this war will drag on. The risk of an expanding war by design or accident will then rise. The risk of a big lost by either will rise. I think that Ukraine is most vulnerable to that, but Russia faces the risk, too.
This analysis argues that the war can only end with Ukraine making concessions to Russia. That may well be the most likely way the war ends. Russia is much larger than Ukraine and in theory can endure much more than Ukraine. After all, Ukraine would almost surely have to pay too high a price to eject Russia from everything Russia has conquered from 2014 to now. And fighting to defend a right to join NATO--which NATO is in no rush to grant--isn't likely. But I won't say that Ukrainian concessions is the only way.
If Russia doesn't reset its offensive to deploy its numerical and material advantage on a local front, this war and the casualties will drag on. Saying the Donbas is the main front while troops are stretched across Ukraine is a verbal and not a practical focus. If the troops looming over Kiev aren't withdrawn to better defensive positions, demoting their status to focus troops and supplies on the main front, Russia will risk a defeat at the hands of the Ukrainians defending Kiev. The same is true for other fronts. Even if the Donbas front is won.
Russia has 3.5 times the population as Ukraine. But that does not mean Russia can lose 3.5 times as many people as Ukraine and get a similar response from their people. In Iraq's long war with Iran from 1980-1988, Iran had 3 times the population. Yet Iran is the country whose morale broke despite suffering "only" twice the dead in the war as Iraq. Russians won't like casualties at this rate once they know. Although a bad reaction may be delayed depending on whether ethnic Russian or non-ethnic Russian provincial soldiers are dying.
Maybe it will be the Russian military or financial elites that take action in the face of a war not decisively won. Maybe it will be the people. The analysis admits this but dismisses it: "the Kremlin’s enormous repressive force can be relied on to keep any unrest in check."
I don't assume Russia can keep the unrest in check. Or if it can, how much damage it will do to Putin's power or Russia's global status before it is checked. Remember, Russia is still an empire. We forget because it isn't an overseas empire. Indeed, in college a political science TA was rather upset with me for calling the USSR "the Soviet empire." Russia is shrunken from its past peaks, but it is an empire. An empire that is trying to expand again.
As an empire, it is more vulnerable to problems shaking the state government. Maybe it will be a 1905-style revolt that jolts the leadership to change course in the wake of defeat. Maybe it will be a 1917-style revolt that topples the government and actually loses territory.
Heck, maybe the fragmentation of the Soviet Russian empire in 1989 and 1991 will get a third round as provinces of the empire get tired of the Viking funeral ride that Putin has taken them on. Russians may not like Putin's nuclear threats any more than Westerners do. Will a third round be like 1989 that loses territory but the form of the government continues? Or will it be like 1991 that saw the empire lose more territory and saw the form of government change?
Or Russia could win the war.
Heck, the analysis from the beginning seems to admit the potential for a dramatic defeat contrary to the initial position: "In the opaque world of Russian politics, change could come quickly – or not at all."
So yeah, maybe nothing much changes despite the war and sanctions. Maybe Putin has enough support and power to clamp down and restore a Soviet Union-style controlled country and economy to pursue his war. Maybe a worse replacement takes over from Putin. Hey, if Russia can't get the Soviet national power and territory back, he can at least get the international isolation, political power, and poverty back.
Just to get some land and people from Ukraine.
Winning!
UPDATE: The Russians respond to Biden's comment that Putin is a "butcher": "'This is a statement that is certainly alarming,' Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters during his daily press briefing." Okay, Russia doesn't care what Biden says. I retract my "regime change" comment worries. Russia just wants to use the president's words to sow divisions within NATO.
UPDATE: While Russia is generally stalled, Russian forces have made some significant gains, according to recent maps, in the Donbas region south of Kharkiv and north of the Donbas occupied by Russia before the February 23 (eastern American time zone) invasion. I wonder if the Ukrainians ordered their most exposed troops in the east to conduct a fighting withdrawal?
UPDATE: Ukraine's negotiating position: "'Security guarantees and neutrality, non-nuclear status of our state. We are ready to go for it,' [Zelensky] told several independent Moscow journalists, speaking in Russian." He also said "territorial integrity" in a ceasefire is necessary, while conceding Ukraine can't eject Russia from all territory. Also, he wants a referendum to validate any deal. And I assume it would be a well-armed neutrality.
UPDATE: A RUSI analyst "says the Russians have committed most of the forces they've built up and that most of these forces are inside Ukraine; they are not able to redeploy forces around the country." Their "main effort" consists of whatever units get logistics and support.
UPDATE: Amazing: Russia has been unable to create a secure battlefield communications network from lack of modern equipment and Ukrainian actions; while Ukraine has secure communications thanks to Starlink and previous efforts to secure its cell phone network. Plus multiple communications networks provide redundancy. In addition, the Ukrainians already had the new Russian radio.
UPDATE: A Russian victory is now much harder for Putin to achieve. He claims he fears NATO and so had to gain Ukraine as a buffer. The same could be said for the Anschluss in Belarus.
But even if Russia ends up overwhelming Ukraine by mobilizing superior numbers and firepower, you have to define victory in terms of Ukraine or NATO. Whether or not Ukraine is crushed and fully occupied, NATO has seen Russian military weakness.
So the alarm at Russia's invasion was not accompanied by fearful passivity. But by resolve to rearm. Even in Germany.
And it gets worse if the Russian victory is partial. Propaganda might be able to portray a partial win as Great Patriotic War 2.0 for many Russians. But the security and intelligence people will know better. A strongman who shows lack of strength might have problems, eh?
UPDATE: Fascinating: "The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine turned into an embarrassing (for Russian leaders) failure because the Russians were unable to supply their forces while the Ukrainian internal transport system survived Russian attacks." The Fuck-Up Fair has been busy in Russia's war effort.
UPDATE: More:
The Ukrainian army still has about a dozen combat brigades and over a hundred thousand troops. This is augmented by more than twice as many reservists and armed civilians who are organized into hundreds of smaller units and have inflicted most of the vehicle losses and personnel casualties on the Russians. The Ukrainian army brigades have to be used carefully because Russia has more combat aircraft and long-range missiles and guided rockets that could attack them.
That's about 40 regular army battalions, give or take a half dozen. I think a few of the heavy brigades could be a potent counter-offensive force in the south on the Kherson front, in cooperation with the reservists and partisans. And don't rule out local Russian army mutinies as they suffer from the mistakes of Russia's high command combined with obvious Ukrainian resistance to being "liberated."
UPDATE: This is interesting:
Vladimir Putin, the Russian president who ordered the invasion, has since removed or arrested many of his subordinates who were in charge of planning the invasion and assessing the degree of Ukrainian resistance that could be expected. Putin disregards the fact that he refused to consider advice that more accurately described Ukrainian preparations. These Ukrainian efforts were concealed by the Ukrainian but not invisible.
Much was made of the Ukrainians dismissing the invasion threat while America and Britain especially said an attack was imminent. It was Ukrainian disinformation.
UPDATE: Video of Ukrainians mistreating captured Russian soldiers? Ukraine should do nothing to discourage Russians from surrendering. And Russia has an incentive to make surrendering seem too risky for its own troops. [I read that the video included shooting prisoners. That's horrible. Sadly, in history that is all-too common even for troops from the good guys.]
UPDATE: It's official: "The Russian landing ship attacked by Ukrainian forces this week at in the southern port city of Berdyansk has sunk, Pentagon officials confirmed on Friday."
UPDATE: Is Putin signaling an end to the war with a less expansive objective? Perhaps by "just" taking all of the Donbas and perhaps a land bridge to Crimea? That could be Putin's intent. But Ukraine gets a vote, too. And because Russia's focus on the Donbas region seems more of a logistics focus that leaves other fronts weakened, Ukraine could make Russia pay for making those Russian forces feel abandoned to sit where they advanced, vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-attacks.
UPDATE: Curiouser and curiouser: "The [senior US defense] official added that Ukrainian forces are also working to eject Russian forces out of Kherson in the south."
UPDATE: The latest ISW update and map. Except for Mariupol, Russia is not advancing. Other fronts are static or failing in attacks. Ukraine is counterattacking around Kiev, exploiting Russian withdrawals to reform and reset battalion tactical groups prior to renewing efforts to isolate Kiev. Ukrainian partisans are working on retaking Kherson. It is amazing that Chernihiv--bypassed by the Russians in the early days of the war--is still holding out in the north. Russia has few reserves to throw in. A new draft intake is near but it will take a lot of time to train them. And we'll see how reservists enjoy being called up.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Interesting: "According to the Financial Times, Russia has dropped demands that Ukraine is "denazified" and is prepared to let it join the European Union as long as it is not militarily aligned." The EU wants to be a military alliance, too, at the expense of NATO. How would that work out?
UPDATE: Is this a sign Russia may declare--like China did in 1979 against Vietnam--that Russia has punished Ukraine sufficiently to pull back to whatever territory Russia intends to hold? "Russia's defence minister has claimed that Ukraine's military capacity had been seriously degraded and restated that the main tasks of the first phase of Russia's military operation in Ukraine had been completed."
UPDATE: We speak of Russian numerical superiority. But I don't think that is true. As an update yesterday noted, Ukraine has in the field 100,000 army troops plus 200,000 territorial army and armed civilians in the fight.
Russia sent in 150,000 troops. They've suffered perhaps 10% KIA. I don't know how many of the non-KIA losses take troops out of the fight. But assume 20% total losses in boots on the ground. So Russia has 120,000 troops. On a huge front. Yes, some of Putin's National Guard has been sent in for occupation duties. But it isn't clear that there is a large number. Plus local people in the pro-Russian Donbas enclaves are in their own formations.
Even if Belarus enters the war, it won't add that many troops to Russia's total.
What Russia has is firepower superiority. And the Russians seem to already be calling in old ammunition from ancient depots that have high dud rates. Some is probably blowing up in the guns.
Until Russia can start generating new soldiers from a larger population, Russia won't have numerical superiority.
UPDATE: Yes, if the war drags on Ukraine will need more than infantry anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles initially sent in anticipation of supplying an insurgency. It will need tanks, infantry carriers, artillery, aircraft, high-altitude air defense systems, anti-ship missiles, drones, and ammunition and logistics help to sustain an army and air force. Ideally, for the big items, Russian and old but updated Soviet weapons already in Ukraine's arsenal.
UPDATE: Russia is trying to make their lack of offensive power around Kiev from casualties and supply shortages a kind of good faith concession to push negotiations forward. And the Russians hope Ukraine will halt its counter-attacks "in return." Don't fall for that.
UPDATE: I just heard a Sky News report that said Ukraine has 10 army brigades on the Donbas front. But Strategypage (noted yesterday) said Ukraine had about a dozen (I assumed maneuver) brigades in action. Or is the 10 brigade comment including artillery and aviation brigades and not just maneuver brigades? Either way, Ukraine can't afford to lose 10 regular brigades in the east. But Ukraine has a dilemma. Hold territory in anticipation of a ceasefire; or risk those troops if the war drags on and Russia regroups to cut off and kill those brigades.
My 2018 Military Balance (they are way too expensive for me to buy the annual updates--this one was costly enough!) says Ukraine had 2 tank, 9 mechanized, 2 mountain, 5 artillery, 4 aviation, 1 naval infantry, 1 airborne, and 4 air mobile brigades. Plus various battalions and regiments of various types, including combat support and paramilitary and border guards. And 25+ reserve light infantry brigades.
How is it that Strategypage says Ukraine has 12 brigades? Is that an uncommitted force? Or have casualties been that high? Or are many of Ukraine's brigades broken down into smaller task forces of various sizes? It really is very confusing.
UPDATE: This CSI: Kharkiv effort on the allegation that Ukrainian troops shot Russian prisoners in their legs is so bad right off the bat that I couldn't even go on. The video picture is so obviously NOT the farm building from a local web site that the attempt claims it to be that it defies my imagination that it could be considered evidence. The two building are obviously different in length. The building in the web site picture clearly extends far to the right of the video screen grab. I don't know if the video is real. But this evidence is amateurish.
UPDATE: Ukraine hits inside Russia near Belgorod: "Ukrainian forces shelled a Russian military camp inside Russia, according to reporting from the New York Post. Such a strike would be the first time Ukraine struck Russia on the other side of the border." I wondered how long that would take. Although honestly I expected strikes on Sevastopol naval base by now.
UPDATE: It sounds like Mariupol defenders are reaching the end of their limits.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update: Russia seems to have abandoned for the moment efforts to take Kiev or push artillery within easy range. Its forces continue to focus on the Donbas. Mariupol could fall in days as Ukrainian defenders are broken up into pockets. It is unknown if Russia will have usable combat power after taking the city to redirect elsewhere.
Most significant seems this: "[Russia] may have decided to stop its previous practices of forcing units that have already taken devastating losses to continue hopeless offensive operations and of feeding individual battalion tactical groups into the battle as they become available rather than concentrating them to achieve decisive effects." If Russia is trying to gather rebuilt and new units for a main effort, that will test the Ukrainians. I continue to worry about the Ukrainian brigades on the Donbas front. I hope Ukrainian engineers have been busy preparing a defensive line further west in case Ukraine has to bug out to avoid encirclement.
UPDATE (Wednesday): The Ukrainians realize the danger in the east: "Russia is moving its forces from northern to eastern Ukraine to try to encircle Ukrainian troops, but is keeping some behind near the capital Kyiv to tie down part of the Ukrainian military there, a presidential adviser to Volodymyr Zelensky said today."
UPDATE: I can't imagine Putin wants a long war. But I imagine Putin wants something he can claim as a victory, whether territorial or battle, before declaring victory. Putin's claim that his military damaged Ukraine enough around Kiev isn't terribly credible. So that can't be it. Will it be all of Donbas and/or the defeat of Ukraine's army there? But pursuing one or both could be expensive for Russia. And if Ukraine conducts a successful counter-offensive at Kiev or Kherson, how does that affect victory perception?
UPDATE: Ukraine's domestic anti-tank missiles.
UPDATE: The Belgorod explosions and fire was probably from old ammunition going up. That is a risk of using--or moving--really old ammunition.
UPDATE: I don't believe John Kirby: "While the performance of the Ukrainians on the field of battle has been amazing and incredible and inspiring, it's not like their performance came as a shock to people here at the Pentagon." We tried to get Zelensky to leave Ukraine in the first few days in the belief Kiev was doomed.
UPDATE: The ISW update and map. There was little movement on the front, including Russia's slow drive into the heart of Mariupol. Ukrainian counter-attacks have been small local operations. Otherwise, Russia has pulled back some of its battalion tactical groups from the Kiev front to be restored to fighting ability. Perhaps to be transferred to Donbas operations. Russia may be using support personnel to replace infantry losses.
UPDATE: Interesting: "Russian troops have accidentally shot down their own aircraft and have at times refused to obey orders, according to Britain's cyber-intelligence agency, GCHQ." Well, friendly fire happens. So I don't read too much into that.
UPDATE (Thursday): Well, that helps Russia claim it was successful: "Russia has destroyed almost all of Ukraine's defence industry, Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych said on Thursday[.]"
UPDATE: Russia is regrouping to continue their offensive, likely on a more limited front in the south. But what is Ukraine doing? "Ukrainian forces are preparing for new Russian attacks in the east of the country as Moscow builds up its troops there after suffering setbacks near the capital Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Thursday."
Hopefully preparing for a counter-offensive to take advantage of Russia reducing forces and/or supplies on the non-primary fronts. Hopefully establishing a strategic reserve if they don't have one. Hopefully making plans to get their army in the east out of the potential Donbas kill sack.
UPDATE: About half of Russia's scarce precision weapons didn't hit their targets.
UPDATE: Useful perspective: "Given these past realities, Ukraine can defeat Putin’s expeditionary army if the U.S. and its NATO allies increase aid, do not embrace no-fly zones or other provocative trajectories to World War III, cease crazy talk of killing or removing Putin, stop whipping up hatred of all things Russian, and remember that history was never on Putin’s side when he invaded Ukraine." However, the form of history not being on Putin's side has a wide range. Would Russia fail only after a long, generations-long Ukrainian insurgency? Or will Russia fail with Ukraine holding all the territory it held right before this year's invasion? Or something in between? Or different? That detail matters.
UPDATE: If Russia really does recruit significant numbers of Middle Eastern mercenaries to fight Ukraine, whoever doesn't desert after the free plane ticket to Europe is going to be part of a force that Ukrainians will hate. Americans hated Britain's German mercenaries in the Revolution. And how will Russians react to these aliens being sent against brothers who are supposed to be in need of rescue?
UPDATE: I will say that I have been shocked that Russian artillery hasn't performed better in this war. Did the Russians get worse or did the Ukrainians learn a lot from their experience.
UPDATE: Ukraine's suppliers will now focus on "longer range artillery, ammunition, and more anti-aircraft weapons" for Ukraine.
UPDATE: Russia's Syrian fighter recruitment effort.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Ukrainian counter-attacks around Kiev and Kherson. Russia continues to attack in the Donbas and against Mariupol but with small gains. Russia's spring draft begins Friday. I wonder how that will go during war. Russia may be trying to set up local puppet governments in areas it controls. Who would serve in them?
UPDATE: Russia may not be able to advance on Kiev, but Russia is still bombing the city.
UPDATE: (Friday): Did Ukraine use helicopters to strike a Russian oil depot near Belgorod? Ukraine denies it. Which they should if they did it to keep Russia guessing. I wouldn't rule out special forces.
UPDATE: More on the speculation about a strike with two Ukrainian Hind helicopters.
UPDATE: Russia invaded Ukraine. But never say the Russians don't have a sense of humor: "The Kremlin has said that a purported Ukrainian air strike on a fuel depot in western Russia will hinder future peace talks." Yeah, Ukraine fighting back is the problem. Lord.
UPDATE: I am perplexed at the notion that the attack on the Russian oil depot might be a Russian "false flag" attack. How does that make sense? The depot is a legitimate military target. Russia has done the same thing. What does Russia get for faking a daring Ukrainian attack unless Russia just wants to hide the fact that an oil depot went up in flames from a Russian accident. Heck, I still don't rule out that Ukrainian special forces launched the attack and that no helicopters were involved in the attack, despite the video. Although the simplest explanation is that Ukraine used helicopters to strike the target.
UPDATE: Russia says the oil depot was civilian. So? Lots of non-military assets can be used by military units. Roads. Bridges. Railroads. They are legitimate targets. And Russia has a history of mobilizing civilian vehicles for their military. And now Ukraine says Russians unhappy with the war might have done it.
UPDATE: Russia will want to suppress news of this nuclear blunder: "'The Russian occupiers have left the Chernobyl nuclear power plant,'' said Ukraine's defence ministry. Two key reasons: losses caused by the Ukrainian army and radiation exposure.'" Or Russia will claim they are victims of a Ukrainian dirty bomb.
UPDATE: British intelligence says the loss of the oil depot will harm Russian military operations: "British military intelligence said the destruction of several oil tanks at a depot in the Russian city of Belgorod, close to the Ukrainian border, will likely add short-term strain to Russia's already stretched logistics chains."
UPDATE: ISW accepts that Russia has stopped feeding in troops for a broad front strategy and will focus on taking all of the Donbas. It will perhaps then push for a ceasefire.
If that is the objective, will Russia pull out of other territory to get that? Will Ukraine accept that? Will NATO pressure Ukraine to accept that deal and scale back support to get that? Will Russians accept getting Donbas at the price it will pay for it? Will Russians ever know the price?
On the new focus, can Russia overcome its losses and gather units and supplies for a Donbas offensive? Can Ukraine hold the line in the Donbas or will Russia cut off units too far east? Russia's capture if Izyum advances Russia's efforts to cut off those Ukrainian units. Can Ukraine exploit the lesser efforts around Kiev and Kherson to launch major counter-offensives? Ukraine is already counter-attacking on that front. And partisans are active behind Russian lines.
So far Russia is screening its withdrawal around Kiev as Ukraine takes back ground. How far back will Russian forces go? ISW thinks the Ukrainians will advance to the Belarus border. And Ukraine opened supply routes to Chernihiv. How many Russian troops will this free up? Will it free up Ukrainian forces, too? What will the sight of Russian forces retreating into Belarus do to Belarus?
I have a lot of questions so far. But Russia bit the bullet and narrowed its objectives. We'll see how the heavy casualties Russia has already suffered limit this shift.
UPDATE (Saturday): Have the Russians pulled back from Hostomel airport, the site of their day 1 failure?
UPDATE: The U.S. will work with new NATO allies to get their Soviet-made tanks to Ukraine. The story implies that the "tanks" include self-propelled artillery.
UPDATE: This is useful information: "Ukraine had already stationed its best-trained forces in the east because of an eight-year war with Russian-backed separatists. They are thought to have suffered heavy losses but are still a significant challenge to Russia's invading army." War reporting is generally very shallow.
UPDATE: Russia's famous 4th Guards Tank Division was humbled near Sumy in northwest Ukraine. Also: "It is Ukrainian tanks that are making history now, as the country’s 1st Tank Brigade broke the Russian siege of Chernihiv in the north on Thursday." People keep telling me that Javelins prove tanks are obsolete. I keep saying that it is likely just poor Russian combined arms capacity that is dooming its tanks. And now we find Ukrainian tanks are performing well. Perhaps it isn't the tank itself that is the problem. One day our current tanks will be obsolete. And I do think they will evolve to cope with threats. But this was doesn't prove tanks aren't necessary on a battlefield.
UPDATE: I will say that Russia is being smart around Kiev as Russia pulls troops out to refit and apparently move to the Donbas. Rather than deplete and demoralize the units still on the line while giving them a "hold at all costs" order, Russia is pulling them back. Where Russia will finally stop withdrawing to hold the line is unclear.
UPDATE: The many ways the Fuck-Up Fairy undermined Russia's military.
UPDATE: The latest American $300 million military aid package.
UPDATE: Ukrainian forces continue to follow the Russians out of the Kiev region. That's nice. And it ends the Hell some of the occupied people faced. But it also isn't defeating the Russians in offensive action. It is letting the Russians break contact and escape. We'll see if that changes.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Russian units are successfully pulling back from positions close to Kiev.
Russia seems to have increased attacks in the Donbas but without much success. Russia has not had time to shift forces from other parts of the front to the Donbas. Continuing the attacks in Donbas without refitting depleted units won't gain ground. Which will make transferred units to that front less likely to be decisive. Mariupol is still hanging on but time is running out. Belarus is training its army but is resisting Russian pressure to get involved. Russian forces in Transnistria stirred but are unlikely to enter the fight.
To me the focus on the Donbas seems like it is giving the front priority on logistics and expectations only. Just more of coming at the Ukrainians in the same old way but on a smaller front. Surely the Russian know better, right?
UPDATE (Sunday): Russia struck a refinery and oil storage facilities in Odessa.
UPDATE: If Russia pulls its troops back into Belarus and Russia in the north, it at least eases Russia's problem of draftees. Units inside Russia or Belarus could be filled with draftees while contract soldiers (whether volunteers, tricked, or coerced) can be focused on the southern campaign inside Ukraine.
UPDATE: There are reports of Russia kidnapping 11 Ukrainian mayors. I wonder if those mayors were Russian assets and want to go to Russia in light of Russia's failure to conquer Ukraine. Ukraine is corrupt, too. I have no doubt some Ukrainians were bought before the war and are now in a difficult situation.
UPDATE: I must admit that the Russians appear to be withdrawing in good order in the Kiev region, with units screening the retreat. There has been no panicked rout. Ukraine may be unable to put pressure on the Russians or Ukraine may not want to further destroy the region by fighting for what Russia is giving up.
UPDATE: I don't think this is lawful resistance to Russian occupation. Russian brutality in the wake of that--if true--isn't justified. But it is to be expected. No matter what paper pledges Ukraine makes about "neutrality" to get Russia out of Ukraine, Ukraine will consider Russia the enemy.
UPDATE: I'm waiting on details of liberated Bucha before really judging. It seems like some atrocities may have taken place. But mass graves aren't--by themselves--signs of Russian crimes. Perhaps the people buried weren't killed in violation of the laws of war during battles. Or perhaps they were murdered by occupation forces. But that must be determined. Mass graves might be a response to the need to prevent disease from spreading. War is ugly on a good day. And now we see it more quickly and closely. War is Hell, you know. Even the Russians might not have committed crimes at a scale suggested by the first stories.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. I stand corrected on my impression of an orderly withdrawal:
Russian forces had attempted to conduct an orderly retreat from their positions around Kyiv with designated covering forces supported by artillery and mines to allow the main body to withdraw. The main body of Russian troops has withdrawn from the west bank of the Dnipro and is completing its withdrawal from the east bank, but the retrograde has been sufficiently disorderly that some Russian troops were left behind.
Although it is unclear enough that it may be days to figure out what is happening now. Russia appears to be intent on largely pulling out of Ukraine west of Kharkiv.
Russia has not been able to gain ground in Donbas. And Mariupol is somehow still holding out in a shrunken core--or cores. Russia has even carried out an attack in the Kherson region.
Russia hasn't lost the war despite the defeat at Kiev. If they only hold what they have now and get a ceasefire, Russia can build up and try for a round three. And this time Russia will know it has a fight on its hands.
NOTE: War updates continue on this post.
