Is Putin really sure Xi is his best friend? Or has Putin's war allowed China to see different opportunities or at least different timelines in its rise to power?
As the West alarmed by Chinese power and ambitions focused on China, China found it's path to superpower status much more difficult. Could a Russia that has insanely decided war in the west is smart provide China with an unexpected and easier path to announcing it has arrived as a global power?
Arguing the Western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine pushes Russia closer to China is silly. One, what were we to do? Accept a Russian victory?
And "closer" doesn't describe Russia's turn to China. Deepening Russia's vassal status under China is what Putin is achieving. You ride that tiger, Vladimir!
If Putin thought a short and glorious war would cement a buffer zone in Belarus and Ukraine, allowing Russia to pivot to defend its Far East from China with a cowed and compliant NATO at its rear, he was disastrously wrong.
Why is it potentially disastrously wrong? A history of control that Putin doesn't like to think about:
In December 2019 Russian political scientist Andrei Kalachinski told the Estonian publication Diplomaatia: "If a large state (i.e. China) grows stronger, it is logical that it starts thinking whether it has handed over too many of its territories in the past two centuries. China has managed to get back nearly all the former colonies, such as Macao and Hong Kong. For China, Primorsky Krai (Vladivostok area) is a part of the former Manchuria... (China) may deliver an ultimatum to us at some point on any old pretext. The British, the Germans, the Portuguese -- all of them have left the former territory of China. Only the Russians have remained. It is good that we have remained, but the devil only knows (what may come of this)."
Russian stumbles in Ukraine perhaps amplify the immediacy of that history. Sure, a "war-ravaged Russia has no strategic value to China." But with NATO energized and Russia flailing, China's assumptions about its rise to power are derailed. Might China alter its plans as its assumptions change? A war-ravaged Russia is a strategic opportunity for China.
China will never treat Russian President Vladimir Putin as an equal and will prove "ruthless" in any business dealings after crippling sanctions and a drawn-out invasion have left Russia vulnerable, according to a former Russian diplomat.China may view Russia not as a junior ally and not even as something once great to strip for parts. But as a target that can finally be hit.
If China was counting on keeping America busy in Europe, this is surely true:
The CIA's director said Tuesday he believes China leader Xi Jinping has been "unsettled" by Russia's difficulties in invading Ukraine, and by how the war has brought the United States and Europe closer.
Russia's flailing might also be opportunity knocking for China. China may find that a dramatic shift in its foreign policy once again makes sense. The West may not trust China, but a Chinese dramatic turn against a vulnerable Russia that has stripped its Far East of military power would at least be tolerated by the West now.
I think Russia and China are frenemies with benefits. Russia is foolish to think it is uniquely special in Chinese eyes. Maybe taking Russia's Far East is too much for China to openly attempt any time soon. But Central Asia, which Russia lost when the USSR splintered, is another thing altogether in the short run for a major effort to increase Chinese influence at the expense of Russia.
So consider this:
Over the past four decades, China has repeatedly shown that it can change course before it courts disaster. The question now is whether it can do so again under Xi.
Has China wrung all the benefits out of Russia that it can? Has Russia actually accelerated that Chinese calculation? What kind of change of course might Xi consider in today's new environment?
Please adjust your pucker factor accordingly.
[NOTE: I provide war updates at this post.]
