Will Russia stop digging the hole it is in before the digging never stops? Trenches* and graves are no way to restore Russian glory. Russia has failed to win the war it started. It is retreating from Kiev. Can Russia regroup to win the war it now wants in the Donbas?
Russia's failure to win the decisive battle at Kiev in 3 days and mop up in two weeks is built on two pillars: Russian failures and Ukrainian successes.
Ukraine has fought harder and more effectively than Russia expected. Ukraine gained the time to mobilize reserves--and the people themselves. And NATO has supplied and supported Ukraine much more strongly than Russia expected.
Russia had a plan for a victory parade and not an invasion plan. Russian logistics were nearly non-existent. Russian communications, and hence command and control were poor. Russia's casualties gutted their invasion units. Russia's air force failed to support the ground forces. Russia's precision weapons were in short supply and even their dumb ammunition stocks are old. Russia's failures exceeded even my expectations a week before the war:
Putin pines for Soviet glory days. Putin's threats to use his military give Russia more stature than its status as a regional military power with continents-spanning defense needs justify. Just like Mussolini enjoyed--until he used his military and exposed it for the sham it was. ...
Putin has made progress in modernizing the Russian military since its poor performance in Georgia in 2008. But modernization is narrowly achieved. And a lot of this technology is smoke and mirrors. Putin can use his military if fighting is brief or limited in scope, against a minor foe.
Indeed, even if Russia's military is adequate to get a victory, a major war could wreck the army and destroy the progress Russia has made since 2008.
The result has been a demoralized Russian army suffering huge casualties that lacks replacements or reinforcements; and an energized Ukrainian population. There is an opening for Ukraine to counter-attack and inflict a major battlefield defeat on the Russians while they reel from the failures. If Ukraine has the units, weapons, and supplies to exploit this moment.
But all that could change if Ukraine can't exploit their edge by ending the war, either after a major victorious counter-attack or simply at the negotiating table before Russia can fix their failures.
Russia could revise their war plan to match means and ends. Russia could fix their logistics and communications. Russia could draft and recruit replacements from the reserves and from abroad. Russia's air force and artillery could work out ways to provide effective direct support to combat units. Those measures could restore Russian troop morale sufficiently to be good enough to push forward behind massive fire support.
And the mud will eventually end. Simply freeing Russian units from the roads will add problems for Ukraine's defense effort.
These changes could inflict more casualties and defeats on Ukrainian forces and reduce the high morale of the Ukrainians. That could make the mostly NATO military supply effort inadequate to sustain the Ukrainians.
This is the situation yesterday per the Sunday ISW update as the Russians admit defeat around Kiev:
So if Russia girds itself for a long war to apply its larger population and GDP advantage compared to Ukraine, NATO must accept that the war may be long:
The belief that a war will be short, even after it has commenced, is common throughout history. The men rushing to volunteer in August 1914 famously thought it would all be over by Christmas. As Hitler’s armies swept across the USSR in the summer of 1941, they carried no equipment for a Russian winter. In each generation, we tend to assume that the latest advances in the destructive potential of weapons mean wars cannot be sustained for long and must of necessity be brief.
Yet the awful reality is that wars simply become more destructive, rather than shorter. Nations find new ways of sustaining long conflicts that astonish each other. In 1793, Britain and France had no idea that the war being declared would last, with brief interruptions, for 22 years: France would mobilise its manpower to an extent never anticipated, and Britain would surprise Napoleon with its ability to finance the long struggle to defeat him.
I've asked if any major war is over by Christmas; and noted how the latest weapons and ammunition run out leaving combatants to make do with what they can get in volume.
The author warning about a long war rightly says NATO must make sure Russia does not win that struggle:
To sustain a long war, a nation needs depths of resources and resilience of a different nature and scale to fighting even frequent short wars. There are perhaps four fundamental requirements: a population that is motivated and unified in making sacrifices; a financial and economic system that can continue indefinitely; secure and multiple lines of supply; and armaments that deny the enemy the advantages it might possess in a more protracted conflict. Ukrainians do not lack the first of these. Their morale and spirit inspire the free world and are far superior to those of their invaders. But they need more help with the other three.
Russia has been embarrassed by failing to win its invasion campaign quickly. But that is not enough. Russia must lose the war. Will NATO sustain Ukraine when the blue and yellow flags in the West fade? Will the West pressure Ukraine to end the war without clear victory?
Or will the prospect of NATO resolve convince Russia to cut its losses before the war reaches a third season with no end in sight?
*Mind you, the force-to-space ratio is too low for a continuous front line of dense trench systems that existed on the Western Front in World War I. But where movement stops, digging begins.
UPDATE: It seems highly likely that Russian forces committed atrocities around Bucha when they occupied it. But I'll want evidence of mass atrocities. Mass graves may or may not indicate that. And obviously, simply invading Ukraine with no civilian dead should rally the West against Russia.
UPDATE: An informative post. Most interesting to me is Ukraine's ability to use drones with night vision to spot for artillery. Which was used to target Russian supply convoys thinking night moves were safe. This capability was a surprise to the Russians. Also, NATO AWACS planes flying inside NATO territory are giving Ukrainians a real-time view of much of the air space.
UPDATE: So we are back to regime change? "US President Biden has again labelled Vladimir Putin a war criminal – and has called for the Russian leader to face trial over the killings in Bucha." WTF?
UPDATE: More on the potential transfer of NATO T-72s to Ukraine: "Regardless of where the tanks come from or how they get into Ukrainian hands, fresh armor could form the backbone of an eventual counteroffensive to take back territory in the south and east or blunt a looming Russian attack in those regions." Tanks can be killed. It has always been so. But nothing yet matches their mobile protected firepower for going on offense.
Russian losses to date are high. NATO estimates that Russia has lost between 7,000 and 15,000 soldiers. Wounded who cannot rapidly return to duty generally number about twice the number of dead. That would mean that Russia has lost between 21,000 and 45,000 troops in four weeks of conflict. To put that into perspective, Russia reported 14,400 killed through 10 years of war in Afghanistan.
The initial invasion force numbered about 190,000 troops. However, that included militias in the Donbas and security forces (Rosgvardiya) for occupation. Ground combat troops numbered about 140,000. Thus, Russia may have lost about a quarter of its initial combat force.
That's a lot of casualties. Green newly trained replacements won't restore the force to what it was on D-Day. And reservists at this point aren't much better, if that. Once out of the military, military skills disappear faster than you might think. The author also notes that Russia is sensitive to losses. I agree. But we sure haven't seen signs of that sensitivity yet.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Basically, Russia is struggling to replace soldier and officer casualties; the Russians are bugging out of northern Ukraine, west of Kharkiv, with the units of uncertain combat capability; Russian attacks south of Kharkiv may be able to envelope some of the Ukrainian units on the Donbas front; the Russian Donbas front units seem ineffective; and the Russian southern forces are trying to hold in the west while still trying to take Mariupol, whose defenders are still hanging on.
Ukraine will have some unit freed for other fronts after they secure Ukraine's borders in the north in the wake of Russia's retreat. Would Ukraine attack into Russia for the psychological effect? I'd rather have excess Ukrainian units sent to the Kherson front for a counter-offensive. And I do worry about Ukrainian forces too far east in the Donbas region.
UPDATE: (Tuesday): Invasion 2.0: "The Russian strategy has obviously changed, with most of the troops pulled out of northern Ukraine and those still capable being sent to the Donbas, where another offensive is being planned. The new Russian troops arriving there are not confident or eager to take on the numerous, determined and effective Ukrainian defenders. Russia launched an offensive in Donbas at the same time troops were moving towards Kyiv and hit a solid wall of defenses."
UPDATE: Indeed: "NATO intel specialists were surprised at the poor performance of Russian commanders, troops and equipment. Part of this is due to overestimating the value of combat experience Russian pilots and commanders gained in Syria and Libya against Ukrainian forces." I had my doubts about that experience.
UPDATE: As access to Bucha increases, the indications of the reality of the Butchers of Bucha increases, even if it isn't documented evidence of widespread atrocities. That may change, of course.
UPDATE: Ukraine will get a small number of more powerful Switchblade "suicide" drones that can knock out tanks. So thank you to Ukraine for field testing the weapon.
UPDATE: Ukraine punched Russia in the mouth and derailed Putin's plan for a short and glorious war. And resuming the Russian offensive even on a more narrow front will be no easy thing to prepare:
Having been forced out of the north of Ukraine since the botched invasion started on Feb 24, Russian commanders will need time to assess their operational failures and devise a new plan.
They may also need to build new military structures and conduct additional training, all of which could take weeks.
Some units will need to be completely reorganised, either by joining together forces with different roles, or by combining depleted units.
Other units will need time to rest and repair soldiers and equipment badly damaged in the first weeks of combat.
Can Ukraine take advantage of Russia's disorganization and launch a multi-brigade counter-offensive in the south that puts Crimea at risk and bags a good number of Russian troops in the Kherson region?
UPDATE: Cannon fodder: "Military conscripts in the Russian-backed Donbas region have been sent into front-line combat against Ukrainian troops with no training, little food and water, and inadequate weapons, six people in the separatist province told Reuters." Keep that up and Russian-occupied Donbas will revolt against Putin.
UPDATE: Putin is stuck in his war, unable to get out yet unable to go back in time and get a glorious rapid victory. A lot of things can happen and the war could go either way. But: "The buzzards are circling. So he must continue to fight until he is forced out and someone else not responsible for the disaster takes over and blames it all on Putin. I think that this can’t end until Putin is pulled from the game." Adjust your pucker factor accordingly.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update:
Russia is ending its northern thrusts into Ukraine but it will be quite some time before those units can effectively reinforce the southern fronts from Kharkiv to Kherson. There is still organized Ukrainian resistance holding out in Mariupol despite heavy Russian bombardment.
UPDATE (Wednesday): For Syrian troops, the Russians will pay "$1,200 a month plus a $2,000 bonus if they complete their six-months and even larger payments if they are badly wounded and disabled or killed. The Assads take a large chunk of this as a commission but the volunteers are making a lot more than the $100 a month they get from the army or the more successful militias." Nothing says "liberation from Nazis" like putting foreign mercenaries in charge of occupying your town.
UPDATE: The Czech Republic sent 5 tanks and 5 infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine. The flow begins from the new NATO countries that used to be vassals of the USSR..
UPDATE: An interesting wargame of a war that stretches on a year: "With neither side able to achieve decisive military effects in the offense, without exception, the combined teams predicted that without a negotiated settlement the war is headed toward an indefinite stalemate." All the more reason for Ukraine to seek an opportunity now while Russia is regrouping to inflict a battlefield defeat on a major Russian force. North Ukraine was a victory for territory. Ukraine needs to bag a major Russian ground force to push a negotiated end to the war that gets Russia out.
UPDATE: Russia continues to bombard Mariupol.
UPDATE: The Telegraph also reported on the Czech armor donation. It is interesting to see that the newspaper said it was the first NATO country to ship tanks. The BBC report I quoted above said it was the first EU country to send tanks. Fascinating, no?
UPDATE: What do Russians really think about waging war on Ukraine?
UPDATE: The war that was supposed to last 72 hours could now go on for years? I'm just saying we paid too much for the computer models the Pentagon relies on.
UPDATE: This would be a meaningful request if our government would open the spigots to American fossil fuel production rather than our strategic petroleum reserve: "Western sanctions against Russia must expand to include oil and gas sales, members of the US Congress told US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen on Wednesday."
UPDATE: And yet Putin withdrew from Kiev, claiming that the operation went exactly as planned: "Kyiv was a Russian defeat for the ages. The fight started poorly for the invaders and went downhill from there."
Sure, exactly as intended except for a few hiccups: "The Russians were ill-prepared for Ukrainian resistance, proved incapable of adjusting to setbacks, failed to effectively combine air and land operations, misjudged Ukraine’s ability to defend its skies, and bungled basic military functions like planning and executing the movement of supplies."
UPDATE: The latest ISW report. Lord knows what is going on in Mariupol other than Russia is attacking and Ukrainians are apparently still fighting there. The Russians pulled out of northern Ukraine. Which simplifies Russia's job because conscripts can be sent to hold the front line inside Russia. Russia is failing to generate offensive power in the south. Russia will need to time to refit damaged units pulled from northern Ukraine. And Ukraine has successfully counterattacked toward Kherson.
UPDATE (Thursday): The Senate passed its bill to help Ukraine, the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022. It will no doubt pass and be signed.
UPDATE: The head of NATO is urging members to send major weapon systems to Ukraine now.
UPDATE: How many of the rest are fresh? "Western officials say 29 of Russia’s original 125 battalion tactical groups have been rendered 'not combat effective'."
UPDATE: Russia is firing artillery and gearing up to attack in the Donbas. But what is Russia pushing forward? Are the additional units too battered to be useful?
And this answers my question of whether Ukraine was building fallback defense lines. It seems so: "Ukraine has already lost ground to Russia. But they are digging in for the fight. As we travelled east towards the frontline we saw new defensive positions and trenches being dug." That implies new positions before the group reached the frontline.
I'll repeat one method of stalling an enemy offensive is to step back out of range of enemy artillery to new defensive positions. This delays the enemy as they have to advance and reset their units and supplies for a renewed attack.
It also provides opportunities to launch limited counter-attacks on the Russian forces advancing, whether with troops or just artillery fire.
Putin is no longer fighting to win over Ukraine and force it back intact into the Russian federation. He is no longer wary of eradicating infrastructure that he once felt would once again become valuable Russian assets.
Instead, Russia is going full Carthaginian peace in Eastern Ukraine — leveling cities, murdering civilians, and destroying an entire modern society for generations.
I did worry about that option before the war.
UPDATE: As Russia prepared to advance in the Donbas, Ukraine also prepares according to is foreign minister:
“[It] will remind you of the Second World War, with large operations manoeuvres, the involvement of thousands of tanks, armoured vehicles, planes, artillery.”
Russia may well advance and cut off Ukrainian forces in the eastern part of the Donbas. But those pincers can be broken off with prompt Ukrainian counterattacks. We shall see how much of Ukraine's military is freed from duty in the north.
UPDATE: It increasingly looks like Russian troops are guilty of widespread atrocities where they occupied Ukrainian territory. Bad things happen in war. But this seems way more than that. Perhaps Russians themselves will recoil from this and try Putin and the responsible commanders and troops for war crimes. How else does Russia recover from this invasion compounded by war crimes?
UPDATE: Will Russia (whether Putin or whoever replaces him) accept a peace deal that let's Russia keep Crimea and the Donbas plus face-saving details before NATO arms Ukraine with more weapons to enable a Ukrainian counter-offensive? Good question. But how much time does Ukraine have for such an operation before Russia can refit its battalion tactical groups savaged in northern Ukraine?
UPDATE: As Ukraine focuses on the Donbas, does this conceal a major effort aimed at Kherson and points east?
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Mariupol continues to fall to the Russian assault. Time is running out. The Russians are preparing to launch offensives in the Donbas but additional units that were pulled out of the north that haven't been refit aren't going to be of much help. Russian and Belarusian units are trying to keep Ukrainian units pinned around Kiev, but are unlikely to invade again. So Ukraine will be able to shift forces from Kiev to the east. Russia will need to encircle the Ukrainians holding the front line in Donbas to defeat them. The Kherson front seems quiet.
Apparently, Russia is recalling conscripts discharged since 2012 and giving them three-month courses to restore their training. Which is pretty much starting from scratch. Extending recalls that far back can't be going over well on the home front, eh?
UPDATE (Friday): The Donbas front:
I don't know why the text always disappears when I copy their maps. But the red shades are obviously Russian control. The red arrows are directions of Russian effort. If those efforts succeed, Ukrainian forces in the eastern salient would be isolated and captured or dispersed if not rescued--or if they can't break out. The orange on the Sea of Azov is Mariupol, where some Ukrainian forces still hold out.
UPDATE: Russia is reportedly forcing Ukranians in occupied territory to fight for Russia: "Lyudmila Denisova, the ombudsman for Ukraine, said that 'on the outskirts of Mariupol, which is temporarily controlled by Russian militants, the occupiers began forcibly mobilising men'."
UPDATE: Well, sure:
The Kremlin said on Friday that what it calls Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine could end in the "foreseeable future" since its aims were being achieved and work was being carried out by both the Russian military and Russian peace negotiators.
Russia may certainly achieve something that they can call their objective all along. And then declare the war over--whether or not anyone else but Belarus goes along with that. Or the Ukrainians might inflict a defeat on Russia's army that stuns Russia into ending the war in that future.
UPDATE: I would not isolate Russia from the UN. Contact must be maintained. Remember, just because Zelensky asks for something doesn't mean it is a good idea.
UPDATE: Slovakia has decided to send S-300 air defense missile systems to Ukraine. American Patriot missiles are taking up the air defense duty in Slovakia. Germany and the Netherlands also sent Patriots.
UPDATE: Russia now has a single commander for the entire invasion--the Southern Military District commander.
UPDATE: This sounds like enough for past losses with more for future losses: "Russia is ramping up its war effort in eastern Ukraine, and a senior U.S. defense official told reporters Friday that Moscow could look to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight."
What will Russia do until those troops can be gathered and trained? Send the gutted units from the failed offensive against Kiev back into battle on the Donbas front? Or will the current units on the Donbas front continue to send in small attacks that damage those units but at least keep the Ukrainians too busy to pull out of the line and refit?
Or could Putin's political position withstand a lengthy "sitzkrieg" of little more than bombardment while the Russian army rests and refits its maneuver units and brings in reinforcements?
UPDATE: While Russia builds up to resume the offensive on a large scale on the Donbas front, I'd like to see Ukraine launch a major counter-attack on the Kherson front. But I don't know if Ukraine has the reserves for that.
UPDATE: The latest ISW update:
Ukrainian forces retain control of defensive positions in eastern and southwestern Mariupol, despite Russian claims to have captured most of the city. ISW was able to confirm the specific locations of ongoing Russian assaults on April 8 for the first time in several days. Russian forces continue to attempt to regroup and redeploy units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine to support an offensive in eastern Ukraine, but these units are unlikely to enable a Russian breakthrough and face poor morale. Russian forces along the Izyum-Slovyansk axis did not make any territorial gains in the last 24 hours. Ukrainian counterattacks toward Kherson continue to threaten Russian positions around the city.
The defenders of Mariupol are tough bastards.
UPDATE (Saturday): I always thought the mine ban was stupid: "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley argued Thursday that land mines have been critical for Ukrainian forces' success against Russian armored vehicles." Bad actors who sow them indiscriminately without recording positions weren't stopped. Only those least likely to mis-use mines were stopped. Taking military advice from a princess was stupid.
UPDATE: I assume Russia is taking so many Mariupol residents to "filtration" camps inside Russia is to find reliable turncoats to staff a pro-Russian government and police force. Taking biometrics is insurance against somebody turning against Russia when in power. And for the rest, it will be easier to suppress insurgency.
UPDATE: There will be a big campaign in the east. Russia seems to promise that and Ukraine keeps saying it is getting ready for it. I hope getting ready for the east conceals Ukrainian preparations to go on offense in the south to liberate Kherson and points east, re-blocking Crimea, and possibly rescuing the holdouts at Mariupol. I'd rather that city be Rorke's Drift than the Alamo.
UPDATE: On a day when little significant happened in the campaign (as opposed to people dying, which is significant in a different way), ISW offers a review of how they assess the war. My few updates reflect the little significant action. Read it all.
I'll just highlight that ISW rejects the US DOD position that Russia has lost 15-20 percent of its combat power. I've noted my rejection of that kind of statement as too simplistic (see this post, search "Russian military power" for the update). The article raises other issues that I've commented on. The Russian army is currently in bad shape.
Who knows what shape Ukraine's is, however. I sure don't know, other than that morale is good.
UPDATE (Sunday): Ukraine's Western and domestic anti-tank missiles and rockets.
UPDATE: A Russian attack on the Donbas front will require lots of Russian artillery to break through the Ukrainian defenders. But will Russia have the ammunition supply to do that for long? And doesn't it make more sense for the Russians to advance south from Kharkiv and north from the Mariupol region to cut off the Donbas front defenders?
UPDATE: The latest ISW update states: "Ukrainian troops may attempt larger-scale attacks toward Kherson city itself in the coming weeks." That's certainly what I've been expecting.
NOTE: War updates continue at this post.
