After weakening his ground forces in a broad offensive that found itself in combat instead of in a parade, Putin decided a narrow front offensive in the south could yet win the special military operation for him. A week ago that offensive began. But not quite.
Putin's military is fighting a war, now. So far Russia has ramped up artillery and probing attacks across the Donbas front. Russia is building up supplies but appears to be feeding additional units into the line rather than building up a major strike force. Will this be the week the Russians open up the long-telegraphed Special Military Operation 2.0 in earnest?
Has Russia solved any problem that crippled the initial invasion other than the overly broad scope and lack of unity of command?
--Are logistics transportation issues resolved?
--Are the already weakened Russian units (13,000 KIA and 7,000 MIA? With probably 13-20,000 WIA too badly hurt to return to the fight any time soon) capable of carrying out their new missions?
--Will hastily scraped together replacements do more harm than good to the depleted units receiving them?
--Does Russia have the precision ammunition to be effective in providing fire support?
--Is there enough dumb ammo for area barrages in a Plan B?
--Can Russian air power affect the battles?
--Can Russia replace armored vehicle losses with working equipment from storage?
--Are the small unit leaders any more tactically proficient?
--Are communication and command and control any better?
--Is the mud going to allow Russians to get off the roads?
--Will the Russian people comprehend the scale of lives lost and turn against Putin?
Will Russian foes--and I'm including China despite their so-called alliance--along the rest of the border stripped of effective Russian ground units take advantage of Russia's flailing war in Ukraine?
--Japan reminded Russia that it wants some islands Russia took in 1945.
--Sweden and Finland are likely to join NATO. NATO is reinforcing the eastern frontiers.
--Germany plans to rearm.
--Britain is showing it is still needed by Europe through NATO despite leaving the EU.
--Will Belarus react to being yoked to Russia's war by breaking free of Russia--with or without Lukashenko?
--Turkey seems to be having second thoughts about Putin's usefulness.
--What might Azerbaijan or Georgia do? Will Chechens revolt again?
--Will Assad decide it can rejoin the Arab world because Russia is in no position to help Syria eject Iran and Sunni jihadis from Syria?
--Will Central Asian states draw closer to Turkey or China?
--Will Mongolia be drawn closer to China, feeling Russia is a less effective counter-weight?
--Will China lean forward on its dormant claims on Russian territory?
--Can India withstand the pressure and stand by Russia for the sake of arms sales?
With Russia busy and suffering from casualties and economic sanctions, many who feared Russia have lost some fear; and many who counted on Russia have to wonder how much Russia can do?
The bright side for Russia is that by retreating from their Kiev front and withdrawing into Belarus and Russia west of Kharkiv, Russia can hold the frontiers with conscripts. And use whatever contract soldiers still alive on a smaller front inside Ukraine.
Still, unless Russia breaks their army completely by coming at the Ukrainians the same old way so Ukrainian troops can kill them the same old way, Ukraine won't win on the battlefield by slowing and eventually stopping Russia's invasion. Can Putin survive ordering his troops to go over to the strategic defensive to hold what he has taken while his army can still fight? Or must Putin break his army or win?
The renewed Russian assault on the Azov steel plant in Mariupol after loudly proclaiming Russia would seal off rather than assault the dug-in defenders argues for the same old way of attacking being the default.
But unless Ukraine can count on a mass revolt among the Russian troops as the French and Russian armies carried out in World War I (the French recovered while the Russians did not), Ukraine must eventually conduct a successful counter-offensive. At the very least, if Russia retains territory from this latest invasion, Russia will eventually resume the offensive from more advanced positions. Lather, rinse, repeat:
A veteran pro-Kremlin commentator says Russia's goal in Ukraine is "the gradual dismantling and phased reformatting of this territory".
Sure, that's the goal now. After the failure to take Ukraine with a victory parade. But the commentator has a point about the reality of the situation.
The Ukrainian counter-offensive may not need to eject Russian troops from all of Ukraine if it inflicts a crippling defeat on Russia's army on one sector of the front. I'm still eying Kherson for that operation.
If Ukraine kills or captures a major Russian force and drives back the survivors, can Russian morale withstand that and hold its remaining gains?
Or maybe Russia has the numbers and will power to finally overwhelm Ukraine's army despite the casualties. Perhaps Ukraine is over-confident from the victory at Kiev and will suffer the isolation and destruction of their Donbas front brigades.
The West shouldn't assume Ukraine has this war in the bag. Ukraine needs support to avoid being defeated let alone needing the support to push the Russians back.
UPDATE: The U.S. will provide an additional $700+ million for Ukraine--half directly to Ukraine and the rest to reimburse allies helping Ukraine. The U.S. will also sell ammunition to Ukraine for Soviet/Russian-designed weapons. Russia struck a refinery in Ukraine.
UPDATE: Ukraine likes Czech- and Slovakia designed self-propelled 152mm artillery pieces. Mobility allows them to "shoot and scoot" to avoid Russian counter-battery fire. How American towed 155mm pieces survive in the face of a Russian offensive on the Donbas front is a mystery given that issue.
Is that threat overblown or are the American howitzers going to the Kherson front where the towed weapons would be safer when Ukraine has the initiative in a potential counter-offensive? I figured this front makes more sense with a shorter supply line to Poland rather than setting up another line of supply for new ammunition types all the way to the Donbas front.
You don't need a lot of pieces with precision ammo. But what if you don't have sufficient precision ammo? And honestly, what if you don't have enough dumb ammo that isn't so old it is a danger to users as well as to enemies?
UPDATE: While the attempt to compare Russia's assumption of local popular support to American efforts in Iraq and the Bay of Pigs is flawed (the majority of Iraqis were certainly happy to be rid of Saddam and the defeat of the Syrian- and Iranian-supported insurgencies in only four years speaks to the narrow base of local resistance; and the Bay of Pigs was half-heartedly launched and abandoned immediately, giving Castro the chance to isolate and destroy the invasion despite Castro's thin control of the country at that point), Russia did make that mistake.
More insightful is the author's description of how Russia had the guts to admit defeat on the Kiev front and retreat. It
is a good point amidst the frequent analysis of Russia's many mistakes. And it does point to the potential for Russia to regroup and reset, as I pointed out Russia did despite the initial debacle in the Russo-Finland Winter War of 1939-1940.
In another weakness, the author makes a flawed contrast to Afghanistan where America chose to lose when casualties were near-zero--a far cry from Russia extricateingitself from an ongoing casualty sponge with Kiev the biggest sponge at the end of that path. The article would have been much better simply focused on Russia's war in Ukraine.
UPDATE: Putin's three options in order of least bad (via Instapundit): 1) Negotiate a peace and withdraw from all territory captured this year; 2) Go on defense while the army is still loyal and partially intact to hold its ground; 3) gather depleted forces and go for broke in the south to win or die.
Good points. But I don't rule out Russia pulling its army out of its butt and deploying massive firepower to get at least a battlefield victory to hold what is has and more, while making Ukraine think a counter-attack is beyond their capacity. This may be hoping for more than is possible either in the victory or Ukraine's capacity and belief. But it is possible.
And if Russia wants to fight this for a couple years, I don't rule that out. Sanctions will fade a bit after the first shock. And Russia will find ways around many of them in many parts of the world that don't share Western outrage. And Western outrage will fade with the prospect of a cold winter. China will quietly help Russia, I imagine. And in time Russia can train a new army and equip it. Maybe that will be failure 2.0, too. With more dire consequences of domestic revolt, army refusal to fight, and territorial disintegration. But I don't rule it out as a path for battlefield victory.
UPDATE: Poland has supplied T-72 tanks to Ukraine.
UPDATE: The Russians really are just a-holes: "Several explosions have hit the state security ministry in the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria, the interior ministry said on its Telegram channel." I assume the Russians did it to justify their way too ambitious goal of advancing all the way there overland.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Yesterday's ISW update:
Local Ukrainian counterattacks retook territory north of Kherson and west of Izyum in the past 24 hours. Russian forces continue to make little progress in scattered, small-scale attacks in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are successfully halting Russian efforts to bypass Ukrainian defensive positions around Izyum, and Russian forces are struggling to complete even tactical encirclements. Local Ukrainian counterattacks in Kherson Oblast are unlikely to develop into a larger counteroffensive in the near term but are disrupting Russian efforts to completely capture Kherson Oblast and are likely acting as a drain on Russian combat power that could otherwise support Russia’s main effort in eastern Ukraine.
The Russians also don't seem ready to isolate the Mariupol defenders and are instead attacking them.
UPDATE: Ukraine is struggling to hold the Donbas front line:
Ukrainian forces, including Lt Gordeev and his unit, appear to be holding the line, although Western experts say they are already outnumbered three to one. They also concede that Ukraine will probably have to trade space and ground in open areas to defend key cities where the Russians will find it more difficult to fight.
Let's hope Ukraine realizes that preserving their army is priority one. If they lose the army they lose the ability to kill Russians and fight for territory. If they preserve the army, they can kill Russians and retake territory.
UPDATE: I certainly assume Ukrainian special forces are blowing things up inside Russia. Tip to Instapundit.
UPDATE: Russia is suspending natural gas sales to Poland and Bulgaria.
UPDATE: On Saturday in the previous war post I noted that the Russians seemed to be in a better position on the Donbas front and were pressing along its length, clawing at territory. It seemed like Russia had greater relative power to account for the added pressure.
Today's ISW report says that on the northern edge of the Donbas front Ukrainian salient, the Russians are advancing with mutually supporting attacks. Slowly. But this is evidence of superior coordination. Ukraine also doesn't have the fortifications to rely on there. So yeah, Russia has greater relative power on that section. On the main Donbas front facing the old line of contact, fortifications are holding the Russians at bay.
In other news, Russia is assaulting the Mariupol steel plant, impatient for success. Russia is up to something in Transnistria. Is Putin looking for a dramatic victory over Moldova somehow to distract from the Donbas front? Could Russia airlift forces successfully into their toehold there to do something effective? Russia is renewing attacks west on the Kherson front, which has long seemed like a defensive effort. Russia has also shelled Ukrainian territory north of Kharkiv where Russian forces withdrew from Ukraine after failing to take Kiev.
Things are definitely edging more kinetic on the Russian side.
UPDATE (Wednesday): It will be years before Stinger air defense missiles can be produced in any numbers again for Ukraine. What fills that gap?
UPDATE: Grain exports will be affected: "Russia launched two missile strikes and damaged a strategic bridge in Ukraine's Odesa region, local officials said on Wednesday, an event that could affect Ukrainian plans to expand exports through Danube ports."
UPDATE: I knew we were supplying intelligence. But it was extensive: "The US helped foil Moscow's efforts to take Kyiv and repelled its advances elsewhere by sharing such detailed intelligence that Ukraine knew exactly when and where Russian bombs would fall, it has emerged." Including warnings to Ukrainian units to move right before Russian strikes hit the area. And Russian atrocities backfired by provoking an increase in the intelligence sharing.
UPDATE: A Russian ammo depot in Belgorod caught fire.
UPDATE: Poor, poor, misunderstood and abused Russia: "The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs says it is sanctioning 287 MPs
in the UK Parliament, accusing them of 'groundless whipping up of
Russophobic hysteria'."
#WhyRussiaCan'tHaveNiceThings
UPDATE: What will Russia do to try to break out of this dilemma?
The Russians must provide troops and equipment. The U.S. is providing equipment but not troops. The American bet is that Ukraine can field more and better-trained forces armed with advanced weapons, while Russia will have to struggle to replace its losses. It is far easier for the United States to produce and ship weapons than it is for the Russians to sustain losses.
This puts Russia in a difficult position. Given the weapons flows announced and the other weapons likely to be supplied, it must try to end the war in the next month or so, only against a much better-armed and motivated Ukrainian force. And having failed to break them so far, the direction of the war is going against the Russians.
I don't see how Transnistria tension helps Russia. The Russian troops there are poor quality. Unless Russia can airlift troops in--and then sustain them--what could troops there do? Unless Russia is willing to sacrifice them all for a small distraction as Russia renews the offensive west from Kherson to take Odessa.
And nukes make no sense. Russians could be the ones most alarmed if Putin escalates to even tactical nukes. What might that unleash inside Russia's government?
Maybe it is just a new offensive on the Kharkiv to Melitopol arc, fought with better tactics, the same tired and somewhat demoralized troops, and lots of dumb shells and bombs. And the recognition that Russia is fighting a war and not organizing a parade. We'll see if that is enough. Or whether Putin has some bold notion to make up for the disastrous start to the war.
UPDATE: An assessment by Western officials:
"But when [Russians] come up against genuine military objectives, they are finding it difficult to overcome the staunch Ukrainian resistance and they are suffering losses," an official said.
Heavy rain is also hampering Russian progress. "Russians don't like to fight in the rain,” an official said, adding that the Russians have poor tactical awareness and continue to suffer from logistical difficulties.
They have the ability to operate off road, but officials say it’s surprising that they still choose not to do so.
Also, Ukrainian are counter-attacking promptly and their special forces work behind Russian lines.
Still, the Russians are continuing to build up forces and are grinding forward very slowly in some places.
UPDATE: The ISW assessment. Russian forces are working to encircle Kharkiv; are making some progress on the northern part of the Donbas salient by using more artillery fire; are assaulting Mariupol defenders who say they are running out of supplies; and are trying to prepare for offensive action west of Kherson despite effective small Ukrainian counter-attacks there. Lord knows what Russia has in mind with Transnistria.
Also, the ammo dump destruction at Belgorod and Voronezh were apparently from Ukrainian missiles or drone strikes.
Finally, Russia may be grabbing civilians to exchange for Russian soldiers; or to parade as fake Ukrainian military POWs for a domestic audience. Lovely people, the Russians.
UPDATE (Thursday): Russian troops who dug in around the shut down damaged Chernobyl nuclear plant suffered radiation sickness. One reason I didn't think Russia would attack through there to Kiev was that if Ukraine held south of there, Russian forces would be stuck with that radiation region being their rear area. And I didn't think Russian troop morale would like that.
UPDATE: At a recent DOD press conference a reporter mentioned that Canada was providing 155mm howitzers to Ukraine and some Excalibur precision shells. The Pentagon spokesman would not answer the question of whether America was providing precision ammunition, too.
UPDATE: Russian veterans of the Ukraine war who go back home know that their comrades aren't dying to rescue grateful Ukrainians from NATO and Nazi control. What might come of that?
UPDATE: Perhaps just really bad OSHA enforcement, right?
UPDATE: The U.S. seems likely to seriously back Ukraine well into the summer: "Biden will request $33 billion from Congress to support Ukraine, a move that represents a dramatic escalation of U.S. funding for the country in its war against Russia."
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment:
Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine made minor advances on April 28. Russian forces attacking southwest from Izyum likely seek to bypass Ukrainian defenses on the direct road to Slovyansk. Russian forces continued shelling and minor attacks along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine but did not secure any gains in the past 24 hours. Additional Russian reinforcements continue to deploy to Belgorod to support the Izyum advance. Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant continue to hold out against heavy Russian artillery and aerial bombardment[.]
In addition, Russian forces made small gains on the Kherson front, although it seems unlikely they can push deeper into Ukraine there. Although what Russia is doing in Transnistria, which is mobilizing what little military it has, is mystifying. Are they cannon fodder to die for whatever distraction they can cause?
Finally, General Gerasimov will take personal command of the Izyum front, if Ukrainian reports are correct. This demonstrates the importance of the front. But I guess unity of command exited Russian priorities pretty fast.
UPDATE (Friday): Well, they work: "Russia used a diesel submarine in the Black Sea to strike Ukrainian military targets with Kalibr cruise missiles, the first time Moscow has announced the use of its submarine fleet to hit its former Soviet neighbour."
UPDATE: I thought Russia hadn't actually seriously begun their Donbas offensive. But is what we're seeing all we're going to get?
Russia's assault on Donbas has "sort of fizzled" and the battle for the region will be over in two to four weeks, says military expert Dr Mike Martin.
The war studies visiting fellow at King's College London says: "Basically the Russians are gonna run out of troops, and the Ukrainians are going to counterattack."
The Russians have squandered their one chance to take the region, he believes.
"They pulled all of these mauled units out of Kyiv, and then tried to reconstitute them for combat in the east," he explains.
But they were "bruised and damaged" by the battle for the Ukrainian capital and Russia failed to build them up and "do some bold manoeuvre".
The bottom line seems too good to be true, with the fellow saying it won't take ten years for Ukraine to beat Russia: "Russian forces will collapse before that, and we’ll see a coup."
UPDATE: BBC: "Western officials" say Russian casualties have slowed down because of a narrower front. But they are still "quite high".
UPDATE: Contrary to the "fizzled" conclusion earlier, this is what I thought was going on: "The [senior U.S. defense] official said Russian troops are wary of getting ahead of their supply lines, adding: 'We believe that essentially what they're doing is continuing to set conditions for a sustained and larger and longer offensive.'"
UPDATE: That will take time to have an effect: "Vladimir Putin could announce the mass mobilisation of Russians on May 9, Ben Wallace, the Defence Secretary, has said." That seems risky. Will the Russian public and centers of power go along?
UPDATE: This has been interesting:
Away from the active battlefronts within Ukraine, though, there’s a less bloody, less prominent front in the two-month-old war, a shadow campaign that has included attacks on military and industrial targets in Russia itself.
It’s not clear how many incidents have occurred, or whether they resulted from air strikes, or missiles, or sabotage. An unofficial tally by RFE/RL, based on open-source reporting, counts at least a dozen since the war’s beginning.
I'm sure Ukraine is behind them. But even accidents will make Russians nervous now. Perhaps nervous enough for Russians to shoot down Russian planes in Russian air space.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment:
Russian forces made limited advances west of Severodonetsk on April 29 but remain stalled south of Izyum. Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine are likely successfully conducting a maneuver defense rather than holding static positions, redeploying mechanized reserves to resist attempted Russian advances. Concentrated Russian artillery is enabling minor Russian advances, but Ukrainian positions remain strong. Limited Ukrainian counterattacks around Kharkiv city may additionally force Russian forces to redeploy units intended for the Izyum axis to hold these positions.
The Russians are bombarding the Ukrainian Mariupol defenders. The Russians were quiet on the Kherson front.
UPDATE (Saturday): The U.S. is training Ukrainian troops in Germany to use equipment the U.S. is providing.
UPDATE: When you pull bits and pieces of units from across Russia and put them together, take casualties, and then push green recruits into them, this will happen:
What we have seen are continued indications at lower levels in the army of -- of -- of poor morale, discouragement, lack of unit cohesion. I mean, this is an army that writ large, across the entire Russian army, is about 40 percent conscripts, and they -- they've just now put a bunch more fresh conscripts into the fight. And what we're seeing is, you know, they -- they tend to have high morale going in; first contact with the enemy, that morale is shattered. And so we continue to see problems at -- at the unit level anecdotally. I can't say every single unit, but anecdotally, some -- some unit cohesion issues that they still haven't -- they still haven't been able to solve.
I'm somewhat surprised at the initial high morale part. They don't know what they don't know, I suppose.
UPDATE: Yes, this seems apparent from Russian targets: "We -- we don't have perfect visibility into Russian targeting and -- and the Russian mindset as to everything they're doing. But in general, what we think they're trying to do is get at the ability of the Ukrainians to -- to replenish their own stores and to reinforce themselves."
UPDATE: Recent Russian attacks in the east:
[The Russian] ground movements are fairly plodding because A, the artillery and airstrikes that they are launching against Ukrainian positions are not having the effect that they want them to have. The Ukrainians are still able to resist a number -- and -- and B, they're still a little wary of getting out ahead of their supply lines. They don't want to make the same mistakes that they've made in Kyiv, and so we think they're -- they're making this sort of plodding, uneven progress, but it is very doctrinal in its approach: launch airstrikes, artillery strikes in advance of -- of ground movements, and then only -- only then, when you think you've softened up the Ukrainian lines do you start to move your ground units.
It is surprising that the Russians haven't ramped up the scale of attacks. Are they still probing? Or unable to ramp up? And if unable, from lack of troops and supplies or something as basic as mud?
UPDATE: The clue bat provides results: "German lawmakers on Thursday voted to send "heavy weapons and complex machinery" to Ukraine just one week after claiming its arms reserves were tapped."
UPDATE: The British are going to supply artillery to Ukraine.
UPDATE: We'll see: "Russian troops are gradually increasing the intensity of their offensive in eastern Ukraine, a spokesman for the Ukrainian defence ministry has said."
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment:
Further Russian reinforcements to the Izyum axis are unlikely to enable stalled Russian forces to achieve substantial advances. Elements of unspecified Eastern Military District units and several air-defense assets are reportedly deploying from Belgorod to the Izyum front to support likely degraded Russian units attempting to advance south of the city. These forces are unlikely to enable Russian forces to break the current deadlock, as Russian attacks remain confined to two major highways (toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove) and cannot leverage greater numbers. Several successful Ukrainian counterattacks out of Kharkiv city in the last 72 hours have additionally recaptured a ring of suburbs north and east of the city and may additionally force Russian forces to redeploy units intended for the Izyum axis to hold these positions. Russian forces appear increasingly unlikely to achieve any major advances in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct wider counterattacks in the coming days.
Is it possible that this is as good as it gets for Russia? Or will the end of mud enable the Russians to use their numerical advantage?
Ukrainian forces still hold out in Mariupol. And Russia is adjusting their lines on the Kherson front.
UPDATE (Sunday): I've written that Russia is sensitive to casualties. I'm waiting for Russians to realize what they are paying for Putin's glory. But does this make it easier for Putin to sacrifice Russians? "Despite Russia’s reluctance to publish information on its losses, available data show that ethnic minorities from poorer regions are disproportionately prominent among the reported casualties." Or does this disproportionate loss of non-Slavic soldiers put pressure on the unity of Russia?
UPDATE: The Red Cross reports that civilians are being evacuated from Mariupol.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment reports that Russian attacks are largely stalled. in other news, Russia will try to break sanctions through allied CSTO nations; Russia looks like it will directly or indirectly annex occupied Ukrainian territory in the south; and there is speculation that Russia will declare a national mobilization on May 9th.
NOTE: War updates continue at this post.
