Russia's invasion is more expensive but no more successful as it drags on. How's that going for Russians?
A short and glorious war to "liberate" Ukraine from so-called Nazis can't happen. That ship sailed and burst into flames. And not just figuratively, as the loss of Moskva showed. Now Russia will try to use numbers and firepower on the southern front to wreck Ukraine's army the hard way. But that doesn't mean all is easy for Ukraine:
Russia could begin the next phase of its military campaign in Ukraine as soon as this weekend or early next week, according to two senior U.S. defense officials, and Ukraine is rapidly running through artillery rounds.
Ukraine must win this looming campaign. But this offensive is not all or nothing for Russia (although it may be for Putin). Russia has actually taken territory from Ukraine in the south from Kherson to the Donbas despite the retreat from Kiev. Ukraine must push the Russians out of the south or Russia will rebuild and launch a new offensive in time. Do that enough times and Russia will conquer Ukraine.
Sometimes I wonder if this war between Russia and NATO-supported Ukraine is Cold War II in a pattern similar to the American Revolution and the War of 1812. Britain didn't really accept the outcome of the Revolution as meaning America was independent. The War of 1812--sometimes called the second War of Independence--was finally needed to convince Britain that America was gone for good and that the price to get it back was too high given other problems.
It has been easy for Russians to forget how they were eager to dump the USSR and the non-Russian parts of that empire in 1991. Putin has exploited that false memory of tragic loss from the Soviet Union's Cold War defeat to become a new czar. Maybe a Russian defeat in Ukraine is needed to finally convince Russians to abandon imperial restoration in the west for good and make peace with NATO rather than pointlessly make it an enemy even as the China threat increases in the Far East.
But first Russia must suffer even more dead soldiers and cripple their economy more. Putin and his backers think one more big offensive will win the war for them. Will the fall of Mariupol be the signal that the big push is on?
So far, the big push hasn't been made even as troops are funneled into the Donbas region. According to the latest ISW campaign report, Russia continues small attacks in the Donbas, but is not taking ground; Ukrainian resistance in Mariupol seems limited to one large steel factory; the Kherson front is quiet; and Ukrainian partisans appear active behind Russian lines halfway between Kherson and Mariupol.
Can Ukraine win this new campaign when Russia finally launches it, and somehow convince Russia to leave? Or counter-attack and drive demoralized survivors of the offensive back into Russia?
UPDATE: Everybody runs low on ammunition.
UPDATE: Are significant numbers of Russian soldiers really refusing to fight? Could it become a significant factor? Tip to Instapundit.
UPDATE: Don't assume Ukraine will win the campaign for the Donbas. I remain worried about all those Ukrainian brigades in that eastern salient and what their loss would do to Ukrainian capabilities and morale. I repeat my advice on the day Russia invaded: "Ukraine needs to do two things. First, preserve their army as a fighting force. Second, kill Russian troops. This is the more basic core of my advice in 2014[.]"
The one thing that the author doesn't advise is one I would suggest. Ukraine needs to be ready to fall back from the exposed salient to a defense line further west. And I really wish Ukraine had pulled back some of its regular army brigades on the front line and replaced them with territorial units. And I wish Ukraine's engineers had prepared a new defensive line further west.
UPDATE: Russia has a couple options on the Donbas front (basic map taken from ISW):
Russia could cut off Ukrainian army units in the eastern salient. Or Russia could batter ahead in the Donbas with a direct offensive. The former might be beyond the capabilities of the shaken and depleted Russian army. The latter at least relies on closer supply lines to apply artillery firepower and is simpler for a shaken and depleted Russian army to carry out. But does Russia have the ammunition to sustain that for long?
And how long will it be before the ground is solid enough to allow off-road maneuver?
Of course, ideally from the Russian point of view they do both. But the direct attack would be to pin the Ukrainian army units on the Donbas front for the kill in a pocket created by the pincers meeting.
But can the Russians restrain themselves in this focused effort? Or will Russian units be sent on offense from Kharkiv to Kherson? That keeps the Ukrainians busy, it is true. But it adds to Russian casualties and logistics strain.
Does Ukraine have a strategic reserve to place west of the pincer arms to counter-attack if the Russians try to maneuver and isolate the forward Ukrainian salient?
Oh, and the blue-lined area south of Zaporizhia is Ukrainian partisan activity behind Russian lines.
If I had my way, the Ukrainians would be ready to skedaddle to a new main line of resistance west of the potential Russian pincers while a Ukrainian strategic reserve launches a counter-offensive through Kherson to the southeast and, once at the Crimea neck, advances northeast.
UPDATE: An interesting interview. This is noteworthy: "There are some suggestions that what [Putin] is trying to do now is take out as much infrastructure and civil society as [possible] and that he has this view that if [he] can't have Ukraine, then Ukrainians can’t have it either. That’s [the only explanation] that adds up because otherwise the way this war is being conducted is grotesquely at odds with what the [Kremlin] says its objectives are." I wondered about that angle before the war.
UPDATE: Here they come? "Ukraine's Armed Forces Command says it sees signs that Russia is beginning its new offensive in eastern Ukraine."
UPDATE: President Zelensky announced that the Russian offensive has begun.
UPDATE: From Ukraine's general staff: "'This morning, along almost the entire front line of the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv regions, the occupiers attempted to break through our defenses,' Ukrainian Security Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov said in televised comments. 'They began their attempt to start the active phase this morning.'"
UPDATE: The ISW assessment. The offensive appears to have begun. But Russia did not pause long enough to do more than shove replacement troops and vehicles into broken units withdrawn from the Kiev front. Ukrainian troops may be pushed back but a decisive Russian victory is judged unlikely.
UPDATE (Tuesday): The Pentagon estimates that Russia has 76 "combat battalions" in eastern and southern Ukraine. I assume that means "battalion tactical groups." I also assume that very few of those BTGs are full strength. I also assume that includes Russian puppet forces.
UPDATE: Battlefield error:
Ukraine’s success against Russian tanks and armored vehicles again revived predictions that tanks are obsolete. Tanks are still relevant and the Russian losses were the result of poor deployment of armored units as well as design differences in Russian tanks that make them much more vulnerable that Western tanks like the American M1, German Leopard or Israeli Merkava.
The Ukrainians don't make the mistakes Russians made. I certainly don't think tanks are obsolete.
UPDATE: I suspect the threats were scaring Russians more than NATO: "Russia will not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says."
UPDATE: America and Britain promise more artillery for Ukraine; while the Czechs offer to repair Ukrainian armored vehicles.
UPDATE: The U.S. doesn't think the Russian offensive has really kicked off in earnest yet. And I think saying Russia has 75% of its combat power over-states what is left.
UPDATE: If Putin is rushing the offensive, the units sent in may simply be easier to kill:
Russia’s military commanders will be desperate for more time: to rest, train and hope the soggy ground hardens as summer approaches, better to allow tanks and other armoured vehicles to use their speed and manoeuvrability over open ground.
Ukraine can use the time to prepare. But Russia may need the time more. We'll see.
UPDATE: Will Syrian mercenaries really provide the cannon fodder Russia needs in Ukraine? It wasn't that long ago that such mercenaries were talked about as rear-area security to free up Russian troops to die at the front.
UPDATE: The U.S. will provide quick training outside of Ukraine on how to use the 155mm howitzers going to Ukraine. Ukrainian gunners will be trained and just need familiarization with the new weapons.
UPDATE: My impression of Russia's retreat from Kiev was a lost Ukrainian opportunity. Was I wrong?
On 29 March, Russia’s deputy defence minister, Alexander Fomin, announced that his country’s forces would scale back their military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv and concentrate instead on the “liberation” of the Donbas region. Indeed, the Russian army ceased to advance; its troops prepared defensive positions and partially withdrew. But the Ukrainians seized the moment and attacked, routing Russian positions north and east of Kyiv. Thereafter, Russian forces withdrew completely from positions west of Kharkiv.
That sounds not like following a retreating enemy but defeating an enemy that didn't plan to get out.
UPDATE: Huh: "Russia has pulled together new forces from all across the country, including exposed territories such as its exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea." I assumed Kaliningrad would be exempt.
UPDATE: This article reminded me of the Soviet practice of treating divisions like rounds of ammunition. Fire one at NATO until it is combat ineffective. Then throw another fresh division at NATO. If Russia is still thinking this way, they don't have enough battalion tactical groups to replicate that approach.
UPDATE: Huh: "Ukraine's allies have provided Kyiv with additional military aircraft and aircraft parts to increase their fleet size and repair others in Ukraine's arsenal that were damaged, the US defence department said on Tuesday."
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. So far the offensive is largely bombardment. Will Russia be too rushed to really build up combat power to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders?
I don't find it a comfort that if Russia somehow does cut off the 10 Ukrainian brigades in the east that the Ukrainians would tie down Russian troops for some time. Ukraine can't lose those brigades and must retreat rather than risk their existence.
UPDATE (Wednesday): The U.S. DOD spokesman clarifies the aircraft issue: "Kirby said Ukraine had received spare plane parts from the US and allies, but not entire planes." I did mention the spare parts option in early March.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment: "Russian forces continued major assaults with heavy air and artillery support but are continuing to build the logistics and command-and-control capabilities necessary for a larger offensive. Russian forces have not achieved any major breakthroughs, nor have they demonstrated any new capability to conduct multiple successful, simultaneous advances." The Russians are still gearing up for a big offensive.
UPDATE (Thursday): Putin declares victory in Mariupol, ordering the last Ukrainian defenders to be sealed in. His army won't survive many more such victories.
UPDATE: Are Chechen fighters the bloody enforcers to keep Russian troops on the line? Tip to Instapundit.
UPDATE: Russia pretends it isn't at war in Ukraine. Which is kind of ironic considering the corrupt military and industry pretended to prepare the military for war. And: "Putin has responded to all this by firing or arresting several hundred military, intelligence or procurement officials. The arrests continue and Putin is trying to gather new staff he can rely on for an accurate picture of what is going on in Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere." But would an accurate picture affect Putin's decisions?
UPDATE: The U.S. will send more artillery, artillery ammo, and tactical drones. The West has incentive to help Ukraine win this war before winter when lack of Russian energy could really bite Europe.
UPDATE: Thoughts on the war.
UPDATE: Strategypage podcast on Russia's flawed tanks and tactics.
UPDATE: Good: "The United States, Britain, and Canada have pledged to send more artillery to Ukraine" while Germany is promising to finance purchases directly from German companies. Now do tanks and infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers.
UPDATE: America's contribution will be 72 155mm howitzers, 72 towing vehicles, 121+ drones, ammunition, and spare parts and related equipment. The drones, I read elsewhere, are based on Switchblade but rapidly developed for Ukrainian needs. Interesting.
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russia still hasn't ramped up ground attacks on the Donbas front. Russia continues to reinforce. Ukrainian partisans seem to be active around Kherson city.
UPDATE (Friday): The last stand of the Mariupol marines. This certainly more than erases the stain of the marine battalion--the only Ukrainian combat unit in Crimea when Russia invaded--surrendering in Crimea without a fight in 2014.
UPDATE: DOD fact sheet on cumulative assistance, including the new artillery shipment:
On April 21, President Biden authorized a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $800 million tailored to meet critical Ukrainian needs for today’s fight as Russian forces launch a renewed offensive in eastern Ukraine.
To me it makes little sense to send these pieces to eastern Ukraine. The line of supply has to stretch from Poland to the Donbas.
Wouldn't it make more sense for these American (and other Western) artillery pieces to go to the much closer Kherson front, freeing Ukraine's Russian-designed weapons and their existing depots and supply lines for the Donbas front?
UPDATE: Huh: "'Right now, the Ukrainians have more tanks in Ukraine than the Russians do … and they certainly have the purview to use them,' the [senior American defense] official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told The Post."
UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Russian forces continue to claw away in the east, taking small chunks of territory. Russian forces in Kherson province launched attacks. But nothing major so far. When will the Russians shift from artillery and small ground probes to something bigger? And where?
UPDATE (Saturday): Thinking about yesterday's news, it is clear that Russia has increased power relative to Ukraine along the Donbas front. Russia hasn't launched a main effort or two, but its army is pressing the length of the front. So the Russians seem to have more units committed.
But does it also mean that Ukraine has a thinner line on the Donbas front? From either casualties or because Ukraine has thinned out their line to build a reserve?
UPDATE: So Putin's publicly staged order is being ignored? "Russian forces have resumed air strikes and are trying to storm the Azovstal steel works in Mariupol, Ukraine's presidential adviser has said."
UPDATE: Spare parts added to Ukraine's air power: "The Ukrainian Air Force has added about 20 more operational aircraft to its fleet because of an influx of spare parts, according to a senior US defense official."
UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment:
The Russians have not taken time to refit troops moving from Kyiv or Mariupol before recommitting them to combat operations. They are not pausing offensive operations to wait until they have concentrated overwhelming combat power, and they do not appear to be massing forces on a few decisive axes of advance. They are continuing the pattern of operations they have followed throughout the war: committing small collections of units to widely dispersed attacks along multiple axes and refusing to accept necessary operational pauses to set conditions for decisive operations.
But the Russians may yet use a lot of the battered BTGs for a big offensive.
UPDATE (Sunday): The latest ISW assessment. Generally static, but "Russian forces made small advances around Severodonetsk, including establishing a pontoon crossing across the Krasna River west of Severodonetsk and capturing the towns of Popivka, Pischane, Zhytlivka, and Kreminna northwest of Rubizhne (confirmed by footage of LNR servicemen posing by village entrance signs) on April 24."
Really, most news this weekend has been about diplomacy, aid, and human interest.
NOTE: War updates continue at this post.
