Ukraine benefited from being on the strategic defensive and exploited successfully those advantages, as Clausewitz amply described. But Russia's mistakes had a major role in enabling Ukraine's seizure of those advantages.
Sure it is true that being on the strategic defense turned out to be a major Ukrainian advantage:
As we cast a provisional glance at the war between Russia and Ukraine, we can see the dynamics of the defense in action, especially with respect to the additional means afforded to the defender. While Clausewitz’s view on the defense is mesmerizingly rich—it comprises nearly a quarter of On War—we will limit our glance to a view of the means themselves: the Landwehr, fortresses, the people, the people in arms, and allies.
Mobilized Ukrainian territorial units were best on defense. Holding cities made them fortresses that limited Russian maneuver and tied down Russian units. The people rallied to resist the invasion and provide battlefield intelligence. And allies rallied to support Ukraine.
All this has made
Ukraine look better and made Russia look worse.
And it is true that Ukraine will be tested if it
goes over to the counter-offensive at some point when the new southern
phase of Russia's offensive culminates. Yet now Russian troops are demoralized and weakened from their offensive failures and casualties. Russia will be less able to exploit the available advantages of the defense fully. And Russia won't be able to exploit most of the advantages that Ukraine had.
But Russia aided Ukraine's defenses by spreading out Russian offensive power across the entire front, maximizing the resistance of Ukraine's people and regional Territorial Forces. Had Russia focused on the south initially, much Ukrainian power would have been required to hold in the north in case Russian forces inside Belarus and Russia launched an offensive.
And under those conditions with more fresh units, even if many were poor quality, Russia might have overwhelmed Ukrainian defenders. The Crimean forces might have had the troops to continue attacking after rapidly fanning out from Kherson to Mariupol, which spread them out and automatically dissipated Russian offensive power.
Russian casualties would still have been high in taking all of Ukraine's coast. But the conventional war could have been ended with a recognizable territorial victory, dulling the casualties. And the casualties would have dropped as Russia went over to defense and fought partisans and insurgents behind their new frontier.
But Russia screwed the pooch. Which even a costly battlefield victory that relies on grinding down Ukraine's army over time won't erase.
Do read it all.
NOTE: War updates continue at this post.
