Are we in a pre-war era? Will the balloon go up in the next couple years? But do we really know the sides? How solid is the Russia-China alignment?
This article, drawing on historical events prior to World War II and the early Cold War, judges that China, Russia, and Iran are likely to decide war is the answer to their problems. And that time is not on their side:
Xi and Putin regard themselves as world-historical men of destiny. They believe they are capable of decisive, strategic action. Xi ranks himself with Mao and Stalin. Putin evokes the memory of Peter the Great. In China, Russia, and Iran the information and decision environments are cloistered.
In China, Russia, and Iran the propaganda ministries have already been preparing their populations for a time of war, great sacrifice, and existential struggle.
North Korea has been preparing for war they say is imminent since the 1953 ceasefire, of course.
Of note, the author shows that China's price for peace is pretty steep despite the soft words:
In 2023, Chinese leaders made a strategic choice to replace defiant “wolf warriors” with peace offerings, extending olive branches, inviting mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence. In this strategy, the burden of choice thus shifts to the United States and others to decide whether to accept these offers.
This Chinese articulation of their San Francisco vision bears a striking, eerie resemblance to the “spirit of Camp David.” That phrase, of Soviet coinage, arose in September 1959. The context was the first year of the second Berlin crisis.
Like the "spirit of Camp David" the Chinese speak of a "spirit of San Francisco" where Xi met Biden and explained that "peaceful coexistence" means America stands aside to allow China to absorb Taiwan.
I have serious doubts that throwing Taiwan under the bus will sate China's appetites. Eisenhower refused to throw West Berlin to the Soviets in that earlier period of a spirit between foes. Just because war didn't follow that decision doesn't mean that is the example to follow, of course. But who thinks surrendering West Berlin would have led the Soviets to say, "that's enough. Let's coexist!"
But the author is persuasive. Do read it. If it is war China chooses, the author thinks the most likely course is that China initiates a de facto blockade of Taiwan combined with a willingness to use force against America if it tries to break it. This would put the decision for initiating war on America, he says.
Although the author says things might work out if Chinese and Russian leaders decide to muddle through an era that isn't too bad, really, and holds promise for outlasting the ADHD West's attention span. The chances could be pretty high that this is the path. But they might not. And action could follow quickly from a decision for war.
But if we are in a pre-war period, what are the sides for the war to come? In his two eras we saw flips in the two camps. Before World War II, implacable enemies Germany and the USSR dramatically--if temporarily--linked arms. And in the early Cold War era, the USSR-China monolith began to crack, ultimately leading China to link arms with America to face the common threat of the USSR.
Could that happen now? I think there is a chance that Russia and China could split. Russia from fear or China from opportunism. My view is that the two are frenemies with temporary benefits rather than true allies.
China might decide that Russia's flailing war against Ukraine is too great of an unexpected opportunity to pass up for regaining territory lost in the Century of Humiliation--Russia's Far East.
Or maybe China would settle for just a signal victory over Russia's navy with nominal--but precedent-setting--territorial adjustments.
Or maybe an indirect diplomatic war to seize dominance of Central Asia and its ex-Soviet "stans."
These might seem much better options than blockading Taiwan (officially China would just be closing the ports of its province, as China considers Taiwan). But saying that breaking the blockade puts the onus of shooting first on America is wrong. China would have to violently seize or sink civilian ships and their American escort heading to Taiwan to maintain the blockade. That was America's dilemma in the Cuban Missile Crisis when America "quarantined" Cuba to stop Soviet shipments to their nuclear bases in Cuba. The Soviets backed down rather than run the blockade. And America didn't have to make the fateful choice to shoot.
Further making a blockade of Taiwan less appealing is that America could counter-blockade China. Is China ready for that?
China is stockpiling fuel and food and trying to reduce the vulnerability of its economy to sanctions—steps one might take as conflict nears. Xi has said China must prepare for “worst-case and extreme scenarios” and be ready to withstand “high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms.”
How long will it take for China to think it is ready? China is suspected of wanting to take Taiwan by the end of the decade. Is that a distraction to disguise the option of striking Russia or real planning? If real, doesn't that give America too much time to rebuild its defense industries?
Russia's military is decimated from the war and less able to fight a peer enemy, notwithstanding Russia's ability to continue a war against a much smaller near-peer Ukraine. Why would China strike stronger America and its allies when an easier target is unexpectedly revealed? Especially when recent news is that corruption has exposed China's military as less impressive than its new-car smell portrays. If I was head of the PLA I'd rather test its mettle against Russia than America and its allies.
Which gets us to Russian motivation for change. I've hammered on the China threat to Russia for ages and it is getting attention lately:
Booming demand for Russians who know Chinese, a product of Putin’s turn to the East, is exacerbating long-standing fears that Moscow will lose control over lands east of the Urals.
Strategery, eh?
So perhaps getting stuck inside Ukraine while throwing hostile rhetoric at NATO is getting worrisome to Moscow as China glances at the Russian Far East more frequently with a funny, lusting look in their eyes that hadn't been there before. Maybe Putin realizes he gets the role of Mussolini if we're in a pre-war era.
And we have this report of Chinese support for Russia with a stunning claim of how Russia might pay for the aid, although I have not seen anything else to corroborate it:
China suggested, and Russia accepted, that long-standing Chinese claims on a quarter of the Russian Far East and most of its prime coastal areas be considered as a form of payment.Seriously? If true, why isn't that a headline everywhere? But even if not true, it demonstrates the thinking floating around out there, no?
Perhaps Putin decides a dramatic change--however temporary he may see it--is necessary for his own survival and to keep the Far East in Russia. That would involve making peace with Ukraine on mostly Ukrainian and Western terms--with a facade of a Ukrainian concession thrown to Russia to disguise this flip--and pivoting to face China in the Far East and Central Asia before it is too late. China's military corruption is exposed so maybe Putin will think he has more time than he thought he had to pivot to Asia and rebuild his ground forces--with that Chinese aid--before China can exploit Russia's current war-caused weakness to demand territorial payment.
I've long said I've gotten an eerie inter-war vibe from events in Europe. But lately I've started to think we'll get through this. That author's article is something to ponder in opposition to my potential optimism. But maybe my optimism is because "we" doesn't include Russia and China who will finally settle their business one way or another on a battlefield.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
