Monday, November 21, 2022

When It is All Quiet On the Winter War of 2022 Front

Will Russia's ground forces break under the strains of defeat, retreat, and death? But can Putin make peace if he loses everything he's gained? I think Ukraine may want to consider selling Crimea to Russia as a part of a peace plan that gets Russia to evacuate all the rest of Ukraine's territory lost since 2014.

Ukraine has occupied all the territory on the west side of the Dnieper River after Russia successfully retreated across the river. Russia's army is getting wrecked in this war and despite continuing to attack in the east, it isn't even holding its ground. The war goes on:

Guessing that the fighting will shift to Ukrainian offensives down the roads south from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol and Berdyansk. This area has been quiet for most of this war. Ukraine will also probably renew offensives between Svatove to Kreminna or to the north of Svatove for the sake of trying to reclaim Lugansk. Meanwhile Russia seems determined to keep attacking along the line between Pavlivka and Bakhmut, which they have been doing for a while.

At some point the Russians may break, the Russians will be clearly defeated, and a peace treaty may be possible. Until Russia is defeated, a ceasefire that leaves Russia controlling key Ukrainian territory is just a pause for Russia to gear up for another offensive. Will Ukrainians want to die to get every piece of Ukraine back regardless of the cost or the problems such an outcome could provide?

While Crimea is part of Ukraine--given to Ukraine by Stalin, verified by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and ratified by the Budapest Memorandum--which Russia signed--in 1994 that guaranteed Ukraine's territorial integrity--that doesn't mean Ukraine must hold that territory if it interferes with a lasting peace.

I'd suggested early that Ukraine put financial pressure on Russia by declaring that Russia was renting Ukraine and that late fees were piling up.

With calls for Russia to pay reparations to Ukraine for the death and destruction of the invasion, Russia is going to resist ending the war. Russia will want something to hang a shred of dignity on.

But that Russian reaction risks bigger disaster for Russia. And frankly, I think Russia fragmenting would be a gift to China.

Ukraine may want to sell Russia the entire Crimean peninsula to avoid future problems for Ukraine and the world.

Ukraine should get clear use of the Sea of Azov, but otherwise the peninsula has too many pro-Russian people, which just gives Russia people to exploit within Ukraine if Crimea is returned to Ukraine.

Russian reparations would essentially be disguised as back rent and the purchase price for Crimea.

Western investment in Russia after the war would look like a victory for Russia, but could truthfully be sold in the West as a way to make sure Russia can pay the price for Crimea. But part of the purpose would be to keep the nuclear-armed Sick, Angry Man of Eurasia from breaking up.

Residents of Crimea should have the option of remaining in Crimea or going to Ukraine. Residents of Russian-occupied Donbas surrendered back to Ukraine should have the option of going to Russia. Proceeds from the sale of Crimea would pay for the relocations. This would have the effect of reducing the number of pro-Russian people left inside Ukraine while helping pro-Ukraine people escape Russian rule.

Ukraine could heavily fortify the isthmus at the neck and the road into southern Ukraine further east.

America could provide ATACMS to Ukraine to provide Ukraine with a Sword of Damocles hanging over the Russian fleet's head. Perhaps most of the missiles could be held in Poland under joint NATO-Ukrainian guard, to be released to Ukraine if Russia gets aggressive.

Putin could proclaim the war a glorious success to get Western approval of the return of Crimea. Everyone would know it is a false claim. But inside Russia who will say the tsar has no clothes? While Ukraine would avoid a Trojan Horse of a pro-Russian region being brought into Ukraine.

Perhaps this won't make sense under future circumstances. But we need to be open to changing circumstances requiring an adjustment of our policies. Just a thought trying to end this war with Ukrainian victory without planting the seeds for a future war. It's up to Ukraine, of course. Although Ukraine might find it loses Western support if Ukraine wants to wage war until it can get a bridge too far at the eastern edge of Crimea.

[But at some level I worry that Russia is quietly building up a new offensive force even as it sends cannon fodder to die--and fix Ukraine's attention--in the Donbas. Could Russia reopen the northern front with new units? And this time plow their way to Kiev behind heavy firepower? I try not to take things for granted. I don't assume the Russians are incapable of learning.]

UPDATE: Thinking about conditions for future negotiations:

Ukraine has given the supposedly mighty Russian military machine a sustained clobbering; instead of occupying Kiev and the whole of Ukraine, Russia has been driven back east. It is clearly never going to achieve the objectives that underlay the intervention in February. But it is unlikely to be driven much further east, and it is inconceivable that it will give up Crimea.

Okay, I'll say it. I don't think that word "inconceivable" means what you think it means. On the other hand, I don't rule out that Russia could scrape up the forces to inflict a defeat on the tired and stretched Ukrainian ground forces.

Victory for Ukraine is not assured and it is too early to start thinking of calibrating our help to Ukraine in order to compel Ukraine to negotiate a peace that gives Russia way too much as a reward for aggression.

The West's job is not to provide Putin with job security. But we do need to think about how peace might look on the ground. 

UPDATE: Ukraine could not easily liberate Crimea from Russia? Depends on how good Russian morale is when Ukrainian forces approach the isthmus to Crimea. I've assumed that if Ukraine gets near it will seal off the isthmus and focus on the north shore of the Sea of Azov. But I don't rule out a thunder run south to exploit Russian confusion and demoralization.

UPDATE: Interesting:

A Ukrainian official acknowledged on November 21 that Ukrainian forces are conducting a military operation on the Kinburn Spit, a location which would allow Ukrainian forces to better conduct potential operations on the left (east) bank in Kherson Oblast.

UPDATE (Tuesday): It doesn't look like the Kinburn Spit is useful to Ukraine for more than static recon or firing positions. I didn't think Ukraine could supply across the water a major thrust from there. But apparently the terrain is completely incapable of handling vehicular traffic even if the logistics weren't a problem. 

UPDATE (Wednesday): I remain worried that Russia's attacks in the Donbas are intended to pin Ukraine's army in place while the Russians build a new army to reopen the now-dormant northern front to capture Kiev. I don't know if the plan can work. Or that it would be decisive. But I worry that Russia's army isn't as close to breaking as I hope. And that the continued Russian attacks aren't as pointless as they seem.

Is Russia's apparent ploy to make it look like Ukraine is attacking into Russia telegraphing a Russian northern offensive "in response"? Is this linked to earlier reports that Russia was planning to fake a Ukrainian attack on Belarus part of drawing Belarus into the war?

UPDATE (Thursday): According to the British, the Ukraine's should keep the initiative over the winter and can do it: "'They have 300,000 pieces of arctic warfare kit, from the international community'—a crucial requirement for any winter offensive." 

UPDATE: This implies no offensive planned from the Kinburn Spit. It is defensive in nature to protect Ukrainian position north:

After forcing Russian troops to retreat from the city of Kherson two weeks ago, Ukrainian special forces are now battling the Russians on the islands and in marshes to the southwest, trying to push them out of a strategically vital peninsula at the mouth of the Dnipro River where it meets the Black Sea.

Special forces certainly implies no conventional advance out of the peninsula. And as I noted, it could provide bases to harass the Russians and interdict supply lines with fires. 

UPDATE (Sunday): Yeah: "Estonia's Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur does not believe that Russia has been critically weakened, even after nine months of war in Ukraine." Russia is still fighting hard in the Donbas. And Russia conducted a good withdrawal from the western bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson. Russia has shown weaknesses. But unless Ukraine hits the Russians hard the Russians may muddle on.

NOTE: ISW updates on the war continue here.