Can America fight a two-front war as it did in World War II? I'm conflicted about arguing against studies used to advocate more American military power. I would rather dominate potential enemies and deter them from even challenging our power rather than tempt enemies and then defeat them. But studies can mislead and lead to poor decisions on increasing our military power.
The Heritage Foundation is warning that our military is not up to handling all tasks:
Conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation issued a damning report Tuesday saying the US military is underfunded, has “poorly defined” priorities, and would struggle to cope with more than one regional conflict. ...
“In the aggregate, the United States’ military posture can only be rated as ‘weak,'” the report [concluded]. Only the Marine Corps came out unscathed, receiving a “strong” rating. The Army received a “marginal” rating, the Space Force and Navy were dubbed “weak,” while the Air Force earned the dubious label “very weak.”
A regional conflict (called a "major regional contingency" in the report) would be something on the order of fighting North Korea or Iran. We'll not even get into the issue of fighting Russia or China.
I wrote this back in 1997 about fighting major theater wars (MTWs):
According to the Quadrennial Defense Review's recommendations, the Army must stay ready to fight two MTWs, nearly simultaneously. With budgetary pressures, the National Defense Panel's review could be an opportunity to simply say that the Army needs to be prepared for only a single MTW. Our Army suddenly would be transformed on paper from dangerously overcommitted to more than large enough to fight a war and disperse troops in operations other than war around the globe. Yet by the same reasoning that says we can currently fight two MTWs nearly simultaneously, we could just as easily assert an ability to fight 100 MTWs nearly sequentially. This reasoning is shortsighted. Our "two-MTW" Army really gives us the margin to win a single MTW. Like our Cold War standards of fighting "two and a half," "one and a half' or "one plus" wars, our two-MTW strategy is more a goal than a concrete reality.
So I'm not really disagreeing with the Heritage Foundation if you narrowly address what their study argues. For example, they are totally right that China gains an advantage by massing their forces in one place while our forces are around the globe and would take time to gather. Which gives China the opportunity to defeat the portion closest to China.
I'm mostly disagreeing with authors who wrongly claim the study shows our military is poor. Which the report's shorthand assessments of the services ("weak", "strong", "marginal", and "very weak") encourage, in my opinion. If the goal is to stop China in its tracks with our portion of our military forward deployed with out allies, that might be a bridge too far. How does an unrealistic standard of adequacy aid our ability to strengthen our military?
And really, in 1941 America was far from ready for a two-front war. America geared up to defeat Germany first while holding Japan yet managed to produce enough power to go on the offensive against Japan, too.
And despite my 1997 warning, America not many years later fought in Iraq and Afghanistan while still holding the DMZ in South Korea. While our fleet was still more than enough to hold off China. And Russia was not even able to pretend to be a major threat to Europe.
Which of our current potential enemies must we be prepared to fight?
Sunni jihadis are still out there but they are weakened with allies such as Iraq hunting them and Afghanistan not yet rebuilt by the Taliban as a terrorist sanctuary.
Right now, North Korea is a basket case with a rotted military that absent nukes probably can't hold the DMZ.
Iran is a fake regional power armed with fanciful wonder weapon announcements resting on an unstable base.
Russia is proving barely capable of fighting a single MTW against Ukraine.
And China--the "pacing threat" for judging our military capabilities--has new reasons to worry about their capabilities. And has threats around its periphery that soak up its power.
Even though I have deep concerns about our senior military leadership, our combat and support forces are still very good. Especially compared to enemies.
Remember, we do have time to mobilize and create power in support of allies holding the line, even if all our potential enemies align and strike at the same time. Look at what a relatively small amount of money is achieving in Ukraine (about $18 billion in U.S military aid compared to a $800 billion defense budget).
And a problem with an ends and means metric is one we've seen a lot lately--what if the administration simply redefines our needed tasks? Recall my quote above when the Clinton administration added "nearly simultaneously" to the requirement for fighting two regional wars (MTWs in the then-current terminology, or "major regional conflict (MRC)" which was a rival term and reappears today). What was inadequate became magically enough.
And now? All of a sudden, what was "weak" is now "strong". That's progress? The military services had zero change in capabilities! In a sense, yes it is progress, in that it aligns means with objectives. But who de we place outside of our defense perimeter? And what are the repercussions if an enemy acts on that? Heck, what are the repercussions if we decide what was deemed not vital is in fact vital after an enemy attacks, even if the enemy didn't believe our first decision?
And as long as I'm at it, with the Marines giving up tanks and artillery, I have doubts about the definitions that give it a "strong" rating. As if a "weak" Navy and "very weak" Air Force could even give the Marines a chance to test their rating.
Before I worry too much about our force structure, I want our senior leadership cleaned up. If our people don't trust those leaders, our people won't long support the funding to increase the military means to match our goals. We'll simply get serially reduced goals dressed up as a "national security strategy" to match ever shrinking means, bolstered by shiny new buzz words.
NOTE: I cleaned up some awkward phrasing that obscured what I meant in a few sentences.
NOTE: War updates continue here.
