At some point the West's objectives will diverge from Ukraine's.
When Russia invaded, the West and Ukraine were united in keeping Russia from conquering Ukraine.
When Russia failed to conquer Ukraine, the West and Ukraine were united in pushing the Russians back.
But eventually, the West will have a different objective than Ukraine. There are signs of division in support for Ukraine as diplomacy is weighed against liberation from Russian conquest.
When Ukraine has at least gotten back the territory Russia conquered in 2022, Ukraine will likely want everything lost since 2014. Depending on the price in lives and money. I don't blame them. But we're not Ukraine. Weather--specifically, the mud--is slowing operations to a crawl until the ground freezes. So Ukraine hasn't gotten to the point of choosing what territory is worth more sacrifice.
The West has to balance pushing Russia back more than the minimum needed against the danger of Russia disintegrating under the impact of complete defeat.
Russia has nukes and we don't want them loose on the world market or used in a brutal internal war.
Nor does the West want China to pick up pieces of Russia in the Far East and replace Russian influence in Central Asia.
Remember, too, America has long reined in allies to keep them from dragging us into unwanted wars. Allies reliant on America for ammunition is a feature rather than a bug.
We want Russia as far east as possible. We should want Ukraine safe from future Russian invasion. But we want a functioning and cooperative Russia east of whatever line that is to face China--not a fragmented remnant of the Sick Man of Eurasia. America may need to insist at some point that Ukraine has won enough.
Ukraine won't like it--or will blame America while secretly being relieved to be restrained. Europe may not like it. But America will insist and ultimately, because of our crucial role in arming and sustaining Ukraine's war effort, we won't be denied.
We aren't at the point of diverging objectives. But we need to be prepared to assert America's national interest when it no longer matches Ukraine's--or Europe's.
UPDATE: It is interesting that ISW writes that Russia is deploying well east of the Dnieper River in Kherson province. ISW judges that Russia believes it can't hold the river line--or even the Kinburn Spit--and that Ukraine can cross the river and push southeast.
ISW offers no opinion on whether Ukraine can do that or intends to do that.
Also, Russian fortifications in the region are based on road networks, leaving them vulnerable to cross-country outflanking.
My initial early war thinking about a counteroffensive from this direction was that Ukraine would push to the river and cross the river in stride before the Russians could reset on the eastern side.
Since then I've been pondering limited amphibious and air mobile operations to pry the Russians loose from the river line.
But if Ukrainian fires can keep the Russian back, Ukraine has river-crossing options. If bridges can be built, repaired, and defended to let heavy forces cross and establish supply lines.
A drive south from Zaporizhia toward Melitopol should still be the main effort. But the Kherson front could be a supporting effort that exploits a Russian need to focus on the Zaporizhia thrust.
In the east, Russian forces continue to claw forward in Donetsk while Ukraine batters at the Russian lines further north.
UPDATE (Tuesday): I'll just note that while the ground freezing in Ukraine will restore movement, that's not the end of the story. In 1941 the Germans rejoiced when the frozen ground allowed their armies to advance again after the mud. But eventually the temperatures got low enough as winter progressed to cripple German military operations. Still, I assume that the Ukrainians who live with that weather are better prepared than the invading Germans were then. We'll see how prepared the Russian invaders are.
UPDATE: I admit that I worry about this possibility:
540,000 Russian combat forces are assembled in Southern Ukraine, Western Russia, and Belarus. The numbers continue to grow, but the numbers already include 1,000 rocket artillery systems, thousands of tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, plus 5,000 armored fighting vehicles, including at least 1,500 tanks, hundreds of manned fixed-wing attack aircraft, helicopters, and bombers.
If this force exists, it would be a powerful offensive force. Especially if those not holding the line are committed to the northeast for a new offensive against Kiev where Ukrainian forces are thin on the ground. But I've seen nothing even hinting at this.
But again, I've worried that we don't see such a preparation for a new Russian offensive. And I worry that we are giving Russia too little credit after giving them way too much before the war.
But it has long seemed to me that the author is ... a bit off ... away from his admittedly impressive combat record.
UPDATE: A counterpoint that Russia is losing. I tend to agree with this view. But Ukraine hasn't made the progress I thought they would by now. So I worry that Russia can build a new army with reasonable training and equipment to reopen a dormant front while the depleted invasion army and ill-trained "reservists" die to keep most of the Ukrainian army pinned in place from Kharkov to Kherson.
UPDATE (Friday): Do the Russians anticipate Ukrainian offensives from those directions?
Russian forces are holding reserves in Crimea to support defensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
Even as I worry that Russia many mass enough sufficiently trained and equipped troops to launch a big new offensive, I know it is more likely to turn out poorly for the Russians even if the Ukrainians face the attack with a much smaller--but superior quality--force.
UPDATE (Saturday): Yes, a ceasefire with Russia still holding too much Ukrainian territory would be a terrible error.
UPDATE: I'd noticed that Ukrainian strikes in this region seemed to be more intense: "Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian forces in rear areas of Zaporizhia Oblast along critical logistics lines that could impact their ability to hold or equip defensive lines." Does this telegraph an offensive here?
UPDATE: Okay: "Ukrainian forces reportedly reached the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River across from Kherson City." Putting a small number of troops on the east bank in a region largely abandoned by Russia is not a big deal. Get back to me when Ukraine has some bridges in place.
NOTE: ISW war updates continue here.
