The war may slow down regardless of what Ukraine may want to do. Russia will rejoice. But the war doesn't need to slow down.
Ukraine has compelled Russia to withdraw from around Kiev and has mounted sizable offensives in the east and in Kherson province. But we are six weeks from those big attacks. Those big attacks grabbed chunks of territory but could not close the deal by sustaining a drive deeper than the first push. There were no Ukrainian reserves with the logistics to push into the fight and exploit the Russian retreats with even deeper advances.
Even the Russian retreat from the west bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson province this last week was apparently done mostly on Russia's terms and not compelled by Ukrainian ground advances. Yes, Ukrainian fires missions to muck up Russian supply lines across the river compelled the retreat. But that's different. Significant. But different.
If the fog of war dissipates enough to show that Ukraine captured significant numbers of Russian troops and equipment, I'll revise my thinking.
And the winter may preclude such deep advances. But the Ukrainians might be able to repeat the Kharkov and Kherson front drives if the Ukrainians have the winter clothing and gear, and other support to attack. I've been writing that I think a winter counteroffensive makes sense for Ukraine.
Some military equipment may need to be adapted for colder weather, and shortages of equipment or ammunition could slow advances due to logistical difficulties — not winter weather.[3] Winter weather could disproportionately harm poorly-equipped Russian forces in Ukraine, but well-supplied Ukrainian forces are unlikely to halt their counteroffensives due to the arrival of winter weather and may be able to take advantage of frozen terrain to move more easily than they could in the muddy autumn months. If fighting does halt this winter, it will be due to logistical challenges and the culmination of several campaigns on both sides.
And if Ukraine can do that, I can't rule out that a Ukrainian winter counteroffensive could drive Russians out of their front line shelter into the open, and crack the morale of the Russian army. It could be on that sector only. Or it might spread across the entire front.
That winter counteroffensive won't be an assault river crossing, I think. Unless Russian morale is already near the breaking point. I think it is far more likely that Ukraine would launch an offensive further east, aimed south from Zaporizhzhya with Melitopol as the objective. ISW believes Ukraine will thin out their lines in Kherson to reinforce the Donbas defenders; and to attack in Luhansk or some other unnamed location. Again, I'd go for the latter attack location and name it Melitopol.
On the other side, with Russia claiming that only half of the Russian troops on the west side of the Dnieper River will be used to hold the lines on the eastern bank, what will Russia do with the extra troops?
It would be smart to form a reserve. But I wouldn't be shocked if the Russians throw them into new attacks on entrenched Ukrainians in the Donbas. That's what ISW thinks.
There won't be much hibernating this winter.
UPDATE: I have long suspected that Ukraine will advance south toward Melitopol rather than try to assault the Russian line holding the Dnieper River in Kherson. But. Ukraine has river patrol boats. And we haven't seen Ukraine use any airmobile capability.
We have also sent helicopters and 105mm howitzers to Ukraine. I had hoped an advance to the river in Kherson province might have used that capability to take a crossing on the run. Could Ukraine grab a bridgehead with a brigade moved by helicopter against the thinned out Russian defenders? Under cover of modern air defenses and Western rocket and and howitzer fire? And then the engineers go to work to span the river for reinforcements and supplies?
And after brushing back the Russian navy and air power from Crimea, could the Ukrainian navy put in an appearance on the coast to land and support troops?
Just trying to look at options.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Regarding my sea option musing, rumors of Ukrainian plans to take Kinburn Spit to outflank Russia's Dnieper River line. Plan or distraction from a Melitopol thrust?
UPDATE: Rumors of Russian forces retreating from the east bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson. Big if true. And are ultra-nationalists going to push Putin to give a Hitlerian army-destroying "no retreat" order? Tips to PJ Media.
A while ago I wrote that the direction of the war would be on the knife's edge until it started to fall to one side. And then its movement could accelerate. Slowly and then rapidly. The cumulative losses on the Russian side might be reaching that accelerating point. If Ukraine can push the Russian ground forces over the edge.
UPDATE: Accident or shot across the bow? "Russian missiles flew over NATO territory and killed two people in Poland Tuesday, a senior U.S. intelligence official told The Associated Press." If deliberate, NATO's retaliation should be additional and more capable weapons for Ukraine. But with Russia's crappy weapons, it could be an accident.
Also, were no air defenses active in Poland?
UPDATE: Honestly, even if deliberate, why get too worked up? Russia can't handle Ukraine. It can't handle NATO, too. So it would be an empty deliberate threat.
The NATO response if deliberate should be to activate air defenses that don't reach into Russian or Belarus territory to shoot down additional incoming missiles. And to help Ukraine more. Don't panic and don't think of this as an escalation that leads to general war. Calm down, people. Don't make this worse.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Per ISW, Russia scraped up precision missiles for a blitz on Ukraine's infrastructure. Likely timed for the G20 meeting, they say. Ukraine shot down a lot. One apparently hit Polish territory, killing two.
Also, it does not appear as if Ukrainian forces are operating on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River on the Kherson front. Although recon probes are possible.
UPDATE: It's even possible that the missile was a Ukrainian air defense missile coming down after missing incoming Russian missiles. What goes up must come down. Such air defense damage was common when America attacked Baghdad in two wars--with America getting wrongly blamed. But I recently read that Russian S-300s in their primary air defense role are designed to detonate if they miss to prevent ground impact explosions. Although that fail safe might have failed.
Would this incident advance the formation of the Flying Nightingales?
UPDATE: Apparently it was a Ukrainian air defense missile that struck Poland.
UPDATE (Thursday): Fascinating: "Currently the Ukrainians have more operational tanks than the Russian forces do inside Ukraine." [UPDATE (Saturday): I meant to mention that in part this is misleading because long sections of the theoretical front line are now the border. So Russia no doubt has tanks inside Russia that are really on the front. All of Ukraine's tanks are in Ukraine.]
UPDATE: Interesting: "Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian forces and logistics nodes in the rear areas of Zaporizhia Oblast and Kherson Oblast." Does this telegraph an offensive heading south in Zaporizhia with a supporting attack from Kherson across the Dnieper River? Or would Ukraine prefer to attack in Luhansk and potentially break the Luhansk Russian puppet and take out those forces from the front?
UPDATE (Friday): The Swedish investigation has found traces of explosives at the locations of the Nordstream pipeline blast. I assumed this was an accident from insufficient or non-existent Russian maintenance. Who did it? Not that I'm upset over it. Assuming the Swedes aren't giving inconclusive evidence more certainty than the evidence deserves.
UPDATE: Also, Russia continues to crawl forward in the east, taking small bites shoving troops into the teeth of Ukrainian defenses.
UPDATE (Saturday): This CRS short report on Ukraine's military has this:
The UAF still relies on a core of professional units to conduct combined arms operations and spearhead operations, supported by TDF and Reserve units. As mentioned, training new recruits to replace and expand these professional units could prove decisive in the coming months.
It sounds like a lot of Ukraine's ground units are suitable for somewhat static combat operations or lack the equipment to spearhead offensives.
That's a problem in long static wars. Germans trained divisions in new tactics to spearhead late World War I offensives on the Western front to compensate for all the divisions useful for static trench fighting only. Saddam Hussein expanded his Republican Guards to two corps for the same reason later in the Iran-Iraq War.
When will the New Army being trained in the West be committed to battle? It seems like some were involved in Kherson but took significant losses early in that counteroffensive. They are clearly needed to put pressure on the Russian army and retake more territory.
UPDATE: Is it my imagination or are Russian attacks on the Donetsk front more intense now? Is this the result of reinforcements from the Kherson front?
UPDATE (Sunday): I guess it isn't my imagination:
Russian forces are reportedly beginning to reinforce their positions in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts with personnel from Kherson Oblast and mobilized servicemen. ...
Russian forces will likely continue to use mobilized and redeployed servicemen to reignite offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and maintain defensive positions in Luhansk Oblast.
So Russia attacks in the east--again. Where will Ukraine launch a new counteroffensive?
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
