Tuesday, November 15, 2022

How Much Money Will the Army Waste Failing to Design an Alternative to the Tank?

The Abrams is getting old. I've worried about it reaching the end of its life because of limits to what can be added or changed to the platform. But replacing the tank with a new model has failed repeatedly, leaving the Abrams--with another update--our primary main battle tank. Can a redesigned Abrams provide a proven platform and the ability to be updated decades more?


These authors thinks the Army should stick to what it knows and replace the Abrams tank with the Abrams X:

As the Army determines the future of the Abrams tank, it should remember that when it comes to purchasing new equipment, it’s often the easiest and cheapest to stick with what you know.

The Army is expected to make an initial determination on the Abrams’ successor next year. Rather than building an entirely new tank, like the Decisive Lethality Platform [PDF], the Army should continue along the Abrams’ iterative design route and purchase the Abrams X with the goal of the first production unit being in the hands of Army soldiers this decade.

The Abrams X is a technology demonstrator rather than a prototype. So it isn't meant to be put into production.

But the authors have a point about an iterative approach to replacing the current (updated) Abrams. The features of the Abrams X need to be examined to see which features are iterative and should be on the replacement model for introduction this decade. And which features need more work to make them affordable and reliable, and more appropriate for a future iterative update. 

I especially like the lighter frame--and I'm assuming this doesn't reduce protection--and new engine for better mileage and the ability to operate quietly while stationary. And if the platform's new software/AI package is built for future updates, that's great, too.

As I argued twenty years ago in Military Review (see pp. 28-33), the Army should not try to leapfrog technology attempting to build the FCS "wonder tank." As I wrote:

Barring successfully fielding exotic technologies to make the FCS work, the Army must consider how it will defeat future heavy systems if fighting actual enemies and not merely suppressing disorder becomes its mission once again. The tentative assumptions of 2001 will change by 2025. When they do, the Army will rue its failure today to accept that the wonder tank will not be built.
Although the Army will again be tempted to replace the Abrams tank with a non-tank, the Abrams may yet again be the wonder tank we refuse to appreciate in another Plan B.

Building the "unmanned wonder tank Decisive Lethality Platform" will be no easier than earlier revolutionary plans. But technological hope springs eternal, I fear.

NOTE: War updates continue here.