The effort to prevent Russia's invasion of Ukraine from leading to much worse outcomes by figuring out how to achieve a peace deal is laudable. But not if it concedes Russian conquests that just provides a launching pad for a new war and much worse outcomes sometime in the future.
Nobody should want a nuclear war or even a general conventional war in Europe to grow out of the Winter War of 2022. I don't see that as particularly likely now. But who knows? Yet sincere efforts to end the war--by providing Putin an "off ramp" from the war he started--to prevent something worse could provide a false sense of relief while giving Russia the opportunity to restart the war later after regrouping and fixing at least some of the flaws in its military and war plans.
The Biden administration is quietly pushing Ukraine to be open to negotiations with Russia. The purpose, it is said, is to highlight Russia's refusal to negotiate. But this is risky. What if Russia offers to negotiate while it holds territory? Can Ukraine turn that down after saying it is something Ukraine wants? Will Russia insist on a ceasefire to talk? A ceasefire that leaves Russia in control of Ukrainian territory?
Will the Biden administration then quietly push Ukraine to accept those terms for talks Ukraine had said it is open to? Talking with a ceasefire gives both sides time to prepare. But Russia needs the time more. And if enough time goes by, all of a sudden Russia is holding crucial territory and another winter is approaching. Will Westerners wonder why they should sacrifice economic growth to support Ukraine, which is apparently unwilling to fight?
One problem is ending the war with Russia still holding Ukrainian territory seized since Russia openly invaded in February. In this post I quoted this ISW analysis about Ukraine's territorial recovery requirements:
Ukraine must regain certain specific areas currently under Russian occupation to ensure its long-term security and economic viability. Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against a future Russian attack requires liberating most of Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts. Ukraine’s economic health requires liberating the rest of Zaporhizia Oblast and much of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, including at least some territory Russia seized in 2014. Ukraine’s security would be materially enhanced by liberating Crimea, which would also benefit NATO’s ability to secure its southeastern flank. [emphasis in original]
We've seen this movie before.
With British and French help to pressure Czechoslovakia to cave in to Hitler's demands, Germany occupied the key defensive terrain of Czechoslovakia in 1938, making it easy to fully occupy the entire country shortly thereafter and gain the use of the robust Czech defense industry, including its good tank models (for the time), strengthening Germany's ability to wage a larger war more quickly.
And speaking of putting the cart before the horse, efforts to imagine how to rebuild Ukraine after the war are great:
German and European Union leaders gathered experts Tuesday to start work on what Germany’s chancellor described as a “new Marshall Plan” for the rebuilding of Ukraine.
But I'd rather focus on winning the war first. Victory should not be an assumption built into the plans those big, nuanced, sophisticated Western brains are working on.
And when rebuilding is planned, do make sure corruption doesn't waste the aid and actually make things worse.
I freely admit I go back and forth between hoping Ukraine can defeat Russia on the battlefield and crack the morale of Russia's ground forces; and alternately, wondering if Russia can finally exploit its far larger size to grind down Ukraine.
Initially my uncertainty was based on not knowing how hard Ukrainians would fight, not realizing the Russians were worse than even I judged, not predicting NATO would support Ukraine as much as it has, and failing to comprehend that Russia planned a parade rather than a war--which forfeited the element of surprise and the initial edge from sheer size and firepower Russia could have relied on.
Since those uncertainties were removed, part of that debate in my head rests on Western willingness to keep backing Ukraine with military, intelligence, and financial aid. In the beginning I was worried the West would not help Ukraine enough. And at this point I worry the West will grow weary of helping Ukraine.
In the short run, Ukraine has the edge--if it can carry out a major offensive. In the long run, Russia may regain the edge if its ground forces don't crack under the pressure of casualties, poor morale, and battlefield defeats. I don't know how long the short run lasts.
Don't let dreams of a Nobel Peace Prize undermine support to help Ukraine win in the short run. Pursuit of an off-ramp (a.k.a. Sun Tsu's "golden bridge" to provide an escape route) from this war may simply provide Putin with a bridge to defend what he still holds. And create an on-ramp for an even worse war later.
The off ramp must be in the form of lifting economic sanctions on Russia rather than the form of validating Russian conquests. Although if Ukraine agrees, some territory might be sold or leased to Russia. As long as the territory in Russian hands doesn't give Russia a springboard for a future more successful invasion.
UPDATE (Tuesday): The Russians appear to be digging in at Kherson city to hold it. If this is a modern Stalingrad, do the Russians play the role of the Soviets or the Nazis? That is, do the Russians inflict heavy casualties on the Ukrainian attackers or do the Ukrainians cut off and capture the Russian defenders?
Ukraine may be able to isolate Kherson with fires that block the Dnieper River. And use precision firepower to slowly devastate the Russian defenders. But Ukrainian forces would need to be right outside the city and control the west bank north and south of the city.
UPDATE: Can Putin even take an "off ramp"?
His concern is not only that any conceivable deal will appear as a loss, but a deal that truly ends the fighting will be followed by a reckoning. So long as the war continues Putin is protected to a degree by patriotic urges to support the motherland when it is in peril, and also the opportunities war provides for censorship and tight control of all dissent. Without the war the consequences of his folly will be exposed. The legacy will not be expanded territory but instead a contracted economy, continued international isolation, a diminished reputation, and a multitude of disillusioned followers, bereaved families, and traumatised veterans with nothing to remember with pride.
This off-ramp talk seems to be mostly Westerners talking to each other, effectively negotiating for Russia, really. Why should Putin participate when Westerners might come up with a better deal than Lavrov could ever negotiate, without any risk to Putin's public position of seeking victory?
UPDATE: Good Lord. Putin isn't asking his young men to fight and die for Russia. He's just telling them to die for him. How long will Russian troops let their individual tragic deaths be mere statistics in the reports that reach Putin's massive desk?
UPDATE (Wednesday): Russia announced a withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnieper River, including Kherson city. Mixed signals must have been for the purpose of deterring a close pursuit.
Will Ukraine pursue and capture men and material? Will Ukraine cautiously follow, but strike further east due south for Melitopol now to exploit this retreat?
UPDATE: Will Russia have prepared artillery and air power to strike Ukrainian units following the retreating Russian units to the river?
Or will Ukrainian aircraft and artillery hammer the Russians as they retreat? That is, decline to attack on the ground out of fear of Russian firepower but counter with their own firepower.
We'll see if the Russian retreat is a signal to Ukraine for a counteroffensive further east, taking advantage of the organized--or not so organized--chaos of the withdrawal.
UPDATE: More on Russia's announced retreat. It doesn't sound like the Ukrainians intend to risk a ground pursuit, in case the Russians are baiting the Ukrainian ground forces to expose their units to Russian firepower. Unless that is Ukrainian misdirection.
UPDATE (Thursday): No sign of a withdrawal from Kherson yet. Let's see how the Russians execute:
This is a military defeat, but not necessarily a decisive one. Much will depend on how far the Russians can manage an orderly retreat rather than a rout.
Normally you want to quietly pull back to reduce chances of pursuit that can create a rout. Is Russia using reverse psychology to deter pursuit by making it seem like a trap?
Or is the high-profile announcement for domestic consumption and, as the article writes, a means to pin the blame for a rout on Shoigu and Surovikin?
UPDATE: ISW thinks there is no Russian trap and that Russia intends to carry out a staged, fighting withdrawal. I read elsewhere (sorry, I lost the source) that the Russians intend to send half the troops currently holding the Kherson front elsewhere. The river front line will be a force multiplier for the remaining Russians.
UPDATE: Ukraine seems to be tentatively pushing into Kherson in a couple places.
In other news, Britain will supply 12,000 extreme-cold weather sleeping kits. Ukraine seems likely to keep up the pressure over the winter. To some extent, at least.
UPDATE: I'm hearing that the Ukrainians are advancing as the Russians pull back. It will be interesting when the Russians get to the Dnieper River and need to cross. That is where panic in the Russian ranks could happen if the Ukrainians get within direct fire range. Or the rear guards will buy the time the bulk of the Russian troops need. We'll see.
UPDATE (Friday): Per ISW:
Russian forces so far appear to be withdrawing in relatively good order, and Ukrainian forces are making expected gains without routing Russian forces[.]
If that changes, I'd expect it to be when Russians get close to the river. Also:
ISW does not assess the fighting in Ukraine will halt or enter a stalemate due to winter weather, despite faulty Western assumptions.
They say any slowing off fighting will be from logistics or lack of troops--not winter. The ground will at least firm up in winter, they note. And the Russians will be at a disadvantage fighting in that weather because of lack of proper gear. That's what I've been thinking.
UPDATE: If true, this was well planned and executed:
In a statement carried by Russian state news agencies, the [Russian Defense Ministry] said the withdrawal was completed at 5 a.m. on Friday, and not a single unit of military equipment was left behind.
And that would make this a somewhat hollow victory for Ukraine by failing to take advantage of the Russian retreat across a river to inflict some serious losses.
But Russia's statement might not be fully accurate.
UPDATE: This seems to indicate that the Russians did indeed get across the river fast:
Ukrainian forces swept into the key southern city of Kherson on Friday after Russia said its military had completed a rapid retreat from the area — a humiliating setback for President Vladimir Putin and a major development in the war.
The retreat was a psychological blow to the Russians and a boost to Ukrainians. I hope Ukraine managed to inflict serious losses on the Russians as they crossed the river. But maybe Ukraine failed to do that. Which means it isn't an operational victory that reduces Russia's ability to continue the war. We'll see.
Also, did Russia leave stay-behind forces in civilian clothes in Kherson city?
UPDATE: I'm going to want verification:
Russia said it had withdrawn 30,000 troops across the Dnipro River without losing a single soldier, but Ukrainians painted a picture of a chaotic retreat, with Russian troops ditching their uniforms, abandoning weapons and drowning while trying to flee.
Ukraine is more credible than Russia. But it's "hope, but verify" for me.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the withdrawal to the eastern (left) bank of the Dnipro River at 5am local time on November 11.[1] While contingents of Russian soldiers likely remain on the west bank, they are likely scattered throughout the Oblast and attempting to retreat as Ukrainian forces push towards the Dnipro River, although some may have remained behind to attempt to conduct partisan activities in small groups. It is unclear how many Russian soldiers remain on the west bank at this time. Russian sources noted that the withdrawal lasted three days and claimed that 20,000 Russian personnel and 3,500 units of military equipment moved across the Dnipro River.
We'll see.
UPDATE: Russia's imperial army is built to be fractured:
The lack of structure inherent in the combination of DNR forces, LNR forces, Russian contract servicemembers, Russian regional volunteer servicemembers, Russian mobilized servicemembers, and Wagner Group Private Military Company (PMC) forces creates an environment that fosters intra-force conflict.
And:
The popularity of Wagner Group forces may have inspired the creation of further private military companies (PMCs) for use in the war in Ukraine. Odesa Oblast Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk claimed that Russian officials are planning the creation of an “Orthodox PMC” under the Russian Orthodox Church on November 12.[59] Private military companies are illegal in Russia.
Fascinating.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
