Russia can't get its maximum victory easily. But at what level of territorial control at the end of major combat operations can it claim victory?
Russia gears up to capture more territory. Ukraine prepares to stop the Russians and resume a counteroffensive perhaps next year to drive the Russians back. How far back is enough to deny Russia a meaningful victory this war?
The Ukrainians observed that the Russian ground forces have been smashed up. Their airborne and naval infantry have especially been robbed of quality. But "the Russian military is now operating as a 'single body, with a clear plan, under a single command.'" Achieving unity of command is a big deal.
The Russians have the initiative and are able to push forward in noticeable chunks, including through exploiting a Ukrainian mistake during a brigade rotation on the front. Ukraine is making the best of a bad situation:
Ukrainian forces may have decided to trade space for time as they wait for the arrival of US aid to the frontline at scale in the coming weeks – an appropriate decision for an under-resourced force at risk of being outflanked.
Yes, Western military aid closes the capabilities gap:
Combine [Western military aid] with Ukraine’s own military spending and Ukraine was spending about 91 percent of what the Russians were spending.
With Western help--which is minuscule compared to
GDP--Ukraine's resistance is not futile. In part, Russia succeeds now because of the long gap in funding American military aid.
This spending balance is an interesting illustration for this author's observation:
Synthesizing the amount of forces Russia has put into the field and its initial military operations suggests that its aims were never focused on occupying all of Ukraine, nor on defeating Kyiv’s military. Instead, it appears that they were focused on eliminating the sitting Ukrainian government, replacing it with a Kremlin-friendly government, occupying Ukraine from the Dnieper River east to the Russian border, and eliminating any Ukrainian military forces that stood in the way of accomplishing those goals. It is useful to be realistic about the limits of Russia’s meta-strategy.
Within this meta-strategy, a set of subordinate strategies broadened and deepened the Kremlin’s definition of victory. The retention of the Donbas and Crimea remained central points of emphasis; thus, that retention is a subordinate strategy. The linking of the Donbas and Crimea along the much sought after “land bridge” was another of the Kremlin’s significant strategic aims—another subordinate strategy.
I'm not on board the first paragraph. Unless it implies helping the new puppet government established in Kiev take the next step of exerting control over the temporary western Free Ukraine. Which has implications for Taiwan, if you want a major lesson for Peking from this war.
But I digress.
The second paragraph, however, leads me to refer back to an older post that on the surface may have seemed defeatist--Ukraine selling Crimea to Russia to end the war.
Will Russia's ground forces break under the strains of defeat, retreat, and death? But can Putin make peace if he loses everything he's gained? I think Ukraine may want to consider selling Crimea to Russia as a part of a peace plan that gets Russia to evacuate all the rest of Ukraine's territory lost since 2014.
Mind you, I wrote that at the high point of Ukraine's military power compared to Russia's after the earlier year combat that wrecked the pre-war Russian ground forces. But as that initially cited author's work indicates, letting Russia keep Crimea--with a large price paid by Russia that legitimizes the retention--could still reflect a victory over Russia.
And that level of victory may be even more significant if Putin raises his objectives rather than decrease them to justify the higher price his military and country have already paid:
Or will Russia expand its objective from the shrunken Donbas goal to make its gains commensurate with its losses? And can that broader objective be obtained?
Making Russia fail in bigger goals would amplify the same territorial change if accomplished before the escalation of goals.
Yet we need to have absolute and not just relative measures of Ukrainian victory by going back to some ISW early analysis of what Ukraine needs to be safe from another war after Putin reloads:
The most advantageous lines Ukraine could hold militarily and economically are its internationally recognized 1991 boundaries. Any discussion of recognizing changes to those borders as concessions to try to persuade Russia to stop its unprovoked and illegal invasion must reckon with the heavy blow such concessions would make against core principles of international law banning wars of conquest, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and many other moral and ethical principles that are central to a peaceful world. But discussions of such concessions are already underway, and so we have examined the concrete and pragmatic problems surrounding their implementation.
Freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything like the current lines enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a future Russian attempt to fulfill Putin’s aims by force. The current lines are not a sensible starting point for negotiations with Russia even if Putin were serious about negotiating a ceasefire on those lines. They are, rather, the necessary starting point for the continued liberation of strategically- and economically vital Ukrainian lands, without which the objective of a free, independent, and secure Ukraine able to defend and pay for itself is likely impossible.
Objectives can be scaled back from achieving 1991 borders. Especially if Russia makes tangible financial concessions that make that justifiable. We need to be able to recognize and accept victory when it appears. That's as much a danger to Ukraine and NATO as pretending Ukraine's defeat is victory.
UPDATE (Friday): Is Russia opening a new front or is this just to pin Ukrainian forces in place?
Russian troops have attempted to open a new front by breaking through Ukrainian lines in the Kharkiv region, a move Kyiv said its forces repelled, though fighting continues.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
