Mandating Quills for Taiwan

After losing Afghanistan and failing to arm Ukraine fast enough, does Taiwan really want to follow our "porcupine" strategy advice?

The U.S. will pressure Taiwan to buy "porcupine" strategy weapons. 

For years, the United States has tried everything to get Taiwan onto a “porcupine strategy,” making the island a pricklier target that might make China think twice about attacking it.

U.S. officials have urged Taiwan to buy an asymmetric toolkit of coastal defense cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and shoulder-fired weapons that could sink Chinese boats before they land and bog down the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in a block-by-block fight if it gets ashore. Taiwan has instead mostly opted for a more conventional diet of submarines, fighter jets, and tanks.

The new aid package that focused on Ukraine and Israel incentivizes Taiwan to buy asymmetrical "porcupine" weapons: 

While the package doesn’t legislate what will be heading over, the Biden administration might manage to finally get Taipei to go along with the porcupine strategy for good.

Welp, Taiwan is doomed (quoting an older post):

"Asymmetrical" concepts seem to miss the point that any weapon system or type of military unit has weaknesses that another weapon or type of unit must cover. That's why we embrace combined arms within the ground services and jointness between the services. It's rock, paper, scissors.

When I hear about asymmetric defenses, it almost always means that someone thinks that a country can escape the burden of defense spending by some clever device that undermines the enemy's entire expensive arsenal. Just because a country decides to use weapons other than carriers to fight carriers or weapons other than tanks to fight tanks doesn't make them asymmetric. It makes it war.

Sure, so-called "porcupine" weapons are needed (yet unsexy naval mines rarely get mentioned). But such weapons will only impose a cost on the Chinese invaders. A cost China might be prepared to endure. I believe the more conventional weapons are absolutely needed to drive the weakened invaders into the sea, a point I first made that has started to be recognized.

But as long as we're on the topic of asymmetrical means to protect Taiwan, let's talk about a real asymmetrical strategy.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post. 

Hold the Line in the Middle East

The Middle East is a violent place with a dizzying array of hatreds criss-crossing the region. American military efforts didn't transform the place into one where bike path debates are the most intense differences. But that isn't the measure of success. Let's defend what we achieved, okay? Or we'll have to go back.

This author decries military aid to the Middle East that he says shortchanges Asia: 

Today, despite all of these grand declarations [of the primacy of defending the Asia-Pacific region], 86 percent of the annual U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) still goes overwhelmingly, as it has for decades, to nations in the Middle East. 

Within that overwhelming portion of the pie, the top beneficiaries of this largesse include long-time security partners Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Of the roughly $13.2 billion Congress placed in the FMF account in Fiscal Year 2024, Egypt’s security assistance is roughly $1.3 billion, and Israel’s share is a tremendous $6.8 billion.

Gosh, why would Israel's aid have surged? 

As daily news stories illustrate, the Middle East is under threat. Why waste the results of the surge of direct American military effort by failing to defend the win?

Yes, a Middle East with allies who help us hunt jihadis, host and support our military efforts to oppose Iran or anybody else, and export oil, is a win. The fact that we can mostly send aid to keep the region at a low simmer without American forces in routine ground combat is a good thing.

And yes, Middle East oil exports to the rest of the world keeps our allies going and sustain economies that we trade with. That's vitally important to our prosperity and security even if we import none of those energy exports.

This is not a steady-state, semi-stable normal that we can just walk away from and expect to continue. Did our needless defeat in Afghanistan in 2021 when even a minimal effort would have held the line teach us nothing? I mean, if the rise of the Islamic State in 2014 didn't teach us the lesson after be needlessly bugged out of Iraq in 2011.

Sure, near the end the author walks back the implications of his arguments to say that the dominance of FMF aid to the Middle East should be reduced by increasing the total pie of aid. But that does not help that much when the argument the author makes clearly leads to the conclusion that America spends too much in the Middle East with the FMF program. If the author didn't want to leave that impression, why not simply make the case that Asian friends and allies need greater FMF aid?

Helping local allies in the Middle East is the best way to reduce the need for direct, persistent American combat to hold the line. Maybe with some more years of aid we won't need to use our military to help allies defeat enemy threats as we had to do when Iran launched a barrage of missiles at Israel and as Iran's ally the Houthi attack shipping in the Red Sea region.

FMF is just one part of our efforts--direct and indirect--to defend our interests and allies who help keep us the dominant power. I prefer sending aid over sending more troops to fight and die.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post. 

Unintended Consequences in Ukraine

Never doubt the potential of seemingly trivial actions. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, taking over Crimea and part of the Donbas, Putin set in motion consequences that would derail his 2022 invasion of Ukraine in the south. 

Over a year ago I noted the stalled Russian drive on Odessa at the beginning of the war:

The Russians made rapid advances out of Crimea despite the choke points and numerous irrigation canals in the Kherson region. How did that happen? A year later Ukraine says it still doesn't know. Although clearly the Ukrainians had too few troops. The story recounts the volunteer militia that rose up to blunt the drive on Odessa at Mykolaiv, which is already known. I was shocked at the speed of Russia's advance in the south. Without that failure, Ukraine would be in a far better position. I suspect Russia turned some of the leadership in the south who expected a quick Russian win.

It was clearly a close-run thing given the reliance on Ukrainian local militia to stop the Russian overland drive on Odessa across the river obstacles after bursting out of Crimea at a rapid clip. While Russia threatened an amphibious operation with the assets it had, Russia never tried to do so.

You'd think an amphibious invasion based out of their new power projection platform of Crimea would have been Conquest 101. Indeed, Russia had observed that its 2008 Georgia invasion would have worked better with French Mistral amphibious warfare ships, as I noted:

Their Black Sea fleet took part in the invasion, and the Russians have noted that they could have carried out the amphibious operation incredibly faster if they had proper amphibious warfare platforms.

When Russia contracted with France to buy the French large-deck Mistral amphibious warfare ships, Russia promised after the brief 2008 war on Georgia not to base the ships in the Black Sea. Russia lied. After taking Crimea in 2014, Russia boldly said it would base the first of two ships initially purchased in Crimea. Russia knew the Black Sea was where a new war would be fought. So of course they'd base a ship there.

But invading Ukraine in 2014 had collateral damage. France eventually cancelled the sale to punish Russia (quoting a story):

In a further sign of the West's growing mistrust and disapproval of Moscow over its conduct in Ukraine, France said it would not go ahead with the planned delivery of the first of two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia.

The reason Russia had tried to purchase the ships--four was to be the total purchase--is because Russia had lost the ability to build large warships after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So Russia did not have an alternative to the French ships.

Eventually, the two ships already under construction went to Egypt. 

Would Russia have conquered Odessa in 2022 with one or two Mistral large amphibious warships in their Black Sea Fleet in those early weeks of war? I think it is likely that would have been enough.

What would the war have looked like with Russian forces across the Dnieper River, supplied through Odessa, and marching north into western Ukraine while most of the Ukrainian army was pinned in the Donbas and significant forces were fighting to keep Russian troops out of Kiev? 

What would the impact of taking Zelensky's home town have been?

Would a hasty retreat of Ukraine's troops from the Donbas front to avoid being trapped on the east side of the Dnieper River have let Russia roll through eastern Ukraine even if Kiev still held?

Would that Ukrainian retreat have turned into a rout?

Would enough Ukrainians have decided Russia was the strong horse and that defecting to Russia was the key to survival? Maybe that would have been enough to tip the balance to make Russia's plan to rapidly install a puppet government in charge work out.

And if Odessa had fallen but Ukraine still kept fighting along some line north of the Black Sea coast, Ukrainian grain exports would not have been possible.

Pressure from hungry countries might have added pressure on the West to let Ukraine fall so Russia could export Ukrainian grain.

And Ukrainian morale could not have been boosted during the brutal Russian ground attacks by a naval campaign that sank Russian warships and drove them back to the eastern Black Sea.

So while I appreciated France's action at the time, who knew the impact it would have eight years later? Never let it be said that I can't compliment France.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post. 

The Winter War of 2022 Tries to Figure Out Victory

Russia can't get its maximum victory easily. But at what level of territorial control at the end of major combat operations can it claim victory?

Russia gears up to capture more territory. Ukraine prepares to stop the Russians and resume a counteroffensive perhaps next year to drive the Russians back. How far back is enough to deny Russia a meaningful victory this war?

The Ukrainians observed that the Russian ground forces have been smashed up. Their airborne and naval infantry have especially been robbed of quality. But "the Russian military is now operating as a 'single body, with a clear plan, under a single command.'" Achieving unity of command is a big deal.

The Russians have the initiative and are able to push forward in noticeable chunks, including through exploiting a Ukrainian mistake during a brigade rotation on the front. Ukraine is making the best of a bad situation:

Ukrainian forces may have decided to trade space for time as they wait for the arrival of US aid to the frontline at scale in the coming weeks – an appropriate decision for an under-resourced force at risk of being outflanked.

Yes, Western military aid closes the capabilities gap: 

Combine [Western military aid] with Ukraine’s own military spending and Ukraine was spending about 91 percent of what the Russians were spending.

With Western help--which is minuscule compared to GDP--Ukraine's resistance is not futile. In part, Russia succeeds now because of the long gap in funding American military aid.

This spending balance is an interesting illustration for this author's observation:

Synthesizing the amount of forces Russia has put into the field and its initial military operations suggests that its aims were never focused on occupying all of Ukraine, nor on defeating Kyiv’s military. Instead, it appears that they were focused on eliminating the sitting Ukrainian government, replacing it with a Kremlin-friendly government, occupying Ukraine from the Dnieper River east to the Russian border, and eliminating any Ukrainian military forces that stood in the way of accomplishing those goals. It is useful to be realistic about the limits of Russia’s meta-strategy. 

Within this meta-strategy, a set of subordinate strategies broadened and deepened the Kremlin’s definition of victory. The retention of the Donbas and Crimea remained central points of emphasis; thus, that retention is a subordinate strategy. The linking of the Donbas and Crimea along the much sought after “land bridge” was another of the Kremlin’s significant strategic aims—another subordinate strategy. 

I'm not on board the first paragraph. Unless it implies helping the new puppet government established in Kiev take the next step of exerting control over the temporary western Free Ukraine. Which has implications for Taiwan, if you want a major lesson for Peking from this war.

But I digress.

The second paragraph, however, leads me to refer back to an older post that on the surface may have seemed defeatist--Ukraine selling Crimea to Russia to end the war.

Will Russia's ground forces break under the strains of defeat, retreat, and death? But can Putin make peace if he loses everything he's gained? I think Ukraine may want to consider selling Crimea to Russia as a part of a peace plan that gets Russia to evacuate all the rest of Ukraine's territory lost since 2014.

Mind you, I wrote that at the high point of Ukraine's military power compared to Russia's after the earlier year combat that wrecked the pre-war Russian ground forces. But as that initially cited author's work indicates, letting Russia keep Crimea--with a large price paid by Russia that legitimizes the retention--could still reflect a victory over Russia.

And that level of victory may be even more significant if Putin raises his objectives rather than decrease them to justify the higher price his military and country have already paid:

Or will Russia expand its objective from the shrunken Donbas goal to make its gains commensurate with its losses? And can that broader objective be obtained?

Making Russia fail in bigger goals would amplify the same territorial change if accomplished before the escalation of goals. 

Yet we need to have absolute and not just relative measures of Ukrainian victory by going back to some ISW early analysis of what Ukraine needs to be safe from another war after Putin reloads:

The most advantageous lines Ukraine could hold militarily and economically are its internationally recognized 1991 boundaries. Any discussion of recognizing changes to those borders as concessions to try to persuade Russia to stop its unprovoked and illegal invasion must reckon with the heavy blow such concessions would make against core principles of international law banning wars of conquest, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and many other moral and ethical principles that are central to a peaceful world. But discussions of such concessions are already underway, and so we have examined the concrete and pragmatic problems surrounding their implementation.

Freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything like the current lines enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a future Russian attempt to fulfill Putin’s aims by force. The current lines are not a sensible starting point for negotiations with Russia even if Putin were serious about negotiating a ceasefire on those lines. They are, rather, the necessary starting point for the continued liberation of strategically- and economically vital Ukrainian lands, without which the objective of a free, independent, and secure Ukraine able to defend and pay for itself is likely impossible.

Objectives can be scaled back from achieving 1991 borders. Especially if Russia makes tangible financial concessions that make that justifiable. We need to be able to recognize and accept victory when it appears. That's as much a danger to Ukraine and NATO as pretending Ukraine's defeat is victory.

UPDATE (Friday): Is Russia opening a new front or is this just to pin Ukrainian forces in place?

Russian troops have attempted to open a new front by breaking through Ukrainian lines in the Kharkiv region, a move Kyiv said its forces repelled, though fighting continues.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

Weekend Data Dump

LOL: "French President Emmanuel Macron is ready to "open the debate" about the role of nuclear weapons in a common European defence, he said in an interview published Saturday." Macron will give the EU control of French nukes only after Macron rules the EU.

Singing to the TDR choir with this observation about US force structure demands: "policymakers and strategic military leaders are often caught between deployability, which requires small, light forces and forces sufficiently robust to handle all the challenges of land warfare."

Russia at war: "Recent Russian attacks on the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv are seeking to make the city uninhabitable. This is accomplished by eliminating electricity supplies, water supply and sanitation systems along with reliable food supplies." Russia will call that a victory.

Anti-missile missiles.

Fort Apache, the South China Sea: "In the most hotly contested waterway in the world, the risk of Asia’s next war hinges increasingly on a ramshackle ship past her time, pockmarked with holes, streaked with rust and beached on a reef." You remember Sierra Madre, right?

Friends in need: "The defense chiefs of Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States will meet in Hawaii to discuss the regional security situation and strengthening collaboration, announced Japan Defense Minister Minoru Kihara on Friday."

It costs $100,000 to knock down a drone. We want a cheaper means. Sure, but what's the cost of what wasn't destroyed by a cheap drone? I'm more worried about prompt reload of air defense missiles. And why not inflict that cost ratio on the enemy with our own drones versus their expensive air defenses? 

The U.S. is willing to expand training for Ukrainian troops.

France and Germany will design and build a tank jointly. I'm assuming a 140mm gun with good armor, active defenses, and "strategic" mobility that consists of fitting on a train flatbed car. Unlike America which has to take them overseas, these tanks will practically roll out of their bases and start fighting.

And in the expensive, definitely-not-built-in-a-garage-with-whatever-components-are-handy drone competition, the XQ-67A.

I hope so: "The fact is that the United States has been so far ahead in submarine technology and secure underwater operations over the past 50-plus years that its submarines are virtually undetectable by either China or Russia." Australia is counting on that. But I hate to assume it just because we have been ahead.

Is Haiti's new transitional government a "game changer?" Based on Haiti's long history of being a side hustle for the F**k-Up Fairy, I'm going to say "no."

LOL! "With the EU election just over a month away, von der Leyen’s team wants to transform the image of the European Commission president from a tough crisis-manager-in-chief to a more personal and warm mother and grandmother who wants her family to grow up in a safe Europe." Tough? In EU world, maybe.

Yeah, given my past focus on the USSR it was clear as soon as the Soviet empire collapsed that American support for Israel had fewer reasons to be intense. After destroying Hamas, it gets trickier for Israel.

In 2013, Israel changed strategy "and shifted priorities away from the ground forces in favor of air force and cyber capabilities, intelligence, special operations forces, and stand-off precision fire." Israel now needs more ground forces for the future. I thought their victory-through-airpower strategy was flawed.

Never mind the Israeli military, can Gazans survive their addled overseas allies? The Western Left wants regime change in Israel--but not in Gaza. Tip to Instapundit.

Taking nostalgia too far: "The suspected members of the Reich Citizens movement, known in German as Reichsbürger, a group that rejects the legitimacy of the modern German state, are accused of membership of a terrorist organization and 'preparation of a treasonous undertaking.'" They aren't helping my case.

Huh: "The US has acquired 81 obsolete Soviet-era combat aircraft from Kazakhstan, a report from the Kyiv Post says." For spare parts for Ukraine? To be modified as long-range suicide drones? Ground decoys? Never mind? Maybe. But why not? Ukraine might be Kazakhstan's first line of defense.

Sounds prudent: "Ukraine's air force said it is preparing for the arrival of F-16s by building underground stores and bunkers at its bases." F-16s are good but hardly a wonder weapon. I wonder if Russia will divert scarce missiles from attacking energy and water facilities to focus on the F-16s? 

Hamas wants a cut of the humanitarian aid: "Hamas political official Khalil al-Hayya told the AP that the group would consider Israeli forces — or forces from any other country — stationed by the [American-built] pier to guard it as 'an occupying force and aggression,' and that the militant group would resist it."

Collective sea defense: "NATO is currently conducting two major naval activities – Dynamic Mongoose 24 in the North Atlantic and Neptune Strike 24-1, which involves four large-deck strike groups and spans both the Mediterranean Sea and Adriatic Sea as well as parts of the Baltic Sea."

The Army wants to replace its 70 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planes: "For the first time, the Army is using a large-cabin business jet — the Bombardier Global 6500 — to serve as the airframe for the spy plane." We no longer need to use large passenger jet airframes to fit the equipment in.

Meanwhile in the South China Sea: "China’s coast guard fired water cannons that damaged a Philippine [fisheries agency] vessel on Tuesday, marking the latest flare-up of violence between the two countries in the disputed South China Sea, Philippine authorities said."

Meanwhile in the waters off Yemen: "Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree claimed the attack on the [merchant ship] Cyclades and targeting the U.S. warships in a statement early Tuesday." Italy also shot down a Houthi drone.

America's logistics weakness in the Pacific isn't mentioned much. In my Military Review article on options for the Army across the Asia-Pacific region, I noted our logistics were too focused on northeast Asia and would need to be expanded to carry out any of the options. But I had no practical suggestions.

Helping friends guard their coasts: "Helping island nations, like Vanuatu, protect their resources and enforce their laws is 'a sweet spot' for the Coast Guard’s operations in the Pacific, Commandant Adm. Linda Fagan said Monday." 

American special forces learn from the Ukrainians they train. I hope some of the lessons are on how to operate against the Russians behind Russian lines.

Has Turkey passed Peak Erdogan?

When the Israel-Iran quasi-war lost the prefix. 

Huh. But the activists told me Israel already had Gaza under siege on October 6, 2023: "Food and other humanitarian aid supplies to Gaza have improved in April, but there is still far from enough to reverse the trend towards famine, said the head of the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees." Apparently not.

I hope our enemies' defense industries are worse: "Metal shavings in contaminated fuel, incorrectly assembled parts, and a plastic scraper protruding from a wing fold were among the faults discovered in five new F-35C Joint Strike Fighters delivered to a U.S. Marine Corps fighter squadron [in 2023.]"

India seeks lessons of the Winter War of 2022. That's nice, but India has failed to deal with what in 2011 I thought was India's most important defense decision of the decade. There doesn't seem to be a sense of urgency. How long will it take India to act on whatever lessons it draws from this current war? 

Is Chechnya's ruler dying? "If Kadyrov goes, the monster he has nurtured is unchained. A fight for the succession will be destabilising. Whoever comes out on top will want to strike a new bargain with the Kremlin — and one that will be bitterly resisted by other elements of Russia’s power structures."

Lukashenko has set up a body, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, that appears to be an effort to maintain his rule--even after his death. My question is whether this is pro- or anti-Putin? That is, does this strengthen the Anschluss or is it a means to slow it down or even escape it?

Putin beats his chest and flings nuclear poo: "To make this work, Putin has to convince other countries that he is prepared for nuclear war. In the process, he will also have to convince his countrymen, which only further undermines the strategy." Will subordinates shoot Putin if they think he's suicidal with nukes?

From blue skies: "Plans to replace F-16s with F-35s are in danger of being rendered obsolete because the fighting in Ukraine demonstrated that the air war has moved to lower altitudes and is being fought with UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) costing less, often much less than $15,000 each." To brown skies.

Is China preparing to devalue their currency to jumpstart exports? Would we raise tariffs to protect industries here or in friendly nations? Or would we accept the help to tamp down inflation a bit with some lower-cost goods?

The charge it was a "conspiracy theory" to say it leaked from a bio-research lab is crumbling: "Four years after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Chinese city of Wuhan, what do we know about the origin of the SARSCOV2 virus?" Science! And racism! And shut up! China lied. And still lies.

The United Kingdom seems to have put Peak Independent Scotland in the rear view mirror. Good. It seems more like an EU revenge operation, anyway. Well, and a strategy to strip away the prefix from the proto-imperial project.

New Office of Naval Intelligence recognition and intelligence guide poster for the PLAN. And another for China's coast guard.

Yes, a Palestinian identity exists now regardless of when or how it was created and a "two-state solution" will not bring peace. Also, the Palestinian assault on the German "ambassador" to the West Bank shows that we should expect violence--not gratitude--at our "humanitarian" Gaza pier when it begins operating. 

Monsters dressed like Santa: "Today is May Day. Since 2007, I have advocated using this date as an international Victims of Communism Day. I outlined the rationale for this proposal (which was not my original idea) in my very first post on the subject[.]" Tip to Instapundit.

I guess winning a five-decade insurgency in Colombia opens options for hypocrisy: "Colombian President Gustavo Petro said on Wednesday he plans to sever diplomatic ties with Israel over the Middle Eastern country’s conduct in its war against Hamas in Gaza." FYI, Petro was in the leftist M-19 guerrilla group.

Trump again said NATO states that don't spend enough on defense are on their own. I find it humorous that journalists ignore the potential cause-and-effect linkage of Europeans resolving to "Trump-proof" European security by [checks notes] increasing defense spending in case Trump abandons NATO. 

Is an East Asia NATO forming?  Could be--for a subset that can agree that the focus of their defense efforts should be the South China Sea. But not every ally or friend can make that the primary battlefield. And how does that work when Taiwan--the central objective on that front--isn't part of it?

The Georgian people haven't forgotten that 2008 Goons of August War and are opposing the pro-Russian drift of their government. FFS. Even if Russia wins the Ukraine War, Putin may decide that finishing the conquest of Georgia would be an easier next step than finishing the conquest of Ukraine.

The V-22 may be a maintenance and flying chore, but when it works it is very useful: "The V-22 program office is studying the future of the tiltrotor aircraft, weighing both a technology refresh as well as whether it could rip off the wings and nacelles to add decades of additional life to the airframes."

The gas isn't itself usually lethal. But forcing you out of your trench is: "The United States on Wednesday accused Russia of violating the international chemical weapons ban by deploying the choking agent chloropicrin against Ukrainian troops and using riot control agents 'as a method of warfare' in Ukraine."

Welcome to NATO: "More than a thousand U.S. soldiers are making a long-distance trek this week in upper Norway, bound for a Finnish artillery range for drills showcasing stepped-up efforts to defend NATO’s new Arctic border with Russia." Finland is a hard target.

No! Way!  "The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan is regenerating strength through aggressive recruitment and by taking advantage of instability in the country, a Pentagon watchdog agency report said Thursday." Get ready for Jihad 2.0.

Smart Diplomacy®: "Iran’s nuclear weapons program benefited greatly from more than $40 billion provided by the U.S. government since Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023." A nuke--that Iran can build--might penetrate. Is Iran exploiting Gazans? Will Biden finally have regrets for loving the mullahs?

Having fun yet? "When Iran finally announces it has nuclear weapons, the Saudis can do so too in just a few months." The Saudis financed Pakistan's "Islamic bomb" and expect a product if requested. And the Saudis have old Chinese DF-3 ballistic missiles--if they still work--and some newer DF-21s, as of 2018.

The Philippines is advertising China's bullying tactics in the South China Sea, as a Telegraph reporter recounts: "I was standing on the deck of a Philippine coast guard ship when a Chinese vessel opened fire with its water cannon." Video included in link.

As the war the Hamas rape-and-slaughter invasion on October 7, 2023 began reaches May 2024 with some Hamas battalions still intact in the south, let's examine the false compassion of slowly invading a populated area. Would deaths be lower with a fast invasion? Avoiding disease, illness, and hunger?

Ukraine's summer 2023 counteroffensive: "the West trained and equipped nine brigades for the offensive. Ukraine would field several additional brigades from the armed forces and national guard, organised under two corps, and a reserve task force." At 6 brigades per corps, that makes sense. I expected three corps.

Wait. What? "Militants launched mortars at Israeli forces in Gaza as they prepared for the arrival of a floating U.S. Army pier[.]" That's news from April 25th. How did I miss that in my news feeds? 

Low-rate production has begun: "NMESIS is a mobile, ground-based, anti-ship weapon system deployed by a small team within the littoral environment intended to support land-to-sea attacks for the US Marine Corps (USMC)[.]" Good. As I wrote, when you start to sink ships, sink ships. Much was lost to do that. 

Defense: "A pair of launchers from the Okinawa-based Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment pointed skyward Thursday from a field at Clark’s Air Force City[.]" It's a former American air base from the Cold War. The deployment is for an exercise.

Norway steps up: "Norway would be able to reach NATO’s goal of military spending of 2% of each member country’s GDP this year."

Forward defense: "Australia aims to double the size of its naval fleet with its largest shipbuilding investment since World War II[.]" But obstacles must be overcome.

That's a bad trend: "The U.S. military has long held a key advantage over China's: it can hit mobile targets at extremely long distances. But that 'monopoly is over,' the Space Force’s intel chief said Thursday."

A national defense asset: "The admiral leading the Coast Guard told a congressional budget panel Wednesday that the service is ready for a larger role in national defense but will need the funds to do the job." We need all the hulls out there swinging.

I don't think peacetime deployments in any way prove "their combat-worthiness": "Changes made to the Marine Corps structure, equipment and approach to deployments are giving the service new ways to react to crises across the globe."

Armenia is conceding defeat in its long post-Soviet series of wars with Azerbaijan. Unless Armenia wants to be seduced by anger to replicate the history of the Palestinians by claiming to be Queen of the Victim Prom to make their situation much, much worse.

Losses: "Russia has lost at least ten percent of its combat aircraft since they invaded Ukraine in early 2022. Since the 2022 invasion Russia has lost 347 combat aircraft and 325 helicopters. Ukrainian losses have been similar, with 346 combat aircraft and 270 helicopters lost [.]" F-16 impact is overstated, IMO. 

Huh: "Serbia was enthusiastically pro-Russian until Russia invaded Ukraine. After that the Serbian government and most of the Serbs backed Ukraine with only a minority supporting Russia." I'd read Serbia was not shifting. This says Serbia is--but would like to repair ties after the war. 

More drones: "Army getting extra funding from multiple sources to accelerate LASSO kamikaze drone program[.]" 

Well, hello: "The U.S. Marine Corps is transforming an unspecified U.S. Air Force missile into a weapon that will give its AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters the ability to strike moving targets on land and at sea 150 nautical miles away." 

Israel is retiring their Patriot missiles as locally-made systems fill the role. The article says it is unlikely Israel would sell Patriot to Ukraine to avoid annoying Russia too much and ending cooperation in Syria. But hasn't that ship sailed with close Russia-Iran defense ties? And is an indirect path to Ukraine okay?

Western ammunition and missile production is inadequate to sustain just Ukraine's needs. We still can't pass the logistics test Russia has provided in Ukraine.

I'm always hesitant to call even the most odious leftist agitators and thugs "foreign agents." Freedom of speech demands tolerance to avoid undermining everyone's freedoms. "Hate" speech isn't an exception to freedom of speech. More speech is the answer. But criminal actions should certainly be punished.

Of course, on October 6, 2023, he saw no indication of the Hamas rape and slaughter invasion of Israel the next day: "U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said on Thursday he did not see any indication Hamas was planning any attack on U.S. troops in Gaza[.]"

Even if China's claim is accurate, the unwritten agreement was an illegal action by the Philippines to cave in to an illegal act of Chinese aggression, no?

Ukraine's sea drones--surface and underwater. Sure, they seem like cheap, revolutionary weapons. But they rely on off-loading to NATO the expensive ISR assets and systems operating over the Black Sea to get the USVs and UUVs to their targets.

Biden wants a US-Saudi security pact but needs Israel to move now toward a Palestinian state. I noted the pact and was relieved Biden got the message--sent to Obama, too--when the Saudis flirted with China. Sadly, Biden wants to re-crown the Palestinians as Queen of the Victim Prom first. Trust takes time.

Arab governments know Iran and not Israel is their biggest threat.

Iran's military power bluff and simulation of democracy. For all the talk from the Left that the West tries to "impose" Western democracy on countries where it is alien, all those countries certainly pretend to be democracies rather than proudly proclaiming some "indigenous" autocratic system of government.

I heard Israel will create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon before the new school year starts. This would be the Limited War option in this post. It creates a "no-launch" zone--as I called it when I speculated about South Korea options--to stop Hezbollah short-range rocket and tube artillery attacks on Israel. 

Russia's invasion of Ukraine failed to follow Russia's own manual for operations. That's why I over-estimated what Russia could achieve with an actual invasion--rather than the attempted victory parade. Notwithstanding my appreciation Russia's military was over-rated, I did not dismiss it.

Is Israel hurt much? "The Biden administration last week put a hold on a shipment of U.S.-made ammunition to Israel, two Israeli officials told Axios." Without veering into politics, the precedent was set that such things done for domestic political advantage are verboten. I can't read minds. Tip to Instapundit.

When will Russians punish Putin for provoking NATO rearmament? "Denmark will raise its defense spending by an additional $5.1 billion over the next four years in order to speed up investments in military capabilities, as the government has warned that Russia is readying for a long-term war."

Hmmm: "Russian forces appear to be choosing to exploit the area where Russian forces are most likely to make tactical gains in the near future[.]" Reminds me of German 1918 Western Front offensives. They made impressive territorial gains but had no strategic focus. And despite the scare, culminated and failed. 

Of course NATO is preparing! You keep threatening NATO! "NATO's four-month long military exercises near Russia's borders, known as Steadfast Defender, are proof the alliance is preparing for a potential conflict with Russia, a spokeswoman for Russia's Foreign Ministry said on Saturday." Chimps with nukes. 

We may be on the eve of Israel advancing into Rafah: "The latest round of Gaza cease-fire talks ended in Cairo after 'in-depth and serious discussions,' the Hamas militant group said Sunday, reiterating key demands that Israel again rejected."

I've avoided political--or even just interesting non-security--news and issues this week. It's difficult. And some issues span the firewall. Which makes this tougher than expected. A work in progress.

Good Luck, Marines!

Marines need to be deployed to isolated outposts in the western Pacific to help the Navy wrest control of the seas from the Chinese navy. Supplying and redeploying them once the shooting starts doesn't seem to be a big concern for the Navy.

If the Marines are feeling a little exposed by the Navy, they have some justification: 

The Navy’s upcoming medium landing ship could cost billions more than the service plans, according to a new report by the Congressional Budget Office.

The CBO believes an 18-ship fleet would cost between $6.2 billion and $7.8 billion in 2024 (inflation-adjusted) dollars, or $340 million to $430 million per ship. That’s a stark contrast to Navy figures, which, according to the CBO, has an 18-ship program at $2.6 billion total, or about $150 million per ship. ...

The medium landing ship is part of the US Marine Corps Force Design 2030 effort, which has the Corps shifting away from some traditional missions and towards capabilities that supporters say will be most relevant in the Pacific. The new ship is intended to transport Marine littoral regiments in and around a conflict, with a focus on a potential conflict with China.

We'll just skip over my concerns the Marines have overdone their shift.

How can a simple barge with pretensions cost more than expected? It's an open-air vehicle deck that doesn't look like it has advanced much beyond the mass-produced World War II LST in basic functionality. Where are the cost overruns coming from? Shipboard WiFi?

But no worries. Building them to civilian survivability standards as that CBO report states could lower the cost. 

FFS.

I'd like something a little more robust when Marines are being dangled at the ass ends of nowhere, vulnerable to being isolated by the Chinese. 

How about using a hull that is worthless for its intended purpose but at least has a bit more survivability than civilian standards:

I've long advocated an armed amphibious transport (APD) converted from warships. I modeled the proposal on the World War II use of old destroyers and destroyer escorts converted on a large scale to move company-sized ground elements around the Pacific. In Proceedings I advocated using old Perry-class frigates to test the concept prior to building purpose-built ships. But since then, we lost our supply of retired frigates, if memory serves me.

But the demise of the LCS is an opportunity not to completely waste the money already plowed into the ship class. Rather than simply mothball or scrap them, why not equip them to move the Marines around?

Maybe the costs could be a little less with some needed combat capabilities included.

Remember, the reason the Marines are being put on those outpost is because the Navy needs their help to gain control of the seas. Doesn't using easily sunk medium landing ships kind of assume control of the seas is established rather quickly to avoid Marines withering on the vine?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post. 

How Low Can Putin Go?

I've been droning on for a long time about Russia's slide into vassal status under China. I'm seeing more and more authors talking about that and China's claims on Russian territory.

So here's a short piece on this sad reality for Putin's bare-chested, tiger-riding bravado (I've got nukes!):

Russia went to war against Ukraine to proclaim its great-power status and unbridled sovereignty over the surrounding regions. Instead, this endeavor has resulted in Russia becoming the subordinate partner in its alliance with China. Lavrov’s visit confirms that, far from being a great power, Russia is increasingly transforming into China’s vassal. 

Russia and China are frenemies with temporary benefits with Russia sliding to vassal status.

I thought Russia hoped to appease China to build up its forces to defend its Far East. I guessed that verbal hostility toward a then-weak NATO was a verbal posturing to obscure the appeasement.

Perhaps it was. Yet after twenty years, Putin found he hadn't rebuilt Russia's power in time to settle his accounts in the West. But he managed to get China to grant five more years. 

And before that extension could end, he launched what he intended to be a short and glorious war to conquer Ukraine and humiliate NATO to allow Russia to face China with confidence.

I warned his military wasn't up to that task. I warned it was risky for Putin to reveal just how much his military fell short of his boasts.

And Russia's military failed to achieve Putin's objective. Yet Putin and his minions beat their chests and fling poo about Russia's greatness--and don't you dare forget about the nukes!

The reality is that Russia has its ground forces tied down--the ground forces of a regional power with continents-spanning defense needs--in the west being ground up in Ukraine--especially his vital airborne forces--with a reviving and expanding NATO rubbing Putin's nose in the large pile of poo he left on the ground around him.

Putin pointlessly angers the West and bows more deeply to a looming China, while pretending that's totally what an Alpha Ruler does.

How low might Xi force Putin to bow to restrain China? 

Bravo. 

How long before the naturally paranoid Russians wonder if China sent Putin to rule Russia just as Germany sent Lenin to Russia during World War I to undermine and destroy Russia?

UPDATE: Will China pay a price for aiding aggression? 

China’s supply to Russia has been one of the "key factors" in gaining momentum on the battlefield with its war in Ukraine, top U.S. intelligence officials told Congress Thursday.

And more relevant for Putin is what China will demand from Russia for this aid--and for whatever price China pays for aiding Russia. 

UPDATE: Huh:

A potential joint invasion of Taiwan [by China and Russia] was raised in the meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee by Republican Senator Mike Rounds, who asked the head of the Defence Intelligence Agency about the Pentagon's plans should an invasion happen. 

Is Putin willing to bow low enough to Xi to agree to participating in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?

That's just astounding. China's help for Russia's war against Ukraine is selling key items useful to Russia's war production effort; and buying oil at discounted prices from Russia.

In turn, Russia is expected to stand in the front ranks of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan so China doesn't face a coalition led by America to defeat the invasion all alone?

That's no alliance without limits. That's a vassal being told by the master what it can get and what it has to provide.

Putin's reputation as a chess master really is astounding, no?

UPDATE: Explain why Russians haven't already strung Putin up by his heels in Red Square?

The growing risk of war between Russia and China presents the most significant challenge to global stability in this decade. Indeed, by the time the 2020s are out, an armed clash between the two countries over China’s increasingly brazen territorial claims against Russia looks like a distinct possibility, with worldwide implications. 

I really don't feel lonely on my assessment any more. And seriously, what will it take for Russians to violently reject Putin's disregard for Russian lives?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

De-Baathification Was No Mistake in Iraq

America made a mistake de-Baathifying Iraq's government by failing to follow lessons of occupied West Germany after World War II? I don't think that is close to being right.

Huh:

In order to craft a de-Baathification process following the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the United States adopted policies that it claimed were based heavily on the denazification policies enacted in the American-occupied zone of West Germany to achieve the same goal. Members of the George W. Bush administration relied heavily on the analogy between the Baath and Nazi regimes and used this as part of their justification for both the invasion itself and the shape of their policies in the aftermath. Despite this, however, the de-Baathification program was badly thought out and badly implemented, proving to be hugely counterproductive for the security and prosperity of post-war Iraq — the United States neither replicated the successes nor avoided the mistakes of denazification.

Saying America made a mistake in Iraq because it failed to follow the cancellation of de-Nazification in Germany after World War II ignores that Germany had no Nazi insurrection to ease that path and reduce the risks of putting defeated Nazis in the bureaucracy. Iraq had a Baathist insurgency that made putting Baathists in the government pretty much American-organized infiltration.

Germans after World War II had a foreign enemy they greatly feared wanted more revenge--the USSR. That made rising up against the Americans and other Western allies rather suicidal given that those Western conquerors were all that stood between the Red Army and the Rhine.

Sunni Arabs feared Shia and Kurdish Iraqis--now in charge as the majorities--who wanted revenge. Should we have made their liberation pointless by keeping the Sunni Arab Baathist torturers and oppressors in charge?  Those we liberated from Saddam were rightly in no mood to be nice to their former oppressors when the oppressors were trying to return to power (See: The Price of De-Baathification" (Posted August 12, 2003) in that recovered post of August 2003 posts from the old site).

I believe the spring 2004 joint Sunni al Qaeda and Iran-backed Shia Sadrist uprisings would have been much worse if "former" Baathists had been in the government and security forces. 

The Shias and Kurds would have felt betrayed by lack of de-Baathification and the Sunni Arabs would have had Baathist people--who'd see a chance to regain full control to protect themselves from deserved revenge by former victims--in charge of combat units. As it was, half of the new Iraqi units collapsed. I suspect more would have collapsed without de-Baathification and some would have started fighting us. Could we have withstood that kind of uprising?

Not having experienced Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi government hurt governance. But the alternative of keeping them in positions of power had multiple problems. And we did get past whatever anger our actions had in promoting Sunni Arab insurgency. Lord, overthrowing the centuries-long Sunni Arab dominance over the Shia wasn't enough to inspire insurgency?

The Sunni tribal Arabs finally came to fear the ISIL invaders who had largely absorbed the Baathist resistance and Iran's Shia puppets more than America. That common enemy led to the Awakening and the Sunni Arab tribal defection to the Coalition. That led to Iraq's government relaxing de-Baathification.

This Sunni Arab support for the Surge offensive bolstered by additional American troops paid off. Both al Qaeda and the Sadrists were fought and defeated. Before that whack with the clue bat, there was no friendship to be had among Baathists by handing out jobs. Iraqi government victory enabled reincorporating Sunni Arabs into Iraq. And even that was shaky given the success of the ISIL offensive in the first half of 2014 across Iraq and Syria.

Perhaps the de-Baathification went deeper than what was proper--and what I wanted--but the new Iraqi government led by the majority Shias implemented the deeper de-Baathification--not America. And even if a mistake--which I don't concede given the other factors--it surely demonstrates that the Shias would have been angry with America about no de-Baathification. What problems would have flowed from that belief that liberation from Saddam was a farce of "new boss same as the old boss" policies?

Oh, and for all the complaints that America didn't have a plan for Iraq unlike the extensive planning for post-war Germany, this section by the author is funny:

The implementation of denazification became increasingly lax, reflecting a growing view that the complete elimination of all former Nazis from professional life was unrealistic. The original idea had been that there would be enough non-Nazi personnel available in Germany to staff public offices. However, the reality was that most of these people had died or fled during the war, or were too weak to work following their suffering under the Nazi regime. The remaining healthy individuals started filling posts that they had no expertise in, while minor collaborators with skills and experience were dismissed. A spate of amnesties followed, and the denazification program was formally ended in March 1948. [emphasis added]

Huh. After years of planning a major piece of how to deal with the defeated society and government, it was horribly wrong.

Also, the New York Times said we had extensive planning for Iraq. Sadly, our planning assumptions also didn't work out when we saw what we had on the ground and we had to adapt. We did to defeat a series of enemies fighting us. Which even the author who claimed the war was a "fiasco" had to return to and explain away the success as the result of a so-called "gamble."

At this point I'd be remiss not to mention how President Obama and Vice President Biden boasted of their success in Iraq. We won. Really.

Examining any victory too closely makes it look like defeat, eh?

And good Lord, if you take a broader view than the de-Nazification issue, are you really going to contrast America's post-Iraq War situation with the success of post-World War II that the anti-war Left made to undermine our fight in Iraq?

As it turns out, I shouldn't have been generous in assuming the anti-war account of the smooth post-World War II occupation was accurate.

That was always a hole in my education. I knew that things were rough in Europe after World War II, but basically it was the interlude between World War II and the Cold War. Even my post-World War II European history education skipped over the end of the 1940s for the most part.

So it has been with some horror that I have been reading Savage Continent by Keith Lowe. It is honestly numbing in the horrors of the post-war in failed plans, hatreds erupting that led to new slaughters and ethnic cleansing, hunger, and political violence ...

It was painful to read. There was shame enough to go around. No wonder it is so easy to skip over this period between periods.

But the point is that compared to Europe after World War II, our post-war occupation of Iraq was friggin' brilliant. Sure, the scale was far less. But the fact is, but for the Iranian, Syrian, and al Qaeda invasion of Iraq after Saddam's regime was destroyed, the Iraq post-war would have gone pretty smoothly. Remember, Europe was not invaded right after the fall of Hitler's regime. Yet still it was a horror show.

Really? The post-World War II model applies to Iraq? 

As for the reality of de-Baathification, it wasn't that harsh initially and was relaxed as early as September 2023 (in that September 30th post at the top of the salvage post from the old site). It was done in a way I thought made sense rather than being too harsh given the situation (Find this post, "“De-Baathification” (Posted April 24, 2004), in that giant salvage of April 2004 posts from the old site). You can't take the current situation and assume that changing the policies that got us here would have improved rather than wrecked the path to today. 

UPDATE: Eric's thorough review of issues around the Iraq War (that I have only belatedly read) includes commentary that moots the idea that we should not have removed Baathists from positions of responsibility. 

One, the UN wanted accountability for Saddam's crimes through the Baath Party. And two, American law mandating a democratic Iraq rather makes keeping the former oppressors and murder in positions of authority extremely counter-productive.

UPDATE: One thing I forgot to mention that intensified the need for de-Baathification was that Shias had reason to be suspicious of American motives after America let Saddam brutally suppress post-Desert Storm Shia uprisings in the south in 1991. 

We had good reason to oppose a pro-Iran uprising, of course. But it left a mark when we were serious about overthrowing the Saddam regime in 2003.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

Germany Moves East to Defend the West

Germany has rejoined the defense of the West.

Five thousand German troops in a combat brigade will move to Lithuania: 

Two dozen soldiers departed from Berlin on Monday morning to set up the first permanent German army bases on foreign soil since the Second World War. ...

The troops will now build two bases, one outside the capital and one outside the second city, Kaunas. Germany has said the bases will be operational and ready to house 5,000 army personnel by 2027.

Stopping the Russians from moving west is a good thing, as I've long advised:

I keep reading that the Germans hate their militaristic past so much that they don't want to fight.

Let's try applying the clue bat to Germany's collective skull on this issue.

Conquering and setting up death camps under the shield of a powerful military? That's bad. By all means, don't do that.

Having a military capable of fighting death cult enemies or stopping the Russians from moving west? Well, that's a good thing. Try doing that.

So I won't complain one bit. I welcome Germany as a valued member of the West stepping up to defend our common values against Russian aggression.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.