I'm not against Marines helping the Navy fight the Chinese navy. But the Marines are over-focused on that single threat. Tired of being a "second Army" in the war on terror, the Marines have decided to be a second (land-based) Navy.
I wrote before the official shift to create more deployable Marine Littoral Regiments, arguing in Proceedings for Navy APDs to move around small Marine (which I called Marine Expeditionary Companies) and Navy ground troop anti-ship detachments in the western Pacific:
The Marines have long been the most significant "allied" army to fight alongside the Army in expeditionary warfare. This shifts the Marines more to helping the Navy deploy, sustain, and fight.
I am on board attempts to get the Marines to adapt to A2/AD by spreading out in smaller units more useful for raids or small missions, as I wrote about in this article in the Naval Institute Proceedings (USNI membership required to access it online)--at least until naval and air dominance is achieved.
The idea of coastal defense is also an idea I'm in favor of the Navy or Marines adopting.I thought that in place of MEUs as the building block that Marine Expeditionary Companies (MECs) could be that basic unit for disaggregated operations under A2/AD threat. And some could be used for other purposes in support of expeditionary advanced base operations[.]
"My biggest concern is does this turn the Marine Corps into a niche force at the expense of its global response capability?" said Sen. Dan Sullivan (R., Alaska), who serves as a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve.
That's my worry. What other threat outside of China requires that kind of anti-ship net in the rest of the world? We still need Marines to assault enemies from the sea. Or at least land early in a fight in a permissive environment for the first battle of a war, as I argued long ago starting on page 38 in Joint Force Quarterly.
Congress wants to know if the Marine Corps FD-2030 changes are correct.
Well the global response issue is not the only worry:
Is the Marine Corps Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) concept essentially replicating the Japanese experience from World War II American island hopping operations? Doesn't moving the Marine units or supplying them close to China assume friendly sea control that EABO is trying to achieve?
And one problem is that the Marines added too many capabilities that seem to make the logistics problem worse. And given the focus of the change, it seems like the MLRs thus far have damned few anti-ship weapons.
I think the Marines could deploy more anti-ship weapons with fewer Marines that are dedicated to the MLRs now. Indeed, as I wrote in that Proceedings article, I'd prefer it if the Navy Expeditionary Command formed the bulk of the anti-ship detachments, which would be augmented with Marine security detachments.
Yes, not all Marines will be organized as MLRs. But all of the Marines are being thinned out and lightened up. Unable to be a second Navy they will also be unable to be a second Army. I mean, the service where "every Marine is a rifleman" has downgraded the value of shooting rifles:
The last class of Marine Scout Snipers is scheduled to graduate on Dec. 15, marking the end of the 0317 MOS and a long tradition of producing some of the deadliest snipers on the battlefield.
I eagerly await the results of the Marine experiments to find out what their smaller and lighter infantry battalions can do in combat.
Those experiments and Congressional questions are evidence that the debate about Marine roles and organization really isn't over, right? What will the Marines actually be able to do in a war?
Subtle innuendos suggest not enough. There must be something inside those units.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
