So invading Taiwan is likely beyond China's capabilities? Does China only get one shot at victory?
Technically the article doesn't say China can't successfully invade. It says China would have a number of "struggles". Why yes. War is like that. Taiwan will have struggles defeating an invasion, too. And sometimes the outcome of a war rests on who is less incompetent.
But what about China's struggles in the path to victory?
The Taiwan Strait, over ninety miles wide, is incredibly choppy, and due to two monsoon seasons and other extreme weather events, a seaborne invasion is only viable a few months out of the year.
The windows will help China, too. If China lands during a window, will allies of Taiwan be able to send sufficient force to operate around Taiwan before extreme weather and monsoons close in? By the time a window to intervene opens up again, Taiwan could be defeated.
China would need to shift military assets to its eastern coast and undertake other visible preparations for an invasion, which Taiwan and the United States would likely be able to detect.
Well, China can gear up for one of the invasion windows. Does Taiwan
gear up every window just in case. Does America? How about other
potential allies of Taiwan? The cost of just-in-case readiness every
window will exhaust those countries while China waits for them to get
dulled reactions to Chinese activities.
Some questions remains about whether China has the naval vessels it would need to invade Taiwan successfully. China’s amphibious fleet is relatively small, and although Beijing will likely turn to civilian ships to sustain and supplement an invading force, those take longer to unload and would be more vulnerable to Taiwanese missiles.
I think the fact that China hasn't built an amphibious fleet means China doesn't think it needs that to invade. And consider that America's large amphibious fleet can't lift anywhere close to a single division.
As for the civilian ships? Some argue that China has too many for their ports to load. And that's a problem! Yeah, lots of assets with spares to lose is a problem?
As the problem of unloading shows, China doesn't need to load them all just to have them clustered around Taiwanese ports waiting to unload.
Even if Chinese troops successfully cross the strait, few deep-water ports and beaches in Taiwan could accommodate a large landing force.
That is a problem. But Chinese special forces infiltrated prior to the war reinforced by troops carried in PLA helicopters, old navy warships, and coast guard ships could make a high-speed dash to secure the ports ahead of the main invasion.
Beijing would also have to assume Taiwan could destroy its major ports at a conflict’s outset to prevent an invader from using them.
But would Taiwan? There will always be ambiguous signals that will argue against preemptively wrecking Taiwan's economy. Heck, why would China blockade Taiwan if overt preparations to invade followed by an announced "exercise" (that really is an exercise and not the first wave) means Taiwan will destroy its own ports and self-isolate?
Taiwan’s west coast has shallow waters extending from most of its beaches, meaning they are not ideal for an invading force.
That is, the authors say, the Chinese invaders will be vulnerable to attack by Taiwanese missiles and artillery.
But that's where a combined arms assault of China's missiles, aircraft, electronic warfare, propaganda and subversion, and special forces come in. Destroying and suppressing the missiles and artillery as well as the command and control, road networks, and ammunition depots will erode the Taiwanese missiles and artillery.
Will it be enough? Don't know. Sometimes you only find the answer during the war. But I do know that saying Taiwan has a plan to use missiles and artillery ignores the reality that China has a plan to nullify them.
Taiwan’s east coast is lined by cliffs that are too steep for an invading force to scale. Moving to Taiwan’s major population centers is only possible via a few narrow passes and tunnels, which Taiwan can destroy or defend.
So what? East coast landings only have to take or destroy the ports to deny Taiwan access to resupply or reinforcements. And bonus if China sets of air defense systems on the east coast.
A Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan would likely have to dwarf D-Day in scale.
Why? Taiwan's active military is small and poorly motivated. My worries haven't eased with time. And in addition to weaknesses in the active forces, its reserves are a joke.
Taiwan has also invested in defenses, from mines to anti-landing spikes, and mobile missile launchers.
Sure. But Taiwan has to deploy the mines. Just like wrecking the ports to defeat a Chinese invasion, deciding to close off Taiwan's coast with mines is a big decision that won't be taken likely lest "peace" be disrupted. You think nobody--especially in America--will argue such moves "provoke" China? Anti-landing spikes work on beaches, and as I've long said, I don't think we'll see D-Day 2.0.
Even if China’s military successfully established a beachhead on Taiwan, it would struggle to navigate the mountainous terrain to secure the island.
The Taiwanese could mount a guerrilla campaign in the mountains, they add.
Seriously? Why would China pursue Taiwanese resistance into the mountains rather than secure the cities where most people and all the economic activity are? Letting the die-hards starve in the mountains will be the solution to that.
Taiwan’s military, by contrast, has the advantage of knowing the land and terrain and how to defend it.
Well, great. That's a single advantage. It may not be enough if the Taiwanese lack numbers, supplies, the will to fight on in adversity against a gargantuan enemy ashore, and American help.
China would need to capture the capital, Taipei, the article says:
However, gaining control of Taipei to establish full control over Taiwan would be enormously difficult. Few routes lead into the city, which sits in a bowl, ringed by mountains that defenders can utilize to target an invading force.
To prevent China’s military from seizing the capital, Taiwan can choose to destroy the city’s major port and the tunnels and highways leading into the city.
I do believe that China's primary effort will be to take the capital. And the map shows the direct assaults from the sea that I predict. And again, what if the Chinese move toward Taipei and the Taiwanese blow the ports and tunnels. Taipei is now self-isolated and starving. And Taiwanese units in Taipei are now trapped inside, unable to move out to eject the Chinese invaders. Freeing China to consolidate bridgeheads and build up for future operations.
That's a problem for defining what a Chinese victory in an invasion is, as I addressed in Military Review. Failure to drive the Chinese invaders into the sea is a Chinese victory.
Even if China’s military entered Taipei, it would have to consider conducting urban warfare.
So? China won't try to win hearts and minds with a careful campaign. They'll blast their way through the cities like Russia did in Chechnya and Ukraine; and as the American-backed Iraqis did in Mosul. Rubble doesn't cause trouble. China will have the island and to Hell with the people and infrastructure. The former can be replaced with loyal subjects and latter rebuilt.
And here we get to the bottom line:
Taiwan has inherent advantages that will make an invasion difficult, expensive, and uncertain. Still, the Taiwanese people’s will to fight and resist will likely prove more decisive than mountains, ports, roads, or the ocean. If China conducts the operation with little opposition, it can probably navigate and overcome those obstacles. However, if confronted with millions of people determined to repel an invasion, China will face a much tougher task.
One, it is a big job to cross the Taiwan Strait and conduct an opposed landing. The struggle is real, as the kids say.
But China will have counter-measures to defeat or erode those obstacles. That's what joint operations are supposed to do in a rock-paper-scissors game for high stakes.
And as I noted in that Military Review article, the idea that a Chinese failure to capture Taipei in the first campaign means China loses the war is nonsense. Just holding a bridgehead means there will be a second campaign, just as 2022 followed 2014 for Ukraine. And Taiwan lacks Ukraine's depth to survive such an onslaught--this time with no amphibious landing required.
Again, I'm not saying Taiwan backed by powerful allies can't thwart China's invasion and leave it burning and bleeding in the waters off of Taiwan. China's plans won't survive contact with the enemy. I'm just saying Taiwan's victory isn't inevitable. Even Taiwan's plans won't survive contact with the PLA enemy.
Have a super sparkly China-can't-possibly-defeat-Taiwan-and-Ukraine-has-sobered-China day.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
