Ukraine's means to defeat Russia are depleted. If America doesn't reopen the spigot, Ukrainians will lose hope and lose faster than we calculate. Doesn't anybody remember how we predicted it could take the Taliban two years to win after we retreated from Afghanistan? And then they won as we were still trying to get out of their way? When we decide we won't help an ally win, our common enemy gets the invaluable safety net of knowing that they don't have to worry about losing the war.
The war goes on. And with Ukraine conserving ammunition until resupply from America can resume, Russia is preparing a limited winter offensive:
Russian forces appear to have conditions conducive to intensifying operations in the Kupyansk direction (Kharkiv-Luhansk oblast area) with the intent of making territorial gains in areas that are more operationally significant than other areas that Russian forces are currently attempting to seize. Ukrainian officials have stated that Russian forces aim to capture Kupyansk and Borova (35km west of Svatove) during winter 2024. ...
Russian forces appear to have gradually reconstituted units badly degraded during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in September 2022 and Russia’s failed winter-spring 2023 offensive, and the Russian command likely intends these relatively well-rested and reconstituted units to intensify localized offensive operations that Russian forces started in the area in October 2023.The Russian forces aren't great. But they are reinforced and appear "less degraded than Russian groupings responsible for offensive efforts elsewhere in eastern Ukraine." And they are very close to Russian supply sources inside Russia, which remains a sanctuary largely immune to Ukrainian attacks.
The American need to defeat Russia in Ukraine is so obvious that I simply don't understand conservative opposition to arming and helping Ukraine.* And there are more extreme positions that absolve Russia of blame!
And we see a new argument gaining ground, that giving up is pragmatic realism:
The New York Times (NYT) published an oped by a member of its editorial board calling for Ukraine to engage in negotiations with and cede territory to Russia after reports emerged that Russian President Vladimir Putin is using backchannels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire. The oped largely ignores near-constant Kremlin public signaling of Russia’s continued maximalist goals in Ukraine. The oped argues that Ukraine should not “pass up” this opportunity to possibly achieve a ceasefire despite the fact that there are multiple reasons to believe that Putin’s pro-ceasefire signaling may not be sincere, such as Putin’s demonstrated untrustworthiness and the possibility that he may intend to use time spent on prolonged negotiations to his political and military benefit.
I enlisted during the Cold War. Perhaps keeping the Russians from dominating Europe is in my bones at this point given that my first real awareness of the danger took place when I was ten years old, as I looked at the McGovern presidential run. The American objective is straightforward. It is a bonus that Ukraine wants to fight Russia and is capable of doing that. Why would we throw away such an asset?
And at this point it's a war of inputs. I don't know what changes the territorial stalemate--but let's hope the change isn't American abandonment of Ukraine. Which practically speaking falls under my "flip an ally" category of changes.
Ukraine could win the war despite the population imbalance if the West supplies the materiel and other resources needed as inputs. With Western backing, the economic balance favors Ukraine.
And population doesn't guarantee victory as I argued in that inputs link. Did America defeat the Taliban with superior population? How about defeating Vietnam? And in the other direction, China basically lost the Korean War despite its much larger population compared to America. And Britain did not crush America with overwhelming numbers in our Revolution. Population superiority is an advantage. But not a silver bullet.
But what are the casualties? Russia announced a paper expansion of their military. But war losses and inadequate manpower mobilization mean the military is actually smaller. Is this actually true? Because I don't see other sources claiming this:
Russian dead, missing and wounded too severely for further service are at least six times those of Ukraine’s, while the Russian population only outnumbers Ukraine’s by 3.5 to one. If this is a war of demographic attrition, Russia is losing.
Although I don't think Russia needs to lose troops in proportion to their size advantage to lose the war, Strategy Page describes a Russian ground force component hollowing out and edging toward collapse. That is something I've expected but has not happened. But Ukraine hasn't been able to hit Russians in their fortifications hard enough to push the Russians over the edge.
Ukraine failed to hit Russia hard enough at the end of 2022--except locally--after Russia's army was shattered. And failed with Western weapons in summer 2023. Can
Ukraine manage to do that this year? Or the next year if the West arms Ukraine to do that? Will Russia's army be stronger or weaker than now or 2022?
Don't think Russia will be grateful we only hurt them. Heck, don't think they'd be grateful if we save them. And FFS, don't think we can calibrate a Ukrainian defensive victory that doesn't hurt Russia too much. That just lets Russia know it can go all out trying to win without the risk of losing.
Let's defeat Russia. Our future will be much better if we help Ukraine achieve that. If we fail to help Ukraine enough, don't assume war weary Ukrainians who believe they've been abandoned by the West will fight hard to buy us time to prepare for Russia's next invasion through conquered Ukraine.
UPDATE (Thursday): Digging in:
New defensive lines visited by Reuters near the northeastern city of Kupiansk on Dec. 28 show how Ukraine has stepped up construction of fortifications in recent months as it shifts its military operations against Russia to a more defensive footing.
Fortifications let fewer defenders hold the line. Which allows Ukraine to build a mobile reserve for counter-attacks to restore the line or their own offensives.
UPDATE (Friday): Russian recruiting and less Ukrainian activity allows this:
ISW previously observed routine Russian struggles to conduct operational level rotations from the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 through Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive.[5] The apparent Russian ability to generate forces at a rate equal to Russian losses likely provides Russian forces the ability to replenish units that the Russian command has withdrawn from the line due to degradation and later return these replenished units to the front.[6] Russian forces maintain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine, and the absence of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations likely removes pressure on operational deployments that had previously partially restrained the Russians‘ ability to conduct rotations.This reduces the chance of Russian units to crack and break in combat. Except on the Kherson front. Still, the units rotated out of the front are getting an influx of poorly trained cannon fodder only, limiting what they can achieve in battle.
Lack of American military aid no doubt contributes to Ukraine's lack of activity.
UPDATE (Sunday): Is this development because the Russian airborne forces are degraded and little more than better-than-average-ground units no longer able to conduct airmobile operations?
Russian forces may be forming air assault brigades within combined arms ground formations as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms.
Or are these just cannon fodder units with fancier names?
UPDATE (Sunday): Don't get your hopes up over reports of divisions in the Kremlin:
In-fighting and factional dynamics within the Kremlin are not new phenomena and do not indicate the imminent collapse of Putin’s regime, particularly because power verticals are the foundation of Putin's regime.
It is easy to conclude that seeing something that normally goes unnoticed is actually significant. Whether or not Putin is vulnerable to elite unrest is separate from these reports of elites maneuvering under the rules Putin set.
*Mind you, most Republican lawmakers are holding up funding for Ukraine (and Israel) in order to get the administration to carry out its basic duty of controlling our southern border so immigration is done according to our standards and laws. Why this standoff isn't framed as Biden holding Ukraine and Israel hostage to bizarrely keep our borders open is beyond me.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
