Friday, June 30, 2023

Terrorstan Reborn

Jihadis in Afghanistan are working hard to create Golden Age 2.0. Because while God may be great. Slaughtering infidels is so much more satisfying.

A UN team monitoring Afghanistan issued a report that "lays out in detail the growing transnational terrorist threats that have evolved in Afghanistan since the Taliban took over almost two years ago." In particular: 

There are an estimated 21 different terrorist groups operating freely in Afghanistan. Some have global ambitions, while some are more regionally focused. The vast majority of these terrorist groups enjoy the hospitality and protection of the Taliban. The two most dangerous groups in Afghanistan that have grown in size since the Taliban’s takeover are Al-Qaeda and Daesh.

Even though Al-Qaeda was specifically mentioned by name in the Taliban’s agreement with the Trump administration, no meaningful action has been taken by the Taliban to stop the group from operating in Afghanistan. In fact, the exact opposite is happening. Senior members of Al-Qaeda, who had not set foot in Afghanistan for almost two decades, are now roaming the land freely.

Al-Qaeda’s reestablished presence in Afghanistan was best highlighted when its leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, was killed in a US drone strike in Kabul last summer. According to the latest UN report, Al-Qaeda “maintains a low profile, focusing on using the country as an ideological and logistical hub to mobilize and recruit new fighters while covertly rebuilding its external operations capability.” It also states that “the relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda remained close and symbiotic, with Al-Qaeda viewing Taliban-administered Afghanistan a safe haven.”

Huh. Who knew? 

Anyone who wanted to know, knew there was no chance of a more nuanced Taliban 2.0. Now the Taliban and their jihadi friends work for Golden Age 2.0.

But no worries, you say. Pakistan engineered the Taliban victory and will keep them in line. Oh:

On May 9, a months-long political crisis in Pakistan culminated in a direct challenge to the stability of the state following the arrest of the former Prime Minister Imran Khan. In the immediate aftermath, as supporters of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) took to the streets of several major cities across the country, the military and state apparatus struggled to gain control of the situation. Security forces deployed across the Pakistani heartland resorted to a violent crackdown against protesters, and the resulting breakdown in law and order created the sort of volatile environment in which terrorist networks and economies are generally known to thrive. This gave rise to security concerns regarding Islamist terror outfits active within Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan.

We effed up in Afghanistan and snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. But who cares? Biden may get his decent interval before those groups with "global ambitions" get organized.

We had a post-Cold War period to help the normals in the Islamic world win the civil war over who defines Islam. But now we have great powers to worry about again and that will hobble our efforts.

If we have time to spare from worrying about Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

Have a super sparkly day.

UPDATE: The State Department actually admitted we screwed the pooch during our Afghanistan skedaddle debacle. Agreeing that we snatched defeat from the jaws of victory is fairly astounding. 

What is not astounding is that the president still thinks he was brilliant. FFS. He has no idea what is going on. Tip to Instapundit.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 continues here.

Thursday, June 29, 2023

Resistance Theater Over Ukraine?

Ukraine's survival in the face of Russia's invasion is because Biden lost the Afghanistan campaign. 

Seriously. While America's defeat in Afghanistan may have taught Putin that America will retreat with hardly any pressure, Biden learned that he couldn't lose another country on his watch.

I warned about this

The image of the sudden and shocking collapse of our ally Afghanistan, which ends our ability to fight jihadis in that part of the world, will no doubt convince enemies that they too can jump on the desiccated corpse of our resolve to achieve their objectives. And worry allies that they can't count on our support. ...

[In] an effort to repair America's reputation left in tatters by this debacle, America will react on a hair trigger to a threat and react strongly against a potential enemy threatening us, an ally, or a friend.

Well, when Putin invaded Ukraine, Biden knew he had to at least look like he was showing resolve to prevent the loss. Sending a few billion dollars of Stingers and Javelins to a country our military said would fold within days must have seemed like a good investment in Biden's image, eh? 

Biden could say he tried. But like our Afghan friends, the Ukrainians could not stop the bad guys despite the weapons we sent. 

#TooBadForUkraineButBidenStrong. 

Biden then got stuck between Ukraine's successful resistance and his own party's sudden and enthusiastic anti-Russian fervor. Welcome to the party, pal

At this point I worry that Biden knows he made the good effort and now can escape his commitment with the support of some Republican isolationists and some Democratic pacifists. Especially if he can blame giving up on Republicans alone.

Let's win this one. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 continues here.

Wednesday, June 28, 2023

Moscow's Nuclear Roulette and Potemkin Strategic Theater

On paper there are a lot of nuclear weapons out there. Is Russia willing to risk their nukes actually work?

There are still a lot of nukes out there:

In 2022, Russia deployed an additional 86 nuclear warheads, bringing its total to 1,674. The U.S. added 26 – a reversal of its longstanding downward trend – giving it a total of 1,770 deployed warheads. However, China is trying to catch up. Its nuclear arsenal grew to 410 from 350 last year, and according to SIPRI, it may catch up with the Russians and Americans by the end of the decade.

But much fewer than in the past, and Russia and America are committed to avoiding nuclear confrontation--notwithstanding Russia's frequent bluster that relies on beating their nuclear chest and flinging nuclear poo--Friedman says. Since America and Russia have 90% of the warheads, that's good. 

Putin has been beating his chest and waving the poo around a little more emphatically these days, warning NATO it is risking war with Russia. And:

Putin also suggested Russia’s large number of nuclear weapons would "guarantee" its security – noting that Russia had more such weapons than NATO countries.

Further, Russia says those few, small nukes can do a lot:

President Vladimir Putin said on Friday that his deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, something he confirmed for the first time had already happened, was a reminder to the West that it could not inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.

Given Russia's nuclear boasts, a small number of tactical nukes in Belarus are pointless, no? Isn't preventing strategic defeat what strategic nukes are for? 

The U.S. isn't exactly publicly sweating over  the Belarus ploy:

Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Friday said the Biden administration is closely monitoring Russia’s claims that it’s stored a tactical nuclear weapon in Belarus, but Washington has “no reason to adjust” its own nuclear posture.

Keep in mind that Russia has a history of outrageous nuclear bluff. So I ask again, do any of Russia's nukes work?

Some surely do. They're too important for Russian security for that not to be true. Does Russia know which are the good ones? Do we? Perhaps the only nuclear weapons Russia trusts are the simpler tactical nuclear weapons. But it's a risk for Russia to put some of its few working nukes outside of Russia, no?

Sometimes I think Russia really is afraid of our thin missile defense system but doesn't dare admit why. And America doesn't call Russia's nuclear bluff because we'd rather not rub Russia's nose in this and because we want China to believe Russia has plenty of nukes to protect its Far East.

As for Belarus, what are they thinking? Having nukes makes Belarus a target for Western nukes in a nuclear clash. I have to wonder if Lukashenko knows the nukes in Belarus don't work so aren't a risk. Which actually makes sense given that I wonder why Russia would risk giving Belarus a small nuclear deterrent force that tempts Belarus to break free of the Anschluss

But who knows? Maybe Putin's nuclear theater is directed at his own people. If Russia is compelled to retreat from Ukraine because he doesn't really want a long war, could Putin argue that the damage inflicted on NATO and it's Ukraine proxy allows Russia to declare "mission accomplished" and return home the real victors of the war:

If Putin can't afford to end the war against Ukraine without victory, he can simply claim victory by saying Russia's glorious military under Putin's leadership made Ukraine a desert by battering Ukraine into perpetual weakness and emptied NATO's armories of weapons and ammunition.

The fact that NATO doesn't invade Russia after Russian troops pull out of Ukrainian territory will be cited as proof of success. Never mind that NATO has no desire to do that.

Add in a display in Belarus of Russia's mighty nuclear arsenal and the argument is complete.

It's not like I don't worry about Russian nukes. The risks of even a dozen striking American cities is surely a deterrent to strategic defeat of Russia that threatens Russia's territorial integrity. So America isn't going to exploit a potential Russian defeat in Ukraine by organizing and supporting a drive on Moscow. Even if America wanted to--which we don't because we'd rather not have Russia fall victim to China by losing control of important territory, and strengthening China--we could not because of the nukes. Even if almost all don't work.

Anyway, enjoy your nuclear theater. I don't think Russia would readily risk exposing its nukes as inert mass-times-acceleration kinetic weapons because they won't risk their territorial integrity with at best a nuclear roulette threat. And at worst, a complete bluff.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 continues here.

Tuesday, June 27, 2023

Can China Win an Invasion of Taiwan Before America Intervenes?

China would like to defeat Taiwan before America can intervene. I've long thought that was true. But is the time it would take America to decide to intervene really the primary brake on American action? And how quickly can China win? Also, define "win".


I've long believed that China does not need to defeat America in order to defeat Taiwan. China only needs to delay American intervention:

As I've droned on repeatedly here, China does not need to defeat America to conquer Taiwan. China needs to defeat Taiwan to conquer Taiwan. And to defeat Taiwan, China only needs to delay our intervention long enough to defeat and conquer Taiwan. This is a far less difficult mission than deterring America or defeating us.
That was an assumption of my invasion scenario.

How much time does China have to win before America intervenes?

This analysis of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is interesting when considering the chance of success for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before America can even intervene. It starts with the assumption--probably correct--that a Bolt from the Blue invasion would be impossible:

This campaign analysis seeks to determine how long U.S. decision-makers can realistically have those debates before the PLA seizes Taipei and the window for effective intervention with military force has closed. ...

For the analysis that follows, the U.S. and Taiwan modify their assessments from “invasion possible” to “invasion likely” one month prior to the cross-strait assault. This is a generous assumption for China, as during the Russian invasion of Ukraine the U.S. had reliable intelligence of a coming invasion nearly five months before its start.6 In this PLA-best-case scenario, a combination of PRC operational security, messaging, misinformation, and military deception enables this surprise.

So we have advanced notice. But intervening quickly will be difficult:

the Biden Administration would lack the explicit standing legal authorities to intervene that exist with congressionally ratified treaty allies outside the limited War Powers Act. As indications and warnings (I&W) of a possible cross-strait assault emerged, and as the invasion began, a robust and likely time-consuming interagency debate would occur within the White House, Pentagon, and on Capitol Hill.

Also, what is China trying to achieve?

The desired endstate for the PLA is the complete seizure of Taipei and the inability for Taiwanese forces south of the city to counterattack and liberate the capital. The desired endstate for the PRC is dislocation, dissolution, or capitulation of the Republic of China (ROC) government and successful (re)unification of the island with the mainland before U.S. intervention can occur.

Under the analysis, China wins in a couple months:

While combat operations may continue on the island, the above modeling shows the practical window for U.S. intervention in a Taiwan invasion prior to the seizure of Taipei and the displacement, dissolution, or capitulation of the ROC government effectively closes 31 days after the initial landings. In the scenario, this is 46 days after the start of the JFSO and 76 days after the “invasion likely” assessment[.]

The invasion scenario is interesting. And aiming right for Taipei has long been my assumption about the invasion. But the simulation is suspect because it does not understand the 3:1 rule (quoting the linked author in the post):

While the conventional wisdom that the attacker requires a 3:1 superiority to succeed, the Soviet/Russian Correlation of Forces Methodology is more sophisticated and recognizes that as long as a commander can do economy of force operations in some sectors to enable concentration in others sufficient to overcome the defender, even an overall inferiority of combat power can be made to work. In this case, a 1:1 will serve the purpose.

Running a simulation on the assumption that China needs superiority all across the entire front underestimates how quickly China could pierce the defensive line on a narrow front and bypass other defenders.

I once assumed it would take a lot of time to intervene. But after looking at American reaction to three surprise attacks after World War II when I wrote about a potential role for the American Army (in Military Review), I think America would intervene quickly:

On three occasions when an enemy struck suddenly—in South Korea in 1950, in Kuwait in 1990, and after the 11 September 2001 al-Qaida terror attacks on the U.S. homeland—America’s decisions to react were rapid. In 1950, President Harry Truman ordered American air and naval action just two days after North Korea invaded.30 In 1990, President George H. W. Bush ordered American forces to Saudi Arabia less than a week after Iraq invaded Kuwait.31 And the U.S. Congress authorized military force a week after the terror attacks.32 China is a potential threat far larger than any of the enemies in those three examples, so the American debate could be longer, but China cannot count on a lengthy delay from America’s domestic politics.

There is no way China has 46 days from the start of initial shaping operations to win before America intervenes. When you consider that under a worst case scenario that early indications and warnings would be 30 days before China begins operations, the American debate can start ahead of time.

In addition, the United States won't need to make a decision to fight China to begin moving troops toward and even into Taiwan:

Washington is preparing evacuation plans for US citizens living in Taiwan as Sino-American tensions boil over, according to multiple sources.

The need to evacuate Americans from Taiwan, America has an excuse to alert regional forces and send additional forces toward Taiwan well before a formal decision to fight China over Taiwan is made.

Honestly, that's brilliant if the main purpose is to get American forces into position to intervener and make China watch the American military gear up or look like brutes for attacking a humanitarian mission. 

But there's more. Speedy American intervention isn't the end of potential delays. Even after America decides to intervene, there is a source of delay (quoting an older post):

The Chinese aircraft carrier would have a role in slowing down our intervention, too. China's first carrier was for studying and training. China's true carriers will be Chinese designed vessels. Those China probably wouldn't risk. But the old Varyag? If I was in charge of the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy), I'd dangle that carrier and some escorts northeast of Taiwan. As I noted, its presence would give us pause. And force us to approach more cautiously.

The final contribution of that first Chinese carrier to delaying our intervention could be to tempt us into taking the time to set up and execute the perfect naval strike mission. Sure, having sovereign pieces of US territory that serve as power projection assets is useful. And the Navy trumpets that mission in budget battles. But the Navy--deep down--wants to exercise sea control and take down another navy that tries to wrest it from us. It would be the best SINKEX, ever.

It gets complicated, no?

But even before considering the complications, the foundation for judging how long China has to defeat Taiwan is flawed. I don't think China has to capture Taipei before America intervenes in order to win. Also from my article:

China does not need to destroy the Taiwanese military, occupy all of Taiwan, or even capture Taipei to win the war. If China can move sufficient army groups onto Taiwan and maintain a reasonable line of supply, it can suspend the war at any time. Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept’s (ODC) core premise is that Taiwanese asymmetric warfare capabilities will target Chinese weaknesses most efficiently “while surviving long enough for third-party intervention.”36 Much of the world—perhaps America especially—would be relieved to have a cease-fire before American and Chinese forces are openly shooting at each other. China would use that cease-fire to strengthen its position on Taiwan and prepare for a second phase of the invasion: the breakout and final conquest of Taiwan.

America will intervene quickly. China doesn't have a lot of time to capture Taipei. But China doesn't need to capture Taipei to set the stage for a future total victory if it gets a ceasefire that accepts Chinese troops remaining on Taiwan.

Will America help Taiwan drive the PLA invaders into the sea? With U.S. Army armored units, if necessary? Or will we fool ourselves that our rapid response compelled China to stop fighting, representing an American victory and a Chinese defeat?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 continues here.

Monday, June 26, 2023

The Winter War of 2022 Becomes Win-Win for NATO

When Russia invaded Ukraine, my view was that unless Russia drove into western Ukraine to put its forces on NATO's border in the center and south, NATO direct intervention was not necessary. The war's costs to Russia's military, economy, and reputation has reduced that reason for NATO to intervene even if Russia eventually achieves that kind of geographic gain.

I'd rather keep Russia as far east as possible to protect America. So I want Ukraine to defeat Russia and eject Russian forces from Ukraine. But NATO might be able to live with the situation even if Ukraine can't inflict a major defeat on the Russians. Honestly, even if Russia somehow finally conquers Ukraine the damage done to Russia will have bought time for NATO to build up its defenses to block that threat at NATO's new front line.

I think the odds of a bigger Ukrainian battlefield victory are better than the odds of Russia winning big. But Ukraine probably won't achieve a Napoleonic-scale war-winning battle. We shall see if a Ukrainian battlefield victory achieves enough to tilt the military balance inside Ukraine sufficiently for Ukraine to maintain the strategic initiative to conduct subsequent attacks to further defeat and weaken the Russians until a decisive result is achieved.

Still, Russia's poor military on offense has managed to take a large chunk of Ukrainian territory, remember. Which represents a win--if an expensive one--that would not have happened if Russia hadn't pushed their offensive.

Ukraine could win this war. But Ukraine could lose, too. If Ukraine loses this counteroffensive--or achieves a small win at too high a cost--that's when things get dicey for Ukraine. The West may not want to gear up to logistically sustain Ukraine. The West would still support Ukraine to keep Russia from easily taking all of Ukraine--and by pushing for a ceasefire in place. But Ukraine essentially loses this war under those conditions if the West decides that bleeding Russia to buy time is good enough.

NATO gets time to rebuild its military forces because it will take time for Russia to rebuild its depleted military (via Instapundit):

Just 14 months into Russia’s war on Ukraine, Moscow’s military has become so degraded that it could take up to 10 years for its forces to recover, US intelligence officials told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday.

It could be as few as five years. But that is about replacing equipment. Training leadership to replace casualties will take much longer. And have no doubt Russia's military is mangled. This take is incredibly generous to Russia:

A new Russian military is emerging from the devastated battlefields of Ukraine. On NATO's eastern flank, alliance militaries are now preparing to face a Russian Army that is mangled but more experienced, less sophisticated but more brutal, and mauled but still well-stocked.

The new Russian military is one with untrained replacement troops--not veterans. An army of depleted and substandard leadership. Perhaps some survivors have learned. But how much influence will they have? And the ground forces have seen their best weapons destroyed or captured; and huge stockpiles of ammunition depleted.

The Russian air force is less damaged but can it get much better? It hasn't so far. Perhaps we'll see signs of improvement during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. In which case I'll reconsider my view.

And the Russian navy is almost undamaged? So what? It's a shadow of its former Soviet self. And it will be last on the priority list for money to strategic nuclear forces, the ground forces, and the air force. It is useful only as long as Russia produces land attack missiles to refill their magazines.

Another factor for NATO collecting a win now is that the Wagner-instigated unrest in Russia may also make Russian leaders gun shy about starting a new major war for a while. This also buys time for NATO to prepare.

And the unrest in Russia may increase the NATO pucker factor about civil war in Russia with all those nukes scattered around.

Still, much of the article focuses on a potentially inadequate NATO defensive posture. If NATO doesn't take advantage of the time Ukraine has given NATO to rebuild its military and defense industries, even a mauled but restocked Russian military could advance west. But that's a NATO issue and not a phoenix Russian military rising from the ashes of Ukraine issue.

There is more risk in the long run to NATO if NATO lets Russia push west in Ukraine. But given the time it will take Russia to repair the damage--if Russia can (the post-Goons of August War in 2008 reforms were supposed to have created the magnificent army of February 23, 2022)--it is not an immediate crisis that a rapid and inexpensive Russian conquest of Ukraine last year would have posed. Russia failed to break NATO as a major result of invading Ukraine. Instead, Russia strengthened NATO and gave NATO a warning of its logistics shortcomings.

Of course, Ukraine can win or lose depending on how NATO judges the Russian threat. Will NATO cash in its chips and tell Ukraine to accept as good a deal as it can get with diplomacy where the armies stand now?

But for now, Ukraine has its own outcome in its hands with the strategic initiative seemingly falling to Ukraine should the counteroffensive(s) succeed. The effects of the Wagner insurrection might help Ukraine achieve a victory. Especially if Prigozhin is a symptom of Russia's internal divisions rather than the main actor causing divisions.

Seriously, Putin already knows "they" are out to get him. How extensive--and accurate--will the post-Prigozhin purges be?

UPDATE (Tuesday): Interesting:

Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivsky Bridge in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of June 26.

Is this just a distraction to keep the Russians from shifting forces from the Kherson front? Could the Ukrainians set up a small base to conduct raids to push Russian troops away from the bridgehead? 

Or is Ukraine prepared to attempt to build pontoon bridges and defend them from aerial attacks to make a big effort? The last option is risky unless Ukraine breaks through further east and causes some chaos. 

Still, it would be interesting if the Kherson front lights up and we see the remnants of the Ukrainian navy do something along with air mobile forces.

UPDATE (Wednesday): The purges appear to have commenced in Russia. Will Putin go too far and hurt the military more? Or will Putin get lucky and actually find a competent general to run the war?

UPDATE (Friday): Ukraine maintains a small company worth of troops on the east bank of the Dnieper River on the Kherson front. Some Russians are going nuts over the failure of the Russian army to crush it.

It certainly looks like Ukraine set up an artillery ambush hoping the Russians charge in to eliminate the bridgehead. That has taken place to some degree already.

NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

Sunday, June 25, 2023

Weekend Data Dump

Huh: " I was surprised to learn that the Marine Corps claimed to have validated its Force Design (FD) 2030 concept based on a few war games and became alarmed about the fact that the current commandant of the Marine Corps has undertaken a radical restructuring of the service having used the games to justify his actions." Tip to Instapundit. I have concerns. Although perhaps the Marine war games are secret because the small  Marine anti-ship detachments are really designed to be inserted to operate on Taiwan. But I'm speculating.

It's science, damn it! "New research reveals that Uranus takes a pounding more frequently than previously thought." Via Instapundit.

I noticed a video on YouTube that argued the Middle East is doomed to forever wars because of the borders drawn by former European colonial powers. This is a common accusation. One, I'm annoyed America often gets blamed though we had nothing to do with that. Two, you're telling me that in the more than 60 years these countries have all been independent that none of them wants to negotiate with neighbors to put their borders "where they're supposed to be"? Sounds like a convenient excuse for everyone in the region to demand more land, eh?

Is this what our farcical media is going with? "Biden’s quirky aphorisms are sometimes weaponized by Republicans to insinuate the 80-year-old president is in mental decline. But Biden has been using unique phrases for years — but even some of his aides aren’t exactly sure what he means by them." Republicans pounce. Okay.


An interesting article about how Russia is improving its tactics. But the article then walks back the opening framing quite a bit. Russia is better in some ways and worse in others. 

Mali wants the UN peacekeeping force out of Mali. The government kicked the French out and now will rely on Wagner. Which doesn't care about corruption--quite the reverse. How soon will migrants be flowing through Mali and Libya to flood Europe? Corrupt Mali officials will get rich. Wagner will funnel money and arms to Russia, and encourage migrants to punish Europe for supporting Ukraine. Remember, while AFRICOM is an economy-of-force front (its motto is "Thank God for SOUTHCOM!"), it is still a front that needs forces to block our enemies and foes. About those enemies.

The British think both sides in the Winter War of 2022 are suffering high casualties. But: "Russian losses are probably at their highest level since the peak of the battle for Bakhmut in March, U.K. military officials said in their regular assessment." Based on news reporting, you'd think only the Ukrainians were getting hammered as Russia largely holds the line.

Retired Army General Jack Keane opposes a new Iran nuclear deal: "To give them another windfall of cash like we did as a result of the 2015 nuclear deal, which led to an expansion of their proxy wars in the Middle East, it doesn’t make any sense. It’s not in our national interest[.]" Our government lied to us or to itself when it denied Iran would stoke more mayhem with more cash from the first deal.

I wondered if Russia's fortifications would be well sited, built, and defended. Well, this report says they are "formidable." And so far against what appears to be limited Ukrainian attacks, are being defended. If all this remains true, Ukraine may have erred in giving Russia time to prepare. Only "may" because unless Ukraine could have attacked earlier with a greater advantage than they have now, Ukraine had to give Russia time because Ukraine needed time more.

Thank God elections have become impossible to rig since then! Tip to Instapundit.

An Iran nuclear deal 2.0 that rewards Iran for pretending it isn't pursuing nuclear weapons won't turn Iran into a responsible regional power. Goodness lessons just won't work on the mullahs. No matter how much Democrats oddly love them.


 

Sure, June 19th, 1865 ("Juneteenth") is not the technical end of slavery in America because Union states with slaves had yet to free their slaves. But practically speaking, with a bloody war to end slavery completed, ending slavery in the last Confederate state was the symbolic and effective end of slavery in America. States with slavery that joined the Union were not going to hang on to their slaves when the armies defending slavery were defeated and gone home. Juneteenth is a fine holiday to mark this accomplishment. Especially when you consider mostly African-American Union troops marching in to inform African-origin slaves that they too were free citizens contrasted with dry state procedural actions.

If the Russian people are becoming passive in the face of Putin's decision to keep feeding their men into the meat grinder of Russian tactics in the Winter War of 2022, what makes you think those same people will rise up in regional independence movements? I mean, perhaps the latter will happen--which is too dangerous to want--but I don't think the passivity for the former is necessarily its cause. Tip to Instapundit.

My old assessment of Russia's failure to drive on Tbilisi in the 2008 Goons of August War sure telegraphed Russia's reaction to failure in the current Winter War of 2022: "The Russians may not have had enough troops to just press on in a frontal assault after their initial losses."

China wants to stabilize relations with America. China must be hurting economically. What can Russia possibly offer compared to America and the West?

Huh: "A United Nations expert said on Monday that the Taliban's treatment of Afghan women and girls could amount to gender apartheid as their rights continue to be gravely infringed by the country's de facto authorities." So no Taliban 2.0?  

I'm really not worried that Chinese special forces will infiltrate America and arm commercial drones to harass us by bombing targets. Matches and gasoline would be more effective. But I am worried that the continental United States is no longer a sanctuary for power projection.

Taiwan's defense dilemma. I'm not overly impressed with the Porcupine Strategy. Luckily Ukraine didn't go that way. I think Taiwan's biggest defense dilemma is defining what a Chinese victory in an invasion means.

It is interesting that land in the Kakhovka Reservoir at the east end is emerging as the water drains through the breached Kahkhovka dam. Check out the map of the Zaporizhia southern front. Will that eventually open up a dry land western flank around Russian defensive belts?  I mean, no roads. And maybe it remains too marshy for anything but special forces and scouts. But it is interesting. And I suppose I shouldn't assume only Ukraine can exploit that potential avenue.

"Quirky aphorisms" all around us (via Instapundit):



Perhaps I was hasty in thinking China is desperate for good relations with America: "Washington had to bribe Beijing to even get this meeting: It has played down Beijing’s intensifying intelligence-gathering (the Cuba spy base, the spy balloon, China’s 'secret police' stations inside our country) and is delaying the declassifying of intelligence on COVID’s origins." And more concessions. Including throwing Taiwan under the bus a bit. And China expects more. It's all very odd.

It is disgraceful that we can't repair and build ships in the quantity we need (via Instaupndit). Yep. And operating the ones we have seems "problematic", as the kids say these days.

Reports that Russia continues to strip troops from the Kherson front behind the flooded Dnieper River to stop Ukrainian attacks speaks to the lack of Russian troops in Ukraine. Ideally one has reserves behind the front. But even in the face of relatively small Ukrainian troops, Russia's reserves aren't enough? Russia has to move troops laterally across the front? Eventually Ukraine could take advantage of this.

China's worries about their military, economy (including fifty million often shoddily built housing units), political power, and whatever the eff Russia is doing in Ukraine.

The discussion about so many young Chinese males being unfit for military service astounds me. Likewise reports in America. I was no young muscle-bound man when I joined. Yet I was considered fit for recruitment and passed the physical tests with flying colors. How is it possible young men can't do what I did? That's frightening.

Iran bought two old French A340-212 long-range transport jets: "France didn’t discover that the Indonesian firm that bought the two airliners was secretly owned by Iran, as was the company in the central African nation of Mali where the aircraft were supposed to go." Or Iran could fly them to North Korea to pick up nuclear warheads. Or to wherever North Korea managed to sneak them to closer to Iran.

BALTOPS 2023 ended: "The U.S. Navy and its NATO allies and partners wrapped up their annual maritime-focused exercise in the Baltic region Friday."

Nome, Alaska will be America's first deep water port on the Arctic.

Will Putin avoid military defeat by declaring victory based on "demilitarizing" Ukraine with his war, and turning around and going home? At least as far as the pre-February 24 borders? I certainly wondered that myself.

Securing America's domestic munitions production.

Is this what those stories about an American missile sub going to South Korea meant? "Ohio-class guided-missile submarine USS Michigan (SSGN-727) arrived in Busan, South Korea, Friday, the Navy announced." Because I thought it was to be an SSBN. Or did I miss an SSBN port call or forget it? This is pointless. But I thought the nuclear missile-armed SSBN visit would be really stupid.

At least our banana republic rulers feel they need to pretend there is rule in law.
No wonder Democrats want more gun control laws. Or more of any type of law. They know they will only apply to the icky people. Note to Ben Franklin: we're struggling on that "keep it" part.

The U.S. says it could take months to get F-16s to Ukraine. This might speed it up.

If he's serious about air defense, he'll support this through NATO: "French President Emmanuel Macron called on European nations Monday to seek more independence on airspace defense and advocated against relying too much on the U.S." If Macron doesn't want NATO involved, we all know why.

Lieutenant John R. Fox's bravery and patriotism is belatedly recognized with the Medal of Honor. A firm commitment to understanding everyone in the Army is a Green-American soldier would help prevent future injustice.

Survey says ... the Navy Surface Warfare Officer community needs to be whipped into shape. I'm just spitballing here, but maybe focusing on defeating enemy navies would help.

Say, timely news that AFRICOM is still in business: "The United States military wrapped up its largest annual joint exercise in Africa on Friday, one marked by a few firsts for the continent-wide drill[.]"

Hard to argue with this assessment: "Iraq has two major problems, one external and the other internal. Neighboring Iran is ruled by a religious dictatorship that condones aggressive interference in neighboring countries. Iraq has long been the main recipient of this meddling. Iran has long sought more economic and political influence in Iraq. This is made easier by Iraq’s internal problem with corruption. Historically what is now known as Iraq was seen as the most corrupt region in the Middle East, if not the world."

The war to attack and defend GPS signals

Close enough for NATO work: "A pair U.S. Air Force B-1 bombers kicked off a historic deployment this week, touching down in Sweden on June 19."

How is it even possible that the builders can't be trusted to build a reliable davit (crane) for the Coast Guard??!! 

Death to the icky carbon people. Greta can go to Hell. I can say that now because she is technically an adult. Tip to Instapundit.

Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq have been reported in the media: "While the thesis and, in some cases, the headlines are breathless, the alarmism is unwarranted." Fingers crossed. I know there is a lot of Iraqi resistance to Iran. I can't rule out that the media effort is made to make us give up on holding Iraq despite our fragile success: "Iraq is a democracy, albeit an imperfect one. Iraq today likely has more retired prime ministers than any other Arab country. While the system is convoluted, Iraqis enter elections not knowing whom their next leader will be." Or perhaps the reason for alarmism is to make a new Iran nuclear deal built on an Iranian "concession" to refrain from taking over Iraq seem like a good bargain.

I'm in favor of helping Ukraine defeat Russia. But I don't like this precedent: "The Pentagon said Tuesday that it overestimated the value of the weapons it has sent to Ukraine by $6.2 billion over the past two years — about double early estimates — resulting in a surplus that will be used for future security packages." No way that could be used to bypass Congress for any other spending, right? Right??

Europeans still need America to help them defend their continent. Sure. But let's consider consequences of walking away. Let's recall the Twentieth Century when Europeans could wage war all on their own. And now imagine the price of not spending a relative pittance of our defense dollars to hold our Great Wall of Europe?

The extensive discussion of racism similar to the incident without actually mentioning the race of the suspects for the actual incident leads me to assume the accused are not actually white.

The fact that SOUTHCOM gets LCS assigned to it speaks of how low the Navy values the troubled LCS.

Will America restore nuclear cruise missiles to the fleet?

The Government Accountability Office slammed the U.S. missile defense system. This is a problem. The continental United States is no longer a sanctuary for power projection.

More on the AUKUS deal, including the advantage having a shipyard in Australia capable of handling Virginia subs. Our two shipyards for that are on the east coast.

Missile magnets: "In Ukraine, Russian commanders made a lot of mistakes and one of the most fatal, and personal, was not making an effort to conceal their field headquarters. The Ukrainians took advantage of this and during an eight month period in 2022 attacked Russian command posts over twenty times, killing ten generals and 152 colonels and lieutenant-colonels along with hundreds of lower ranking staff officers." What I don't learn is whether the Russians belatedly adapted to this problem. I'm assuming the answer is yes, more or less.

The Air Force will cut Tactical Air Control Party personnel by 44% because it is retiring the A-10. Huh. I thought the Air Force said the F-35 could do the job. Won't forward air controllers still be needed? Like I said, it's always been a matter of trust and not about a specific plane.

Small USVs would have to travel pretty fast to be useful as a "nonlethal" ram, wouldn't they? And why would the Chinese warship commander assume this ram was not equipped with a warhead? Wouldn't that attack on a Chinese warship lead the commander to fire at the USV and any other American warship nearby? I am skeptical.

I know Greta Thunberg's prediction of climate doom by 2023 was not about the immediate end of the world. It was a claim that without immediate action taken by 2023 the world would inevitably be doomed. Which is fine. Since we missed the deadline, would she and her ilk please shut up and go away? Because it apparently is futile to go along with their "green" plans. Let's enjoy our tragically brief time left on this planet.

The Army will revise its prepositioned equipment stockpiles to correct problems made evident drawing equipment to send to Ukraine.

Xi shouldn't get his hopes up over the meeting: "A U.S. Coast Guard ship sailed through the Taiwan Strait a day after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken completed a trip to Beijing during which he met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping[.]"

The Japanese and Europeans took a closer look at Mercury.

Good news and still-bad-but-a-little-better in Philippines security.

The battle for Russian battlefield logistics.

Tip to Instapundit, is China a "dying paper dragon"? I've long been a China skeptic, and I may have underestimated their problems. But if China is going down from demographic and financial disaster, what comes next for China? Again, I'll again suggest the option of "all of the above." But remember that decline may be relative. Japan faltered from its rise to surpass America. But it is still an economic power and a growing military regional power. China may also muddle along. And be dangerous to someone if not directly to America.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine may be stumbling, but Russia's Anschluss with Belarus is on the surface tightening every day.

Aside from restoring democracy, Brexit has benefited Britain. And if Britain chooses, it can achieve even more freed from the for-now, proto-imperial EU. The propaganda of Remainers to bend the knee to Brussels has been amazing to behold.

The House Appropriations Committee added more money for four Coast Guard cutters intended for Pacific operations.

The Marine Corps Commandant is surprised by the "lack of trust" in the Marine Corps over its radical restructuring? Oh? Trust? That's the response from the top rather than addressing criticisms? Doctrine and organization is now a matter of faith? This erodes the trust I have and I grow more and more concerned.

Russia no longer wants to let you know how much war spending is pushing Russia into deficit spending (via Instapundit). I've said for a long time not to assume Russia can outspend or out-die smaller Ukraine. 

Trouble On China's Belt and Road: "Nations in the middle corridor, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucuses, have been reluctant to sign big ticket infrastructure deals with China after watching Beijing saddle countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka with massive amounts of debt that have stymied economic growth and led to bankruptcy."

Welp, stupidity's been MIRVed. Tip to Instapundit.

NORAD: "The U.S. must focus on detecting and tracking potential air and missile threats to the homeland even before they launch[.]"

Global nuclear warhead count. North Korea has 30? What delivery system works? Aircraft? Short-range missiles? I don't think ICBMs are working. As for China, despite earlier reports of massive expansion of their nuclear arsenal, they seem to want ICBMs for conventional fires: "A recent effort to calculate how many nuclear warheads China has concluded that they have not been producing enough plutonium for an expansion of their nuclear warhead inventory[.]"

Sanctuary city sends illegal immigrants seeking sanctuary away. Tip to Instapundit.

And now for something completely different:


Russia has gone from China's friend without limits to China's liability without limits. And now, after the Wagner insurrection, Russia is China's neighbor without limits to internal chaos. Shouldn't Putin be worried about China adjusting its foreign policy toward the Russia China has?

I doubt Ukraine will have an easier time at the front because of the Wagner insurrection. My limited experience in uniform included going into the field for an FTX the morning after the communist coup started in 1991. I knew the coup was starting, but my entire pre-Internet world was focused on getting our signal equipment working. This viewing the world through a straw is common in the military--especially in combat. So unless Russian leadership effs things up behind the lines, I think there is a good chance Russian troops still holding the front are unaffected by the Wagner coup attempt. At least in the short run. Much depends on whether Prigozhin was a symptom of deeper problems in Russia's society rather than the prime actor in the drama.

Will enough North Koreans decide that they have nothing left to lose? "North Korea is getting sick of tyranny and they aren’t afraid to show it to the state police apparatus."

Chutzpah: "Afghanistan's supreme leader said Sunday the country's women were being saved from 'traditional oppressions' by the adoption of Islamic governance and their status as 'free and dignified human beings' restored."


 

Hate: "Over the last three years, the 27 member states of the EU (European Union) have seen an increase in Islamic terrorist activity."

A reminder of what lack of rule of law means for determining who has power: "Clashes, artillery fire and air strikes surged in Sudan's capital on Sunday, witnesses said, as a war between rival military factions that has displaced 2.5 million people and caused a humanitarian crisis entered its 11th week."

ISW thinks the Wagner insurrection will hurt Russian troop morale: "Prigozhin’s rebellion has illustrated that Russian forces lack reserves in many rear areas and almost certainly will degrade the morale of Russian personnel in Ukraine[.]" I've noted that Russia's lateral movement of forces from Kherson to deal with Ukraine's limited counter-attacks indicates a shocking lack of reserves.

Interesting: "Lukashenko will likely seek to use the de-escalation of the armed rebellion to advance his goals, such as delaying the formalization of the Russia-Belarus Union State or preventing Putin from using Belarusian forces in Ukraine."

Note to Democrats: The Wagner Insurrection is what an actual insurrection looks like.

Saturday, June 24, 2023

The War to End All Wars for Ukraine?

Is the Winter War of 2022 doomed to be known as Russo-Ukrainian War I? Or will Russia change its path to join the West rather than bizarrely seeing it as the threat to all that is good and holy in Russia?

World War I shows that wars don't end as soon as we hope and truly ending a war without sowing the seeds of the next war is hard:

Before the Russian invasion, many assumed that wars among major twenty-first-century powers, if they happened at all, would not be like earlier ones. They would be fought using a new generation of advanced technologies, including autonomous weapons systems. They would play out in space and cyberspace; boots on the ground would probably not matter much. Instead, the West has had to come to terms with another state-to-state war on European soil, fought by large armies over many square miles of territory. And that is only one of many ways that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine harks back to the two world wars.
As Russia invaded Ukraine, early on I warned that modern war is not inherently short. Indeed, before even the War on Terror I warned that the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated that assumption is false:

The war as a whole showed us that modern war is not inherently brief. Arab-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani wars since World War II have misled us into thinking this is the norm. Desert Storm has seemingly confirmed this view and America now seeks a small but lethal Army that will strike hard, win fast, and come home. Yet by fighting on for years when most believed the First Gulf War would have to end rapidly, the Iraqis and Iranians have provided us with a much needed lesson that wars do not just end on their own. By simply pausing instead of furiously fighting Lemming-like until all weapons and ammunition are expended, these two states fought for nearly eight years.

As the Winter War of 2022 dragged on it has demonstrated that wars rarely end by Christmas

And most relevant at this point because we now know wars can drag on, victories are often not complete enough to end a threat

Sure, as that author concluded, the West should help Ukraine rebuild. But I say let's not get ahead of ourselves and assume Ukraine wins. First things first. Russia has to lose before we worry about ending Russian resolve to reverse that loss.

To prevent that, the author goes on to argue for bringing Russia in from the cold. But the author's statement that "if Western leaders are determined to treat Russia as a permanent pariah—then the future for both countries will be one of misery, political instability, and revanchism" puts too much responsibility on the West for Russia's actions. 

The major question is whether Russia will continue to be and act like a pariah, self-destructively earning Western worry and hostility. Face it, we can write the future story of how a NATO effort to end Russia's pariah status by ending the war will evolve inside Russia as a stab in the back by NATO that deprived Russia of the victory it had earned--and deserved. You can look at World War I for that lesson, too.

Anyway, do read the article. It is interesting even if I disagree with the confidence that the West has the power to cause or prevent Russia from sinking into misery, political instability, and revanchism.

Or will the Winter War of 2022 be the clue bat that has a good effect on Russia? That is my scenario for ending Russia's long and pointless hostility toward the West.

UPDATE: Russia appears to be getting a beating by the Prigozhin clue bat. Will the Wagner uprising purportedly designed to change Russia's military leadership shake Russian resolve to continue the war?

I suspect Prigozhin will lose this fight. But a battle for loyalty of military and security commanders may be taking place now. Yet it doesn't seem like anybody significant is willing to openly support Prigozhin at this point.

What will that maneuvering behind the scenes result in? What more will Prigozhin try to do to persuade sympathetic leadership to openly side with him? I'm sure nobody wants to support a losing effort and end up executed by Putin's loyalists.

Even a failed coup might be a sufficient beating with the clue bat to pressure Russia to end the war. Although that might take the form of a compromise among Russian factions where Russia disavows a desire to take more land but tries to hold what it took at such a high cost so far.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

Friday, June 23, 2023

Quantity of Terrain Has a Quality All Its Own

Megacities have no more or less difficult terrain to fight through than any other terrain. True. But quantity and density of terrain have a quality all their own.

This article urges the United States not to be excessively afraid of megacities because defended cities are no more dangerous than other defended terrain:

The urban environment is complex and difficult. Tactically, it strains communications, overloads sensory capability, and pushes the decision-making onus to the lowest level. Strategically, it is complex because tactical actions are amplified and the speed at which local and international audiences are informed has never been faster. American and British environmental doctrine emphasizes the significant operational challenges that this environment presents.2 In truth, however, the urban setting is neutral. It affects all protagonists equally, even if it does not always appear to do so. In The Jungle is Neutral, the classic account of three years of behind-the-lines jungle fighting against the Japanese in Malaya during World War II, the British soldier F. Spencer Chapman attributed his success to the principle that the environment is intrinsically neither good nor bad but neutral. What is true for warfare in the jungle — an environment that inflicts its own demands every bit as severe as those of the city — ought to be true for urban warfare.

In my recent warning in the July issue of Army magazine about fighting in megacities, "Bright Lights, Big Costs: Be Wary of Megacity Warfare" (I'll add a link when one comes available), I warned against eagerness to plunge into megacities just because we create the capabilities to do so. 

I did not argue in the article that megacity terrain is more difficult than other terrain. I admit I'd long assumed that was essentially true. Although my long history of playing wargames always showed cities no more effective than forests, jungles, mountains, major rivers, or fortifications for providing defensive bonuses. At some level, I don't think I assumed what made cities more dangerous was a qualitative difference in the difficulties of that form of broken terrain. And more recently I've read about that issue. I was easily persuaded that the Dupuy Institute research is absolutely correct that pound for pound, urban terrain is no more effective for defenders than other broken terrain. I'm assuming my unexamined assumptions about the relative value of urban versus other terrain made that easy to agree with when pointed out.

And honestly, earlier drafts of my article before I submitted it conceded this parity of effectiveness. But I had word limits and sections not directly relevant had to go before submitting. But again, I did not say that urban warfare is uniquely more dangerous. My warning was mostly about megacities. Which are, as the name indicates, huge.

Two things in practice make urban warfare in megacities more dangerous than other types of terrain, including smaller cities. Scale and density. 

First is scale. If I may be so bold, I wouldn't urge our Army to plunge into megajungles--or megamountains--either. Even if enemies face the same type of problems we would, our military has more expensive and high-tech assets that we rely on that would be nullified than any enemy force seeking refuge in a jungle or in a mountain.

I don't care if the enemy is equally constrained. Our enemies might be happy to trade more casualties with supporting weapons and capabilities equally nullified. The scale of the problem makes even equally dangerous terrain time consuming and casualty producing for our troops

As I observed long ago about Iran's initial defense when Iraq invaded it in 1980:

The demonstration that troops apparently hopelessly outclassed can make a good showing - even if they have to do nothing more complicated than die in place in their bunkers - is useful. Iran's ill-coordinated light infantry forces were stubborn obstacles to Iraq's ambitions when deployed in the cities of Khuzestan. Fighting a determined foe block by block and house by house as the Iraqis did in Khorramshahr would force our Army to play by our enemy 's rules. Although it is possible that information dominance could extend our superiority in open warfare to urban areas, that breakthrough has not happened. We must not forget that urban conditions may limit our technological and training advantages, lest we experience our own Khorramshahr debacle one day.
A mega-Khorramshahr debacle.

Second, there's the issue of density of terrain even if it is no more dangerous than other terrain types. 

A village may be no more dangerous to attackers than a ridge line or a small stream defensive line. A small city may be no more dangerous than a grouping of small hills. A large city may be no more dangerous than crossing a wide river.

But while forests, elevated terrain, or water obstacles may be no more difficult than urban terrain, when an attacker pushes through that forest, elevated terrain, or water obstacle, the next such defended obstacle might be 1, 20, or 100 miles away. Break through a block in a city and the next defended obstacle is ... across the street. Time after time. Again and again. Assault, suffer casualties, repeat.

And on top of the military problems, add in the information war problem of attacking through densely packed civilians in the city as opposed to the relative or total lack of civilians in other poor terrain that discourages habitation. 

Look, you don't have to sell me on being prepared to fight in a megacity. We might have to for some reason. Or we might need to help allies and advise them on how to take their own megacity. Or skills and equipment will make attacking a smaller urban area easier or cheaper for U.S. forces than the current situation. But don't ask me to embrace this battlefield.

Quantity of equally dangerous terrain has a very bad quality all its own. I repeat, don't be eager to fight for control of a megacity.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

Thursday, June 22, 2023

Ukrainian Corruption on Hiatus

I've long warned that if Ukraine is just a smaller version of corrupt Russia, Ukraine can't gain the edge over Russia to maintain its independence. The contrast between their drone arsenals demonstrates the difference in corruption makes on the battlefield. But I fear this is a short-term Ukrainian edge.

For the moment, Ukrainian corruption is suppressed and is giving Ukraine an edge on the battlefield:

The government bureaucracy in Russia discourages and disrupts any private efforts to design and build not merely UAVs, but private efforts to build most anything which might compete with government ways of building or doing things. Because that will interfere with government corruption. Ukrainians have noticed that one of their assets in the war is the disruptive effect the Russian bureaucracy has on the Russian military.

While there is some corruption in Ukraine, there is also a lot more popular anger and active opposition to any corruption hurting the war effort. Less corruption in wartime Ukraine means there are a lot more opportunities for innovation without interference from some corrupt official or supplier. Russian troops still had a lot of UAVs but not as many as the Ukrainians and not with all the innovations found in many Ukrainian UAVs. This made a difference and still does, even though the Russians have been quick to use new forms of jamming to disrupt or destroy Ukrainian UAVs. Both sides suffer heavy (in the thousands) UAV losses each month and Ukraine, with NATO support and unencumbered by economic sanctions, is able to maintain a UAV edge on the battlefield. 

The urgency of the war has suppressed Ukrainian corruption. But if Ukraine defeats Ukraine that urgency will decrease and the corruption will regain its former power to undermine Ukrainian defenses.

Indeed, if the war drags on in a frozen conflict on a new front line, Ukrainian corruption will re-emerge. If that happens, the additional edge that Western military and economic support provides to Ukraine will erode. And eventually erode Western willingness to back Ukraine financially.

And without Western backing because of corruption, the massive damage Russia has inflicted on Ukraine will have lasting effects [Oops. I forgot to link the source and typing in the text below doesn't provide the source. My apologies.]:

Cumulatively, the loss of territory, business, and people due to Russia’s invasion and bombardments and its occupation or blockade of critical Black Sea ports caused Ukraine to lose 29.1% of its pre-war gross domestic product. Industrial output fell even more, at a 36.9% loss. The only silver lining is that this nosedive is projected to halt in 2023, with GDP expected to grow by 2%. 

It is not exactly shocking that Ukraine’s government in 2022 dedicated 80% of its tax revenue to defense and security, spending defense dollars at nine times its monthly rate in 2021.

As an alternative to trying to conquer Ukraine, I wondered before the war if Russia's objective would be crippling Ukraine for a generation.

The price is far higher for Russia in direct costs and long-term economic growth. And the strategy is not deliberate. The "strategy" is the result of collateral damage to Russia unleashing a brutal firepower-intensive war strategy.

Ukraine might make sure the damage it does to itself with corruption lasts longer than the war damage Russia has inflicted on Ukraine.

My warning to Ukraine about defeating corruption may be moot for the moments, but in the long run remains valid:

Only by becoming more like the West can Ukraine build the economic and military power to remain a free country, just as a free West built on rule of law defeated the USSR.

Remember, Russia is fine with a corrupt Ukraine. It allowed Russia to weaken and dominate Ukraine's government before 2014, and it will allow Russia to buy influence and control in Ukraine once again.

Stalemate, even tilted toward Ukraine as I noted in this post, in the Donbas won't matter if the real fight for Ukraine takes place in the secret bank accounts of Ukrainian officials and business people.

Russia may be stymied in conquering Ukraine by military power with Western support. But Russian advances in the south through Kherson province show how corruption can hand territory to the Russians. Russia could simply try to conquer using different means exploiting lack of rule of law.

I hope this fight against corruption is part of NATO's long-term planning for defeating Russia's future threats to Ukraine. I hope Ukraine values defeating Russia more than opportunities for enrichment through corruption.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

Wednesday, June 21, 2023

Ancient Green Men?

Is there a path to our level of civilization without fossil fuels? And if not, doesn't that prove no advanced civilizations existed on Earth before us?


I recently became aware of speculation that a pre-Ice Age human advanced civilization could have existed. It was kind of fascinating to watch a video on it. Almost all the evidence was a discussion of how time would erase all evidence. Most interesting was the notion that UFOs are really ancient human drones still operating. So support one speculation with another speculation. Bravo.

But it did get me to wondering. If such a civilization existed, how did it get its energy to create a civilization? I mean, we keep finding and exploiting new sources of fossil fuel because our technology gets better. But we clearly got the easy stuff long ago. And fossil fuels don't renew over a period of tens of thousands of years.

So if fossil fuels are a critical bridge between burning wood and advanced "green" energy production, you'd think a past civilization would have used up the fossil fuel--or at least the most easily retrieve fossil fuels--and left us with no coal and oil easy to reach with early industrial age technology.

So I asked ChatGPT a question:

explain how human civilization could have advanced to our current technology level if no fossil fuels were available. Could other sources of energy propelled industrialization until solar, wind, water, and nuclear power for electrical generation could become the primary source of energy?

And this is what it gave me:

/BEGIN CHATGPT/

If fossil fuels were not available, it would have certainly posed challenges for human civilization to advance to our current technology level. However, it's important to note that human ingenuity and the need for progress often drive us to find alternative solutions. While it might have taken longer, it's plausible that other sources of energy could have propelled industrialization until solar, wind, water, and nuclear power became the primary sources of energy for electrical generation. Here's a possible scenario:

  1. Early dependence on renewable energy: In the absence of fossil fuels, humans would have relied heavily on renewable energy sources right from the start. This could include direct use of wind and water power for mechanical tasks such as milling, pumping, and transportation. Humans have historically used windmills and watermills for such purposes, and these technologies could have been further developed and optimized.

  2. Biomass and biofuels: Without access to fossil fuels, biomass and biofuels could have played a crucial role. Biomass, such as wood and agricultural waste, could have been used as a primary source of heat and energy for cooking, heating homes, and some industrial processes. Biofuels derived from organic matter, such as vegetable oils and alcohol, could have been used for transportation.

  3. Technological advancements and diversification: As societies progressed, advancements in engineering, materials science, and other fields would have continued. This could have led to the development of more efficient and diverse technologies for harnessing renewable energy. For example, early versions of solar collectors could have been developed to harness sunlight for heating and limited electricity generation.

  4. Exploration and utilization of other energy sources: Without the easy availability of fossil fuels, humans would have been incentivized to explore and exploit other energy sources more extensively. Geothermal energy, which harnesses heat from the Earth's interior, could have been tapped into for heating and electricity generation. Tidal and wave energy could have been used in coastal regions, while the potential of harnessing the energy of ocean currents might have been explored.

  5. Nuclear power: As the understanding of nuclear physics advanced, nuclear power could have emerged as a significant energy source. Research and development into nuclear fission and fusion could have been accelerated without the overshadowing presence of fossil fuels. This could have led to the earlier adoption of nuclear power plants as a primary source of electricity generation.

  6. Technological leap to renewables: With a greater focus on renewable energy, the research and development into solar, wind, and water power would have been prioritized. Scientists and engineers would have worked towards improving efficiency, storage, and scalability of these technologies. As a result, solar panels, wind turbines, and hydroelectric power plants could have been developed earlier, becoming the primary sources of energy generation.

It's important to note that this scenario is speculative, and the actual path human civilization would have taken without fossil fuels could have been different. The absence of fossil fuels would have certainly presented challenges, but it would have also accelerated the development of alternative energy sources due to the necessity of finding sustainable and environmentally friendly options.

/END CHATGPT/

Is this plausible? 

Could humans have committed so much to cultivating biomass before fossil fuels provided concentrated and plentiful energy? Could that path have created an industrial revolution and paved the way for an agricultural revolution?

Or could the path have been selective breeding of plant species over a longer period of time to replicate that kind of growth in output?

Hey, maybe ancient Teslas with lots of potato batteries?

And maybe this path doesn't allow for a population explosion, leaving a small footprint on Earth.

The path relies on different advances early but that doesn't mean it couldn't happen without the easier path of fossil fuels to propel industrialization.

Of course, one has to ask why this path might have been taken instead of using the easier fossil fuel path. 

Could a past vanished civilization have existed where we don't find fossil fuels now? Maybe that means the easy fossil fuels path was taken by the past civilization, explaining why fossil fuels aren't in some places today. It was just in a more narrow area and then that civilization abandoned fossil fuels early--or died out in some cataclysm--leaving plenty in some areas for our current civilization to use.

If there is no evidence possible on Earth, might we find evidence of an advanced civilization on the Moon where the elements would not erase and bury the evidence? Or elsewhere in the solar system? 

Of course, would we believe it was evidence if it wasn't a giant structure? Or just seem like more nonsense? 

Or would we assume space aliens and not humans left the artifacts?

And if we don't find evidence where it would last long enough elsewhere in the Solar System for us to discover it, does it prove no advanced civilization existed on Earth? Undercutting the argument that lack of proof on Earth is kind of sort of evidence it existed?

But if the path is plausible regardless of whether it happened here, maybe distant aliens could have followed that path. What would that mean for their signatures to detect them?

Funny enough this notion of prior but now erased advanced civilizations must be pretty old given that my dad once mentioned this idea to me when I was a kid.

NOTE: The image was made with DALL-E.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.