Do states too often assume short and glorious wars? Yes. But even short and glorious wars are no silver bullet to all your problems.
The fallacy of the short, sharp war:
States have frequently embarked on military campaigns that failed to achieve their objectives as quickly—and cheaply—as expected. For every Spanish-American or Austro-Prussian War that seems in retrospect to be a short, sharp success for the victors, there is a Crimean, Boer, or Afghan War that those of us with the benefit of hindsight know grinds on longer and presents a butcher's bill greater than planners and politicians anticipated. In fact, history suggests that quick, decisive victories are the exception rather than the norm. Yet, states continue to plan and initiate wars with the expectation that they can achieve decisive victories unreasonably swiftly. All too often, disaster results.
The author undermines the premise by citing Afghanistan as an example of failing to get a rapid victory; but citing the Spanish-American War as one that worked.
The Taliban (2001) and Spanish government's military forces (1898) were both defeated quickly. But both victories featured long insurgencies (in the Philippines, for the latter) after the conventional win.
But yes, many times a planned short, sharp war doesn't work out that way. Here's Exhibit A, in my opinion. So far, I suppose. Putin did ask us to hold his beer.
Further, arguing that Japan's decision to attack America at Pearl Harbor is an example of planning a short and sharp war ignores that Japan did not have that plan. Japan planned a short and sharp offensive to establish a perimeter in the wake of smashing our fleet, encompassing newly conquered oil resources. At that perimeter they believed they would exhaust American willingness to die to push through to Japan. Japan thought they had the advantage in willingness to die in a long war despite economic inferiority.
The Doolittle Raid prompted Japan to instead try to extend their perimeter to Midway Island, where the American fleet ambushed the much larger Japanese force. The carrier and pilot losses crippled the ability of Japan to hold their perimeter. And America was not put off by the casualties.
But even successful short, sharp wars (Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait, Iraqi Freedom to overthrow Saddam, Enduring Freedom to overthrow the Taliban) just punch your ticket for the next problem. A decade+ of confrontation with Saddam, insurgencies and invasions by al Qaeda and Iran, and insurgencies, respectively.
Heck, the classic short and sharp Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War just evolved on the Egyptian front into the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal line. The short war solved a specific military problem--keeping the Egyptians from knifing into Israel. The war of attrition was hardly ideal. But it was a better military problem than a Sword of Damocles hanging over Israel's survival.
A big problem for America is too high expectations for what a military victory can achieve. No war is a silver bullet solution to your problems. We always have to work the next problem.
But by all means, one subset of the issue is wrongly assuming a short and glorious war. Does anybody ever go home by Christmas? Leaders must guard against that tendency.
UPDATE: Related thoughts from a few years ago.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 continues here.
