Does a past 18th century war over Crimea have lessons for the Winter War of 2022? Well, it certainly reveals a Russian preference for destroying everything in its path.
The problem with using this framework to
analyze Russian and Western policies on Ukraine today is that Russia
has risked its entire ground forces in a fight that does not look like a
cabinet war for Putin, even if it really is--or should be--for Russia. And Ukraine is no mere passive province to be fought over. Ukraine wants to live.
Still, given Russia's switch from a parade ground occupation march to a firepower intensive war against Ukraine's frontlines and cities, this observation by Clausewitz is perhaps instructive:
He asserts, “It is uncertain whether the Empress Anna… wanted to conquer Crimea, or just to devastate it… the latter made but little political sense.” Despite this judgment, Clausewitz returns to the theme of devastation again and again in the text, showing that the various Russian armies, put the enemy territory, “under fire and sword,” “destroy[ed] these areas,” waged, “a campaign of raiding,” and “devastate[d] the peninsula.” Clausewitz eventually concluded that these measures were essentially “preventative… namely as a means of distracting and hindering the [Crimeans] so they could not,” take more decisive military action. Modern Russian tactics, such as the strike campaign against the Ukrainian power grid, have confused modern commentators, but experts such as Justin Bronk and Michael Kofman assert they have a similar goal: depleting Ukraine’s stocks of air defense missiles. In other words, in both the 1730s and 2020s, Russia has used devastation against civilian targets to cause chaos, diluting the effectiveness of their enemy’s military response.
Russian preference for destroying anything of use to an enemy is applicable. And predictable, I suppose.
Indeed, a careful reading of recent Russian military writings would reveal that Russian strategic thought emphasizes brutalizing civilians and lying about their responsibility for brutalizing civilians. Westerners who demand criminal trial levels of proof help Russia get away with this. Although Russian doctrine to minimize Russian troop casualties as much as possible has not been evident in the Winter War of 2022.
And there are other parallels with that 18th century war on how Russia wages war. I do worry Russia will eventually learn enough to win despite repeated stumbles and high losses.
Still, if the destruction is meant to dilute Ukrainian military effectiveness, the main source of Ukraine's military capability is abroad from Western supplies. With all due respect to Ukrainian skill and valor, that skill and valor would be displayed in a guerilla war east of the Dnieper River by now without the supplies. And Russia's firepower is not diluting Western support or Ukrainian skill and valor.
But despite my reservations on the article's application, by all means check it out. Depending on what Russia and
America decide, the Winter War of 2022 could go on. Then we might have more applicable lessons.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 continues here.
