When Russia invaded Ukraine, my view was that unless Russia drove into western Ukraine to put its forces on NATO's border in the center and south, NATO direct intervention was not necessary. The war's costs to Russia's military, economy, and reputation has reduced that reason for NATO to intervene even if Russia eventually achieves that kind of geographic gain.
I'd rather keep Russia as far east as possible to protect America. So I want Ukraine to defeat Russia and eject Russian forces from Ukraine. But NATO might be able to live with the situation even if Ukraine can't inflict a major defeat on the Russians. Honestly, even if Russia somehow finally conquers Ukraine the damage done to Russia will have bought time for NATO to build up its defenses to block that threat at NATO's new front line.
I think the odds of a bigger Ukrainian battlefield victory are better than the odds of Russia winning big. But Ukraine probably won't achieve a Napoleonic-scale war-winning battle. We shall see if a Ukrainian battlefield victory achieves enough to tilt the military balance inside Ukraine sufficiently for Ukraine to maintain the strategic initiative to conduct subsequent attacks to further defeat and weaken the Russians until a decisive result is achieved.
Still, Russia's poor military on offense has managed to take a large chunk of Ukrainian territory, remember. Which represents a win--if an expensive one--that would not have happened if Russia hadn't pushed their offensive.
Ukraine could win this war. But Ukraine could lose, too. If Ukraine loses this counteroffensive--or achieves a small win at too high a cost--that's when things get dicey for Ukraine. The West may not want to gear up to logistically sustain Ukraine. The West would still support Ukraine to keep Russia from easily taking all of Ukraine--and by pushing for a ceasefire in place. But Ukraine essentially loses this war under those conditions if the West decides that bleeding Russia to buy time is good enough.
NATO gets time to rebuild its military forces because it will take time for Russia to rebuild its depleted military (via Instapundit):
Just 14 months into Russia’s war on Ukraine, Moscow’s military has become so degraded that it could take up to 10 years for its forces to recover, US intelligence officials told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday.
It could be as few as five years. But that is about replacing equipment. Training leadership to replace casualties will take much longer. And have no doubt Russia's military is mangled. This take is incredibly generous to Russia:
A new Russian military is emerging from the devastated battlefields of Ukraine. On NATO's eastern flank, alliance militaries are now preparing to face a Russian Army that is mangled but more experienced, less sophisticated but more brutal, and mauled but still well-stocked.
The new Russian military is one with untrained replacement troops--not veterans. An army of depleted and substandard leadership. Perhaps some survivors have learned. But how much influence will they have? And the ground forces have seen their best weapons destroyed or captured; and huge stockpiles of ammunition depleted.
The Russian air force is less damaged but can it get much better? It hasn't so far. Perhaps we'll see signs of improvement during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. In which case I'll reconsider my view.
And the Russian navy is almost undamaged? So what? It's a shadow of its former Soviet self. And it will be last on the priority list for money to strategic nuclear forces, the ground forces, and the air force. It is useful only as long as Russia produces land attack missiles to refill their magazines.
Another factor for NATO collecting a win now is that the Wagner-instigated unrest in Russia may also make Russian leaders gun shy about starting a new major war for a while. This also buys time for NATO to prepare.
And the unrest in Russia may increase the NATO pucker factor about civil war in Russia with all those nukes scattered around.
Still, much of the article focuses on a potentially inadequate NATO defensive posture. If NATO doesn't take advantage of the time Ukraine has given NATO to rebuild its military and defense industries, even a mauled but restocked Russian military could advance west. But that's a NATO issue and not a phoenix Russian military rising from the ashes of Ukraine issue.
There is more risk in the long run to NATO if NATO lets Russia push west in Ukraine. But given the time it will take Russia to repair the damage--if Russia can (the post-Goons of August War in 2008 reforms were supposed to have created the magnificent army of February 23, 2022)--it is not an immediate crisis that a rapid and inexpensive Russian conquest of Ukraine last year would have posed. Russia failed to break NATO as a major result of invading Ukraine. Instead, Russia strengthened NATO and gave NATO a warning of its logistics shortcomings.
Of course, Ukraine can win or lose depending on how NATO judges the Russian threat. Will NATO cash in its chips and tell Ukraine to accept as good a deal as it can get with diplomacy where the armies stand now?
But for now, Ukraine has its own outcome in its hands with the strategic initiative seemingly falling to Ukraine should the counteroffensive(s) succeed. The effects of the Wagner insurrection might help Ukraine achieve a victory. Especially if Prigozhin is a symptom of Russia's internal divisions rather than the main actor causing divisions.
Seriously, Putin already knows "they" are out to get him. How extensive--and accurate--will the post-Prigozhin purges be?
UPDATE (Tuesday): Interesting:
Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivsky Bridge in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of June 26.
Is this just a distraction to keep the Russians from shifting forces from the Kherson front? Could the Ukrainians set up a small base to conduct raids to push Russian troops away from the bridgehead?
Or is Ukraine prepared to attempt to build pontoon bridges and defend them from aerial attacks to make a big effort? The last option is risky unless Ukraine breaks through further east and causes some chaos.
Still, it would be interesting if the Kherson front lights up and we see the remnants of the Ukrainian navy do something along with air mobile forces.
UPDATE (Wednesday): The purges appear to have commenced in Russia. Will Putin go too far and hurt the military more? Or will Putin get lucky and actually find a competent general to run the war?
It certainly looks like Ukraine set up an artillery ambush hoping the Russians charge in to eliminate the bridgehead. That has taken place to some degree already.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
