Megacities have no more or less difficult terrain to fight through than any other terrain. True. But quantity and density of terrain have a quality all their own.
The urban environment is complex and difficult. Tactically, it strains communications, overloads sensory capability, and pushes the decision-making onus to the lowest level. Strategically, it is complex because tactical actions are amplified and the speed at which local and international audiences are informed has never been faster. American and British environmental doctrine emphasizes the significant operational challenges that this environment presents.2 In truth, however, the urban setting is neutral. It affects all protagonists equally, even if it does not always appear to do so. In The Jungle is Neutral, the classic account of three years of behind-the-lines jungle fighting against the Japanese in Malaya during World War II, the British soldier F. Spencer Chapman attributed his success to the principle that the environment is intrinsically neither good nor bad but neutral. What is true for warfare in the jungle — an environment that inflicts its own demands every bit as severe as those of the city — ought to be true for urban warfare.
In my recent warning in the July issue of Army magazine about fighting in megacities, "Bright Lights, Big Costs: Be Wary of Megacity Warfare" (I'll add a link when one comes available), I warned against eagerness to plunge into megacities just because we create the capabilities to do so.
I did not argue in the article that megacity terrain is more difficult than other terrain. I admit I'd long assumed that was essentially true. Although my long history of playing wargames always showed cities no more effective than forests, jungles, mountains, major rivers, or fortifications for providing defensive bonuses. At some level, I don't think I assumed what made cities more dangerous was a qualitative difference in the difficulties of that form of broken terrain. And more recently I've read about that issue. I was easily persuaded that the Dupuy Institute research is absolutely correct that pound for pound, urban terrain is no more effective for defenders than other broken terrain. I'm assuming my unexamined assumptions about the relative value of urban versus other terrain made that easy to agree with when pointed out.
And honestly, earlier drafts of my article before I submitted it conceded this parity of effectiveness. But I had word limits and sections not directly relevant had to go before submitting. But again, I did not say that urban warfare is uniquely more dangerous. My warning was mostly about megacities. Which are, as the name indicates, huge.
Two things in practice make urban warfare in megacities more dangerous than other types of terrain, including smaller cities. Scale and density.
First is scale. If I may be so bold, I wouldn't urge our Army to plunge into
megajungles--or megamountains--either. Even if enemies face the same type of problems we
would, our military has more expensive and high-tech assets that we rely
on that would be nullified than any enemy force seeking refuge in a
jungle or in a mountain.
I don't care if the enemy is equally constrained. Our enemies might be happy to trade more casualties with supporting weapons and capabilities equally nullified. The scale of the problem makes even equally dangerous terrain time consuming and casualty producing for our troops.
As I observed long ago about Iran's initial defense when Iraq invaded it in 1980:
The demonstration that troops apparently hopelessly outclassed can make a good showing - even if they have to do nothing more complicated than die in place in their bunkers - is useful. Iran's ill-coordinated light infantry forces were stubborn obstacles to Iraq's ambitions when deployed in the cities of Khuzestan. Fighting a determined foe block by block and house by house as the Iraqis did in Khorramshahr would force our Army to play by our enemy 's rules. Although it is possible that information dominance could extend our superiority in open warfare to urban areas, that breakthrough has not happened. We must not forget that urban conditions may limit our technological and training advantages, lest we experience our own Khorramshahr debacle one day.A mega-Khorramshahr debacle.
Second, there's the issue of density of terrain even if it is no more dangerous than other terrain types.
A village
may be no more dangerous to attackers than a ridge line or a small
stream defensive line. A small city may be no more dangerous than a
grouping of small hills. A large city may be no more dangerous than crossing a
wide river.
But while forests, elevated terrain, or water obstacles may be no more difficult than urban terrain, when an attacker pushes through that forest, elevated terrain, or water obstacle, the next such defended obstacle might be 1, 20, or 100 miles away. Break through a block in a city and the next defended obstacle is ... across the street. Time after time. Again and again. Assault, suffer casualties, repeat.
And on top of the military problems, add in the information war problem of attacking through densely packed civilians in the city as opposed to the relative or total lack of civilians in other poor terrain that discourages habitation.
Look, you don't have to sell me on being prepared to fight in a megacity. We might have to for some reason. Or we might need to help allies and advise them on how to take their own megacity. Or skills and equipment will make attacking a smaller urban area easier or cheaper for U.S. forces than the current situation. But don't ask me to embrace this battlefield.
Quantity of equally dangerous terrain has a very bad quality all its own. I repeat, don't be eager to fight for control of a megacity.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
