Sure, Russia has learned some things from its early poor war
performance. They'd have to be non-sentient to not learn anything at
all. But don't panic. Keep calm and carry on.
Russian improvements on their early war performance don't seem to have led to Russian victories of any significance. So saying the war is "now going Russia's way" seems silly:
What many of these analysts failed to recognize, however, is that Russia has vastly more capacity to make war, both in terms of material and personnel, and therefore has the capacity to absorb enormous losses and still remain viable. ...
Put simply, Ukraine doesn’t have the personnel or industrial capacity to replace their lost men and equipment in comparison to the Russians.
And calling Ukraine's defense of a number of cities a mistake seems really wrong. Yes, Ukraine suffered casualties. But Russia has likely suffered far more. And Ukraine bought time for the West to arm it. Ukraine's weaponry is getting better while Russia's is getting worse. That doesn't seem like Ukraine is screwing up.
I just don't think much of that author's war analysis. He relies too much on Russia's size advantage, which--using the Iran-Iraq War where Iraq won "on points" as a counter-example--I believe is no guarantee of Russian victory over Ukraine despite a theoretical long-term advantage:
Like Iran, Russia has a 3:1 advantage in population. But Russian morale as a conqueror, that is clearly not liberating people from Nazis, is not superior. This could break Russia before Ukraine. Just how do we define the transition from the short run to the long run?
What about GDP and defense spending? You'd think Russia clearly has the edge with a 9:1 GDP advantage.
But Russia is under Western sanctions that will harm Russia's ability to go to war production levels. Russian Soviet-era stockpiles will run low in time--or reach the material and ammo almost more dangerous to Russian users than Ukrainian targets.
And Ukraine is being supplied by the West, which has an immensely greater GDP advantage than Russia's advantage over Ukraine. So you can't just count the value of the arms and services provided to Ukraine when comparing the economic advantage. You'd have to count the research and development and logistics value on Ukraine's side of the ledger that provides the weapons, supplies, and services.
So when you compare the scientific, industrial, and military effort on both sides, is Russia really superior in material?
Ukraine hasn't won. And might not. Let's first see how Ukraine's "big push" goes before saying it is doomed.
And if Russia hangs on to territory it captured since 2022 because Ukraine can't recapture it, the Russian victory may be too expensive to really secure Russian territorial integrity.
But not because an alarmed NATO arms up to invade a weakened Russia. But because of that which must not be named.
Of course, if the West heeds that author's warnings of "inevitable" Russian victory and abandons Ukraine, he will be made right. But because of Western policy and not because of the balance of power.
My view is don't let the Wookie win; focus on what we can do to help Ukraine defeat Russia:
General Grant put it well to his subordinates who raised constant worries about what Lee could do when Grant's army marched:
Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.Our enemies need to spend more time dwelling on their concerns about what America can do.
Whatever Russia has learned so far, it isn't a double somersault. Analysts can argue that Putin can never admit defeat in Ukraine. But that is true only until there are outcomes worse than admitting defeat in Ukraine.
UPDATE (Monday): There appears to be action around Bakhmut, in particular:
Ukrainian military sources told the BBC that a series of small scale armoured offensive operations are under way.
They did not say whether this was the start of Ukraine's long awaited full scale counter-offensive.
Earlier, Russia's defence ministry said it thwarted a major Ukrainian attack in Donetsk.
I'd imagine Bakhmut is a feint. Unless Russian defenses prove to be weak.
UPDATE (Monday): Oh?
But it is now time that the United States develop a vision for how the war ends. Fifteen months of fighting has made clear that neither side has the capacity—even with external help—to achieve a decisive military victory over the other. Regardless of how much territory Ukrainian forces can liberate, Russia will maintain the capability to pose a permanent threat to Ukraine.
One problem with so many Western analysts is that they seek "visions for how a war ends" instead of visions for victory. Let's focus on that shall we, rather than looking for ways that essentially give Russia a partial victory--and launching pad for future attacks.
FFS, at least wait until we see if Ukraine's counteoffensive actually proves Ukraine can't defeat the invaders.
UPDATE (Monday): Per ISW, Ukrainian forces have made some relatively decent advances around Bakhmut; Ukraine's Russian proxy forces are still active inside Russia; and Ukrainian forces are launching what appear to be probes at other unspecified areas of the front. Meanwhile, Russia continues small attacks on the Donbas front.
UPDATE (Monday): I wonder if Ukraine could have built pre-fabricated bridge sections to rapidly create underwater bridges across the Dnieper River to make the Kherson front an option. Move air defenses to cover crossings and add in boats and helicopters, and Ukraine might build a supporting threat from there.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Russia blew a hole in the Kakhovka dam that will flood land along the Dnieper River on the Kherson front. The Russians either believe this is a viable front for a Ukrainian attack, want to divert Ukrainian attention, or see it as retaliation for the pro-Ukraine Russian raids into Russia.
UPDATE (Tuesday): If the nearby nuclear plant isn't threatened, I can't rule out that Ukraine did this.
If Ukraine knows Russia would blow it during a Ukrainian river crossing, Ukraine has incentive to blow it ahead of such operations so the flood water surge will recede before Ukraine attempts to leap the river.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Aside from the nuclear plant issue, I'm not sure if destroying the bridge is a war crime. Both sides have valid military reasons to destroy the dam. I guess it might depend on whether the destruction's civilian impact is disproportionate to the objective of closing off the river--if Russia did it, or making sure the river is open by a certain date--if Ukraine did it.
Unless I'm missing something. Which is certainly possible.
As an aside, that issue of "proportionality" is about the collateral damage of a military mission. It has nothing to with preventing one side from retaliating heavily if someone else attacks. That notion of "proportionality" is nonsense. It is designed to keep one side from effectively fighting back to stop attacks.
For example, if a unit is taking sniper fire from a building, it is disproportionate to nuke the building to get rid of the sniper.
To be clear, this is awful. And it may be a war crime. But I don't assume it is regardless of who did it. War is awful.
UPDATE (Tuesday): This makes me think it is unlikely that Ukraine did it:
Officials said about 22,000 people live in areas at risk of flooding in Russian-controlled areas, while 16,000 live in the most critical zone in Ukrainian-held territory.
Ukraine would have warned its people to evacuate, I imagine.
UPDATE (Friday): Reports of Ukrainian attacks at separate points along the front. The Russians say there is heavy fighting in Zaporizhia province and that their forces are smashing the Ukrainians. We'll see. But no doubt all the time Ukraine took to create its counteroffensive force gave Russia time to rest and rebuild its troops in the south and to build fortifications.
UPDATE (Friday): It is interesting that foreign observers are saying sightings of Western vehicles indicates the main effort. I've long said I think Soviet models will do the heavy lifting in the opening moves of the offensive rather than the few modern Western tanks. And I've mentioned that committing those few Western advanced models early would be a great feint. Because it would be assumed they signal the main effort.
UPDATE (Friday): There is very little out there except locations and loud Russian claims of stunning victories. Perhaps that is true. But Ukraine and Western media are clearly being quiet to avoid telling the Russians too much. I'll wait for more detailed and reliable news before I start getting skittish.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
