The third Ukrainian counteroffensive, this time "the big one" that could be decisive, has begun after a long build up for what it can achieve. What will it achieve? And where?
On the eve of D-Day, Eisenhower expected the airborne forces to be virtually destroyed to provide a small margin of success to the troops charging the German fortifications on the Normandy beaches. He prepared a message in case the invasion failed--and planned to resign his command. Failure would have required
The Ukrainian offensive has begun but we don't know where the main effort will be. Russia blew the Kakhovka Dam, apparently believed Ukraine could have crossed the Dnieper River on the Kherson front notwithstanding the difficulties of an opposed river crossing on such a wide river.
And if Ukraine did it, it indicates that it believes it can cross the river as long as the threat of Russia blowing the dam doesn't loom over their crossing and bridge-building efforts.
When the water recedes and the land dries, we'll see.
Ukraine knows the stakes are high for its current counteroffensive. This analyst has generally been overly pessimistic about Ukraine. But he has a point:
To succeed, Zelensky’s troops will have to attack this elaborate defense with limited offensive air power, limited air defense, insufficient quantities of artillery shells, and a force that is equipped with a hodge-podge of modern and antiquated armor – staffed by a mix of conscripts with no combat experience and some officers and men with basic training by NATO instructors.These are all true things. And shortages of equipment, numbers, and training always have been true things in war.
On the other side, Russia has to have sited and built those elaborate defenses--and then hold them when attacked--with skill. Russia has demonstrated limited air power, limited air defense against limited Ukrainian aerial missions, insufficient quantities of shells, and a force now leaning on older and worse than antiquated armor--staffed by poorly trained mobilized troops under the command of poorly trained officers replacing those who died so far.
As has always been true in war, the outcome depends on the interaction of two flawed military forces.
And despite the tactical superiority of the defense over the offense, at the operational level you have to attack at some point to win. That's how you put stresses on the flaws of the enemy, enlarge them, and exploit them. All while making the enemy too busy to exploit your flaws.
Even as Ukraine's counteroffensive appears to be in its early stages, Russian forces continue attacking along portions of the front line.
Ukrainian forces have probed at Russian defenses in Luhansk province, around Bakhmut, in western Donetsk province near Zaporizhia, and in western Zaporizhia province. There is some Ukrainian movement forward farther east but the initial attack in western Zaporizhia was apparently contained by the Russians and pushed back. The Russian units there are--as I feared--in better shape (and had time to build fortifications) than those further east which have been in action all this time.
That's the problem. I'd rather see an advance in western Zaporizhia in order to advance to the Sea of Azov. There, the Ukrainians will cut Russian lines of supply to Crimea and the Kherson front, but be farther from Russia's established logistics system in the Donbas. And the Ukrainians will be close enough to threaten Crimea and the Russian defenders along the Dnieper River facing Kherson province.
But if the Russians prove too
tough in western Zaporizhia, the Ukrainians have to attack in a section that isn't as well
defended despite not providing the biggest advantages to unhinge the
Russians if successful. They have to
win somewhere--anywhere, really. But it is still early and few Ukrainian
forces have been committed let alone suffered serious casualties that would indicate the counteroffensive is over. Casualties will be heaviest trying to break through Russian defenders.
So keep the letter of resignation in your pocket for now.
UPDATE (Monday): Russia has learned from its initial failures:
The changing Russian tactics along with increased troop numbers and improved weaponry could make it challenging for Ukraine to score any kind of quick decisive victory, threatening to turn it into a long battle of attrition.
I hoped Russian troops were demoralized enough to collapse. But I didn't count on it.
We shall see if the attrition inflicted on Russian forces can weaken the Russians enough to finally enable Ukrainian maneuver to collapse Russian troop morale on a section of the front.
This illustrates my long-made observation that taking time to counterattack gave Russia time, too. Russia used it. The question to be answered is whether Ukraine made better use of the time it took to launch the big push.
UPDATE (Monday): Despite some small-scale but high-profile armored vehicle losses, early on I don't see evidence that Western armor has been significantly committed to the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Indeed, I haven't seen images of Ukraine's Soviet stuff knocked out. This is still probing.
My view has been that committing Western armor would signal the main effort so they won't be part of the force to break through Russia's defense lines. The Western armor will be for the exploitation. IMO.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Have four of the nine Western-equipped brigades been committed to Ukraine's counteroffensive?
Maybe. But given their presence at the front is likely to be judged significant for the main effort by Russia, it seems to me it would be wise for Ukraine to separate out detachments to operate independently of the brigades to simulate main efforts.
Also, there are three new brigades. And possibly six rebuilt existing brigades using Soviet-origin equipment (including Polish and other East European armored vehicles) if earlier reports on Ukraine's strategic reserve are still correct.
The fog of war is thick right now.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
