Some Must Be Expendable

When contemplating fighting a peer power for control of the seas, the U.S. Navy must be able to suffer losses without crippling its ability to win the campaign.

One of the conclusions of this paper on Navy composition is that the Navy's warship balance is too top heavy with multi-mission warships. Actually cheaper and more focused warships are needed to get numbers. Although the balance of the entire fleet is given a higher priority so it can be deployed and sustained in a sea control campaign:

Indeed, this effort [to recommend a force structure for the Navy] is supported by the idea, contained in the most recent National Security Strategy (NSS), that the U.S. has returned to an era of great power competition with China and Russia.  The last time the U.S. – and the U.S. Navy – found itself in this position was late in the Cold War.  The premise of this effort is that what was good enough for the Cold War great power competition era, in terms of U.S. Navy force structure, is probably a pretty good basis for what the force structure should be in today’s era. ...

If we assume that the force structure of 1989 was built to compete “over there” against a near-peer competitor in an era of great power competition, then it follows that a similar force structure, extrapolated from the Cold War force structure, would be ideal for serving the same purpose today.  Note that the emphasis is on “structure” and not “numbers”: there is a fiscal reality to ship acquisition, and the basis of any future Fleet numbers will be based on the Congressionally mandated number of aircraft carriers (11).  The numbers for each type of ship in Column <4> were derived by multiplying the number of ships of that type from 1989 by the ratio of present-day capital ships (21xCVNs and LHD/LHAs) to the number of 1989 capital ships (33xBBs, CV/CVNs, and Large Deck Amphibs), and rounding to the nearest integer.  The rationale for this approach is that, in rough terms, the number of escort combatant and fleet support vessels is related to the ability of the Navy to escort and supply capital ship strike groups while also being able to conduct ancillary operations. [emphasis in original]

I've noted how top heavy our fleet is. It was a rational response to the sudden collapse of the Soviet naval threat combined with the still nascent Chinese naval threat. The Navy reduced numbers of vessels and focused on fewer multi-role larger ships. These ships are the most time-consuming and expensive to build, so in an emergency it could more easily build the cheaper bulk ships the Navy shed over time.

As China has risen as a naval threat, the Navy has telegraphed an intent to abandon the top-heavy force structure. As I've long opined, the Navy needs to pick a number for how many warships it needs and build as many cheaper ships as it takes to get that number:

If numbers really are important--and I think they are--we can get the numbers. Yes, because of geography we have to build larger ships capable of sailing long distances, so we can't just build small corvettes the way many nations do, who just need to sail out of their port to reach their patrol area. But we could have a real high-low mix with a low end based on basic ships with decent weapons systems that could be augmented with mission packages, which we are building for our littoral combat ships (LCS) class, if the balloon goes up for a bigger war against a more capable foe. We already use neutered Perry frigates that no longer have their missile launchers. Why not build new, cheap, frigates designed to accomodate mission packages that turn them into potent warships in war time?

Okay, 13 years ago I had hope that the LCS concept had promise rather than being an expensive failure best used to test our weapons effectiveness. But it's still a good idea.

Still, the Navy has limitations that our allies in Eurasia don't have. As I noted, our ships have to be large enough to cross an ocean and fight. Allies--and enemies--often just have to leave port to get to their patrol stations:

But there are limits to trading size for numbers. Remember that we aren't a European power of the Cold War era--or even China or Japan today--whose ships mostly need to leave port and then prepare to fire. They can build small ships heavy on weaponry. We need a ship capable of cruising long distances across oceans, in potentially rough seas, even before we put a single weapon on it. That requires tonnage. That affects the theoretical trade off I'd like with some practical minimum sizes.

And of course, there's the issue of projecting the Navy overseas that the report addresses. That part of the report was part of my post on power projection more generally. 

We don't want our ships defending our ports from direct attack, right? Let's create a Navy that can sail across the globe, sustain losses, keep fighting, and win control of the seas over there. 

[Oops. Noticed title typo. Fixed.]

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

A Strategy of Massive Poo Flinging and Chest Beating

Please tell me that Putin and his leadership aren't as stupid as Putin makes them seem.

Putin's apparent nuclear threat is reinventing stupid: 

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday once again drew international attention when he warned that if even one missile enters Russian territory, "hundreds" of warheads will respond.

The United States once thought it could reduce conventional military capabilities and rely on nuclear weapons. By pledging Massive Retaliation with nukes for any level of aggression, we assumed we could inexpensively deter aggressors. 

The Korean War demonstrated that Massive Retaliation was not credible for threats less than national destruction. We realized that massed firing of nukes for any attack is not credible. But Russia has limited options short of nukes:

Unfortunately for Russia, they will find that nuclear weapons aren't useful for defending their country. Threatening to use nuclear weapons is only credible in the face of national destruction. Certainly, a Chinese army marching on Moscow would lead Russia to unleash nuclear weapons to prevent that. And Russian nukes would deter China from using their own nukes on Russia.

But China isn't going to march on Moscow. Will Russia really provoke a general nuclear war with China if the Chinese take a chunk of territory in the Far East but go no further?

Nuclear weapons deter the worst case scenario. And nukes help keep war in the conventional sphere for a longer period of time.

But effective conventional forces are needed to defend Russian territorial integrity in fights short of national extinction.

If Russia responds to a single nuke by firing hundreds, many hundreds will land on Russia a half hour later. So nobody believes this kind of threat.

But I also don't believe the Russians are this stupid because they have a history of nuclear bluffs. 

The main problem Putin faces is that Russia's conventional military is too weak to defend their huge border without nukes. Russia's bluster helped to conceal that conventional military weakness reality. The war in Ukraine exposed the reality. 

The real problem for Russia is that if nuclear-armed enemies do believe this kind of threat, Russia guarantees that if an enemy decides to initiate nuclear attacks on Russia, hundreds will land on Russian territory in a first strike. And Russia doesn't just face America with that capability. Russia faces China with that kind of nuclear threat. And the Chinese know Russia considered a nuclear disarming strike on China many decades ago. Oops.

Chimps with nukes, the Russian are. 

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

The Russian Cavalry Must Come From the Air

Russia failed to get air superiority over Ukraine. There are many reasons for it. But I think the basic reason is that Russia needs to preserve their air force for more important targets--the Chinese.

Via Instapundit is this post on reasons for why Russia failed to gain air superiority over Ukraine.

The reasons are all valid. But I think Russia could have powered through those obstacles--and endured the aircraft and pilot losses--to use their air power if it was really needed in Ukraine.

And with Ukraine's limited air power, Russia finds that its operational concept of holding off NATO air power defensively is the default situation in Ukraine. As long as both sides' air power is nullified, I think Russia figures it has the firepower advantage over a Western-style army. Remember, at some points Russia was credited with a 15:1 artillery fire volume advantage over Ukraine.

By withholding aircraft from providing routine close air support, Russia preserves their air power in case it really needs it to intervene on the battlefield to blunt a Ukrainian offensive. Or for the next war.

Away from the front lines, Russia has been able to use missiles for strategic missions. The one thing Russia loses by withholding air power is the ability to strike deep throughout Ukraine's military rear areas. Clearly that objective is not important enough to get Russia to risk their aircraft.

More broadly, Russia needs their air power intact as a strategically mobile source of firepower across vast Russia:

What if the Russians really see this new strategy to counter supposed foreign subversion linked to precision weapons as applying to China which poses a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia in their Far East. A Chinese threat only suspended by the 20-year treaty they signed in 2001. Russia is running out of time to be able to defend their territory in the Far East rather than appease play second fiddle to China while the power differential favors China.

In that light, Russian investment in long-range air and missile precision strike capability isn't intended to reach America but is intended to reach Russia's own Far East and neighboring China from European Russia. The fifth column might not be Russian protesters on the streets of Moscow but ethnic Chinese illegally settling in Russian territory in the Far East (and maybe local Russians who'd rather go with China than distant Moscow which siphons off their natural resources) where their empire is truly at risk.

Russia's exercises for their airborne forces could be seen in this light, too.

That last link above is about Russia practicing moving their strategic ground forces reserve across Russia:

With most of Russia's army second tier at best (with the vaunted battalion tactical groups simply the useful parts of their brigades that can be scraped together with working equipment and trained personnel), Russia is relying more on the VDV.

The second tier forces have to be the bulk of the army in any theater. But they will need to be reinforced and stiffened by better quality forces. So the VDV has to be mobile as well as better trained and equipped in order to reinforce any local army under threat (or that is tagged for offensive operations against a small neighbor, of course).

Which I think is largely about quickly reinforcing the Far East.

The airborne forces have been savaged fighting Ukraine. Russia will no doubt prioritize post-war rebuilding on these units. But that will be easier than replacing lost air power, with their expensive machines and ammunition plus crews that take a long time to train.

As long as Putin's war against Ukraine is just a special military operation, the air force will remain uncommitted. And I don't think this really limits Russia's war effort against Ukraine.

UPDATE: Related thoughts on Russia's poor ground forces that are unlikely to be good enough to exploit any effects of its air attacks to win:

The most important point is that airpower, under the best circumstances, cannot take and hold ground. Ground forces must be deployed to do that. Drones can support ground campaigns, as airpower did in WWII and Vietnam, but the gap between intelligence and action makes support for ground attacks more difficult.

And strategic attacks are unlikely to break Ukrainian will to resist.

I still think that air power is not necessary for battlefield victory if you nullify the enemy's air power. Under those circumstances your superior artillery can be the decisive firepower support on the battlefield. That said, I still want air superiority to use air power against enemies.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

Measuring the Chinese Threat

Are we over-hyping the Chinese military? No doubt. But that's no reason to relax.

Does the Pentagon report on Chinese military power over-state Chinese naval power? 

The Pentagon also harps on the fact that, by ship count, China now has the world’s largest navy — generally failing to note that, because U.S. ships are typically much bigger, America’s naval tonnage exceeds China’s by a ratio of about two to one.

It's not like numbers of ships is uniquely used to measure the PLA Navy. America measures our own fleet by numbers. Counting and defining battle force fleet numbers as the foundation of a Navy debate has been going on for a long time.

And our ship tonnage must be greater just for our ships to reach the western Pacific. Long journeys require larger hulls for the range and to absorb the pounding waves. The Chinese start there and can deploy more small, short-legged vessels. So measuring by tonnage would actually misrepresent the U.S.-China naval balance for a fight in the western Pacific.

Also, much of our tonnage advantage is from our super carriers. Which might not be an advantage just 5 hours into a war.

But sure, a focus on the shiny hardware likely overlooks Chinese weaknesses. 

And leaves out China's geographic problem that America doesn't have.

But don't get complacent. I worry our non-weapon factors are weakening:

What we should do but won't is revamp selection and training for our senior officers to reduce the climate of stupidity that cripples American warfighting abilities. 

Somehow our flag officers are convinced that there are many substitutes for victory. But the truth is that woke lips sink ships.

But no worries. A Navy with fewer suicides, sexual assaults, hazing, extremism (all extremism?), and racism (all racism?)[*] will hold its head high as its woke sailors burn and drown in distant oceans as enemies crush them in battle.

That will count for something, right?

Let's focus on improving our leadership issues rather than convincing ourselves that China's leadership issues make their military ineffective. 

*Good leaders should be able to combat those listed problems as they prepare their personnel for war. It seems too often that warfighting is an afterthought.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

Working on the Definitions Section of the Winter War of 2022

As we try to defeat Russia's invasion of Ukraine, don't let people use manipulation of the "Definitions" section to define a Russian victory over Ukraine as a Russian defeat to fool America into thinking we achieved glorious nuanced victory. That might be the best hope of Russian victory from a new offensive.

The war that Putin began with his attempt to conquer all of Ukraine in a rapid parade through Ukraine's cities to kill off Ukraine's rulers and replace them with pliant Russian puppets failed. Russia is enduring horrific losses to keep fighting. The Ukrainians believe a Russian offensive is looming:

Russia is MASSING men and arms for a new offensive. As soon as January, but more likely in the spring, it could launch a big attack from Donbas in the east, from the south or even from Belarus, a puppet state in the north. Russian troops will aim to drive back Ukrainian forces and could even stage a second attempt to take Kyiv, the capital.

ISW thinks Russia will launch an offensive in winter 2023, possibly aimed at Kiev and maybe including another thrust from Belarus. ISW thinks it is unlikely to succeed and that Belarus won't send in its army. 

But the Russian effort to portray Putin as a competent leader taking charge of his military will put pressure on the Russian ground forces to do something dramatic, no? It may fail spectacularly. Yet Russia has to try something to reverse the trends against Russia on the battlefield. And then what will the Russians who've said "if only the czar knew!" as an excuse for battlefield losses say?

Reigniting the war will certainly stir Ukraine's allies from the complacency of a stalled--and partially reversed Russian invasion. But it will stir voices for ending the war with Russia retaining its conquests.

I'm fine with figuring out what outcome in the war is in America's interest:

What should the United States do in response to this Russian invasion? In any adversarial relationship, strategic thinking requires aligning means with ends. Any proposal of means–shipment of offensive and/or defensive weapons, economic sanctions, activation of alliances, supply of foreign aid, expressions of indifference, withdrawal of support, or other actions–should start with the articulation of the specific ends sought. ...

Regarding Ukraine:  What exactly is the goal of the U.S. intervention?  What is the outcome that we believe serves our national interests? Regrettably, neither American nor allied Western politicians have clearly answered this question.

Preventing Russia from quickly overrunning Ukraine and getting a cheap victory unified NATO. As NATO and its allies succeeded in that mission, the objective has become murkier. And the willingness to pay a price to get whatever that objective is becomes shakier.

I've noted that issue of defining what our victory should mean. Indeed, I do think we have to be careful about how Russia is defeated. But don't dare assume Russia will lose this war as an excuse to believe we can calibrate Western aid to Ukraine to get the perfect sort of win we need before Ukraine actually defeats Russia. That kind of nuanced effort risks rescuing Russia and giving Putin the chance to win by even marginally tipping the trends of a war on the knife's edge in Russia's favor.

First, "trading" Ukraine for a Russia alliance is immoral and a sucker's game. Russia would be no ally if it sees threats as a way to get land. That just whets Russian appetites. Russia has to have a bout of clarity for a needed alliance with America. 

And saying supporting Ukraine "distracts" us from achieving other more important objectives has a long history as an excuse to lose a war. Once the existing war is lost, the "more important" issue fades away. Some people are perpetually looking for Mister Good War.  

Not that the authors of that initial piece agree with the initial two options. Yet the siren song surface allure of these options can put America on the rocks. I eagerly await honest debate on this issue. Which I'm for, as a rule.

The details are important, of course. But don't abuse that need in order to justify and hide a Western diplomatic move that ratifies Russian victory. The basic form of the end of Russia's invasion of Ukraine must be that Russia loses its war of aggression and Ukraine wins. 

UPDATE (Tuesday): Sure:

ISW has extensively reported on the fact that the Wagner Group uses convicts to build out its fighting force and that Wagner Group forces are serving a largely attritional role in operations near Bakhmut, failing to take significant ground but effectively pinning Ukrainian forces in the defense of surrounding territory.

But why does Russia keep battering away at these defenders? 

To keep the Ukrainians pinned so Russia can attack elsewhere? 

To reduce Ukraine's ability to gather forces for counteroffensives? 

To kill Ukrainians in the belief that Russia is better able to endure losses? Ukrainian soldiers on the front since Russia invaded are under great stress. Does Russia think this is the objective notwithstanding heavier Russian deaths? 

Or does Russia need to be able to say Russia is still attacking somewhere? 

UPDATE: I think this is a good indicator of the stress the Ukrainian defenders are under:

President Volodymyr Zelensky on Tuesday visited the eastern frontline city of Bakhmut, now the epicentre of fighting in Russia's nearly 10-month invasion of Ukraine.

Zelensky met military officials and handed out awards to Ukrainian servicemen, who have been holding back a fierce and months-long Russian campaign for the city.

UPDATE (Wednesday): ISW:

Negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. They are means to the same ends—full control of Ukraine and eradication of Ukraine’s statehood and identity.

Let's help Ukraine make gains this winter before the window of opportunity closes.

UPDATE (Saturday): Russia is battering itself against Ukraine's Bakhmut in the Donbas. 

More than 6 months ago I compared the course of Russia's invasion to the 1941 and 1942 German campaigns against Russia. I wondered it the war was "reaching" the 1943 Kursk stage, when Russia batters itself against Ukraine's defenders and loses the initiative for good. 

Maybe. Ukraine has begun to push the Russians back. But there has been no destruction of a Russian army in the field. Maybe the Russian push on Bakhmut is still within the 1942 lens as Russia elevates Bakhmut to a major objective. Hence my comment recently that Ukraine should rename the city "Zelenskygrad." 

Mind you, this war is this war. I'm only making the comparison as a means to broadly judge weakening Russian offensive power and wondering when Ukraine can--if it can--sustain a counteroffensive that drives the invaders out.

Heck, maybe the war goes from the Eastern Front 1942 to the Western Front 1918, with Russia repeating Germany's last gasp offensive that gained ground but broke their army.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

Weekend Data Dump

The United States sent more aid to Ukraine.

In cyberspace, no one can hear Russia scream in failure.

As persistent surveillance linked to firepower (or police power) expands, the race to hide from that network proceeds.

ISW assessment: Belarus is supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine with its territory, bases, equipment, and facilities. Russia pushes Belarus to support it more, which has the effect of more completely ensnaring Belarus in the Anschluss. This threat requires Ukraine to guard its border with Belarus. But Russia is unlikely to push Belarus to wage war on Ukraine. Which would have only a temporary boost for Russia given Belarus military weaknesses and internal dissent.

And now for something completely different:

Statistical proof of racism caused by wildly different definitions of hurricane deaths. Which is why I always say to check the definitions section. Mind you, I have no strong opinion on which definition is correct. But pick one only before making damning charges.

Iran's mullah regime begins executing the resistance. Executing protesting or resisting Iranians may or may not break the resistance. But it also could break the solidarity of the ruling mullah class.

This is shocking: "Three of the Royal New Zealand Navy’s nine ships are now docked at the Devonport naval base indefinitely, due to insufficient personnel." I mean, who knew New Zealand has a navy?

America and its allies are trying to stop jihadis in Niger.  

Camp Blaz, the future home on Guam for American Marines leaving Okinawa in the next several years. If America island-hopped in World War II at the rate this uncontested move is taking we'd still be fighting Imperial Japan in the Pacific.

Ukraine is working hard to attack Russia's fuel supplies directly and by interdicting lines of supply. Russian troops will lack mobility and even heat to survive if it gets bad enough. But: "Although this will not end the war, this move will allow the Ukrainian counteroffensive to make significant gains this winter." As I've noted, you can't break an army if you don't attack it.

America has the suspected bomb builder for the terror attack that destroyed a Pan Am airliner over Scotland.

And now for something completely different:

 

The Ukrainian War and the debate on massed versus precision firepower. I've noted this issue before. Until Ukraine, I thought precision was winning, notwithstanding my worry about precision-targeted mass. Although to be fair, with two militaries unable to attack and punch through enemy lines to create a war of movement, artillery has more ability and opportunity to use mass fires. We'll see if Ukraine manages to punch through Russia's lines and observe how artillery functions in a non-static battlefield.

Yeah, I think I've noted Russia's efforts on this: "Russian saboteurs were at work over the past eight years going after Ukrainian ammunition storage. There are reports of some 210,000 tons of munitions being destroyed prior to the February 24^th invasion." Especially near a major Kharkov arsenal.

Belarus will allow Ukraine to ship grain through its territory to Lithuanian ports. Interesting.

Germany will deploy Patriot air defense missiles to Poland, ending a pointless diplomatic spat Poland started with Germany around that issue.

Mmmpox, ba duba dox
Ba du bop, ba duba dox
Ba du bop, ba duba dop ba du
Yeah
Mmmpox, ba duba dox
Ba du bop, ba du dop, yeah
Said oh yeah
In an mmmpox they're gone
Yeah, yeah

Fuck the teacher unions and damn their leaders to Hell.

How people can believe 2 + 2 = 5.

The friends of the Taliban--the Russians, Chinese, and Pakistanis--are being targeted by jihadis inside Afghanistan. How will the jihadis act toward America when the jihadis get back their global reach from Afghanistan sanctuaries?

China had 3 years to "bend the curve" and still will likely see their health establishment overwhelmed by a Covid wave. Tip to Instapundit.

How the Great Firewall of China was overwhelmed by angry Chinese subjects. I'm not the first to say this, but China's advancing economy hasn't led to freedom in China. Yet.

No comment, comrades.

China's expanding nuclear arsenal. Note how assumptions can vary what you see. As I've said, surprising an enemy is less about hiding what you are doing than in convincing the enemy there is a benign explanation for what they see.

Russia could run out of reliable rocket and tube artillery ammo in "early 2023." Does that mean by June? Also: "Because their ammunition stocks are 'rapidly dwindling,' Russian forces are likely using more ammunition in 'degraded conditions,' which may not fire or explode correctly, the official said." I wondered about that. Russia would reduce usage before just running out. Can Russia match production and imports to their usage?

Balance of really fast terror: "The Air Force on Monday carried out the first live-fire test of its first hypersonic weapon, which can travel at least five times the speed of sound, according to service officials."

The Russian air force was actually much more active over Ukraine early in the war in air defense suppression missions. Air power is very useful. But I think that if you can greatly degrade or nullify an enemy's air force--or if they don't have much--that you can succeed with ground-based firepower to support your troops. I base this on centuries of gunpowder warfare before planes were invented. Pretty bold, right? Still, bolstering Ukrainian fighter aircraft strength would be helpful. Here's a way.

Huh: "Viktor Bout, the Russian arms dealer the US swapped for WNBA star Brittney Griner last week, officially joined a far-right, ultranationalist party, which could set him up for a seat in the Russian parliament."

Maybe if America didn't pretend Afghanistan a nation-state rather than tribes and clans, we could have done the same: "A determined but often chaotic uprising by clan militias supported by Somali government troops has forced the al-Shabab militant group, one of al-Qaeda’s wealthiest and strongest global affiliates, onto the back foot, say Somali and U.S. officials."

A C-17 as a ground-based refueler. That's nice. I guess. But I always shake my head when I see alternate uses for our already inadequate airlift. What secondary capabilities project our power abroad, eh? I'd grimace no less watching a B-21 unloading pallets of MREs and water bottles.

British negotiations with Mauritius will have an effect on whether America's leased Diego Garcia base can continue its vital role in protecting the Indian Ocean. Britain, of course, uses the island.

USNS Comfort in distress.

Slovakia prepares to give upgraded MiG-29s to Ukraine.

Remember, Russia has a history of admitting Crimea is part of Ukraine. The record on the Donbas is just as damning of Russia's current claims.

Estimated casualties in the war: Ukraine (13,500 – 16,500 killed; with WIA four times the KIA). Russia and Donbas proxy forces (16,028 – 19,028 killed; with WIA four times the KIA).

The Altay tank is armored with corruption. 

The broad outline of Japan's rearmament.

Wait. What? I thought Democrats loved illegal immigrants?

Gosh, why don't I trust the media?

Israel continues to wage war on Iran inside Syria.

I honestly think Democrats want Republicans to take out Biden. All the while complaining--with massive media support--they are victims of horrible MAGA Republicans who must be defeated by a more sentient Democrat in 2024. But I'm cynical that way.

The right to die evolves into the duty to die and eventually becomes an order to die.

As a rule I side with incompetence over malice as an explanation. But I'm willing to consider a deliberate effort to anger a voting base: "9 million people received emails that mistakenly said their student loan forgiveness was approved [.]" Via Instapundit.

Insider trading? It could be coincidence, of course.

Germany announced a deal to buy 35 F-35 fighters. In part this continues Germany's ability to carry American nuclear bombs.

State of national emergency in Peru.

Will Russia renew its offensive on Kiev in early 2023? Or the Russians could reinforce the Donbas front where the infrastructure of an active--if unsuccessful--offensive already exists.

Is this a sign of Chinese friendship or a Chinese opportunity to loot a desperate Russia? "China's President Xi Jinping ordered Chinese officials to forge closer economic ties with Russia, offering a lifetime from punishing Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine, The Wall St. Journal reported." My bias is not to see significant Russian-Chinese alliance activities. I need to be careful about that lens.

Russia is warning of consequences if America sends Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine.

This seems prudent: "Vietnam has conducted a major expansion of dredging and landfill work at several of its South China Sea outposts in the second half of this year, signaling an intent to significantly fortify its claims in the disputed waterway, a U.S. think tank reported on Wednesday." Defend them before China takes them.

Will Ukraine use its old Soviet recon drones--modified to hit those Russian heavy bomber air bases recently--to attack the Kerch Strait bridge?

The Army's new light tank gives infantry added punch to take on enemies who generously decline to support their infantry with heavy tanks. Also, the MPF can be airlifted! LOL. Years ago I read that airlifting a Stryker brigade to South Korea would take longer than shipping it by sea. Smaller units could be airlifted faster, of course. Assuming the Air Force makes it a priority.

The A-10 as decoy carrier.

China bans the export of its Loongson CPU to Russia because it needs them for its own military uses. Huh. Russia should really worry about that.

Is Iran's economy going to be significantly disrupted by protests?

The people for whom naming the ship Fallujah is a controversy don't like the Navy very much anyway. We killed a lot of jihadis there, especially in the second battle. Commemorate the battles there. 

I'd wondered why I haven't heard much about this lately, but Russia's officer corps continues to suffer heavy losses.

Interesting: "The Russian military has burned through its munitions stockpiles so quickly since it invaded Ukraine nearly 10 months ago that Russia’s armaments industry cannot keep pace with the need for more artillery shells and rockets."

I'm just pulling out two things from this article on the EU's response to Russia's invasion. Europeans agree Russia is a threat and while reacting quickly Europeans don't have a vision of what victory is. Sure, when Russia invaded it was easy to unite around the initial vision of victory centered on preventing Russia from overrunning Ukraine. Once past that, objectives will diverge. Who will provide leadership for Europe then? A European state? America?

An argument for providing ATACMS to Ukraine. In one sense, Russia's escalation to a war against Ukraine's cities and civilians negates our motive to avoid escalating the war. That ship sailed with wrecked utilities inside Ukraine. I'd rather help Ukraine build their own longer-range weapons from local components. That said, I can't say I'm against the proposal.

Can the EU bolster the western Balkans against Russian and Chinese Trojan Horse influence that foments chaos?

Canadian truckers look on with envy at how responsive China's government is to anti-lockdown protesters.

Strategypage reports that 20,000 foreigners have volunteered to fight for Ukraine. 

In some ways, the new B-21 is more like a scaled-up F-35 than a smaller B-2.

I call BS: "China is the ultimate long-term planner, and we’ve never been able to replicate that in Washington." The Chinese do not have some genetic or mystical planning magic. And if they do, what good has it done them? America spotted China several thousand years of planning and here we are debating if China can overtake our economy and position in the world.

Elon Musk is settling business to protect his family.

It's not like we need a sense of urgency to get nuclear attack submarines into the fleet, or anything.

Nice work if you can get it: China's neighbors would like to trade with China and have American power to balance China and guarantee their interests against Chinese pressure and aggression. They don't want the problems associated with siding with America? Ponder the problems associated with China defeating them. It's a delicate balancing act for America. We need to be strong enough for China's neighbors to resist China. But weak enough to encourage them to arm up.

Coal use increased in 2022. Clearly, Russia isn't able to find alternate customers for all of its oil and natural gas sales no longer going to Europe.

Every other illegal immigrant gets a free pass into America. But not somebody who fought on our side. He should have been able to enter legally.

Statements like this wouldn't get attention or traction if there was any transparency at all with home surveillance and police body camera video showing what happened at the Pelosi home that night. I assume authorities are buying time for the videos to somehow get lost or accidentally erased. Tip to Instapundit.

Are economic problems in small countries around China's periphery one more set of problems for China? I wonder if China may find intervening in some of them a way of integrating them into China's economy more effectively. Looking at you, Mongolia, while Russia is too busy in Ukraine and too reliant on Chinese trade to object.

The way Russia is willing to throw men and material into Ukraine's meat grinder at Bakhmut--a city with no real operational value for Russia--perhaps Ukraine should rename the small city to Zelenskygrad to really encourage Putin to kill off his army there.

About that Russian "hybrid warfare" so many Western analysts flung their panties at: "But many of the alleged innovations of hybrid warfare – disinformation, psychological warfare, political disruption – have been around since warfare began." Ahem. Pretending to support local rebels is not new. Buh bye.

Is Putin visiting Belarus to put pressure on Lukashenko to further integrate Belarus into Russia? And will the visit include maximizing the role Belarus could play in a Russian winter offensive on Kiev in 2023? Lukashenko continues to resist Russian control as much as he can.

I heard some speculation about China's navy operating in the Arctic based on melting sea ice. Pray tell, how does the Chinese navy get past Alaska to reach the Arctic?

I don't know what I got that is still hanging on to me after two weeks. It isn't Covid. I had that, and it's different. And in most ways was not as bad. And I had a flu shot. It seemed like a bad cold, but after getting mostly better I had a partial relapse. Dunno what it is. Not really bad but hangin on. It is interfering with life. Maybe my system got lax? I haven't been sick since before the pandemic. So could be. Tip to Instapundit.

Signs of Iranian resistance getting more desperate and serious: "Iranian security personnel clashed with prisoners in Karaj, Alborz Province on December 17, reportedly killing one and injuring up to 100 others." Iran kills dissidents abroad, too, where stirrings of revolt among exiles grows.

Own goal in the Middle East? Ignoring the problem doesn't make it go away.

Diversifying Europe's energy away from Russia. But well within range of Russian power to interdict. More non-Russian energy infrastructure. 

Why did Kherson fall so quickly and easily to the Russians in the initial invasion? Did the army need to save itself to fight another day? Or was their collaboration contributing to the lack of defense? Still unclear. But I have long wondered why there was so little defense there and across the south--especially on the constricted terrain leading north out of Crimea.

Don't forget the NORAD Santa tracker for our little ones!

The Chinese Battalion Tactical Group?

Has China based its army combined-arms battalion on the Russian battalion tactical group, which has proven to be an over-rated combat formation?

China has settled on a basic tactical unit for the People's Liberation Army Army (PLAA):

After years of substantial reform, the combined-arms battalion of the combined arms brigade is the basic combat unit of the PLAA. PLAA officers tell PRC media that the formations comprise more than 10 different combat arms, are plug-and-play and adjustable based on the terrain and mission requirements.

Ten different combat arms? Does the PLA combined-arms battalion replicate the Russian battalion tactical group (BTG) that pushes combined arms down to the battalion level with a lot of firepower within it? 

I was never impressed by the BTG:

I think the BTGs are simply the usable parts of Russian brigades and so should really be thought of as their brigades in practice. 

That feature of the process of generating BTGs from the parent brigades was shown to be a problem early in the Russian invasion of Ukraine (quoting an article):

Brigades were also reorganized to create Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) where the first battalion in each brigade consists of professionals, which allows them to deploy quickly and (theoretically) fight competently. Unfortunately, if most of the professionals are concentrated in the first unit out the door and it then takes significant casualties during an operation, all that is left is conscripts, reservists, and other second-tier personnel, which does not bode well for longer-term operations. 

And more recently a more basic problem with the BTG was highlighted. It was one I did not appreciate:

There was an important difference between the Western battle groups and the current BTGs. The Western battle groups were kept simple (mainly infantry and tank companies) with the addition of combat engineers or artillery as needed. American infantry officers got lots of realistic training using these battle groups. Western armies had many career NCOs to make sure the troops performed well. 

Russia expanded their BTGs after 2000 and added more support units so that each BTG had most of the support capabilities usually found in a division. These support units were smaller in the BTG, often a dozen or so specialists riding in a few trucks. 

The complexity of pushing the coordination of all those different types of combat, combat support, and even combat service support elements into a battalion-sized formation overwhelmed the leadership found in a BTG (from the previous link):

The flaw in the BTGs was not obvious until they encountered well-armed and motivated opponents. That happened soon after they crossed the border into Ukraine. The leadership in these BTGs could not handle the complex composition of BTGs. Senior Russian leaders knew this from the performance of BTG leaders during military exercises. This was not a surprise as the quality of officers had declined in the last decade and there were still not enough experienced NCOs.  

The Chinese combined-arms battalions could be replicating the critical flaw of the BTG's multiple types of combat units. Having more than ten different combat formation types in the PLAA battalion is a problem, no? That sounds like more types than the Russian BTG could contain. The Chinese command and control problems must be really bad.

And it could be even worse. By making the PLAA combined-arms battalions "plug and play" with a composition that changes with terrain and mission, the inadequate command and control staff might not even have the time to train all the different capabilities that the unit has within it. Or is put into it at the last minute for an operation.

Apparently the Russians have abandoned BTGs for the fight inside Ukraine:

Russian forces have largely stopped deploying as battalion tactical groups because the formations have proved ineffective, the UK's Ministry of Defence (MoD) has said.

It will be interesting if the Chinese examine the Russian experience and adjust their combined-arms battalions to be less like Russian BTGs and more like Western  battle groups (combined-arms battalions) more reliant on higher echelons for the support units the Chinese and Russians have pushed down to their battalions.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

Chef Macron Starts Cracking Eggs

Ukraine and the defense of NATO are mere eggs for the lovely Brussels Omelet that Macron wishes to whisk up.

Why on Earth is Macron essentially negotiating with other Western powers for Putin? 

The West should consider how to address Russia's need for security guarantees if President Vladimir Putin agrees to negotiations about ending the war in Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron said in remarks broadcast on Saturday.

Why negotiate a concession to Russia absent Russia offering something in return first? All Putin has to do is sit back, kill Ukrainian civilians, and wait for the West to compete with itself for more concessions before Russia even begins to think about talking!

This is a violation of Negotiations 101. 

Of course, if Macron is simply trying to strengthen the proto-imperial European Union to strip away the pesky prefix, his diplomacy makes more sense. 

Macron's diplomacy has nothing to do with saving Ukraine.

Don't forget that Macron is an emperor in search of an empire:

Are we going to let an egomaniac build an anti-American empire in Europe? Oh, I'm not talking about Putin. We're resisting him. I'm talking about France's Macron.

You doubt me? France's Macron "has sought to empower the European Union to counterbalance the apparent regional dominance between China and the United States." That's right, Macron apparently thinks that the morally equivalent America and China need sophisticated and--dare I say--nuanced European power to balance them. 

What are the limits of what the EU would surrender to get the authority to carry out that role?

I shudder to think what the EU apparatchiki would surrender to get that sovereign power? Chinese control of European telecommunications? Ukraine? Belarus? Some of the new NATO countries in the east that can be safely thrown to the Russian wolves to preserve the "real" European countries farther from Russia's grasp?

Would the EU agree to a new version of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that offers their enemies territorial and diplomatic concessions to ensure the creation and consolidation of the EU Empire?

Macron seeks to sit on the throne of an EU Empire where the sun never sets. That proposed empire is a threat to America and to Europeans who value liberty.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

The End of Westphalia?

If America is experiencing a government, social, and economic shift that is fueling our divisions and unrest, will our growing budget deficits be resolved by a major shift that decreases the size--and in time perhaps the scope--of our federal government?

America's big-government model of the federal government is unsustainable as it sucks in more resources and is less able to efficiently or effectively use those resources. World War II followed by the Cold War institutionalized this model. The rising national debt may be resolved by a major change in how our government is organized and staffed.

I can see future Republican presidents outsourcing some executive functions because they can't trust the left-leaning federal bureaucracy to do their jobs for a Republican. Is this how the bloated and unaffordable federal bureaucracy is ended in the long run? Now, think tanks function as shadow farm teams for the party out of power. Will there also be a constellation of private companies that get government contracts for carrying out government functions at the federal and state levels?

Or maybe a Democratic president would be desperate enough to maintain social spending to resort to this. Democrats would find that system a more direct--and more efficient--means of funding supporters than the indirect model of the so-called non-partisan civil service bureaucracy that tends to back the people who fund their jobs more enthusiastically.

This new model would extend to foreign policy. George Friedman wrote about these changes:

Consider foreign policy, an area that is the central responsibility of the federal government. As we have seen, the three prior institutional cycles emerged from war. The fourth one is now starting to emerge from both a war and a massive geopolitical shift. The war is the one that began on September 11, 2001. But the critical thing to remember is that since 2001 the United States has been in a constant state of war, even if not on the scale of World War II or the Civil War. But it is a war that has lasted far longer than any other in American history. And the inability of the government to frame the war in such a way that it might be won, the institutions of the United States revealed their fundamental weaknesses. War requires a simplification, an understanding of a desired end, clarity on strategy, and allocation of resources appropriate to both. The government proved incapable of the clarity needed for a war because it could not simplify. The complexity of the government was translated into a complicated plan for the war, and the complexity trapped the warriors in a confusion that undermined their mission. [The geopolitical shift was the collapse of the USSR.] ...

Except for Desert Storm, the United States has failed to win a war since World War II. Successful empires use as little military force as possible, depending on the regional tensions between nations to maintain their interests.

I have problems with his statement on America's failure to win since World War II. But I'll let that go for now. 

The key point is the inability of the government to focus on winning wars by mobilizing state assets, and the question of whether the government structure is the problem. I've touched on that as I struggled to see how America can afford to sustain a long struggle against jihadi terrorism:

I have come to more clearly agree with the idea that we need to minimize our effort. I was long against the idea that we could go in massively to Iraq or Afghanistan and expect results before the burden of that large sacrifice wore away our resolve to win. A slow win you can actually achieve is better than futilely trying for a quick win that can't be sustained. And at home I rejected calls for a needless draft or massive tax increases as just a means to get Americans tired of the Long War in order to admit defeat.

In posts here, here, here, and here I've addressed a role that defends America's position in the world affordably without routinely applying massive force in response to threats. Indeed, pre-blog just after 9/11 I wrote about pacing ourselves for a long struggle (longer than I anticipated, I admit).

This is difficult to accept. The Civil War and World War II set the template of massive mobilization efforts to decisively defeat an enemy that threatens our security at home. World War II especially established that "ideal" military response. 

The Cold War forced America to operate in an era without the shield of friends that could contain a threat abroad until America could mobilize massively and intervene decisively, if necessary. The collapse of the USSR changed things massively again and we need to adapt.

My posts on the Global Troubles outlook are perhaps the most on point about coping with military threats over long periods without exhausting ourselves with big (and futile) efforts, with the earlier posts addressing the benefits of defending the international system we built and an early guess at the big picture of that system developing.

A need to more affordably achieve foreign policy objectives could force America to further reduce its military and rely on other states as well as non-state actors to be the pointy end of the foreign policy stick. The non-state actors could be contracted for the period of time needed to achieve the result without creating a new bureaucracy that endures beyond its mission. Which is a feature of our dying big government model.

I'd long wondered if the trans-national jihadi terrorists and the resulting war on terror era signaled an end to the Westphalian system's dominance:

When nation-states no longer have the monopoly on the use of world-altering power and when states cannot control the threats from disease and terrorism that gestate inside their borders, we must not be hobbled by being chained to the capitals of the world.

The Treaty of Wesphalia has taken another and perhaps a decisive hit by our action. Not that national governments are irrelevant. They are still easily the major players. But when small groups can--possibly with the aid of nations--threaten to kill hundreds of thousands of us, national borders can no longer restrain our military or diplomatic actions.

I don't know if the State Department changes I noted lasted. But even a moment in time change could foreshadow eventual lasting change and significance.

Will America's foreign policy implementation follow this model with a greater revival of non-state military and coercive power to supplement a scaled-back American government national security infrastructure?

After reading Thomson's book and really thinking about how recently we ended pirate kingdoms, privateering, armed companies, private mercenary units, and cross-border recruiting of troops and officers on a large scale, the idea of revived private warfare by the West despite our laws and international system seems far more likely to me than it did when I speculated on that possible future. (And I looked to recruiting globally, too.)

There are glimmers of the organization to sustain such a privatized military power and the demand for these services (and here's one that is free).

Will civil war in Russia accelerate that trend?

Does the United Nations last as the stronghold of state dominance in its current form? I was on that long ago (in the pre-Blogger form, so scroll down to "Rules of Engagement" (Posted August 19, 2003):

In essence, the global community's rules of engagement are a crock. We cannot count on the international community to deal with genocidal and dangerous regimes. Did we not try this route with one of the more egregious violators of the world's peace and prosperity when we begged the UN to let us deal with Saddam's defiance of the UN?

 We need a new international organization of willing members who will fight with us. It doesn't even need to be a formal organization that explicitly abandons the UN. The UN should not, however, have a political role that limits our ability to defend our people in the absence of international resolve to protect our people. The UN should be restricted to UNESCO and WHO and the like.

We need rules of engagement that let us shoot the SOBs when we recognize them—not when they open fire. We're talking nukes here one day, people. The UN is not nearly enough.

If states are demoted in practice, the basis of the UN is undermined. It can't possibly last in its current bureaucratic bloat form for long under those conditions.

If America is lucky enough, America may be able to go back to the relative safety of  broad oceans and overseas allies buying America time to mobilize and gather forces. Add in the ability to use hired temporary allies and we have a new era arising from the unaffordable wreckage of our current national and international systems.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

Acceptable Collateral Damage

I await the proliferation of authors who argues that Ukraine should be honored to be sacrificed to the Russians' tender mercies for some greater good.

 

So, the West has to let Russia defeat Ukraine so [checks notes] China doesn't win? 

There’s a shrewd Chinese allegory that captures the essence of China’s thinking on this conflict: "As two tigers are fighting ferociously in the valley, a sage monkey is sitting on top of the mountain, looking down and waiting to see how it will end." 

The two tigers are Russia and the United States, both considered by China to be its top adversaries. China is the wise monkey patiently waiting as Moscow and Washington are eroding their respective combat power, fighting a proxy war over control of Ukraine.

What nonsense. While Russian combat power is eroding rapidly and Russia is being exposed as a paper tiger, American power is only taking a brief dip because of arms and ammo shipments to Ukraine. But that is temporary. America seems committed to increasing production capacity.

And the weapons shipped to Ukraine are less useful for an aero-naval war as any early period of a war with China would be. Further, Western weapons in general are getting a boost that should give future sage monkeys second thoughts about choosing war.

Oh, at some level the analyst has a point. But the only way out of the dilemma is abandoning Ukraine? Maybe Russia should be the one to get her message. 

And this gem from that analyst: 

On Wednesday, the Pentagon finally admitted what was clear to serious intelligence analysts from the start: Ukraine has no military path to victory against Russia.

The Pentagon also said Ukraine had no military path to avoiding being overrun by the Russian juggernaut in mere days. And to be precise, the Pentagon said the odds for Ukraine's victory going forward weren't high "anytime soon". Big difference. 

Never heard of the analyst. Have no need to hear from the analyst again. 

Not that the monstrous notion of abandoning Ukraine to Russia's tender mercies for some other "greater good" is new. I assume there will be a growing chorus that saving the planet from climate change requires the sacrifice of Ukraine. How dare we destroy the planet to save Ukraine, eh?

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

The German Coup and the Ghost of Zimmerman

What's up with the Germans? And what are the Russians up to?  Is there a Zimmerman Email?

Not hearing a lot of news on the foiled coup plot in Germany:

Three alpaca stared bleakly at us as we rounded what seemed like the umpteenth sharp bend along the rural roads of the east German region of east Thuringia.

Looming behind the animals, perched on a hill, we finally saw what we'd travelled all this way for: the stone turreted towers of the neo-Gothic hunting lodge, Schloss Waldmannsheil.

HQ, to a large extent, until this Wednesday, for an eclectic group of plotters, hoping to take over the German parliament and destroy the structures of modern Germany, replacing them with a monarchical system, with a Prince at its head, whose family used to rule this region for hundreds of years before World War One.

And all this to be done and dusted by Christmas.

Sound incredible, almost unbelievable?

I had to search for that story. My normal feeds are really quiet since the initial stories on the arrests.

The thousands of potential coup supporters called "Reichsbürger" don't sound all that coup-like. We have such in America, called "sovereign citizens." There is an African-American centered version whose name escapes me now. There may be Hispanic and Asian groups for all I know. 

And some of the statistics trotted out in support of the threat seem very misleading. Could apply to any country. And even if true, so what? Lots of people could believe lots of dangerous things, no?

Further, how many of these people are from the former East Germany, and the result of that trauma for so many who miss communist authoritarianism? 

So are the Germans nuts or coup plotters? Could be both, of course. I don't mean to sound like I'm dismissing them. But the the tone of the news that is out there is odd for such a major plot, no? 

So yes, it does sound incredible. Including the tidbit that the 71-year-old German prince at the center of this plot has a "far younger Russian girlfriend who tried to get backing for the planned coup from the Kremlin[.]"

Huh.

Yet it is only almost unbelievable. Almost as unbelievable as the German effort to get Mexico to go to war with America to distract America and keep it from sending troops to Europe in World War I. 

Yet that happened.

Throwing Germany into chaos would really cripple the NATO effort to supply Ukraine given Germany's geography and NATO bases there. To say NATO would be distracted by such an event is a gross understatement.

Is the relative silence on this event the result of great care on Germany's part because of potential links to a desperate Russia? We saw how amateurish Russian interference in our 2016 election was. I can totally see Russians in the intelligence apparatus thinking a coup in Germany would solve Russia's problem in Ukraine. Putin didn't have to know or approve, I'd guess.

I have no evidence. Just a nagging suspicion based on the desperate need of Russia to throttle NATO's support for Ukraine to avoid getting totally defeated in Putin's failing war of conquest.

What's happening?

UPDATE: Some news:

Any attempts to get to the bottom of the problem will need to address German society’s deeply conflicted attitude toward the military. Due largely to Germany’s fraught past, today’s soldiers are sometimes regarded with disrespect or outright suspicion. Politicians often appear reluctant to view the army as anything more than a “necessary evil.” Those who die in conflicts are described as “victims,” not “heroes.” Military celebrations meet with controversy or neglect. Many soldiers hesitate to wear their uniforms in public for fear of being verbally or physically attacked.

Germany’s reluctance to embrace its military is understandable, given its history. But holding the Bundeswehr at arm’s length risks detaching it from society and politics, potentially breeding an us-against-them mentality.

But the news is still sketchy on the actual recruitment of troops and police for the plot. It is more heavy on potential.

And if the issue is German troops being susceptible to extremist propaganda, that attitude from the public and government contributes.

If the German military isn't busy preparing to defend Germany from external threats, it's troops have too much time to contemplate how the people and politicians mistrust them for putting on a uniform to defend Germany. That breeds resentment and vulnerability to those who can demonstrate simple respect for their service.

So let me pull out the clue bat one more time:

Germany pioneered mobile warfare backed by close air support. Now, both parts of that combination are atrophied.

I keep reading that the Germans hate their militaristic past so much that they don't want to fight.

Let's try applying the clue bat to Germany's collective skull on this issue.

Conquering and setting up death camps under the shield of a powerful military? That's bad. By all means, don't do that.

Having a military capable of fighting death cult enemies or stopping the Russians from moving west? Well, that's a good thing. Try doing that. 

Spend money on the military to show it is valued, and get it busy training to defeat the Russians and kill jihadis. That will take care of a lot of the extremism problem. 

UPDATE: Is my speculation really out of bounds, as we watch unrest in Kosovo?

Now there is a war involving Russia and the United States. It is not going well for Russia thus far. When fighting a war, forcing the enemy to divert his attention is critical, particularly when there is – at best for Russia – a stalemate. They have looked for other ways to distract the Ukrainians, but it is the Americans that must be distracted.

I did warn about this back in the summer:

Last October I noted Serb tensions with Kosovo. In February I noted that Serbia was arming up; and in April China delivered anti-aircraft missiles to the Serbs. Are the Serbs planning to revive the Kosovo war? Is Russia pushing this to distract NATO? Tip to Instapundit.

Germany in chaos would be the ultimate distraction in Europe.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.