We're approaching a second winter of war after Russia invaded Ukraine in late winter 2022. Who has the advantage in a longer war?
My preferred name for Russia's invasion, the Winter War of 2022, implies that the war would not drag on this long. I explicitly explained that like the Soviets in 1939 after faltering in their invasion of Finland I expected the Russians to recover from initial mistakes to wage war more effectively. In 1940 after 3 months of war, the USSR finally overwhelmed much smaller Finland.
Russia did change their methods since the initial failures of February and March 2022. The Russians contracted their offensive frontage to the Donbas region--and then to the Donetsk section eventually--and unleashed heavy firepower on the defending Ukrainians--and then on Ukraine's cities.
But Russia's adjustments have not allowed Russia to overwhelm smaller Ukraine. Russia does not have the conventional military resources of Stalin's USSR. Ukraine in 2022 isn't as tiny compared to 1940 Finland. And NATO and other Western states have sent large amounts of military and financial aid to Ukraine.
Ukraine has reoccupied territory as Russia has withdrawn and Ukraine has captured territory by defeating the Russian defenders. But Russia still holds territory it has taken since invading in 2022 and in 2014-2015 in Crimea and the Donbas.
And the Russian army still stands despite being decimated. So far it has not collapsed under the strains of defeat and casualties.
The Russians attacked in the late winter during the first winter. Will Ukraine return the favor this winter?
Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukrainian forces plan to continue offensive operations over the coming winter to capitalize on recent battlefield successes and prevent Russian forces from regaining the battlefield initiative. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group Serhii Cherevatyi stated on December 4 that frozen ground enables heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles to advance and that Ukrainian forces are preparing such vehicles for winter operations.
But where will Ukraine attack? This is what I've been thinking:
The path to a Ukrainian victory — or at least the most obvious path — will probably cut south, through the muddy and flat fields of the Zaporizhzhia region. ...
But for all the logical speculation, the roads and military positions near the front line show little evidence of a buildup of troops, and there are no indications that the Ukrainians are trying to mount an offensive in Zaporizhzhia region anytime soon, Muzyka and other analysts said.
Originally I thought this offensive would be too risky with two open flanks as it drove south toward the Sea of Azov. I thought an offensive in Kherson that bounced the river after defeating the Russian ground forces on the west bank would be safer for the Ukrainians with flanks covered by the Black Sea and the wide Dnieper River. Logistics across the river would be tough. But I thought that price was worth the flank protection.
But now, and even before Ukraine compelled the Russians to withdraw across the river on the Kherson front, the level of Russian casualties in nearly ten months of war make the flank problem of a Zaporizhzhia offensive aimed south at Melitopol less of a constraint.
And with Russian lines of supply north of the Sea of Azov cut, Ukrainian forces in that corridor would have interior lines, allowing Ukraine to rapidly focus on the east or west for subsequent drives. Ukrainian forces in the Donetsk or the Kherson front could support those follow-up drives east or west.
This has provided Ukrainian troops with a major advantage. Unlike Russian troops in Ukraine, Ukrainian soldiers suffer less from malnutrition, cold weather, and untreated wounds....
Ukrainian troops survive longer in combat and suffer fewer casualties, which means the average Ukrainian combat soldier is more experienced, trained, led and supported than their Russian counterparts. Ukrainian forces are prepared for a winter campaign and Russian forces are not.
I'll note that lack of indications near the front or otherwise is not proof such preparations aren't taking place. How obvious were the preparations prior to the Kharkov offensive? Further, the ground hasn't frozen yet, meaning moving forces closer to the front would simply telegraph the intention and provide targets for Russian artillery long before the Ukrainians can attack.
And even if the Ukrainians build on continuing operations to hammer the Russians on the Luhansk front first in order to avoid the most obvious path, Melitopol still looms large as the decisive front, in my mind.
And if such an offensive ends the war before reaching the first anniversary of the war, I guess my war name quandary is ended. It would be good for Ukraine, Europe, and the world if the war ends before this coming winter ends.
UPDATE: Huh:
Ukrainian forces blasted the Russian-occupied city of Melitopol with more than a dozen explosions lighting up the sky amid conflicting reports of casualties among Russian forces in the area.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Fighting in the east is locally heavy despite the nearly static front. Russia's battering against Ukraine's defenders is costing Russia dearly with no clear significant objective at the end of their road. Unless keeping the Ukrainians engaged there is the point.
UPDATE: Russia can't simply bombard Ukraine's civilians into submission:
Pentagon officials are in the final stages of preparing a plan to send a Patriot air defense missile system to Ukraine to counter Russian aerial assaults, U.S. officials told CBS News.
UPDATE (Friday): We have a massive 24/7 news apparatus and the satellite photo information is news to me:
Commercial satellite photos do show Ukrainian forces assembling for what appears to be another offensive to seize all of Kherson province and cut off Crimea from vital supply lines from Russia. That could coincide with the Russian offensive out of Belarus, which the Ukrainians appear to be ready for.
Apparently the media is too busy looking up dirt on Elon Musk.
UPDATE: Massive Russian missile attack on Ukraine's civilians today.
UPDATE (Sunday): My view is that while Russia's military was over-rated, it could have done better if it had been used properly. This seems to bolster my view:
ISW has long assessed that faulty Russian planning assumptions, campaign design decisions, and Russian violations of Russia’s own military doctrine undermined Russian operations. The NYT acquired and published logbooks, timetables, orders, and other documents of elements of the 76th Airborne Division and 1st Guards Tank Army related to the early days of the war on December 16.[11] The documents demonstrate that Russian military planners expected Russian units to be able to capture significant Ukrainian territory with little to no Ukrainian military opposition.
Do read it all.
The Russians lied so much they fooled themselves. The Chinese have a similar problem.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
